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There is increasing pressure for low and middle-income countries to move towards achieving 
universal healthcare coverage (UHC). According to WHO (2013), UHC guarantees the right 
to affordable health care for every individual, without financial hardship. The Director-General 
to the World Health Organization, Margaret Chan (WHO, 2010 p. 1), says UHC “is the single 
most powerful concept that public health has to offer”.” 
In recent years, UHC has come onto the policy agenda, but Nigeria has been criticised for its 
slow progress.  
This study investigates why and how the UHC policy is developed by focusing on the roles 
and interactions of policy actors, their policy setting, and ‘how’ their actions influence the 
policy process and outcome of UHC so far in Nigeria. It will provide evidence of Nigeria’s 
policy process that will enhance the understanding of the politics of such health care policy 
implementation processes, which is fundamental to the success of policy networks of UHC in 
low- and middle-income settings. 
This is an empirical study using a mixed method approach involving quantitative and 
qualitative research components. The study combines the social network analysis (the 
quantitative component) with a more general policy process framework (the qualitative 
component). Data collected between March 2016 and February 2017 involved face-to-face 
structured interviews, face-to-face semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis to 
identify members of relevant policy networks and describe the pattern of relationships and 
influence within the UHC discourse. 
The SNA analysis displayed a full structural network taxonomy of the UHC policy process and 
identified key members of the UHC discourse into four key institutions and organisations- such 
as the power actors, peripheral actors, gatekeepers or brokers, isolated actors, and policy actors 
connected to the power actors. 
The theoretical policy process framework highlights five key gaps that exist as challenges and 
obstacles which impedes the implementation process of UHC Nigeria. These challenges and 
obstacles include, changing political climate, concerns about system capacity and finance, poor 
coordination between federal and state levels, corruption and problems with the private sector 
– HMOs. These challenges and obstacles limit the government’s ability to provide social and
financial risk protection and access to quality health services to vulnerable Nigerian 
communities. 
Drawing on the theoretical framework and intervention, this thesis concludes that the political, 
policy, financial and organizational constraints of the health system limit UHC Nigeria 
implementation progress. Addressing the reasons why these issues ensue would be helpful in 
taking strategic steps towards achieving financial protection and access to basic health services 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Betweenness centrality ‘Betweenness centrality’ measure refers to the degree 
in which an actor (a node) in the policy network lies 
or is connected between two or more actors to gain 
considerable influence within the network (Borgatti et 
al., 2013) 
Centrality ‘Centrality’ measures the value, prominence or the 
influence of an actor (a node) within a given social 
network (Bellotti, 2015) 
Closeness centrality  ‘Closeness centrality’ measure refers to the inverted 
total of the shortest distance or path to every actor 
(every node) within the policy network (Borgatti et 
al., 2013). 
Degree centrality ‘Degree centrality’ measure refers to the number of 
connections or ties an actor develops within the policy 
network (Prell, 2012) 
Eigenvector centrality ‘Eigenvector centrality’ measure refers to the 
importance of an actor due to its connection or ties 
with other influential actors inside the policy network 
(Prell, 2012).  
Policy entrepreneur  ‘Policy entrepreneur’ is a person that seizes the 
opportunity to influence policy outcomes for their 
self-interest (Ashford et al., 2006). 
Window of Opportunity ‘Window of opportunity’ in health policy refers to an 
opening created when three policy streams (politics, 
policy and problem) couple together for a policy 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
  
1.0 Introduction 
This study investigates how the idea of universal healthcare coverage (UHC) came onto the 
policy agenda of a developing country, Nigeria, the actors who promoted or opposed the 
emerging UHC policies, and the way those policies developed as they were debated within the 
policy network.  It is a case study of movement towards a policy objective – UHC – that Nigeria 
has still to achieve but is progressing slowly towards.  The research is intended to shed light 
on how such a policy was advanced through a series of incremental steps and was slowed 
through disagreements over the means by which UHC could be achieved and nature of the 
reforms that would be necessary, as well as downright opposition.  Special attention is given 
to the network of actors and organisations that were directly or indirectly involved in the policy 
debates, and the policy process via which a series of reforms were introduced with the aim of 
progressively improving healthcare coverage for the Nigerian population.  Systematic data on 
the nature of the UHC policy network is combined with accounts from qualitative interviews 
with key stakeholders to build a picture of how policy to improve access and coverage evolved, 
the opposing views concerning how UHC should be taken forward, the respective roles of 
domestic and international actors, and the obstacles encountered. 
 
 
1.1 Why achieving UHC in Nigeria is important 
The author started this research with a strong conviction that healthcare in Africa needed 
radical improvement, and a feeling that a country with Nigeria’s resources was doing much 
worse than should have been the case. 
For example, it was clear from published statistics that Nigeria, although one of the wealthier 
African nations, was spending less in health in GDP terms than several of its neighbours.  
Figure 1 shows that the 3.9 per cent of GDP allocated by Nigeria for Current Health 
Expenditure (CHE) in 2016 is dramatically low in comparison to other African countries. For 




Faso, Malawi, Rwanda, and Namibia spent respectively 16.5 per cent, 6.7 per cent, 9.8 per cent, 
6.7 per cent and 9.1per cent of GDP on CHE (The World Bank, 2020). 
 
 
Figure 1: Current Health Expenditure (CHE) for Selected African Countries. 
This shows CHE as % Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Nigeria X, South Africa X, 
Sierra Leone X, Burkina Faso X, Rwanda X, Malawi X and Namibia X in 2016. Adopted 
from The World Bank (2020). Key: crossed colour codes represent the Selected African 
Countries. 
 
Low levels of health expenditure down through the years had translated into poor outcomes on 
many important health indices.  Even after earlier reforms that aimed to expand coverage, a 
2016 study showed that Nigeria scored at or below the African average in a number of key 
areas (Adewole and Osungbade, 2016).  Poor health indices were evident in a low average life 
expectancy of 54 years, high infant and under 5 mortality rates of 88 and 143 per 1000 live 
births respectively, and a maternal mortality ratio of 630 per 100,000 live births. There was 
clearly considerable scope for improvement. 
 
At the same time the author was aware of a global movement whereby many developing 
countries had either achieved to aspired or to achieve UHC, a movement which had featured 




international experts (Savedoff, 2012; Kruk, 2013; Sen, 2015).  The student knew that policy 
makers in Nigeria too were beginning to talk about UHC as path to improving health outcomes 
but formed the impression of a slow and rather stilted policy process that warranted 
investigation. He reasoned that a study that examined the nature of the ongoing policies debates 
and any barriers that were slowing progress towards UHC would provide valuable lessons for 
policy makers.  
 
 
1.2 UHC: An idea whose time has come? 
1.2.1 Definitions 
UHC is based on the premise that all communities and people should be eligible to use the 
preventive, curative, promotive, rehabilitative and palliative services of the health sector as and 
when they need to in order to maintain a good state of health (Atun et al., 2015). The definition 
of UHC involves three key objectives, which are that (WHO, 2017): 
1. Individuals must have equal access to good quality health services irrespective of their 
social status. 
2. The health services provided should significantly improve the health status of the 
recipient. 
3. Health services should be sufficiently affordable to protect the recipient from financial 
hardship and impoverishment.  
 
An early precursor to UHC was WHO’s 1978 “Health for All”, Alma Ata Declaration, which 
asserted that health is a fundamental human right. While in practice Alma Ata set a target only 
for achieving a basic level of primary care for all, the drive towards UHC sets the more 
ambitious target of delivering comprehensive care for the population.  The UNs’ current health-
related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) includes a target to: ‘Achieve universal health 
coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services 
and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all’ 
(Chapman, 2016; WHO, 2018, goal 3.8). 
 
The UHC policy aims to prevent premature deaths and reduce disease by ensuring access to 
health services that are good enough to serve people in need (Bloom et al., 2018). According 




and financial hardship because unintended health-related issues like accidents, disease, 
infection, illness and sudden death constitute a major burden on total household expenditure. 
The financial burden obtained from the incurred health expenses can result in financial 
destitution that affects the future of a family for generations. UHC not only safeguards 
immediate health problems but prevents financial impoverishment that amplifies ill health over 
time. 
 
In recent years, there has been an emerging commitment to achieving UHC goals. Universal 
Health Coverage has been regarded as the third health transition with global impact. The first 
transition included public health improvements such as sanitation and basic sewage 
management. The second transition is the epidemiological transition which saw diseases of 
affluence supplant communicable diseases. UHC is described by the WHO as a crucial 
development required to improve global public health (Frenk, 2015; Ramke et al., 2017; Hsiao 
et al., 2014). 
 
 
1.2.2 Increasing Global Interest in UHC 
After a period when international bodies such as the World Bank and IMF supported neo-
liberal policies that translated into a bigger role for private corporations and coverage gaps for 
those who could not pay, the tide has swung back towards policies that favour UHC.  The 2010 
World Health Report, Health Financing: The Path to Universal Coverage (WHO, 2010) was 
particularly influential in building momentum for reform.  A May 2011 World Health 
Assembly resolution requested the Director General to convey to the UN Secretary-General 
the importance of UHC for discussion by a forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, 
and in December 2012 the Assembly endorsed a resolution on Global Health and Foreign 
Policy urging member countries to accelerate progress toward UHC. Further support came in 
2014 when the sixty-seventh World Health Assembly passed a resolution in support of UHC.  
Other developments include the publication by WHO and the World Bank of the first UHC 
global monitoring report, Tracking Universal Health Coverage, in 2015, and the Lancet 
Commission on Investing in Health’s (CIH) Global Health 2035 report (Jamison et al., 2013), 
which proposes an investment framework for improving global health through UHC.  UHC has 
been included in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (see section 1.5).  It was 




produced a political declaration whereby the signatories “strongly recommit to achieve 
universal health coverage by 2030” (United Nations, 2019). 
 
The People’s Republic of China, long criticized for health policies that signalled left but turned 
right, is now improving coverage for its rural population (Lia et al, 2011).  Brazil, Rwanda, 
Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Turkey and South Korea all have ongoing reform programmes.  
Other low- and middle-income countries, such as India, Ghana, Mali, Kenya, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam – as well as Nigeria – cooperate as members of the Joint 
Learning Network for Universal Coverage and are widening coverage, mainly through the 
creation of public or voluntary health insurance schemes and closed-end financing mechanisms.  
 
Sharing of UHC experiences can be a valuable tool not just for planning UHC reforms, but for 
consolidating and maintaining progress made.  There is now an extensive network of support 
organisations that encourage both global North to South knowledge transfer, and – perhaps 
even more important in the recent past – South to South knowledge transfer.  The Joint 
Learning Network for UHC, with funding from bodies that include the WHO, the World Bank 
Group and the Rockefeller Foundation, has since 2009 functioned as an umbrella network for 
organising conferences, workshops and exchange visits, and collecting knowledge resources, 
such as technical information on effective financing mechanisms (Nachuk, 2013). Entities 
based in the global North, such as Results 4 Development, Access Help, and the Lancet 
Commissions have also played a part.  In recent years a number of regional networks that allow 
geographically proximate countries to coordinate actions have also appeared, including the 
ASEAN+3 UHC network, and the European Union-Luxembourg-WHO Partnership for UHC.  
In Africa, there is the “Health for All” campaign, supported by the governments of Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Nigeria, with financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation (Management 
Sciences for Health, 2020.), and One-by-One’s “Target 2030: UHC for Africa” campaign, 
associated with Access Challenge (One by One, 2020.).  Other pressure groups such as the 
African Health Economics and Policy Association, Amref Health Africa, and the People’s 
Health Movement have also pushed for progress towards UHC.  There are signs that some 
African countries are looking to Asia for lessons about UHC success, as is illustrated by recent 
cooperation projects between Kenya and Thailand, and Egypt and Japan (World Economic 





Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is considered to be a long-term public health and 
development objective. Although international human rights law does not provide any absolute 
guarantee of UHC, a growing series of international declarations, resolutions and agreements 
are pushing countries towards providing a basic level of healthcare and social protection.  
While different countries are meeting this challenge in different ways, otherwise dissimilar 
healthcare systems are increasingly sharing the objective of extending coverage (see: Marten 
et al., 2014). Usually this will involve new financing mechanisms or service delivery 
arrangements that extend access to basic healthcare to previously under-served population 
groups. This is what governments striving for UHC seek to achieve through major health 
system reform - the provision of quality health care and financial protection for the whole 
population (O'Connell et al., 2014). 
 
Inequitable access to health services can be observed in many countries, and often originates 
from political and socioeconomic structures that are highly resistant to change. Progress is only 
likely if reformists can mobilise countervailing power to equalise access (Kutzin and Susan, 
2016). The reform experiences of a growing number of LMICs and UMICs show that the drive 
to UHC can overcome political opposition and have a positive influence on the social 
determinants of health (Hsiao et al., 2014). One key step in breaking the negative relationship 
between social disadvantage and poor health is to make essential health care available at 
affordable cost (Balabanova et al, 2011; Gupta and Shahabuddin, 2018). The cost of health 
care should not be a burden on people. UHC systems usually provide free or low-cost benefits 
in order to address the healthcare needs of the people. 
 
Many debates about UHC wrestle with uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of different 
policy options for widening coverage. A sound health financing framework is crucial for 
successful implementation of UHC reforms, and policy makers need to weigh up the benefits 
and costs of different incentive structures and resource allocation mechanisms. Typically, the 
financial resources allocated to healthcare are pooled from various sources such as government 
budgets, payroll taxes/employment-based contributions and prepayment insurance schemes, 
and the overall balance will be crucial (Schieber et al. 2006; WHO, 2019). For instance, 
Nigerian policy makers have deliberated the relative attractiveness of tax-funded services 
versus encouraging cost-sharing from users via health insurance or out-of-pocket spending 





1.2.3 Dimensions of UHC 
The 2012 World Health Report elaborates further on the concept of UHC by classifying it into 
three dimensions: ‘Who gets health coverage?’, ‘Which health services are provided?’ and 
‘What proportion of health costs are covered’ (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The three dimensions of UHC.  
Source: WHO 2008. 
 
Who gets health coverage: This dimension concerns the coverage of health services provided 
for the population under UHC? In this dimension, ‘universal’ is the key word, meaning that the 
healthcare provided should be available to the whole population. However, the 2010 World 
Health Report notes that in reality no high-income countries have achieved universal provision 
without health system trade-offs. For instance, the United Kingdom’s National Health Service 
provides free healthcare only for those “ordinarily resident” in the country, which means that 
universal access does not apply to ineligible overseas visitors or UK nationals who have been 
absent from the UK for more than 6 months (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020). 
 
What health services are provided: This concerns the packages of necessary treatments that are 
provided free or at affordable cost.  How this is organised will depend on the financing and 
service delivery arrangements. Typically, UHC systems are funded from a mix of government 
tax revenues and payroll tax or contributions-based social health insurance schemes and may 
be delivered by both public and private sector service providers.  These are various mechanisms 




of public hospitals and direct reimbursement of healthcare charges to providers by insurance 
funds. Some UHC systems levy user co-payments or other forms of cost sharing, but these need 
to be sufficiently affordable that financial hardship is avoided (WHO, 2017). 
 
Providing financial protection: Transitioning to UHC means that a health system avoids 
creating significant financial barriers to access.  According to the 2012 UNGA Resolution 
(Ooms et al., 2014), UHC requires “that all people have access, without discrimination, to 
nationally determined sets of the needed promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative 
basic health services”. It further recognises that “when managing the transition of the health 
system to universal coverage, each option will need to be developed within the particular 
epidemiological, economic, socio-cultural, political and structural context of each country in 
accordance with the principle of national ownership” (Ooms et al., 2014: 5). WHO (2010) 
suggests that LMICs that lack the financial capability to introduce the prepayment and pooling 
schemes necessary to provide cover for poorer citizens, may need to supplement domestic 
funding with foreign aid support?  
 
In conclusion, UHC is a multi-dimensional concept, which involves making available an 
adequate range of healthcare services to the whole population, at low or zero cost at the point 




Actions related to UHC are focused on changing and improving the health needs of people and 
their communities. For example, on March 10th, 2014, the African Presidential Summit on 
UHC was hosted by the Nigerian government under the theme of ‘Universal Health Coverage, 
The Vehicle for Sustainable Growth and Development’ (WHO, 2015). This health forum saw 
the 16 African countries in attendance declare their commitment to improving their respective 
health systems by allocating about 15 percent of their national budgets annually to achieve 
UHC. The forum resulted in a series of actions undertaken by national policymakers to make 
progress towards UHC.  
 
In Nigeria’s case, one of the most significant developments involved earmarking additional 
funds to support the widening of coverage. There are commendable efforts by the federal 




ways to improve domestic health financing despite low expenditure on health and weak health 
system resource mobilisation caused by the country’s fiscal constraints (Aregbeshola, 2018). 
 
UHC is gathering momentum and becoming the main point of attention in many global health 
policy conversations. A variety of related actions can be observed. Typically, an action plan 
includes (1) building and maintaining an adequate health platform that provides curative 
medicines and care, (2) ensuring wide access to healthcare at affordable rates, (3) quick access 
to necessary medicines and (4) the availability of appropriate human resources for the health 
platform and system to utilise (Boerma, et al., 2014). Many studies have highlighted that 
achieving UHC depends on building a capable workforce that goes wider than just front-line 
care and includes the personnel to staff the necessary governance systems, including 
management and financing (Barros et al., 2015; Onwujekwe et al., 2019).  
 
 
1.3 UHC in the Sustainable Development Goals era 
The progress towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) has coincided with the replacement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with an even more ambitious set of Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), and UHC and the SDGs have to an extent become intertwined.  
Planning to achieve the SDGs presents policy makers in developing countries with the complex 
task of managing a broad range of activities including developing infrastructure and setting 
milestones. UN member states are required to monitor and report progress, including progress 
on goals related to UHC (Wirtz et al., 2017). The goal that relates directly to UHC is 3.8 (quoted 
in section 1.3.1), which is seen as central to achieving the objectives set in other domains 
(Hogan et al., 2018).  The UN Statistical Commission has developed two indicators which can 
be used to monitor progress in achieving goal 3.8:  SDG indicator 3.8.1 measures the quality 
and range of the health services covered across households, while SDG indicator 3.8.2 
measures the quantity of household health expenditure as a portion of total household income. 
Hogan and associates’ (2018) study examines progress towards meeting SDG 3.8.1, and 
associated research by Wagstaff et al (2017) does the same for SDG 3.8.2. An inter-agency, 
Expert Group report on SDG Indicators explains that 3.8.1 relates to “coverage of essential 
health services (defined as the average coverage of essential services based on tracer 
interventions that include reproductive, maternal, new-born, and child health, infectious 




most disadvantaged populations)” (Hogan et al., 2018 p.1) (see Figure 3). SDG indicator 3.8.2 
concerns the extent of CHE, and how far out-of-pocket household health expenditure depletes 
total household budgets, so as to force a trade-off between securing health care or buying other 
basic essentials such as food and education (WHO, 2017) (see Figure 3). SDG indicators 3.8.1 
and 3.8.2 thus respectively describe the comprehensiveness of the healthcare that is available 
and how much households spend on care. The World Health Organisation (2017) considers 
that the SDGs are intended to “leave no one behind” and that it is important to monitor 
implementation. This section describes the outcomes of the recent efforts made by selected 
countries when it comes to monitoring their journey toward UHC. 
 
Figure 3: SDG Target 3.8. 
This shows the indicators used to assess progress in achieving SDG Goal 3.8. Source: 
WHO (2017). 
 
Hogan et al. (2018) developed an index using 16 tracer indicators to measure progress in 183 
countries towards achieving target 3.8.1.  Across 52 countries, for which data was sufficient to 
allow measurement, coverage was between 1% and 66% lower for the poorest population 
quintile compared with the average for the national population as a whole. Diagram 3 illustrates 
the varying levels of service coverage between countries. At the top end are Europe. North 
America, Australia, New Zealand, and East Asia with index scores of about 77. Against this, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia have the lowest index of 42 and 53 respectively. Within 






Figure 4: UHC service coverage index scores for selected countries. 
Progress towards SDG 3.8.1 based on index developed by the WHO, IBRD and The 
World Bank (2017). 
 
Regarding Indicator 3.8.2, Wagstaff et al (2017) found that the worldwide prevalence of 
household catastrophic spending on health at the 10% threshold was projected to be 9·7% in 
2000, 11·4% in 2005, and 11·7% in 2010.  This would mean that in 2010 about 808 million 
individuals experienced catastrophic health spending that is above 10 per cent of a family’s 
total income, which is approximately 11.7 per cent of the global population (see Figure 5). 
Recent data show that the Latin American and Caribbean regions have the highest rate at the 
10 per cent threshold of about 14.8 per cent of the population, with Asia coming next with 
about 12.8 per cent affected (see Figure 5). Many African countries are witnessing an 
unprecedented rise in household debt caused by CHE for health, with an increase in numbers 
affected of over per cent annually.  Africa now follows close behind Asia where numbers of 
households affected are rising by less than 4 per cent per annum (see Figure 5). The current 
incidence rate of catastrophic expenditure related to SDG-UHC indicator 3.8.2 at 10 per cent 
of the total household expenditure shows 27% of Nigerians suffered CHE at the 10%+ of 





Figure 5: Global and regional trends in CHE. 
This figure shows the trends between 2000 and 2010 in catastrophic health expenditure 
in the various regions, using CHE as in SDG indicator 3.8.2. Source: WHO (2017). 
 
The literature suggests that by 2010 the poverty rates in the African continent were among the 
highest in the world at an average income (based on 2011 purchasing power parities) of $1.90-
a-day. Since 2000, the level of impoverishing health expenditure has decreased in several 
African countries, at both the 2011 PPP $1.90 and 2011 PPP $ 3.10 figures (see Figure 6) 








Figure 6: Global and regional impoverishment caused by out-of-pocket expenditures. 
This figure shows the proportion of population falling below $1.90-a-day and $3.10-a-day 
poverty lines. Source: WHO, IBRD, The World Bank (2017). 
 
For the above reason, LMICs including Nigeria, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Ghana, have sought 
to avoid budgetary over-reach in their plans to introduce UHC. The governments of these 
countries have generally had to refrain from big-bang reforms that introduce comprehensive 
coverage for all in a single step, and instead take the path of incremental progression towards 
UHC over time. Some may be able to progress faster than others, and countries with greater 
resources and capacities can utilise their domestic resources to do so (Wirtz et al., 2017; Kieny 
et al., 2017 and WHO and World Bank Group, 2017). 
 
The chapter now moves on to provide necessary background information on Nigeria and its 
healthcare system. A brief account of the Nigerian economy. Politics and demographics are 
given, followed by an overview of the Nigerian healthcare system, including its recent 








1.4 Country profile 
1.4.1 Geography/demographics 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is located in West Africa between Cameroon to the east and 
the Republic of Benin to the west, with the Atlantic Ocean bordering it to the south and Niger 
to its north (see Figure 7). The Federal Capital of Nigeria is Abuja; the country contains thirty-
six states. Nigeria contains over 400 ethnic groups (with three major ethnic groups, Igbo, 
Yoruba, and Hausa), offering an extreme diversity of ethnic groupings together with multiple 
dialects and languages. 
 
The country became independent from the United Kingdom on 1st October 1960 (Deekor et 
al., 2016). Nigeria measures 1200km from east to west, and 1050km from north to south. The 
Nigerian coast features mountains in the east and lowlands in the north; the Niger valley 
features high plateaus. In the north there is dry grassland containing a diverse range of plants 
and animals; the south is dominated by tropical forests.  
 
 
Figure 7: Shows the political map of Nigeria and neighbouring countries.  





The Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (2019) estimates that, based on a 2019 United 
Nations estimate, the Nigerian population is approximately 195,875,237. The largest Nigerian 
ethnic group is the Hausa-Fulani followed by the Yoruba, Igbo, Urhobos, Nupe, and Tiv. There 
are many languages spoken in the country, the official language being English. Non-English 
languages are widely spoken and include Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba. The country is divided 
along Religious lines between Christianity and Islam; many northern Nigerians follow Islam, 
whilst those in middle and south regions are predominantly Christians (Dakar et al., 2016).  
 
 
1.4.2 Economic Context 
In 2015, Nigeria had the largest African economy, surpassing South Africa’s economy, which 
had previously held this position for decades. Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is in 
the top 30 of global economies, with total revenue of N7.166tn in 2018 (Bugit, 2018). National 
income comes primarily from oil production revenues, but also from export of natural resources 
such as palm oil, coal, rubber, and cocoa. The Nigerian economy is thus vulnerable to 
fluctuations in oil prices and domestic/global oil production levels (Odekunle et al., 2016). 
Nigeria is a tropical region with large quantities of agricultural land, with the agricultural sector 
delivering approximately 20 per cent of GDP in 2013. Although agriculture is still the Nigerian 
economy’s largest sector and employs two-thirds of the workforce, hurdles to production have 
restricted sector performance.  
 
Nigeria possesses the largest oil reserves in Africa and is the sixth largest oil-producing country 
globally, with a maximum crude oil production capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day and gas 
and oil reserves of 192 trillion cubic feet and 37 billion barrels respectively (Gwaambuka, 
2018). Crude oil constitutes 90 per cent of exports and approximately 75 per cent of 
government revenue. According to the World Bank (2018), Nigeria’s GDP grew by 5 per cent 
from 2010 to 2014 but contracted by 2.7 per cent in 2015 and 1.6 per cent in 2016 because of 
a decline in global oil prices and the sabotage of many oil installations in the country. 
Nonetheless, recent research shows that Nigeria has gradually recovered from the 2008 
recession with an increase in GDP of 0.8 per cent from 2017 to 2018, primarily driven by 
increases in oil production.  The Central Bank of Nigeria (2018) reported that the Nigerian 
economy grew by 1.8 per cent in the third quarter of 2018, an increase on the 1.5 per cent 




than a 2.9 per cent increase in the previous quarter. The Nigerian GDP Annual Growth Rate 
averaged 3.85% from 1982-2018, achieving a high of 19.17 per cent in the fourth quarter of 
2004 and a record low of -7.81 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1983. Nonetheless, the 
government is committed to improving Nigerian lives through the implementation of economic 
reforms as described in the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan 2017–2020, predicting future 
growth by 2.8 per cent from 2019 (CBN, 2018). There has been significant socio-economic 
progress in Nigeria since 2005, when the Human Development Index value in the country 
increased by 14.1 per cent from 2003 (the base year) projected at 0.443 to 0.534 in 2018 (UNDP, 
2018).  
 
Nigerian socio-economic progress could be further improved through overcoming a number of 
specific developmental challenges and obstacles, including dependency on crude oil 
production, renovation of dilapidated infrastructure, diversification of the economy, 
improvements to governance and accountability problems and offering better living standards 
for the population. Research has suggested that these challenges and obstacles increase 
inequality in Nigeria, with the gap between the rich and the poor widening. Other research has 
highlighted Nigeria’s inequality as one of the key causes of an increase in the Islamist Boko 
Haram insurgency in the north of the country (Dunn, 2018). The increasing divide between the 
North and South has been underscored by a lack of economic development in the north 
compared to the south. The Nigerian government is aware of these challenges and has 
committed to providing access to essential services and reducing poverty through the 
introduction of inclusive development policies (World Bank Group, 2018; Odekunle et al., 
2016; CBN, 2018). 
 
 
1.4.3 Political Context 
Politically, Nigeria was created in the 19th century, when the British Empire colonised coastal 
areas around the Niger River. Using the divide and rule method, the British empire 
divided/controlled the formation of empires, kingdoms, and city-states (including the Oyo and 
Benin kingdoms in the south, and the Hausa kingdoms and the Borno dynasty in the north), 
pitting ethnic groups against each other in the western, eastern, and northern regions (Gov. Ng, 
2019). In 1960, after half a century of British direct rule, Nigeria achieved independence and 




Ironsi. Under military rule (1966-1999), the country experienced eight military coups (in 
January and July 1966, 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985, 1990 and 1993). It also underwent the alleged 
Vatsa coup of December 1985, a civil war (between 6 Jul 1967 – 15 Jan 1970), having eight 
Military Heads of States and two short term non-military Head of States (1979-1983 and 
August 1993-November 1993) during the period (Gov. Ng, 2019). In 1999, Nigeria transitioned 
from a military rule to democracy through the election of former military Head of State 
Olusegun Mathew Okikiola Aremu Obasanjo, who represented the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP). Ever since, Nigeria has adhered to a democratic political system, wherein all individuals 
have equal rights and freedom of choice to realise their principles and defend and promote their 
interests via multi party-political platforms whose candidates promise to realise their ideals 
upon election (Aregbeshola and Adewale, 2011).  
 
Traditionally, the political sphere has been characterised by a two-party system, with various 
opposition and ruling parties holding a central role (Kim S-Y, 2006). Historically, political 
parties have reflected the country’s Muslim-Christian divide, being headed by former Military 
leaders and characterised by limited democratic processes with a heavy reliance on a plutocratic 
ruling class (Adeleye, 2013; Brown, 2013). Muhammadu Buhari (the President since 29 May 
2015) is from the All-Progressives Congress Party (APC), which achieved 54 per cent of the 
votes cast. In this election they defeated the main opposition party, the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP), securing 196 seats in the House of Representatives, against the PDP’s 133 and 
the minority All Progressives Grand Alliance party’s five. In the Senate, the upper chamber of 
Nigeria’s bicameral legislature, the APC took 60 seats and PDP 48 (The Commonwealth, 2019). 
 
Nigeria’s judiciary is independent from its legislature. The Chief Justice presides over the 
Supreme Court, which is made up of up to 15 Associate Justices. It is the final court of appeal 
with jurisdiction over disputes between states, or between the federal government and a state, 
especially relating to funding and resource allocation, and over election disputes. The Federal 
Court of Appeal has a president and at least 35 justices, at least three of them having Sharia 
Law expertise and another three having experience in Nigeria’s customary law. Beneath these, 
there is also a Federal High Court, with each of the 36 states also having a high court. States 
are entitled to have a Sharia court of appeal and a customary court of appeal. Federal court 
judges are appointed by the president on recommendations from the National Judicial Council 




recommendations from the National Judicial Council, and approved by the state assembly 
(Commonwealth Governance, 2019). 
 
Critics have labelled Nigeria’s democracy as profoundly undemocratic. They highlight several 
key problems, including the inflation of census figures to make some regions look populous, 
the ability of stronger political parties to manipulate election results in their favour and the 
preponderance of corruption and lack of transparency (Abdulmalik et al., 2016). The Nigerian 
health sector in particular has been widely disrupted by this rise in corruption, which has led to 
the inability to provide financial resources in order to meet public health sector requirements. 
A lack of financial governance has also led to improper deployment of state resources 
(Uzochukwu et al., 2016). Nigeria is affiliated with a diverse set of international organisations, 
including the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the African Development Bank, 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), IMF, the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (AU, 2017).  
 
 
1.4.4 Health status 
Nigeria’s health status is crucially dependent on its socioeconomic context. In a population of 
over 200 million, 60 per cent of Nigerians live in rural areas (Odekunle et al., 2016). There is 
high social inequality, particularly in regard to access to healthcare services. About 49 per cent 
of rural inhabitants in Nigeria have access to adequate social amenities such as roads, food, 
sanitation, and clean water, with around 51 per cent of Nigerians lacking access to clean water 
facilities. This compares with other 70 per cent of Nigerians in urban areas who have access to 
these social amenities (Uzochukwu et al., 2016). 
 
Nigeria’s total healthcare expenditure is one of the lowest among sub-Sahara African countries 
and indeed worldwide. Nigeria spends less than 5 per cent of its GDP on health, which is less 
than the OECD average of about 8.9 per cent in 2017.  Approximately 75 per cent of health 
expenditure takes the form of household out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, which increases the 
levels of poverty and impoverishment in the country (FMoH, 2017). The OOP expenditure as 
percentage of current health expenditure (CHE) in Nigeria has fluctuated and has tended to 
decrease from the period 2001 – 2015, ending in 2015 at 72.24 per cent, an increase by 0.01 
per cent over the previous year (World Bank Group, 2017). The UHC service index of Nigeria 




Africa. Northern Africa having an index of 64 and Sub-Sahara Africa 42 (World Bank Group, 
2017).  
 
Nigeria’s key health indicators offer further insights into the limitations of the country’s health 
system. Key health indicators such as life expectancy, the burden of communicable diseases, 
maternal mortality rate, and infant mortality rate in Nigeria are amongst the lowest in sub-
Saharan African countries. This deterioration is the combination of years of poor governance, 
lack of accountability, economic recession and political instability (WHO, 2017). The World 
Health Organization (2018) states that Nigeria has the third highest infant mortality rate 
globally (9 per cent), after Pakistan (10 per cent) and India (24 per cent) and followed by the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (4 per cent) and Ethiopia (3 per cent). Nigeria’s infant 
mortality rate is 64.6 per 1000 live births compared to the sub-Saharan African average of 51.5 
per 1000 live births and a global average of 39.1 per 1000 live births (World Bank Group, 
2018). The Nigerian Minister of Health, Isaac Adewole, confirmed that the country had made 
significant progress in decreasing the rate from 102.5 per 1000 live births in 2003 to 64.6 per 
1000 live births in 2017 (Punchng, 2017). Likewise, the country has a high maternal mortality 
rate of about 814 per 100,000 live births, compared to an African regional average of 547 per 
100,000 live births and a global average of 216 per 100,000 live births. Nigeria is considered 
one of the most dangerous places to deliver a child and offering the fourth worst national 
maternal mortality ratio, after Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, and Chad. Total life 
expectancy in Nigeria is approximately 54 years, below the sub-Saharan African average of 61 
years and a global average of 72 years (WHO, 2018). 
 
USAID’s (2019) research shows that the number of new HIV infections in Nigeria stands at 
130,000 and AIDS-related deaths at around 53,000 deaths. About 1.9 million Nigerians live 
with HIV, with 55 per cent adults having access to antiretroviral drugs, and 32 per cent of 
pregnant women with HIV having access to treatments preventing mother-to-child 
transmission of the disease. Mother-to-child transmission of HIV has infected approximately 
35 per cent of children in Nigeria (USAIDS et al., 2019). Thus, the Federal Ministry of Health 
(FMoH) focuses on implementing policies such as the UHC policy in response to Nigeria’s 
poor key health indicators. Current policies aim to improve health outcomes related to maternal 
mortality, the disease burden of HIV/AIDS, infant mortality, and life expectancy, areas where 





1.5 Overview of the Nigerian Health System  
This section reviews Nigeria’s healthcare system in regard to its structural framework, 
development and operational health strategy. In recent years Nigeria’s health system has been 
profoundly affected by wider political and economic events, particularly the recovery from 
military rule, crude oil price fluctuations and the 2008 global recession which seriously 
undermined its health goals. For instance, between 2015 and 2018 proposed health expenditure 
dropped from 5.78 per cent to 3.9 per cent of GDP, significantly lower than other Sub-Sahara 
African countries like Zambia (6.2 per cent), Tanzania (6.8 per cent), Malawi (7.2 per cent), 
Kenya (7.5 per cent) and South Africa (7.5 per cent). Significantly, all the above countries 
(including Nigeria) had committed to spend 15 per cent of GDP on health in the 2015 Abuja 
Declaration (McIntyre et al., 2018). The World Health Organization (2017) has indicated that 
Nigeria’s health expenditure is directly related to its health system’s poor performance, 
highlighted starkly by the recent outbreaks of Ebola virus, Monkey pox, Yellow fever, Cholera 
and Lassa fever, together with high maternal and infant deaths. As suggested above, this health 
crisis has its roots in Nigeria’s social and economic context; a key example of this can be seen 
in the recent outbreak of the Ebola Virus, which created national health insecurity in most of 
Nigeria. This insecurity prevailed despite significant contributions from international health 
organizations, which ensured that the country had the capacity to deal with and tackle the 
deadly virus in a manner comparable to more developed, western countries. Moreover, it is 
clear that sustainable social and economic growth within Nigeria depends to a significant extent 
on improved performance from the healthcare sector (Abdulmalik et al., 2016).  
 
The World Health Organization rates Nigeria 187th out of 191 countries in regard to health 
system performance and suggests that one-third of 700 health facilities are dysfunctional, 
placing millions of Nigerians in need of health support (Mathew, 2019). The country is also 
held back by poorly functioning primary health care services which cannot cope with the 
emergence of non-communicable diseases (such cancer, heart related diseases and diabetes), 
weak accident and emergency responses and low healthcare coverage under the NHIS scheme. 
Overall health indicators suggest that Nigeria, compared to other Sub-Saharan countries, 
performs worse in terms of healthcare delivery, with Nigeria failing to achieve most of the 
health related MDGs by 2015. For example, in 2017, Ghana allocated 6 per cent of GDP to 
health, while Nigeria budgeted just 4.7 per cent. Despite Nigeria having the largest economy 




health ranking. Instead of having one of the most developed health systems in Sub-Sahara 
Africa, Nigeria healthcare suffers from a lack of effective regulation and governance 
arrangements (Wollum et al., 2015). Moreover, a lack of healthcare facilities, especially in 
rural areas, has created many potential healthcare issues. Each level of the government, from 
Federal to local, faces challenges in meeting healthcare systems requirements due to a lack of 
services, resources and coordination in the health system, impeding the sector’s overall 
development. There is also profound inequity in the supply of medicines to people suffering 
from health issues in rural areas (Shuaib et al., 2014).  
 
These issues are compounded by negligence and a lack of responsibility from various levels of 
government in providing proper healthcare services (Deekor et al., 2016). Despite the 
government’s failure to meet the healthcare requirements of Nigerian people, many 
international organizations are engaged in providing effective health facilities and services, 
including the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
The institutional structure of healthcare in Nigeria is based on policies produced and regulated 
by the Federal Ministry of Health. The Nigerian Ministry of Health is responsible for 
establishing state health institutions to provide the maximum possible healthcare services to 
the people of Nigeria (Nwadiuko et al., 2016). This institutional structure is divided into three 
tiers, at Federal, State and local levels of government, but is supported by other key 
stakeholders such as the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), National Primary Health 
Care Development Agency (NPHCDA), Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Ward 
Health Authorities, NGOs and development partners and Donors (such as UN Bodies and 
External Government Agencies) (see Figure 8). These stakeholders are engaged in healthcare 
system regulation, including service provision and financing across all of Nigeria (Uzochukwu 






Figure 8: Key stakeholders in the Nigerian healthcare system. 
Source: Pharm Access Foundation (2016). 
 
When there is a lack of proper healthcare a country cannot maintain steady economic progress 
(Deekor et al., 2016). Research by the National Council on Health also supports the argument 
that healthy Nigerians will help the economy to thrive. However, in contemporary Nigeria, 
difficulties in healthcare provision are becoming an obstacle to economic development, with 
citizens suffering due to a lack of facilities available related to health infrastructure. Leadership 
in particular has consistently been a crucial factor in developing the Nigerian health sector’s 
ability to achieve the required improvements. The Federal Government, together with key 
stakeholders are required to address health problems to reduce the national burden related to 
the inadequate healthcare system and establish healthcare infrastructures which would improve 
its healthcare system and policy (Uzochukwu et al., 2016).  
 
 
1.6 Chronological background and Timeline 
The earliest roots of Nigerian healthcare can be traced back to the early fifteenth century and 
the Kingdom of Nri. During the 1400s healthcare in Nigeria mainly depended on traditional 
medicines and treatments, many of which are still observed in parts of the country (Uzochukwu 
et al., 2016). From 1472 to 1880 many European Missionaries, including the Portuguese and 
Spanish, began to explore Nigeria and establish colonies (Nwadiuko et al., 2016). Doctors from 
Europe introduced a western-style healthcare system, primarily for the benefit of European 
incomers. From 1880-1945 the influence of British missionaries became prominent within 




British Nigeria (Odekunle et al., 2016). During the era of British colonisation new healthcare 
practices and healthcare infrastructure were introduced. After World War II healthcare policies 
initially followed the pre-war pattern, and Nigeria’s colonial development plan of 1945 built 
on the colonial heritage.  
 
After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the newly established FMoH formulated a National 
Development Plan and National Health Policy to improve the health system.  After the 1978 
Alma-Ata Declaration much of the focus shifted to primary healthcare-led policies. Following 
a period of military rule and a transition to democracy in 1999, the FMoH oversaw the launch 
of two five-year strategic plans, two successive revisions of the National Health Policy and the 
implementation of NHIS. This last crucial change mostly focused on achieving Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) targets before 2015 and UHC for Nigerians in the healthcare 
sector (Abdulmalik et al., 2016) (see Table 1 for key chronology events of the Nigerian health 
system). Due to failures in reaching these MDGs targets, the Nigerian government has 
refocused its attention on improving financing arrangements so as to increase the prospect of 
successful implementation of health policies. Despite this focus, less than 5 per cent of the 
population have health insurance coverage, and these health care issues are significant 
challenges to the Nigerian government (Uzochukwu et al., 2016). With the world shifting from 
the MDGs to SDGs, the Nigerian government has increasingly linked the aim of improving 
access to healthcare to the SDG targets. Much of the ongoing policy debate as the present study 
started was concerned with agreeing milestones for widening healthcare coverage, in line with 




Table 1: Timeline of key events in Nigeria’s health system.  




1.7 The Structure of the Nigerian health system  
The Nigerian health system is organized into a three-tier structure of primary, secondary and 
tertiary tiers, which are accountable to all levels of government (Federal, State, and Local 
government, as well as at the Community level) for all major health system functions, including 
stewardship, financing and healthcare delivery. However, each level of government also uses 
three distinct models of health services provision, these being the public, private and faith-
based models (see Figure 9). Pharm Access Foundation (2016) estimates that public health 
sector healthcare provision remains a concurrent responsibility for about 73 per cent of the 
three tiers of government, while the private health sector provides about 12 per cent of 
healthcare delivery and faith-based institutions constitute about 1 per cent of healthcare 
provision. The remaining 14 per cent of healthcare provision is not specified due to a lack of 
data surrounding these issues (see Figure 9) (Pharm Access Foundation, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 9: Nigeria’s pluralistic healthcare system. 
Source: Pharm Access Foundation (2016). 
 
 
The Federal level of the health sector is responsible for policy development, regulation, and 
overall stewardship, providing health service through tertiary care and teaching hospitals (47 




secondary hospitals (3768 in total), which include district hospitals, comprehensive health 
centres and specialist and general hospitals and for the regulation and technical support for 
primary healthcare services. Local healthcare, which is the least-well funded and organized 
level of government, is responsible for primary health care in each ward (29,854 facilities in 
total), including dispensaries and health posts, health centres and clinics. As a result of poor 
financing, primary healthcare services in many local areas are a weak base for the healthcare 
system (Table 2) (MedCOI, 2017 and Pharm Access Foundation, 2016).  
 
Table 2: Levels of the Nigerian health system.  
Source: Pharm Access Foundation (2016). 
 
While the organizational charts convey the impression of a well-coordinated system, its 
practical workings are far from seamless. There is often a duplication and confusion of roles 




coordinating and tracking performance and benchmarking, especially at community level, 
where primary healthcare services are often poorly implemented (Pharm Access Foundation, 
2015). The system for referrals between these four levels is inconsistent and often ignored. 
Ailments that are supposed to be managed at the primary level are often managed at the tertiary 
level. This is because the other levels are very weak, with inadequate infrastructure, personnel 
and other deficiencies (GOV.UK, 2018). All four government levels, employ a full range of 
personnel, including doctors, nurses, midwives, community health extension workers and 
allied medical professionals such as laboratory scientists, pharmacists, dentists and managers. 
Health workers in the public sector are paid by the government level that employs them.  
 
Generally speaking, the Federal Government is responsible for the funding of tertiary hospitals, 
the state governments look after secondary hospitals, and the local government authorities take 
care of the PHC facilities. Nonetheless, there are a few limited exceptions: in some states, 
health professionals working within PHC facilities might be employed by the Federal 
Government, while some higher-level health professionals employed by the Federal parastatals 
or vertical programs may also work at the secondary and primary levels. Nigeria has one of the 
largest stocks of human resources for health in Africa, but these still do not meet the country’s 
needs. In 2016, an inventory of healthcare personnel indicated a total of 65,759 doctors (38.9 
per 100000 population), 249,566 nurses and midwives (148 per 100000 population), 505 
dentists (0.001 per 1000 population), 5,483 dental technicians (>0.04 per 1000 population), 
19,225 medical laboratory scientists (11.3 per 100000 population), 2,818 physiotherapists (1.7 
per 100000 population), 1.286 radiographers (0.76 per 100000 population) 5,986 community 
health officers (CHOs) (3.5 per 100000 population), 42,938 community health extension 
workers (CHEWs) (25.3 per 100000 population), 28,458 junior community health extension 
workers (JCHEWs) (16.8 per 100000 population) and 16,979 pharmacists (10 per 100000 
population) (FMoH, 2016).  
 
The Federal Ministry of Health has established a national health workforce registry, although 
this is not yet fully functional, and the registry’s data are not regularly updated. At present, the 
regulatory bodies maintain health workers’ records in their jurisdiction, but the records are 
often not up to date and are therefore inadequate for planning (FMoH, 2016). There are more 
doctors per capita in the south than in the north, though no large regional disparities exist in 
regard to the number of nurses. Most doctors and nurses work in secondary and tertiary level 




destinations for migrant doctors. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) report identified Nigeria as the leading African source of foreign-born 
nurses practising in OECD countries. In spite of this brain drain, there does not appear to be 
any official action taken either to retain the health professionals or to re-attract those in the 
diaspora. With Nigeria’s estimated 193 million people, medical tourism to external destinations 
will continue to thrive (Eriki et al., 2015).  
 
 
1.8 Nigerian health system revenue sources  
There are various revenue sources for financing a health system that include direct and indirect 
taxes, OOP payments, donor funding, voluntary payments, co-payments, and mandatory 
payments that are adjusted into revenue pooling to minimise the risks associated with health-
related problems (Nkwo et al., 2015). In Nigeria, healthcare financing is focused on several 
sources, primarily out-of-pocket payments, donor funding, tax revenues and various types of 
health insurance (Akazili and James et al., 2017). The World Bank Group (2017) states that the 
National Health Accounts estimate that the bulk of Nigeria’s health funding is borne by 
households’ OOP expenditure: these OOP fees are the combination of facility entrance fees, 
drug costs, material costs and the consultation fees.  OOP payments tend to have a regressive 
impact, since they take a higher proportion of the income of the poor than of the wealthy 
(Fabricant, Kamara and Mills, 1999). Household expenditure as a proportion of total health 
expenditure (THE) varied between 72.2 per cent in 2015 and 83.1 per cent in 2003. Nonetheless, 
Nigeria’s OOP expenditure as a share of current health expenditure has fluctuated substantially 
in recent years, decreasing between 2001 and 2015. A recent WHO report (2017) suggests that 
this has massive implications for those seeking to access health services without suffering 
financial hardship. The report shows that, although they may have access to some health 
services, more than half of the world’s 7.3 billion people do not receive all of the essential 
services they need. Regarding financial protection, over 800 million people spend at least 10 
per cent of their household budgets to pay for health care, and about 100 million people are 
pushed into extreme poverty due to their health expenditure (WHO, 2017). The federal 
budgetary component of health expenditure has been at best 5 per cent of the national budget, 
even though African countries committed to an allocation of 15 per cent in the 2014 
Presidential Summit on Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in Abuja, Nigeria (MedCOI, 2017). 




African countries such as Zambia (6.2 per cent), Tanzania (6.8 per cent), Malawi (7.2 per cent), 
Kenya (7.5 per cent) and South Africa (7.5 per cent) (McIntyre et al., 2018). 
 
 
1.9 Study aims and research questions  
With the above considerations in mind, the student has formulated the following general study 
aims, and a set of related research questions: 
Aims 
1. To investigate the roles and interactions of policy actors in the UHC policy process and 
how they impede or advance progress in extending coverage.  
2. To investigate the extent of consensus or disagreement between influential actors and 
interest groups on the direction of UHC policy, and how that has affected progress. 
3. To identify the barriers and obstacles which affect Nigeria’s process of health policy 
towards achieving UHC.  
 
Research questions 
1. Who are the influential actors and organizations shaping UHC policy in Nigeria? 
2. What are the patterns of influence and power relationships within the policy network? 
3. What are the respective roles of domestic and international actors in shaping policy? 
4. Is there disagreement within the policy network over the approach to UHC to be 
pursued, or the feasibility or desirability of UHC policies? 
5. What are the main gains and setbacks to date, as seen by policy actors? 
6. How far along the path towards UHC do policy actors believe Nigeria has travelled, 
and what is their assessment of the prospects of achieving adequate coverage? 




1.10 Addressing the questions through a mixed-methods study 
Answering the above research questions will require an empirical investigation of the social 
interactions between policy actors and policy organisations involved in the formulation and 
implementation of UHC-related policies in Nigeria. It will be necessary to investigate patterns 




shapes policy. The study methodology will be explained in detail in Chapter 3.  For now, it is 
enough to say that the breadth and complexity of the policy network, as well as the elite 
character of the actors, made direct observation infeasible, so that the research needed to turn 
to accounts of action in the network provided by policy actors themselves. This was approached 
via a mixed-methods study. The two main components of field work were face-to-face 
structured interviews (involving quantitative analysis) and face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews (involving qualitative analysis) with key policymakers/stakeholders.  This was 
supplemented by analysis of relevant documents. 
 
 
1.11 Plan of the thesis 
Having outlined the scope and aims of the study in the present chapter, we will turn in Chapter 
2 to review relevant background literature, and in Chapter 3 to discuss the study methodology, 
devoting separate sections to the different approaches required for a quantitative social network 
analysis (SNA), and a qualitative analysis of in-depth semi-structured interviews with the same 
network actors.  This is followed by the two main findings chapters relating to the SNA data 
and data from the qualitative interviews.  The thesis then moves on to a Discussion chapter, 























This chapter reviews relevant literature on universal health coverage (UHC) and the 
development of UHC-related policies in Nigeria. This includes a discussion of “normative” 
literature on the benefits of UHC, a review of what other countries is doing, criticisms of UHC, 
and consideration of policies so far introduced in Nigeria. The main purpose of conducting this 
literature review is to provide background for the empirical findings presented in subsequent 




2.1 Literature search strategy 
The literature review used two main search strategies, namely electronic and manual searching. 
The electronic search mechanism gathered relevant information from 1997 to 2020 using 
several web databases, such as Science Direct, Medline, Google Scholar, the World Bank 
Group website, the WHO website, the International Labour Organization website, and the 
Ministry of Health Nigeria website. The keywords used in the search strategy included 
“universal coverage”, “universal health coverage”, “UHC”, “health insurance”, “dimensions 
of UHC” AND “Nigeria’s health system”, “Sub-Saharan Africa”, “health” or “health care*” 
AND “health financing*” or “UHC in Nigeria” AND “impact”. Manual searching involved the 
use of textbooks, official documents, and articles in order to gather data relevant to the thesis. 
This included searches of the reference lists of relevant articles for additional sources, and 
‘forward chaining’ by identifying sources that cited a relevant article (Cooper et al, 2018).  In 
this initial search phase, 278 articles were identified, and their abstracts were checked for 
relevance to the topic and 89 pieces of research were then considered in detail. At the time of 
writing up the thesis, over 50 additional sources have been reviewed to bring the discussion up 






2.2 Benefits of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 
This section provides a brief review of literature that argues that UHC brings multiple benefits. 
Several authors have commented on the beneficial effect of increasing access to quality health 
services for individuals who are in need of these services. A recent study (Moreno-Serra and 
Smith, 2012; Moreno-Serra and Smith, 2015) using data from 153 countries found that 
increased health coverage improves the lives of the population, and especially the most 
vulnerable.  Better healthcare is found to be accompanied by a reduction of financial hardship 
and poverty. For instance, countries such as Brazil, Niger, Thailand, and Ghana have seen 
significant improvements in their population’s health and economic situation since they 
implemented their respective UHC policies.  
 
In Brazil, about three-quarters of the population (roughly 140 million people) have access to 
health services, boosting the country’s health indicators, with infant mortality falling from 46 
per 1000 live births in 1990 to about 14.8 per 1000 live births in 2017 (World Health Statistics, 
2018). Life expectancy at birth in Brazil rose to 75.5 years old in 2017 from 69 years old in 
2007. Sub-Saharan countries such as Niger also saw improvements when governments 
introduced policies supporting progress towards UHC, which included free health care for 
pregnant woman and children, and decentralising health programs (WHO, 2018). To take one 
indicator, Niger has seen a 5.1 per cent decrease in infant mortality from 226 deaths per 1000 
live births in 2000 to 81.1 in 2017.  Of course, it is essential to keep in mind that developing 
countries such as this must necessarily extend coverage one step at a time, rather than achieving 
UHC immediately (WHO, 2018).  
 
Other studies reviewed the financial benefits of introducing UHC for the health sector or the 
broader economy. In many developing countries the health sector is like any other market 
system, with a network of buyers and sellers who shape the demand and supply of services 
reimbursed through out-of-pocket payments. Studies show that about 150 million people suffer 
from financial hardship, while 100 million people are left impoverished yearly by the need to 
pay out-of-pocket for treatments (Tahsina et al., 2018; Cotlear et al., 2015 and Zhang et al., 
2019). Other research by Krishna (2013) showed that Gujarat, a state in India, saw 88 per cent 
of households fall below the poverty line due to unaffordable healthcare expenditures. Even 
some developed countries, such as the United States are facing a situation where high health 
costs cause personal bankruptcies and impoverishment, something that the Obama reforms 




consequences of catastrophic health expenditure and even from episodes of financial hardship 
and delayed treatment-seeking associated with variable health costs (Wagstaff et al., 2018). For 
instance, from 2000 to 2006, Thailand saw the prevalence of catastrophic health expenditure 
(at the 10 per cent threshold) for the poorest quintile of households drop from 4.0% to 0.9%, 
after introducing UHC in 2001 (Limwattananon et al., 2011). Meanwhile in Mexico after the 
introduction of “Seguro Popular”, a social health protection program that provided health 
coverage to about 53 million people, the percentage of Mexicans affected by CHE fell from 
3.1% to 2.0%, while those officially defined as living in poverty fell from 3.3% to 0.8% in 
2000-2010 (WHO, IBRD, and the World Bank, 2017). In conclusion, UHC allows households 
to keep funds they would have spent on care, while on average leaving them healthier because 
of improved access.  The extra money in the hands of poorer people leads to increased spending 
on basic goods and boosts the economy (OECD, 2017).  
 
According to Ramke and associates (2017) the move to UHC reflects, but also amplifies the 
societal value placed on social solidarity and social protection for the disadvantaged in many 
countries. Their study showed that the new developments in UHC led to a shift in collective 
values that made an international consensus on a set of ambitious Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) possible.  According to this line of argument improved social solidarity in the 
healthcare field has helped move opinion to support advances in social protection in other areas. 
 
Studies by Wirtz et al. (2017) and Tangcharoensathien et al (2015) found that implementing 
UHC eliminated many health-based barriers and hurdles to education. Children who remain 
untreated face various health issues and disabilities, which include visual problems and hearing 
difficulties affecting their education.  
 
Stigler and associates (2016) argue that the emerging consensus on the value of UHC creates a 
climate in which national governments increasingly regard health as a basic human right of 
their citizens. These authors suggest that the right to healthcare is a basic need for all people 
but note that many African countries face difficulties in funding the infrastructure and services 
necessary to make this equal right to health a reality.  
In Nigeria, inequality still exists between the public sector and the private sector. Prices of 
healthcare services in the private sector are higher than those in the public sector. Insofar as 
UHC removes the price mechanism as the main means of accessing healthcare it removes a 




based on their needs rather than ability to pay (Schmidt et al., 2015). The typical pattern as 
coverage is extended is that access to care broadens from the wealthy and those employed in 
the formal sector to progressively include dependants, the unemployed, older people and the 
chronically sick.  As everybody is eligible for treatment, the possibility of demands for extra 
payments to access care is reduced, so that services are provided directly to the people without 
being affected by factors such as corruption (Reich et al., 2016; Reeves et al., 2015b). 
  
It has been argued that apart from its positive impacts on health, UHC has potential to improve 
the economic well-being of individuals and communities and increase social and political 
stability (Bloom et al, 2004; Lorentzen et al., 2008). It may accelerate economic growth by 
improving school attendance, educational attainment, and workplace attendance and 
productivity. Better health improves the economic circumstances of households by allowing 
regular employment with few absences (Bloom, 2011; Bloom et al, 2018). A variety of 
healthcare interventions have been shown to have positive effects on educational attainment 
and earnings, including iodine and iron supplementation, de-worming, and malaria eradication 
programmes (Bloom et al, 2018). Regarding economic growth, investment in UHC is likely to 
generate positive outcomes from the economy (Reeves et al., 2015a; Wirtz et al., 2017). On 
average, a 10-year increase in life expectancy results in a 1% increase in annual GDP (Bloom 
et al., 2018). All of the reviewed studies reported that one of the main benefits of the UHC 
system is that it provides social protection for disadvantaged groups who previously lacked 
access to care.  
 
 
2.3 What others are doing 
While it would be premature to say that international law provides an absolute right to essential 
health services for all recognised by all countries, there is increasing global pressure to move 
in this direction, supported by agreements such as the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and other international declarations, resolutions at international conferences, 
and domestic legislation (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights/ WHO, 
2008).  The literature search suggested that about 75 out of the 192 countries have passed 
legislation to provide universal health coverage for their citizens or residents. 58 of the 75 
countries have exceeded the threshold for achieving SDG Target 3.8.1 based on >90% of the 




the progress of countries in the LMIC category, which includes Nigeria. The countries that 
have not adopted UHC tend to expand their health care coverage slowly, leaving some people 
vulnerable and without access to health care for extended periods of time. A recent World Bank 
Group report in 2015 recommends that governments should focus more on “how” they can 
achieve UHC, while dealing with the “what?” and “why?” questions naturally during different 
phases of the policy process (Cotlear et al., 2015).  
 
 
Figure 10: LMIC countries (GNI per capita of $1,046 to $4,125). 
Source: The World Bank website (2018). 
 
The literature suggests that governments within the sub-Saharan Africa region (especially in 
Nigeria) are struggling to deal with the growing healthcare needs of their populations, the rise 
of health service costs and the challenges associated with the implementation of UHC in their 
respective health systems (Greer and Maeda, 2015; Ramke et al., 2017). These foregoing 
studies suggest that a country involved in UHC needs to have a reliable, effective and robust 
healthcare system in order to tackle the impoverishment and financial hardship that result from 
out-of-pocket payments. 
 
Expanding health coverage depends on political commitment and sufficient political will to see 
through what a difficult implementation process is often. Usually, a strong cooperative effort 
between policymakers, health representative groups (labour unions), political parties and 
policy organisations is required, Generally the combination of supportive actors, propitious 
events and resources necessary to make progress will only be intermittently present, at those 
times when a “window of opportunity” opens (see Evans et al., 2012). This does not mean that 




sometimes the absence of a desirable condition can be overcome.  Countries like the United 
Kingdom, Thailand, Turkey, Rwanda and Indonesia embarked on UHC reforms in periods 
when their economies were not strong.  Similarly, the heavy burden of reconstruction after 
World War II did not prevent France and Japan successfully implementing UHC. Most of these 
countries began their efforts to achieve UHC through the provision of a minimum health 
package at comparatively low levels of income. They have developed their healthcare systems 
incrementally to progressively extend coverage over time (WHO, 2010; Ikegami et al., 2014; 
Maede et al., 2014; Green and Maede, 2015).  
 
 
Much of the mainstream policy commentary on establishing UHC is framed in terms of the 
first two of the above approaches.  For instance, the World Health Organization/International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank (2015) has argued that achieving 
UHC in developing countries will generally involve a major role for governments operating in 
a multi-agency environment, not least by putting in place an adequate public financing 
mechanism or negotiating external financial assistance. This is because political commitment 
alone is not sufficient to secure movement towards UHC if resources are inadequate. For 
instance, several African countries that declared their political commitment to UHC in the 2014 
Abuja declaration have fallen well short of realising this ambition (World Bank, 2016). How 
UHC is achieved varies depending on the country (Wagstaff, 2007; McKenna et al., 2017), but 
the Commonwealth Fund identifies three common pathways (see: Seervai et al., 2017).  These 
pathways are single-payer coverage, regulated private health coverage and mixed public-






 Figure 11: Three paths towards achieving UHC. 
 Source: Commonwealth Fund (Seervai et al., 2017). 
 
Single-payer coverage: This is a largely public system in which government healthcare 
facilities are directly involved in providing care for citizens or residents, with most finance 
coming from the single source of government revenues, typically tax receipts. Among several 
countries around the world that use a single-payer system are Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Taiwan, Sweden and South Korea. Within this general type there are several variations in the 
details of funding, for example, involving integrated versus purchaser/provider split systems, 
centralised versus decentralised structures, public hospitals versus a public-private mix, and 
salaried doctors versus doctors who are independent contractors, even when practicing in 
public hospitals. 
 
Regulated private health coverage: This pathway toward UHC is regulated by the government, 
but the organisation and delivery of healthcare to the population is left to the private sector. 
Such a UHC system can be seen in the Netherlands, where private but not-for-profit insurance 
funds compete against each other to attract insured members. In this variant of social health 
insurance funding comes from pooled premium contributions made by businesses and their 
staff, which are then redistributed using a risk-adjustment formula to prevent insurers from 





Mixed public-private coverage: This system achieves UHC through a two-tier system that 
involves both the public and private sectors, with both having a significant role in the financing 
and delivery of health care. For example, France’s health system uses a mixture of payroll taxes 
and government tax revenues to support not-for-profit insurance funds that provide coverage 
for the populace. Similar to the regulated private health coverage system, the government stays 
at arms’ length, overseeing negotiations between insurance funds and health providers, but 
rarely intervening directly. 
 
According to the World Bank (2017), the way universal coverage is implemented is determined 
by the choice between available financing models, with consequences for the revenue source, 
the groups covered, the way that risk pooling is achieved, and the type of providers (see Table 
3).  
 
Table 3: Models of healthcare financing. 
Source: World Bank (2018). N.B. Payroll taxes in this classification includes employer 
and employee contributions in SHI systems that label them in that way. 
 
There are few comparative studies of how well different countries are doing in achieving UHC. 
A study by the World Bank and the Government of Japan (see Maeda et al., 2014; Reich et al., 




countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam), representing a range of national income levels. The study categorised 
the countries committed to UHC into four different groups. Category one comprised countries 
at the stage where UHC is high on the policy agenda. Category two comprised countries that 
had implemented the UHC policy but are struggling to extend health coverage. Category three 
comprised countries that have achieved the World Bank/WHO UHC criterion (health 
coverage >90 percent of the population) and were working to maintain that level of coverage. 
Category four consisted of countries where UHC was fully functional, but policy makers still 
needed to make adjustments to cope with changing demand for services (see Table 4). The 
study report concluded that the path towards UHC is a challenging one that needs political 
support, technical understanding and substantial financial investment in the health system.  
 
 
Table 4: Approaches to UHC in 11 countries. 
Source: Maeda et al., (2014), Reich et al. (2016 p.812). 
 
 
The factors of accessibility and availability mostly affect health outcomes and health service 
coverage. The availability of an effective, high-quality workforce, capable of good team 
working, is also important for successful UHC reform (Hsiao et al., 2014). Ensuring equitable 
access to key services has a cost and is likely to require significant investment in facilities and 
professional training (Culyer et al., 2018). The other critical elements for effective health 
coverage include a proper system of supply and procurement of health technologies and 
medicines, quality governance, and reliable health information systems. UHC is not only about 
the health coverage itself, but also the process of managing, funding and delivering the 
coverage. A UHC system aims to adjust itself to meet the requirements and needs of the 
communities and people it serves (Maruthappu et al., 2016). Health services, including 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Status of UHC policies 
and progrmmes 
Agenda-setting piloting new 
programmes and developing new 
systems
Initial programmes and systems in place, 
implementation in progress; need for further 
systems development and capacity building to 
address remaining population not yet covered 
Strong political leadership and citizen 
demand lead to new investments and 
UHC policy reforms; systems and 
programmes develop to meet new 
demands 
Mature systems and programmes; 
continuous adjuments required to 
meet changing demands and rising 
costs
Status of health coverage Low population coverage, at the early 
stage of UHC 
Substantial share of population gain access to 
services with financial protection, but 
population coverage is not yet universal and 
coverage gaps remain in access to services 
and financial protection 
Universal population coverage achieved 
but countries are focusing on 
improving financial protection and 
quality of services
Universal coverage with 
comprehensive access to health 
services and effective financial 
protection




complementary and traditional services and medicines, are managed so as to be responsive to 
the needs and expectations of the public. System managers must be able to monitor and reorient 
healthcare over time in order to make sure that it is delivered in the most effective and efficient 
manner. This builds public support for UHC and increases resilience by ensuring that people 
will defend a UHC system when opponents seek to dismantle it (Ottersen et al., 2017).  
 
All around the world, UHC systems are on the rise, making affordable care available to ever 
larger numbers of people (Hsiao et al., 2014). However, the task of ensuring health for all is 
far from complete, and there are still huge areas where access to healthcare is uneven or 
unavailable to many. The joint World Health Organization/International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank (2015) publication, Tracking universal 
health coverage: First global monitoring report, states that around four hundred million people 
in the world do not have access to essential and basic healthcare services, and estimates that 
around 6% of people in less developed countries fall  into poverty due to spending on healthcare 
(World Health Organization/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank, 2015).  
 
Several developed countries with established UHC systems face challenges in maintaining 
them (McKee et al., 2013; Reeves et al., 2015). Economic disturbances and austerity have 
affected some of the southern European countries, as well as some developing countries that 
previously provided relatively wide coverage, such as Venezuela (Bello et al., 2017).  UHC 
emerged in the mid-20th century, mainly in high-income countries, albeit in a period of post-
war austerity (Gupta and Chowdhury, 2014).  A review of this history is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  Suffice it to say that the national health service and social health insurance system 
approaches developed in European countries, evolved into two variants of UHC (the Beveridge 
and Bismarck models) that influenced former colonies and others attracted by Western 
approaches (Roemer, 1993). On the Asian continent, the “Tiger” economies, including Taiwan 
and South Korea, used their strong financial resources to implement diverse but effective health 
care systems under the banner of UHC. Later, as previously described, others such as Malaysia 
and Thailand also achieved UHC, but these newer systems too are now experiencing challenges 
of sustainability in times of financial restraint, population changes, and political turbulence 





Even African and Latin American pathfinder countries have been affected by the problems that 
maturing UHC systems face. In Ghana, a founder member of the Joint Learning Network, the 
introduction of a UHC program had initially brought a good basic benefits package, an effective 
payments mechanism, promotive health care and automatic enrolment of patients into the 
health care programs (Atun et al., 2015).  However, economic problems in recent years, 
together with the unwillingness of the Government to prioritise health over other areas of public 
expenditure, have resulted in a slowing of planned coverage expansions (Hsiao et al., 2014). 
This has led to a maldistribution of financial and human resources in health facilities in Ghana’s 
different regions, with a markedly better level of services in the Upper East Region of Ghana 
compared with less fortunate regions (Amoah and Phillips, 2018). 
 
Argentina provides an even more dramatic Latin American example of the fluctuating fortunes 
of a UHC system in a middle-income country.  Under Peron the nation introduced a progressive 
social health insurance and tax funded public system that seemed to offer high promise, but 
economic crisis in the 1990s, and restructuring and decentralisation after a World Bank rescue 
package, left the system in disarray.  By the mid-2000s it was being portrayed in the health 
policy literature as a prime example of social health insurance gone wrong (Lloyd-Sharrock, 
2006; Cavegnero, 2008), and of “an unequal struggle between equity and the market” 
(Penchaszadeh et al., 2012).  The recent history has been one of incremental change that still 
left significant coverage gaps and failed to address problems of pluralism and fragmentation 
(Belló and Becerril-Montekio, 2011; Boerma et al., 2014; Atun et al, 2015).  The system has 
been described as one of “nominal” or “aspirational” UHC, meaning that although there is near 
universal enrolment in programs, many people remain unable to access services (Rubinstein et 
al, 2018).  
 
 
2.4 Systematic comparison of UHC implementation in other countries 
Accountability, transparency and data revision are key to pinpointing areas for improvement 
when evaluating healthcare systems performance. Comparing other health systems offers 
policy makers a suggestion to improve their health system relative to their counterparts (Barua 
and Moir, 2020). 
 
This section examines the factors such as long-term political commitment, expanding financial 




countries using a systematic comparison approach and discusses which factors the writer thinks 
are missing in Nigeria. Two definite questions come to mind when evaluating the performance 
of Nigeria’s healthcare: (1) “what are the health outcomes of Nigerians?” and (2) “How is the 
Nigerian health system performing?”  
 
About 26 health indicators are carefully drawn out from the WHO, IBRD and the World Bank 
(2015; 2019) and Barua and Moir (2020) reports comparing the performance of several health 
systems committed to UHC. These 26 health indicators are categorised into three features 
focusing on (1) the structure of a health system, (2) the financing of a health system and (3) the 
performance of health systems (note that this feature further splits into indicators such as health 
outcomes, health and capital resources and incidence of catastrophic expenditure per cent (see 
Figure 12). Comparing the Nigerian health system to other countries with UHC provides a 
corresponding value of Nigeria’s structure, financing and performance. Furthermore, the 
countries picked for the comparative analysis were chosen based on the following criteria 
(WHO, 2015): 
• must be a United Nations member state, 
• must have UHC commitments, 
• and are categorized according to their income level. 
 
Figure 12 attempts to compare the health system performance of 20 countries committed to 
UHC and explores how their unique experiences can offer insights into the factors missing in 
Nigeria’s UHC pursuit. The missing factors emerging from the comparative approach include 
the following: long-term political commitment, expanding financial protection and addressing 





Figure 12: A health system features for selected countries within the global north and south. Source: WHO (2020); The World Bank 




Long-term political commitment: strong political leadership and long-term commitment 
alleviate the possibilities of achieving and sustaining UHC in many health systems. A political 
leadership capable of resilient mobilisation, adaptable and sustainable social environment can 
provide the political continuity that accommodates various stakeholders without losing sight 
of the UHC goals (Maeda et al., 2014). 
 
Thus, the commitment to UHC in 2014 by the Nigerian government is laudable, and further 
legal strides towards implementing health policies such as the Basic Health Care Provision 
Fund (BHCPF), the 2014 National Health Act (2014 NHAct) and the 1% Consolidation 
Revenue Fund (1%CRF) that ensure extra increases to public financing are a step in the right 
direction for the health system.  
 
However, these policies on their own cannot guarantee UHC in Nigeria. According to 
Aregbeshola (2017), Nigerian policy makers lack the political will to make UHC a reality and, 
without long-term political commitment, years of meticulously shaped policy solutions have 
little influence on UHC implementation (Maeda et al., 2014). 
 
Notably, achieving UHC is complex but possible, and requires cooperation between interest 
groups, policy makers, stakeholders and government officials to ensure its realisation within 
the stipulated date. The Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, is yet to demonstrate political 
will, similar to his predecessor (Former President Goodluck Jonathan) towards Universal 
Health Coverage implementation. Policy makers expect more response from the Buhari 
administration because the declining health outcomes affect socioeconomic development 
(Ewelike, 2020). 
 
UHC countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand and 
Mexico have achieved expanded health coverage through long-term political commitment. 
These countries adopted UHC initiatives in response to several social, political and economic 
crisis. For instance, Thailand, and Turkey’s pledge towards UHC occurred during a severe 
financial crisis that hit both nations; or Brazil through the democratisation movement; and in 
France and Japan through the post-World War 2 restoration efforts.  
 
Although these moments of crisis or upheaval mobilised national solidarity needed to embark 
on such a health system reform, these actions were not enough to drive and sustain the change. 




long-term reforms with the legal basis for UHC advocacy in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, France, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand and Mexico. 
 
For instance, it took Japan consistent political commitment to UHC since launching the 
residence-based National Health Insurance (NHI) under the National Health Insurance Law in 
1938 to health reforms in 2004. After World War 2, two-thirds of the population received health 
coverage until the National Health Insurance Law amendment in 1958, which authorised 
mandatory access to healthcare through reformed NHI programmes to all municipalities in 
Japan. Following this, health coverage in Japan expanded from the former sector to the 
informal sector, self-employed, farmers, vulnerable and unemployed individuals, achieving 
UHC by 1961 (WHO, 2018). Under a single payment scheme, healthcare prices are set 
according to the global price revision rate, which helps the Japanese government every two 
years to control public spending on health. In 2004, health reforms in Japan saw improvements 
in government-run hospitals with greater autonomy and flexibility to manage hospital affairs 
(WHO, 2018). 
 
These health systems demonstrate that attaining and sustaining UHC is a complicated process 
that involves a long-term political commitment that persists despite political change. 
 
Expanding financial protection: Financial protection is a vital objective of SDG-3.8, which 
ensures individuals get affordable care without becoming impoverished, and over 95% of 
uninsured Nigeria fall into poverty due to health-related costs. Consequently, Nigeria has a low 
life expectancy at birth (55 yrs.) in Figure 12 - almost twenty-nine years lower than Japan’s 
life expectancy at birth.  
 
Using the incidence of catastrophic expenditure (%) (total household consumption or income 
exceeding 10% or 25%) and out-of-pocket expenditure (OOP) indictors in Figure 12 to 
compare the level of out-of-pocket health spending with each country. Most notably, China 
and Nigeria have the highest percentage of incidence of catastrophic expenditure, with the out-
of-pocket health spending exceeding 10% and 25% of their household expenditure, 
respectively (WHO, IBRD and the World Bank, 2019). Nigerian households spend 15.1% on 
catastrophic OOP health payments, on average at a 10% threshold of total consumption 
expenditure, which is higher than Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, 
Thailand, Mexico, Ghana, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, India, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Liberia, Burkina Faso 





Aregbeshola (2019) attributes this excessive dependence on OOP expenditures to the failure of 
the NHIS whose objective is to prevent impoverishment from accessing healthcare. Since its 
inception in 2005, the NHIS has provided health cover to about 4.6% of the population leaving 
the remaining Nigerians spending OOP for care. Furthermore, the author states that many 
middle-class households experience higher catastrophic health payments than lower-class 
households because lower-classed households tend to pursue local herbal remedies or resort to 
self-medication. 
 
To crowd out the cost of OOP expenditure, the World Health Organisation (2015) suggests 
increasing public spending on health to facilitate health coverage expansion across the 
population. Although the WHO shows no direct link between increased public spending on 
health and financial health protection, experiences across several health systems show that 
increasing spending on health using organised financial mechanisms such as pooled pre-
payment mechanisms reduce OOP spending for many households (WHO, IBRD and the World 
Bank, 2019). For instance, many within the health communities encourage pre-payment 
financial mechanisms such as tax or social insurance as a better approach to reduce catastrophic 
health expenditure for many households. Countries such as Canada, the UK, France, Japan, 
Thailand, Mexico, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Ghana (with predominantly publicly financed 
system) show how pre-payment mechanisms reduce catastrophic health expenditure and 
impoverishment from healthcare consumption (WHO, IBRD and the World Bank, 2019).   
 
As a pre-payment mechanism, the NHIS Nigeria has failed to live up to its expectation of 
expanding access to affordable health services for uninsured, poor and vulnerable Nigerians. 
The failure lies within the government’s inability to match the 2001 Abuja declaration target 
of earmarking at least 15% of the annual budget for healthcare improvement (Aregbeshola and 
Khan, 2018). 
As countries become wealthier, their healthcare spending improves and substantial reliance on 
public expenditure phases out OPP over time, but there is an anomaly to this trend - the United 
States health system (WHO, 2003). The United States is the only country within the high-
income group that spends (approximately 18% of GDP) more on healthcare. With 27.2 million 
Americans without health insurance, higher healthcare costs are the root cause of household 





Several lessons demonstrate that achieving UHC is possible in Nigeria’s income level and 
experiences from other countries demonstrate that increasing public spending on health 
expands financial protection and crowds out catastrophic health expenditure and 
impoverishment. Without government action towards significant health reforms that increase 
health budget and reduce household reliance on OPP spending, achieving UHC in Nigeria may 
be far off.  
 
Furthermore, socioeconomic development supports health coverage expansion, but it does not 
guarantee equitable coverage. Many progressive Nigerian policy makers would prefer that the 
Nigerian government avoid enacting policies that evolve into a US-style health system (market-
oriented system) in favour of a welfare state-style health system (social-oriented system) seen 
in Europe (France, the United Kingdom, and Turkey) and Asia (China, Japan, Thailand, Viet 
Nam, and Sri Lanka). These health systems (that are all heralded as UHC success stories) are 
predominantly public health financing system capable of redistributing resources to reduce 
disparities in accessing health care services (Aregbeshola, 2019). 
 
Human resources for health: Figure 12 suggest that the health workforce density in Nigeria is 
among the lowest in the world at approximately 3.8 per 10,000 population for medical doctors 
and 11.8 per 10,000 population for nurses. For instance, in 2018, France indicated a workforce 
density of 32.7 per 10,000 population for medical doctors and 114.7 per 10,000 population for 
nurses, while the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Thailand, India and Sri 
Lanka indicated, respectively, 26.1/145.5 per, 28.1/81.7 per, 23.1/99.4 per, 21.6/101.2 per, 
8.1/27.6 per, 8.6/17.3 per and 10/21.8 per 10,000 population of doctors/nurses (WHO, 2020) 
(see Figure 1 for further comparison). The World Health Organisation (2016) found that 
approximately 1 in 4 doctors, and 1 in 20 nurses employed in Western countries happened to 
receive training from Africa, which instigates a shortfall of around 1.5 million healthcare 
personnel within Africa.  
 
Adeloye et al. (2017) attribute Nigeria’s underperformance in health outcomes to health 
workers relocating into high-income countries, and such setback results in a brain-drain on the 
health system. The brain-drain creates a massive gap in Nigeria's health workforce 
compounded by the government’s incompetence to deploy strategic national policy guidance, 





The workforce for health is central to Nigeria’s UHC ambitions, and this requires an efficient 
and productive distribution of health workers fit for purpose, which equips the health system 
to meet the growing demand for health (Szabo et al., 2020). 
 
Mature health systems with consistent political and technical commitment maintain and 
improve universal health coverage through reformist policies on the workforce for health 
(WHO, 2016).  
 
Every pathway towards UHC attainment differs according to contextual factors specific to the 
health systems, but efforts towards scaling up the health workforce distribution are similar.  
 
For many health systems, adapting to an analytical framework of the health workforce 
dimensions of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality is a well-known 
transformative process used to regulate the health workforce to meet growing healthcare 
demands (WHO, 2016).  
 
Allocating health workforce  is a technical and political process that requires stringent planning, 
coordination, education and management efforts on the part of the private and public sectors 
(Sales et al., 2013). Several authors with success stories show how their health systems align 
political commitment and thorough technical strategies on workforce resources for UHC 
achievement. For instance, Badr et al. (2013) present a case study on Sudan accomplishment 
for strengthening the human workforce for health through information, coordination and 
accountability mechanisms. Sudan’s health system, with political support, used a “country 
coordination and facilitation” mechanism to mobilise human resource for health experiencing 
worker shortages, deprived management and fragmented health services to establish a robust 
health information system and developed a participatory policy making responsive to universal 
health coverage achievement.  
 
Tangcharoensathien et al. (2013) suggested that Thai healthcare workers contributed to 
developing UHC in the health system. Pre-UHC achievement, Thailand was struggling with 
poor health outcomes, low health service coverage and a weak local health infrastructure which 
were improved through measures that redistributed the accessibility of health workers fit for 
purpose along national guidelines. Post-UHC achievement, Thailand, with the help of a sound 
HRH and governance, succeeded in increasing the capacity of nurses to 210% and doctors to 




and expanded health workforce resulting to a fountaining and attained UHC 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2013).  
 
Campbell et al., (2013) say substantial health workers and expansive health coverage fosters 
an effective and equitable UHC. In Mexico, health reforms between 1995 and 2003 increased 
the human resources on health policies to match the population demands. Programa de Calidad 
(PAC), an expansive health coverage programme initiated in 1996, addressed the inequity of 
health workers accessibility in underserved areas and adequately improved health outcomes 
for Mexico’s health system. For instance, the level of well-trained nurses and doctors increased 
80% (for nurses) and 170% (for doctors) outperforming the population’s health demands of 
30%. Furthermore, infant mortality and under-five mortality reduced from 32.6 to 14.6 per 
1000 live births and from 41 to 17.8 per 1000 live births respectively during this period 
(Alcalde-Rabanal et al., 2013).   
 
These success stories - from Sudan, Thailand and Mexico - show attempts of health outcomes 
by improving the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of the health workforce 
(Sales et al., 2013). Despite the contextual factors specific to each health system, Padilha et al. 
(2013) indicate that political leadership is central to HRH development and it ensures 
continuity, stability and coordination between different sectors and government officials on 
human resource development efforts. 
Lessons from these health systems suggest that substantial commitment from the Nigerian 
government towards improving human resources increases the likelihood of UHC achievement 
is needed. A Global Health Workforce Alliance (Campbell et al., 2013) report offers a 10-point 
agenda for success in strengthening the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of 
the health workforce in any health system context of universal health coverage. The 10-point 
agenda is as follows: 
• Understanding that health workforce is central to translating universal health coverage 
into good healthcare outcomes for the health system.  
• Providing competent and well-trained workforce required to compensate the 
population’s demand for health services.  
• Introducing national policy goals focused on improving healthcare workforce for the 




• Building an effective Information Technology (IT) system that encapsulates evidence 
base data and strategic intelligence needed to monitor, sustain, survey and manage 
policy objectives.  
• Monitoring and evaluating are key in sustaining the technical capacity to create and 
apply policies. 
• Increasing political will at all levels facilitates and encourages policy continuity that 
maintains UHC policy on the right path.  
• Systematic reforms on several governing institutions creates a stable environment for 
the healthcare workforce.  
• Adopting cost-effective measures for health workers reforms. 
• Reassure the international community of the government commitment toward 
substantial support and assistance for health systems development.  
• Increase collaboration with global associates in tackling technical difficulties by   
reinforcing appropriate global health governance and mechanisms 
 
The key lessons from the comparative analysis are consistent with evidence-based policy and 
practice. This section exposes missing factors such as addressing the human resources for 
health, expanding financial protection and long-term political commitment that is likely to 
facilitate Nigeria’s UHC attainment. With these missing factors in mind, the Nigerian 
government response through good governance, political commitment and strong leadership 
can meet the population health needs, achieve UHC and provide adequate service delivery, 
otherwise the prevailing health crisis may continue (Adeloye et al., 2017).  
 
 
2.5 Criticisms of UHC  
Regardless of UHC benefits, many criticise the UHC vision, or problems arising from the way 
it is implemented. Free market liberals warn that UHC advocates should not assume the values 
underlying the policy are shared by all (Missoni, 2010; World Health 
Organization/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2015). 
They point to the ongoing debate surrounding health reforms in the United States (which might 
be going the opposite way towards UHC under Obama’s ACA and President Biden promising 
more (Biden, 2021)), echoed elsewhere in the world, where some argue that health is a matter 




solidarity-based health programs that require mandatory contributions or support through 
taxation (Boudreau, 2017; Amadeo, 2020). Regarding the way UHC is financed, critics contend 
that developing countries are often compelled to comply with directions from international 
donor bodies, for example, to channel money towards selective interventions, such as the 
GOBI-FFF program (advocated by UNICEF) rather than investing in a wider range of primary 
healthcare services (Verrecchia et al., 2018; Reis, 2016; Brearley, 2013; WHO, 2013).  Another 
issue is the tendency of international agencies to provide consultancy that recommends 
something resembling a standard package.  This is probably less of a problem than in the past, 
but it is important to understand that UHC is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach and needs to be 
tailored to suit particular national contexts (Cheng and Wilson, 2015). 
 
There are, however, undeniable criticisms facing many health systems with UHC, especially 
towards their policy approach tailored to their national context. Some mature and successful 
UHC health systems still encounter unintended consequences (such as the overall deterioration 
in the quality and variety of health services and persistent health inequities) caused by their 
policy approach (Lim, 2019; Krugman, 2021). A brief outline explores the policy criticisms 
from three mature health system – the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France - 
purposefully selected for having achieved UHC through various pathways, such as 
comprehensive coverage, single-payer coverage, regulated private health coverage and mixed 
public-private coverage (Montgomery, 2020). 
In the Netherlands, the government implemented the 2006 health reforms to transit from an 
ineffective public and private insurance system to a regulated private health coverage system. 
The government under the Authority for Consumers and Markets, Health Care Authority and 
the Health Care Institute act as a regulator for the health insurance scheme responsible for 
healthcare competition, price, care quality standards and basic health package (Altenburg-van 
den Broek and Lynch, 2010). 
 
After these reforms, the Dutch health system ensured every individual access to quality and 
affordable care and, through mandatory health insurance and managed competition, achieved 
UHC with a UHC service coverage index of 86. Improvements in the Dutch health outcomes 
saw life expectancy at birth move from 78.2 years in 2000 to 81.6 years in 2015, above the 
OECD average (OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017). 
 
The transition towards a regulated private health coverage system improved the mortality rates, 




hospitalisations and survival rates showed better estimates than the OECD average due to 
efficient primary and secondary care. Although mortality rates on non-communicable diseases 
caused by tobacco use, obesity, and alcohol demonstrate a mixed picture, the Dutch 
government is attentive to the health issue (OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies, 2017). 
 
Figure 13: A marketplace of health insurance groups in Netherland. Source: Lynch and 
Altenburg-van den Broek (2010). 
 
Despite access to quality health services, good health outcomes and stable public funding in 
the Netherlands, critics argue against the managed competition as a guiding principle of its 
health reform in creating market value and curbing healthcare costs (Lynch and Altenburg-van 
den Broek, 2010). They consider the Dutch health system an exceedingly uncompetitive 
oligopoly market where, since its 2006 health reforms, approximately 88% of the market share 
is captured by the four largest health insurance companies (see Figure 13) (Dutch Health 
Authority, 2010).  
 
Notwithstanding the government's intention to reduce healthcare costs and create value for the 
consumer through market competition, the health market still emerges as oligopolistic. Even 
supporters of the Dutch health system consider its health insurance market very uncompetitive. 
 
Since 2008, the oligopolistic market has grown to a point where health insurance companies 
are able to use their buyer power (monopsony) to negotiate with pharmaceuticals companies. 
There is now, in many instances, less competition and consumer choice. Hence, rather than 




supply-side influence with health insurance companies (Altenburg-van den Broek and Lynch, 
2010). 
 
In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service (NHS) adopts a single-payer system to 
achieve universal health coverage, but with a small private sector providing elective surgery, 
and nursing home care. Unlike its European counterparts, the NHS provides healthcare free at 
the point of contact. European counterparts such as France, Germany and Italy adopt a social 
health insurance system of universal health coverage backed by the government with healthcare 
financing mechanisms similar to the NHS. In contrast to the NHS, where the entire population 
has free health coverage, countries like Germany, Italy and France have a considerable portion 
of its citizens without public insurance cover but having subsided private insurance cover 
(Dayan et al., 2018; Krugman, 2020; Montgomery, 2020). 
 
The writer’s analysis shows a mixture of opinion of the NHS performance where its supporters 
are highly impressed with the system, and its critics allege that the system does not perform as 




Figure 14: Percentage of patients seen within four hours for medical consultations. 
Source: Dayan et al./Health Foundation (2018).  
 
Compared to other OECD health systems, the NHS is good at reducing the financial risk of 
healthcare costs at the point of consumption, making the British less inclined to postpone 
getting medical treatment due to cost. Consultations in the UK are free, lower than the OECD 
average (see Figure 14), higher than countries such as Germany (2.6%), Spain (2.8%) and 




almost 4.2% of British people only avoid health consultation because of travel cost and the cost 
of abstaining from work (The Commonwealth Fund, 2017). 
 
NHS waiting times and patient treatment satisfaction compares well with similar health 
systems. While data are limited, a Commonwealth Fund report suggests that 88% of British 
people have to wait few hours to receive treatment when visiting the Emergency Department 
(because these visits are not all emergencies, and there is a triage system where patients who 
visit the Emergency Department without urgent medical need become less of a priority) (see 
Figure 14) (Molloy, Gardner and Thorlby, 2017). Furthermore, the NHS performs well on 
waiting times for selected procedures such as cataract surgery and hip and knee replacement. 
For instance, only the Netherlands (37 days) and Italy (50 days) publish shorter mean average 
wait times for cataract surgery than the UK (73 days), while hip and knee replacements waiting 
times for the UK have a mean average of 97 days above the Netherlands (42 days) and below 
Spain (150 days) (OECD, 2017; 2018). 
 
The NHS is well-organised in providing low administrative costs and cheaper use of generic 
medicines (Dayan et al., 2018); however, critics still call attention to several problems, such as 
low efficiency and underproduction or overproduction of care existing within the health system 
(Xie, 2012). 
 
Low efficiency: this is a problem created when the government's intervention on a particular 
health issue is exacerbated, thereby running the risk of discouraging motivations. For instance, 
nurses and doctors within the NHS are public servants employed by the government without 
profit-seeking motivation. The after-effects create long waiting queues at hospitals and a 
bottleneck of patients requiring free and non-urgent treatment, making the system operate slow 
and inefficiently. A proportion of patients then move towards private care for diagnostic 






Figure 15: The performance of lethal diseases and other fields in the National Health 
Service UK. Source: Dayan et al. (2018) 
 
Low efficacy translates into poor healthcare outcomes, which essentially influences the quality 
of the NHS. For instance, compared to the United States, the NHS performs poorly on 
successful medical care that could save lives. Figure 15 shows a summary of how well the NHS 
performs in each of the 12 most lethal diseases. Most notably, health outcome measures for 
lethal diseases such as breast, colorectal, lung and pancreatic cancer show relatively low 
performance (see Figure 15) (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016; Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement, 2018).  
Underproduction or overproduction of healthcare: in a single-payer and socialised medicine 
system such as the NHS, the supply and provision of healthcare services is publicly funded by 
the government budget centrally into the NHS, leaving the health system at risk of 
underproduction or overproduction (specifically where untested drugs/treatments are used) for 
care. There is a divide of information or asymmetric information between central planners and 
consumer demand for health (this is equally true of other systems, especially private provision 
in the US), in effect improbable to deliver health services at an optimal level (Xie, 2012).   
 
The Nigerian health system if it is looking to adopt the UK health system approach towards 
achieving universal health coverage should build an institution that provides doctors and GPs 
a comprehensive assessment to deal with the low efficiency issue (as is also being done in the 




a managed competition among health providers could regulate underproduction or 
overproduction of healthcare, emphasising consumers’ right to choose hospitals freely. 
In France, the healthcare system was ranked number one by the World Health Organisation in 
2000 (Rodwin, 2003). France adopts a mixed public-private system of universal health 
coverage structured around the Bismarck approach where the entire population has compulsory 
health coverage through the statutory health insurance system (SHI), which extends to every 
worker (in 1945), seniors (in 1945), self-employed (in 1966), unemployed (in 2000) and 
immigrants (in 2016) (Tikkanen et al., 2020). 
 
With health spending over 11% of GDP above the OECD average (8.8%), the French health 
system covers the costs for a comprehensive health service, which includes hospital, physician, 
prescription drugs and long-term care, and excludes co-insurance, co-payments and 
consultation charges that exceed government contributions. SHI is financed primarily through 
employee and employer payroll tax, self-employed income tax, national income tax and 
earmarked tax, state subsidies and tax levied on tobacco and alcohol (Tikkanen et al., 2020). 
 
Health spending per GDP in France improves health outcomes and patient satisfaction where 
OOP expenditure represents 2% of household expenditure (because 95% of the population own 
supplemental insurance, which reduces OOP cost on services such as dental, hearing, and 
vision care) (OECD,2019). 
 
Furthermore, the curative care or medicine displays a high standard in its 30-day mortality rate 
after heart attacks and strokes of about 20% and 10% lower than the OECD average. The 
French health system is considerably better at preventing hospitalisations for asthma and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (at 150 per 100,000 population) less than the OECD 
average (of 237 per 100,000 population), while avoidable admissions for diabetes and heart 
failure are above the OECD average. Antibiotics prescription in France is 25% above the 
OECD average (OECD, 2019). 
 
Criticism of the French health system exists despite its achievement of universal health 
coverage under a public-private health insurance system; critics identify prominent health 
disparities associated with the mixed public-private system model (Rodwin, 2003; Vigneron, 
2012).  For instance, the geographic distribution of health resources creates disparities in 
mortality outcomes across France. Under the SHI, where equality is the catchphrase of the 




services reduces as the geographical distance extends from urban to remote areas (Vigneron, 
2012). For instance, many public health policy solutions attend more to urban areas than in 
remote areas. In France, the number of doctors in remote areas is 2.7 doctors per 1 000 
population, compared with a 3.9 per 1 000 population in urban areas (OECD, 2019). Some 
critics suggest that a geographical analysis of the health system can help spread access to 
medical services to undersupplied areas and people most in need of care.  
 
Another criticism is the perceived problem of uneven distribution of quality health services 
where some listed hospitals in France are considered dangerous to the public due to low-quality 
care delivery. The lack of coordination and case management services by these hospitals has 
increased the awareness of healthcare issues surrounding patients with chronic diseases and 
older patients. Critics suggest these issues are aggravated by the radical nature of the French 
health system (Rodwin, 2003; Vigneron, 2012; OECD, 2019), but it ranked first in the world 
in 2000. It still comes out well in rankings, although ranking depends on what is seen as most 
important (see Global Burden of Disease Study 2016) (Ryan et al., 2017). 
 
Moving forward, UHC in Nigeria needs to learn from these experiences, acknowledge the 
problems associated with the various health financing models and provide credible policy 
solutions that fit its national context before reforming the healthcare system towards UHC 2030. 
 
 
2.6 Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in Nigeria  
The push towards UHC in Nigeria is often discussed in the context of its disappointing 
outcomes on key health indices. Nationally, Nigeria ranks among the worst performers on 
indices of global health issues and is ranked among the 10 worst countries in the world with 
respect to disease burdens (Muhammad et al., 2017). Most notably, Nigeria has the highest 
global burden of malaria, with about 40 per cent of global malaria deaths occurring in the 
country. 90 per cent of Nigerians are at risk of malaria, which kills more than 300,000 Nigerians 
annually, and with 11 per cent of maternal deaths linked to the disease. Furthermore, Nigeria 
is rated as the second worst country with respect to maternal and child deaths globally, second 
only to India. Some 15 per cent of global maternal deaths occur in Nigeria alone, and the deaths 
of new-born babies in the country represent a quarter of the total number of deaths of children 
under five worldwide (Thisday, 2018). Many reform advocates see UHC as the crucial policy 




to ensure that all citizens have access to affordable and high-quality healthcare. Nonetheless, 
critics note that in 2017 73 per cent of Nigerians were still paying out of pocket for their 
healthcare (Aregbesola, 2017). 
 
The path towards UHC in Nigeria has been long and not always smooth. The country's first 
attempt at building a healthcare system was made in 1962, when the then Federal Minister of 
Health, Dr. M. A. Majekodunmi, presented a bill to parliament for enactment in Lagos, though 
the bill was rejected. In 1988, the then Minister of Health commissioned a committee that 
recommended the template for the present-day National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). The 
law was signed into force in May 1999, but only became operational in 2005 (Medical World, 
2015). The original intention had been that the NHIS would expand to provide UHC within ten 
years (Adewole and Osungbade, 2016), but at the time of the study still covered only a very 
small percentage of the population (estimated by the FMoH (2016) as around 3%). This left 
Nigeria at a critical inflection point in its effort to improve access to healthcare and to move 
towards UHC. President Jonathan had made a formal declaration at the African Presidential 
Summit on UHC in 2014 committing the country to achieving UHC, and in October of that 
same year the National Health Act (NHA) was signed into law, providing a legal framework 
for healthcare provision to Nigerians and for the organization and management of the health 
system, and earmarking finance to support progress towards UHC. Yet at the time of the 
fieldwork the strength of this commitment and the pace of future progress remained uncertain.  
 
In Nigeria the chosen route to UHC was health insurance through the NHIS (Onoka, Hanson, 
and Hanefeld, 2015; Okpani and Abimbola, 2015; Adewole and Osungbade, 2016). NHIS’s 
main formal sector social health insurance scheme, which covers all federal government 
employees, as well as organised private sector enterprises with at least 10 employees, is funded 
through payroll-based premiums. NHIS in Nigeria functions as a pre-payment plan, where 
participants pay a fixed regular amount. These funds are pooled, and the finance is channelled 
to Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) to pay for those needing medical attention. As 
such, it is primarily a risk-sharing arrangement, which can improve resource mobilisation and 
equity. The NHIS operates as a regulator overseeing the HMOs, and co-ordinates and manages 
several insurance schemes aimed at particular groups alongside the main Formal Sector 
Program (NHIS, 2018). 
 
The NHIS has implemented community-based health insurance (CBHIS) programmes for 




schemes are based on a community or occupational group, with a requirement that 50 per cent 
of the group or a minimum of a thousand members enrol in a new scheme.  Members are 
required to pay monthly or seasonal fees in advance, which is a challenging requirement for 
poorer people. Additionally, the NHIS oversees targeted schemes for children under five, 
tertiary-level students, prison inmates, disabled persons, and the police, armed forces, and other 
uniformed services. 
 
To speed up the attainment of UHC, legislation of the Health Act allowed states to create their 
own health insurance schemes. Many states have taken advantage of this opportunity, including 
Lagos, Oyo, Ekiti, Delta, Bayelsa, Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Kwara, Abia, Adamawa, Kano, 
Anambra, Sokoto, and Enugu states (Awosusi et al., 2015). Nonetheless, most states have been 
reluctant to join because of the anticipated increase in wage bills. Some states like Lagos, Ogun 
and Kwara are also implementing CBHIS. The NHIS schemes are relatively unusual in that 
they give private sector health maintenance organisations (HMOs) a substantial role by 
licensing them to facilitate the provision of healthcare benefits to scheme members, something 
that is said to have discouraged some states from getting more closely involved (Onoka, 
Hanson, and Hanefeld, 2015). The financial contribution coming from the public insurance 
schemes is relatively low because of the low levels of enrolment, even by African standards.  
A recent four-nation study showed that health insurance uptake in Nigeria lagged behind uptake 
in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania (Amu et al., 2018). As fieldwork was drawing to a close, some 
stakeholders concerned with low uptake, including the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Health, Senator Lanre Tejuoso, were pushing for policy change to make the scheme mandatory 
for all Nigerians (Ojo, 2018). 
Nonetheless, under the present system healthcare public provision is limited.  Over 70 per cent 
of Nigerians lack insurance coverage and rely mainly on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments to 
access healthcare. Critics argue that this is a major factor in explaining low life expectancy, 
and the myriad poor health outcomes that affect Nigeria (WHO, 2017). Statistics show that the 
level of OOP expenditure as a share of total health expenditure in Nigeria remains at 72 per 
cent, the highest on the continent and one of the highest globally. This poor performance is 
particularly notable when compared with OOP expenditure in poorer countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as Kenya (26 per cent) and Gabon (22 per cent). Even countries afflicted with 
conflict and post-conflict like South Sudan (54 per cent) and Sierra Leone (61 per cent) are still 







2.7 Policy actors involved in UHC Nigeria discourse 
According to Walt (1995), actors involved a health policy process are a group of individuals 
or organizations with influence who shape health policy in the direction of achieving policy 
solutions. Policy actors involved in health policy are either state actors or non-state actors could 
on one side or the other side of the policy process use their influence to determine the policy 
outcome. Many policy analysts consider state actors such as the federal government, Ministry 
of Health and other government parastatals the most influential in the policy process due to the 
influence they possess over the rule of law and state budget. Hall (1978) also mentions a list of 
hypothetical non-state actors such as interest groups, opposition political parties, the electorate, 
trade unions, non-governmental organizations, external governmental agencies and UN bodies 
that as usual participant in a policy process.  
 
What defines the result of a health policy is the role each actor plays and the influence of 
prominent actors, in combination with the relationship among actors in both state and non-state 
settings. They have been different actors who have paid crucial roles in the UHC Nigeria 
implementation process. The ways in which these actors interact with each other have 
expanded, as have the state and non-state networks concerned with the UHC discourse in 
Nigeria. The idea of a policy network can be used to describe, explore and understand the 
interconnections between actors (Lewis-Lettington and Munyi 2004).   
Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 260) state ‘. . . focusing on policy networks will never provide an 
adequate account of policy change, because such networks are but one component of any such 
explanation’, focusing on the relationship between state and non-state networks poses 
questions regarding accountability (for example, who sets the policy agenda), as well as 
interdependence in policy processes (where sovereignty lies). Using networks allows an 
exploration of such fundamentals which contributes to understanding changing policy 
processes and policy environments.  
 
Scholars have used the idea of ‘policy networks’ to demonstrate the complexity of creating 
policy and the relationships between different state and non-state actors. The policy networks 
involved in UHC discourse have through investigation provided insight into policy 





In some situations, interactions may be highly contentious, with non-state networks urging the 
state to shift position. This can enable the federal government or the Ministry of Health to fund 
projects, programs and policies which are geared towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 
in Nigeria (This Day, 2018). For instance, policy actors such as civil society organizations 
(CSOs), Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), UN bodies, USAID, the Health Reform 
Foundation of Nigeria (HERFON) and Economic Community of West African States  
(ECOWAS) persistent push for the one per cent Consolidation Revenue Fund (1%CRF) and 
the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF) influenced the National Assembly to shift their 
policy in Nigeria, relating to its inclusion in the 2014 National Health Act in the 2018 budget 
(Hafez, 2018). 
 
The inclusion of one per cent of the consolidate revenue fund to the allocation of the health 
sector in the 2018 budget was hailed as monumental (Onyeji, 2018). Many policy makers 
believe that the one per cent Consolidation Revenue Fund (1%CRF) can change the trajectory 
of the country’s health system (Onyeji, 2018).  Provided by the 2014 Health Act in 2018 budget, 
the one per cent of the Consolidated Fund to made available to provide what we called the 
Basic Health Provision Fund, and that Fund will be invested through Social Health Insurance; 
Primary Healthcare Revitalization, Accident and Emergency Management and Critical Needs; 
Research and Development; Recruitment and Training of quality healthcare providers at the 
primary care level. The implementation of the one per cent Consolidated Fund is one of the 
major opportunities that has provided the Nigeria health system for achieving the Universal 
Health Coverage policy (Alawode, 2018). 
 
The NMA was a contributor, with other stakeholders, in getting the healthcare bill through the 
senate committee on health by making UHC their ‘rallying cry’ over the year after the 
introduction to the 2014 National Health Act and beyond the act coming into effect in 2016 
after 10 years of consideration. The National Health Act was signed into law in 2014, after 10 
years of consideration. The Act aims to establish a framework for the Regulation, Development 
and Management of a National Health System; to achieve the Universal Health Coverage and 
meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The NMA had over the years protested the 
non-implementation of the National Health Act. They threatened the federal government with 
a lawsuit as well as embarked on a bi-weekly protest march to urge the lawmakers to include 





The NMA is at present involved in influencing UHC health policy formulation in an ad hoc 
manner. This also involved in many of the government’s activities, it is consulted formally by 
the government only on an ad-hoc basis in respect to UHC policy. This is done by making 
unsolicited recommendations to government on various health issues and also by making inputs, 
whenever invited, to some of the UHC committee meetings on policy formulations 
(Iheamnachor, 2018; Obinna, 2018) 
 
In alternative situations, state and non-state actors create collaborative relationships where the 
former can achieve policy goals with assistance from the latter, even when they are looking 
after their own interests (Rhodes 1988; Tantivess and Walt, 2008).  
 
Key policy actors enable collaboration and coordination of activities or efforts, the exchanging 
of information and the construction of common knowledge (Stone 2001) in ways which support 
UHC policy outcomes. Such achievements, where they result in several key policies which 
were formulated and put forward, help enhance UHC implementation in Nigeria. During the 
Ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) with Prof Eyitayo Lambo as 
Minister of Health, the agenda was to reform Nigeria’s health and bureaucratic systems which 
to the creation of an NHIS programme with the purpose of attaining an expansive health 
coverage by 2015 (Umeh, 2015).  
 
The FMoH, State Ministry of Health (SMoH), Federal Government, UN Bodies, development 
partners, private providers, private employers, HMOs and NMA were key networks involved 
in moving Nigeria towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) (Onoka et al., 2013). The agenda 
was set for solving the problem of access to quality health care services and health status of the 
citizens through the formation of a National Health Insurance Scheme, which in 1999 was a 
step towards UHC (assumed to be the solution) (Onoka et al., 2013). Becoming operational in 
2005 with the help of the public-private-partnership between the NHIS, Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) and other health care providers (Onoka et al., 2013). Whilst the NHIS 
shapes health insurance policy through the licensing of HMOs which operate the health 
insurance business, it also accredits health care facilities so that they can provide benefit 
packages to registered enrolees. HMOs have responsibility for the purchasing of health care 
services on behalf of the scheme for registered enrolees. To ensure population coverage, the 
scheme has specific programs for different areas of society. These are the Formal Sector Health 
Insurance Program for the Federal Civil servants, Urban Self-employed Social Health 




Social Health Insurance Program (also covers pregnant women), Permanently Disabled Social 
Health Insurance Program, Prison Inmates Social Health Insurance Program, Tertiary 
Institutions and Voluntary Participants Social Health Insurance Program and the Armed Forces, 
Police and other Uniformed Services Insurance Program (captured under the Formal Sector 
Program). Out of all of these programs, only the Formal Sector Program is functional (Ele et 
al., 2016).  
Those in charge of the scheme are held to account by trade union criticism, mostly from the 
NMA, over the handling of the NHIS as a health insurance regulator. However, the NHIS has 
responsibility for accrediting HMOs and health care providers HCPs, as well as ensuring rules 
of engagement compliance (HMOs and HCPs), it does not the power to enforce these as they 
were multiple complaints about the HCPs or the HMOs or made by the HCPs about the HMOs 
or vice versa and are rarely appropriately addressed. Pressure from the NMA and existing trade 
unions forced the government, through the FMoH, to respond to the unacceptable events within 
the Nigerian scheme, through commitment and willingness, to achieve comprehensive health 
sector reforms. A 2006 revised health reform stated that provision of adequate and sustainable 
finance is crucial for effective, efficient and equitable health system performance. Guided by 
the National Health Policy, the National Health Financing Policy 2006 is committed health 
financing fairness and has been recognized as one of the goals of achieving UHC in Nigeria 
(Campbell et al., 2014).  
 
Despite the World Health Assembly’s 2005 resolution on UHC financing, Nigerian progress 
on the UHC policy, in comparison to their African peers, is still lagging behind. UN body 
progress metrics suggest that the Nigerian health system requires more than a cosmetic change 
– it needs radical reform to improve its performance. In 2014, WHO and the World Bank 
offered a framework for monitoring UHC advances towards a focus on indicators and targets 
for service coverage including promotion, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and palliation—
with financial protection for all. Pressure on the FmoH and the government to reach a critical 
inflection point in its efforts to expand healthcare access, and to move towards UHC resulted 
in Nigeria's UHC Declaration which was adopted at the Presidential Summit on UHC in 2014 
(WHO, 2014). 
 
Collaboration took place between key policy actors to support the government’s move towards 
universal health coverage (UHC). The former President Goodluck Jonathan presented to the 




Legislators, Health Commissioners, Traditional Rulers, development partners among others, 
concluded with the Presidential Summit Declaration on UHC. In conjunction with the National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), Minister of Health, Minister of State for Health World Bank 
Representative in Nigeria the meeting assembled top policy actors whose focus was 
campaigning for effective coverage towards universal health coverage in Nigeria (Awosusi, 
2014).  
 
There may be difficulty in pinpointing certain events where interactions have occurred between 
policymakers, but through using social network analysis and policy process theory the study 
can identify possible alliances, partnerships, interactions within the UHC discourse (Tantivess 




There is a large literature on UHC, which ranges from case studies of the original UHC 
countries in the global North to case studies of recent UHC success stories in the global South.  
Much of the literature takes a normative stance that described the benefits that UHC can 
provide in terms of improved health and well-being, in reducing social inequality, and 
contributing to economic growth.  While the author is sympathetic to the values that underlie 
the drive for UHC, the arguments about the value of healthcare coverage for all as a public 
good are less relevant to this thesis than what we know about the problems of developing and 
implementing UHC policies.  The literature review shows that there are many “overviews” 
studies of the policy stories of different UHC country stories, and especially accounts of the 
conditions for successful implementation or what happens when reforms go off track. But our 
knowledge is thinner when it comes to the detail of what happens when a country that was not 
a UHC pathfinder responds to current messages from the WHO and others that UHC is possible 
almost everywhere and initiates a policy debate about how to introduce its own program of 
UHC reform.  That is the gap in respect of which this thesis seeks to make a contribution. 
 
Almost by definition the countries that have already achieved UHC generally possessed more 
of the prerequisites for major health system reform than those that did not.  In a sense the 
countries now starting out on this path are the more difficult cases, partly in terms of levels of 
wealth and baseline positions in terms of existing health expenditure and infrastructure, but 




the UHC path. We cannot therefore assume that research reports of policy formation in the 
UHC pathfinder countries will tell us what will happen when similar processes are enacted in 
countries like Nigeria.  On the one hand the environment is different because the lessons of the 
pathfinder countries are now being disseminated by a range of international bodies, networks 
and campaigning groups, and on the other, domestic political, institutional and economic 
conditions may be less favourable to UHC reform.  Nigeria is a wealthy country by African 
standards, but one whose level of investment in its healthcare system is markedly lower than 
several regional comparator countries.  It therefore makes a useful case study for research on 
the UHC policy discourse in a country that can be seen as a trend follower rather than a trend 
































This study makes use of two frameworks for analysing policy making: Walt and Gilson’s (1994) 
policy process model and social network analysis (SNA), especially as developed by Lazega 
(1997). The policy process approach was developed by a research group at the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (Walt, 1994; Gilson et al., 2008; Buse, Mays and Walt, 
2012; Gilson, Orgill and Schroff, 2018), and has been widely applied in studies in developing 
countries, often by doctoral students. SNA is a well-established and highly technical approach 
with an array of tools for measuring and analysing various relationships within a social network 
(Borgatti et al., 2013). In the author’s view, the two approaches complement each other well. 
Policy process studies set out to investigate (using the concept of power and Kingdom’s 
multiple stream framework) how actors interact to make policies in particular social contexts, 
while SNA involves quantitative analysis to delineate the boundaries of a policy network and 
the patterns of relations between actors within it.  
 
Because identification and description of a policy network is a foundational exercise on which 
a more in-depth account of the dynamics of influence and power in the policy making process 
can be built, the empirical chapters that follow will examine the quantitative SNA data before 
the qualitative interview data.  However, because policy process writing is likely to be more 
accessible to most readers than the more highly technical SNA approach, we will reverse that 















3.1 The policy process approach 
Two components of the policy process approach that are central to the present study are the 
policy triangle and the conceptualisation of power in policy making. 
The policy triangle is a concept intended to represent central dimensions of the policy process: 
actors, content, process, and context (Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16: Policy analysis triangle.  
Source: Buse, Walt and Mays (2012). 
 
Buse, Mays and Walt (2012: 9) acknowledge that this is a “highly simplified approach to a 
complex set of inter-relationships” and that the triangle is “like a map that shows the main 
roads but that has yet to have contours, rivers, forests, paths and dwellings added to it”. They 
emphasise that the four components must be seen as operating in interaction rather than 
isolation, and also highlight the power dimension, which they state must be included in any 
analysis so as to take account of the important place of politics in policy analysis. 
 
Actors are at the centre of the triangle, and include not only individual actors, but organisations, 
such as civil society groups, international bodies and government departments and parastatals.    
Actors may form alliances or networks, so that the pattern of relationships is crucially important 
in policy process studies.  Buse, Mays and Walt (2012) maintain that a variety of actors will 
try to exert influence over the direction of policy, and that their ability to do so will depend 





Policy content may vary on a number of dimensions that make policies more or less hard to 
deliver, such as complexity, scope, cost, place in the overall government policy programme, 
and degree of consensus or controversy. Where there is more than one route to a policy 
objective such as UHC, the selection of the mechanism to bring the desired outcome about, 
such as public health insurance, may itself be a matter of debate.  Even if there is broad 
agreement that such a mechanism is preferred over alternatives, there may still be considerable 
controversy about the form of the insurance scheme or schemes selected and the respective 
roles of public and private sectors. 
 
According to Buse, Mays and Walt (2012: 13) the policy process encompasses the “ways in 
which policies are initiated, developed or formulated, negotiated, communicated, implemented 
and evaluated”.  They direct attention to the processes, trajectories or chronologies that shape 
policies as they move from initial conception to rollout in a healthcare system.  Many early 
writers on the policy process, such as Lasswell (1956) and Howlett and Ramesh (2003) identify 
a number of stages of the “policy cycle” but differ regarding just how many stages are present.  
Walt et al (2008) opt for the four stages of agenda setting, policy formation, implementation 
and evaluation. The notion of the policy cycle was intended to describe a characteristic 
sequence of stages through which a policy passed as it progressed to have real world impact. 
In recent years the stages approach has been criticized for over-simplifying the complex 
trajectories, with frequent overlaps or undulations, that real-world policies follow.  However, 
some argue that the “stages heuristic” remains useful for conceptualising the broad sweep of 
what is inevitably a fluid policy process and helps us to more easily label the literatures 
concerned with aspects such as agenda setting or implementation (see: Cairney, 2013). The 
author acknowledges that policy formation, implementation and evaluation may overlap and 
interact, but takes the view that it remains useful to distinguish implementation from policy 
formation, not least because policy actors themselves often refer to these aspects of the overall 
policy process.   
 
One aspect of process that is rarely discussed is the period of time over which a policy is 
implemented, which as Sabatier (1999) points out can often be very lengthy.  Sabatier (1999: 
149) writes of the “desirability of longitudinal studies of a decade or more” and suggests that 
“early implementation studies using time frames of 3-4 years resulted in premature assessments 
of program performance”. It can be argued that reforms that take too long to implement may 




favourable combination of circumstances that raised a policy high on a government policy 
agenda is eroded with the passage of time.  This may mean that implementation efforts are 
driven by different groups at different times, and that there are ebbs and flows in the degree of 
governmental support.  For example, Intaranongpai and colleagues’ (2012) study of the Thai 
UHC reforms over a ten-year period describes how the pendulum swung between top-down 
and bottom-up influences as the organisational framework changed and new alliances between 
interest groups were formed.  The history of UHC reform efforts in Nigeria is a lengthy one 
that involves moments of what appeared to be rapid progress and pauses when little advance 
was possible, and this is part of the background to the ongoing UHC policy debates examined 
in the present study. 
 
At the top of the policy triangle is context.  Context refers to the political, economic and social 
environment in which policy is formulated.  A developing country such as Nigeria provides a 
very different context from a Western country such as the United Kingdom in terms of 
geography, GDP, demography, culture, religion, history, and political system. Collins, Green 
and Hunter (1999) discuss context and health sector reform and remind us of the need to link 
“policy context with an overall understanding of the policy process, the “messiness” of policy-
making, the interrelationship between the contextual factors, [and] the contextual factors 
interpreted by policy actors” (p.1).  The nature of social institutions, both in terms of the formal 
organisations that make up the governmental and healthcare sectors, and their characteristics 
ways of operating, is a major contextual factor (Scott, 2013).  This extends to the institutional 
configuration of the healthcare system and the pattern of relationships between the central 
health ministry and its parastatals or decentralised tiers, which in Nigeria includes the state and 
local government levels. The present thesis seeks to put into context the collective and 
individual behaviours of the actors involved at these levels in establishing Nigeria’s UHC 
policy. The act of placing something in context – contextualising it – is both methodological 
and substantive. From a substantive perspective, it involves the identification of constraints on 
the behaviour of those involved and the opportunities available both to them and to others. 
From a methodological perspective, it is an essential part of comparative analysis and is 
necessary if results are to provide satisfactory answers to the research questions (Silverman 
and Gubrium, 1994).  
 
Buse, Mays and Walt (2012: 9) emphasize that the policy triangle is a “highly simplified 




roads but that has yet to have contours, rivers, forests, paths and dwellings added to it”. They 
caution that the dimensions of actors, content, process and context interact with each other and 
cannot be analysed in isolation and argue that the framework puts politics at the centre of policy 
analysis.  
 
Other writers, who are otherwise broadly sympathetic to the policy process approach, have 
criticised the policy triangle for paying insufficient attention to additional factors that influence 
policy. For example, Shiffman and Smith (2007) describe a framework of ideas, the power of 
actors, and environment, and describe “issue characteristics” (specific features of particular 
issues) that can affect policy.  John (1998) and Howlett and associates (2009) produced a 
framework of ideas, institutions and interests (the “three I’s”) to show how these forces shape 
policy making. Both of these frameworks share many of the assumptions of Walt and Gilson’s 
original approach. These friendly critics take the view that the policy process perspective can 
be enhanced by greater attention to institutional theory, the impact of organisational rules and 
norms in relation to policy processes, the characteristics of issues, and actors’ purposive action.  
 
Buse, Mays and Walt (2012) argue that politics is “omnipresent” in the policy process, and 
they see power is a key component of their theoretical framework, especially in relation to the 
connection between actors and process.  Among their concerns are the distribution of power 
within the network of policy actors, how different groups exercise power, and how power 
shapes decision making. 
 
There is, of course, a huge political and social science literature on the conceptualisation of 
power and how this aligns with various overarching theoretical frameworks. The policy process 
approach defines power as the ability to influence policy decisions, and especially to control 
use of resources (Buse, Mays and Walt (2012: 20).  The three dimensions of power identified 
by these writers are power to make decisions, power as non-decision making, and power as 
“thought control”. The first, based on a classic study by Robert Dahl (1961), is concerned with 
how successful different actors and groups are in exercising direct or indirect influence on 
policy making. The second aspect of power as non-decision making refers to the ability of elite 
actors to prevent certain issues from rising on to policy agendas, thus ensuring that they are not 
widely debated or translated into proposals for reform. The final dimension of “thought control” 
is based on Steven Lukes’ (1974) claim that elites use insidious means to shape public 
perceptions of reality through socialisation, mass media propaganda and other forms of 




established UHC policy rather than agenda setting, the notion of power as influence over policy 
decisions is probably most relevant for us, but we will return to the various aspects of power 
later in the thesis. 
 
Buse and associates (2012: 10) suggest that power is not always manifest in a rational process 
through which individual actors realise favoured policy objectives, but often in struggles 
between groups or factions. They suggest that power may not so much reside in individuals, 
but in “policy networks”, sets of connected actors inside and outside government in a particular 
sector who seek to influence policy (Buse, Mays and Walt, 2012: 91).  In a country such as 
Nigeria, with a well- developed apparatus of central government, and also a relatively strong 
level of state governments, these networks are quite extensive and have complicated 
relationships with international bodies and actors in domestic non-governmental organisations. 
Policy process writers acknowledge the likelihood that network actors will come together in 
alliances and coalitions, borrowing ideas in part from writers such as Kingdon (1984) (policy 
entrepreneurs) and Sabatier (1988) (advocacy coalitions).  The conclusion must be that making 
policy is rarely a rational process but is iterative and is influenced by the various actors. 
Lindblom (1959) described policy making as a process of “muddling through”, while Cohen, 
March and Olson’s (1972) “garbage can model” portrays organisational decision making as a 
sometimes-chaotic process, in which solutions may only be loosely connected to problems.  
 
It is worth noting that a number of more recent policy process studies pay greater attention to 
the network concept. Quissell and colleagues (2015; 2018) examine the emergence of 
transnational networks to control tuberculosis and pneumonia and argue that network formation 
can be seen as an outcome of the policy process linked to the alignment of problem, politics, 
and policy streams, as in Kingdon’s (1984) three streams approach.  Shearer and associates 
(2018) look at the issue of whether network structure affects policy innovation, taking the case 
of how research evidence was utilised in three policy networks in Burkina Faso.  This study 
marks a shift of emphasis from the earlier studies in that it moves more explicitly to utilise 
SNA tools and concepts, in particular measures relating to network closure and heterogeneity. 
Interestingly, the wider study (Shearer et al., 2016) combines elements of SNA with the “three 
I’s” framework of institutions, interests and ideas, based on Peter John’s (1998) book.  The 
author was unaware of these recent developments when he conceived the idea of combining 
SNA and the policy process approach, but this parallel development suggests that this may 




LSHTM group is innovative and interesting, their use of SNA tools is so far quite limited. The 
present research attempts to go a step further by bringing a wider range of SNA techniques into 
an integrated study.  
 
The present study sets out to examine UHC policy making in Nigeria in context.  The policy 
process approach sets out to unravel the complexity of power and process that underpins the 
UHC policy discourse. It tries to reconstruct the story of the reform process. SNA approaches 
the contextualisation of the behaviour of the various actors in a different way by identifying 
the network in which they operate and measuring various aspects of network relationships.  In 
essence it describes the social environment in which the actors operate, in effect, inductively 
modelling the structure or relational pattern of the social setting in which the observed action 
takes place. Participants are clustered in subsets according to criteria that may include political 
alignment, social ties, obligations, and influence over decisions (Miller and Dingwall, 1997). 




3.2 Power in health policy  
According to Buse, Mays and Walt (2012), power refers to the ability an individual or 
organization has to influence a desired outcome. In regard to UHC Nigeria implementation, 
the idea of power is in decisively influencing individuals or groups irrespective of their 
intentions or will (Buse et al., 2012). Consequently, health systems are influenced by power 
dynamics underlying societal interactions. This is because power can be assumed by particular 
groups in a health system who can influence the direction of health policy, and, if powerful 
group interests are unrepresented in the present institutional structure, they will use persuasion 
to turn the issue to their advantage (Khan, 2010). Naturally, power is the primary focus of many 
social and political theories. Additionally, power is occasionally tightly concentrated among 
particular actors, e.g., policy elites (Wright Mills, 2000).  
 
To recognize how an individual, organization and network derives power is crucial to increase 
understanding of how and why power flows in a direction or accumulates in a particular group. 
This understanding also assists awareness of how the power sources are unevenly distributed 




The student aimed to provide greater engagement with the power concept to guide other policy 
analysts focusing on mixed methods analysis in Nigerian UHC discourse. Our focus is the 
narrow power role in shaping health policy and systems functioning, instead of exploring 
power as a determinant of health outcomes (e.g., in the context of social position or 
macroeconomic structures). To analyze power distribution in Nigerian UHC discourse, this 
section focuses on understanding the nature and forms of power, and how exercising power 
supports and opposes, facilitates policy change, in addition to how it underpins change 
resistance (Sriram et al., 2018).  
 
UHC Nigeria analysis draws on power as decision making, a part of the three dimensions of 
power developed by Steven Lukes (1974) which are as follows: power as decision making; 
power as non-decision making and power as thought control (Buse, Mays and Walt, 2012). 
Power as decision making is a dimension of power that emphases the actions of individuals or 
group’s ability to influence policy decisions (Buse, Mays and Walt, 2012). Hence, this explores 
the identity of the different groups of policy actors or policy organizations and their relative 
power which will help understand the politics surrounding the policy process of the UHC 
process in Nigeria.  
 
This is because the extent of power assumed by a certain group within a health system can 
directly influence the course of any health policy; meanwhile if powerful groups’ interests are 
not met from the current situation from the institutional structure, they will lobby in other to 
overturn the issue to their benefit (Khan, 2010).  
 
Robert Dahl’s (1961) classic study concludes about who has power by examining the available 
preferences of interest groups and making a comparison with policy outcomes. He discovered 
that the resources conferring power on citizens and interest groups varied and that these 
resources were unequally distributed: while some individuals had plenty of some political 
resources, they were poor in others. Thus, different individuals and groups were able to exert 
influence on different policy issues. These findings caused Dahl to conclude that different 
societal groups, including weak groups, could ‘penetrate’ the political system and exercise their 
power over decision makers according to their preferences. While some people directly 
influence key decisions, defined as the successful initiation or vetoing of policy proposals, most 
had indirect influence by voting power. The range of resources which can be used in health 





As hypothesized by Lavers and Hickey (2015:10–11), in a competitive political setting where 
elite policy actors are excluded from the ruling coalition are powerful and where the ruling 
coalition has little autonomy from its supporters and the population in general, healthcare 
policies or programmes are more likely to derail. Rulers have an incentive to turn them into 
clientelist channels of redistribution and sites of rent capture to accommodate the powerful 
opposition or reinforce the loyalty of their supporters. Implementation of healthcare policies 
and programmes might also suffer because ‘‘the more powerful lower-level factions become, 
the greater the number of points at which the enforcement of particular rules can be blocked” 
(Khan, 2010: 65).  
 
However, criticism of Dahl’s analysis suggests that his observation on policy issues fail to 
recognize the possibility that dominant groups exert influence on the policy agenda towards 
their goal and away from acceptable concerns. On the contrary, the second dimension of power 
developed by Steven Lukes (1974) articulates differently, power as ‘non-decision making’ 
involves “the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision making to safe issues by 
manipulating the dominant community values, myths and political institutions and procedures” 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963 p. 641). 
In this dimension of power, Nye (2002) conveniently differentiates ‘non-decision making’ into 
hard and soft power where hard power illustrates the carrot and the stick approach and soft 
power relies on co-opting actors towards your interests, goals and objectives through resources 
such as culture, values, ideas, and institutions. Hence, draws attention to what and who 
persuaded the Nigeran government towards UHC implementation as a policy agenda and this 
is beneficial in understanding the concept of legitimacy in Nigeria’s policy-making process.  
 
Furthermore, the third dimension of power conceptualizes by Lukes (1974) is ‘power as though 
control’, and it is a form of power that shapes the preferences of other policy actors and their 
perceptions of what is in their interest. In this dimension, Lukes consider this form of power as 
‘supreme’ and ‘most insidious, which manipulates actors away from their interests, perceptions 
and cognitions or from contesting the policy ideas present to them either because there are no 






This highlights the fact that wider bodies of power theory (from Steven Lukes’ (2005), a 
prominent policy theorist, characterized three faces or dimension of power) offering insights 
into the emergence of power in UHC discourse, how it is channeled, and how power is overtly 
or covertly expressed.  Finally, power taxonomy developed by Steven Lukes (1974) 
characterized an important domain of power analysis, focusing on how actors might extract 
power from specific sources such as resources, skills, knowledge, access or individual 
attributes. Recognizing how individuals, organizations and networks derive power is vital to 
increase understanding into how and why power flows in a particular direction or accumulates 
in groups. This understanding also aids awareness of how those power sources are unevenly 




3.3 Multiple stream framework 
The previous section uses the policy process model to explain Nigeria’s UHC reform from 
agenda-setting to policy formulation, policy implementation and policy evaluation. According 
to Roberts et al. (2004), each policy stage carries the flow of political or non-political events 
that need a continuous theoretical analysis to capture any policy change. 
According to Buse, Mays and Walt, in exploring the flow of events with Nigeria’s UHC policy 
process, a good starting point of an analysis is the agenda-setting stage which identifies how 
policy problems/solutions get onto the government agenda and how the response to these issues 
is crucial to the study. 
Numerous studies on agenda-setting, commonly use the Hall model and Kingdon’s multiple 
streams framework model, two prominent theories best known for evaluating how problems 
enter the policy agenda. These two theories are simple and easy in assessing the agenda-setting 
stage of the policy process. The Hall model responds to the legitimacy, feasibility and support 
of how the policy issue and the solution enter the government agenda. However, Kingdon’s 
multiple streams framework centres on the policy process and the actors involved, which is a 
research objective of this thesis (see page 30). 
 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) suggests that agenda setting is affected by 
three parallel streams in the policy making process (the problem stream, policy stream and 




an idea ‘whose time has come’ moves on to the government’s policy agenda. The coming 
together of streams creates a time-limited ‘window of opportunity’ when a policy may be 
translated into legislation and then real-world change. This is illustrated in Figure 17, which is 
based on the MSF as developed by Ashford et al. (2006). 
 
 
Figure 17: A theoretical framework for understanding how the UHC policy rose to the 
top of the government’s policy agenda. Source Ashford et al. (2006).  
Key: WofO* = Window of Opportunity 
 
 
Kingdon’s framework would predict that, during Nigeria’s pre-UHC period, the streams flowed 
along different channels until conditions changed to bring them into at least partial alignment 
and open a window of opportunity (see in-depth analysis in Chapter 6). These three parallel 
streams - the problem, policy, and political streams - have the following features (Beland and 
Howlett, 2016): 
1. The problem stream (growing awareness of health and health policy problems) exposes 




through health indicators, public opinion or sudden health crisis (like a pandemic, 
epidemic and endemic) and then work to get government to respond.   
2. The policy stream (policy responses to address perceived health system problems) 
occurs when policy experts scrutinize and suggest policy solutions to the issues. In this 
stream, ideas are floated around and narrowed down to a particular solution.  
3. The political stream (the political climate) involves the political factors that converge 
the other two streams, such as national elections and pressure group activism 
programmes.   
 
Kingdon (1984: 21) understands agenda-setting as how “the separate streams of problems, 
policies, and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to 
problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces.” According to Kingdon 
(1984), these three independent streams flow through a policy window opening, which gets the 
problem recognised by government action or inaction. The policy window opens under certain 
circumstances, such as election events, socioeconomic crisis or budget deadlines and is taken 
advantage of by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in a policy subsystem to advance their self-interest 
(Howlett, 1998). 
 
Policy entrepreneurs are actors existing within the policy subsystem who take the opportunity 
to influence and shape the outcomes of the three streams and their convergence to their 
advantage. Furthermore, policy entrepreneurs who have the ears of influential officials are 
more likely to advance their self-interests because they can propose a set of ideas when the 
opportunity arises (Zahariadis and Exadaktylos, 2015).  
 
To successfully analyse Nigeria’s UHC with Kingdon’s MSF, much of the agenda-setting 
strategy will depend on how various policy entrepreneurs marshal their arguments on the 
substances of the policy solution to the issue revolving around the health system.  “The content 
of the ideas themselves, far from being mere smokescreens or rationalizations, are integral parts 
of decision making in and around government” (Kingdon, 1984: 133).  
 
Furthermore, the Kingdon model appeals to Cohen et al.’s (1972) ‘garbage can’ theory of 
organisation which rejects the fact that decision-making occurs in a linear progression where 
policy makers identify problems, bureaucrats with comprehensive analysis provide several 
responses and the government officials pick out the best response. The ‘garbage can’ phrase 




dumped in a place. For Cohen et al. (1972), deciding on a policy solution to issues is messy, 
ambiguous and time-consuming to generate the feasible response. Sometimes the phrase ‘an 
idea whose time has come’ emphasises how policy makers wait for the right opportunity to 
present policy solutions to government officials or the wider policy communities.  
When compared to other policy making theory, such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) and punctuated equilibrium, Kingdon’s MSF model is applied mostly around US policy 
making and less in other countries. Yet, Cairney and Zahariadis (2016) consider the model 
applicable without difficulty in any country’s policy making processes because it suggests a 
systematic insight to identify multiple stream events and windows of opportunity that brings 
issues to the any country’s policy agenda (Cairney and Zahariadis, 2016).   
 
Furthermore, Cariney and Jones (2016) suggest that the MSF model can identify several 
universal elements, such as ambiguity, competition for attention, an imperfect selection process, 
limited time and a departure from ‘comprehensive rationality’ and a linear decision-making 
process within the agenda-setting process. 
 
Howlett et al. (2016) examine the capabilities of the multiple streams framework and ascertain 
that it is possible to combine the MSF model with other approaches, such as the ACF and policy 
process theory, to create a representative analysis that captures diverse features (such as the 
intricacy of policy drivers, involving shift in political ideology and government interventions) 
during policy making.  Their interpretation suggests that combining the MSF with such 
approaches provides a superior analytical framework for policy making instead of having 
competing approaches or zero-sum alternatives. 
 
Furthermore, Kenis and Schneider (1991) complement network analysis and policy process 
analysis by using network analytical methods to identify and reconstruct complex policy games, 
i.e., relationships or patterns of strategic actions between a set of actors in policy formulation 
and implementation. In this approach, network analysis can be used as a measurement tool for 
game-theoretical models. Network sampling methods could be used to specify boundaries for 
the identification of aggregate or collective actors, and to identify relationships between players, 
which are fundamental for a given game (e.g., information structures on mutual payoffs). 
 
Similarly, Nagel et al. (2017) integrate the MSF model with the policy network analysis (using 
social network analysis tools) to examine a recent climate change policy in Germany and Japan 




information exchange network connection in Germany than in Japan because an integrated 
network leads to a more progressive institutionalised policy in Germany compared to Japan. 
They argue that the integration of policy network analysis with MSF offers a precise and 
formalised analysis of identifying more or less policy network integration. 
 
MSF is a matured policy framework with recent dynamic development calling for better 
conceptualisation, operationalisation, and empirical application. To contribute to this 
momentum, we aim to develop the concept of network integration by enriching it with 
quantitative policy network analysis. We argue that it is possible to apply policy network 
analysis to MSF to indicate more or less integrated policy frameworks and that this application 




3.4 Social network analysis 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) describes the relationships connecting people in a given social 
circle (Chanut et al., 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 2009; Jang, 2012; Borgatti et al., 2013). Its 
origins lie both in mathematical graph theory and social science. Graph theory makes available 
a set of abstract concepts and methods for the analysis of graphs that can be utilised to map 
social networks. Other analytical tools come from social science, including methods used for 
the visualization and analysis of social networks.  
 
According to Shearer et al. (2016), SNA provides a set of tools for investigation of social 
behaviours and their effects. The behaviour of the actors can be placed in context by network 
analysis on the basis of a description and inductive modelling of the structure, or pattern of 
relationships, of the social setting in which an action takes place. Specific data are collected on 
exchanges and relationships between network members and analysed with the aid of various 
pre-specified procedures. 
 
SNA scholars maintain that a great deal of social behaviour is shaped by the structure of social 
networks (Wasserman and Faust, 2009; Borgatti et al., 2013). Lazega (1997) sees the 
interactions between actors as having theoretical priority over the individual character of the 
actors.  Social action is seen as being embedded in a network of relations, so that it must be 




actions in isolation. Examples include government systems which require politicians and 
officials to interrelate effectively, and national economies in which actors depend on money 
that changes hands many times (Borgatti et al, 2013). 
 
SNA may be approached either quantitatively or qualitatively. As well as mapping networks 
using quantitative techniques, SNA can shed light on the nature and meaning of social 
interactions within the network (Crossley, 2010; Fuhse and Mützel, 2011; Bellotti, 2015; 2016; 
Hollstein, 2016). In particular, writers have point to the ability of SNA to shed light on the 
context in which actors interact by investigating the way the group environment is structured 
(Lazega, 1997; Bellotti, 2015).  Usually, qualitative analysis is introduced as an additional 
component in a mixed methods study, rather than an alternative to quantitative SNA (Crossley, 
2010; Edwards, 2010). According to Wonodi (2012), SNA is well suited to mixed methods 
research because it helps to place actors’ interactions and meanings in the context of the 
patterns of network ties (see also: Ryan, Mulholland and Agoston, 2014); this works 
particularly well in the case of interactive networks such as communication or influence 
networks. 
 
Mixed methods and SNA has become increasingly popular in sociology and political science. 
It has been used to answer a wide variety of research questions including how social 
movements are formed and how formal and informal networks come to exist both inside and 
between institutions (Ryan and D’Angelo, 2017; Ahrens, 2018). Crossley (2010: 2) has argued 
that, while the formal structural mapping of networks provided by quantitative SNA studies is 
valuable, there is a risk this neglects social process and agency.  Crossley points out that the 
interactions that produce network “ties” also generate shared meanings, norms and identities 
that tend to be overlooked in quantitative analysis. He points to the value of studying networks 
as “social worlds” and suggests that SNA can benefit from incorporating ideas from 
sociological symbolic interactionist theory and the associated methods of participant 
observation and qualitative interviewing, which can be combined with more conventional SNA 
analysis (Crossley, 2010: 2-3). Reason why the thesis uses a qualitative survey.    
 
There is now a growing number of mixed-methods or qualitative network analysis studies of 
policy networks (Schindler, 2006; Sandström, 2008; Sandström and Carisson, 2008; Schiffer 
and Hauck, 2010), and this seems a promising line for development.  Quantitative data on 
formal structural properties of networks, such as degree of closure, flows of information, advice, 




combined with qualitative data on actors’ subjective perspectives, aims, ideologies and vested 
interests.  Such studies have covered both domestic policy networks and supra-national 
networks, such as those formed by international civil society organisations or regional blocs 
like the European Union (Schmidt, 2013; Verloo, 2006). Such studies allow structural network 
characteristics to be visualised and combined with qualitative insights on the dynamics of the 
policy process and its wider societal context. 
 
SNA typically uses visualisations to illuminate network structures.  Wonodi (2012) describes 
SNA as a research method that uses visual representations to illustrate social phenomena and 
the interactions that take place between individuals in a social circle. The research method 
engages with social systems on the basis of the relationship between the actors (or “nodes”) 
that constitute the systems. Emmanuel Lazega (1997), for example, used SNA to describe and 
inductively map dialogue patterns and relational structures between judges working in the field 
of patent law in EU countries. He used it primarily for the investigation of, and extraction of 
information about relationship patterns and ways of exchanging advice and information 
between judges lobbying for the construction of an EU patent court. 
 
 
Figure 18: A simple network graph. 
 
 
An SNA can comprise a number of “nodes” which represent individuals or organisational 
actors, which are all conceived as active agents. Nodes will most frequently be either 
individuals – doctors, perhaps, or hospital managers – or collectives (groups of doctors or 
hospital managers). The connections that join nodes together are relationships that may be 




et al, 2011). Figure 18 shows a diagram (in blue) containing six nodes, each of which represents 
policymakers in the Nigerian health system. In this diagram, the only relationship shown is 
between SMoH and Gs5 and the other four nodes exist in isolation, but when every node has 
been tied into the social setting it becomes a network circle. The SNA researcher must 
understand that there may or may not be ties between some nodes while the analysis is in 
process (Park et al., 2012). The four completely detached nodes shown in Figure 18 are known 
as ‘isolates’ which will be discussed further below.  
 
 
Figure 19: A complete directed network graph. 
 
Networks (such the graph in Figure 19) provide a way to think about relationships between the 
nodes that constitute the system.  
 
Network analysis has to do with structure and relative position, and a large collection of 
concepts have been developed to measure structure and position. Various theoretical concepts, 
such as structural equivalence and centrality (see below) are used to measure and quantify the 
character of nodes and their ties (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011).  
 
 
3.5 Concepts utilised in SNA 
A graph can represent relationships in a social network in a quantitative way and translate data 
into a visual diagram (Borgatti et al., 2013). SNA has its own specialist language, partly 
borrowed from mathematical graph theory.  For example, a vertex is an endpoint for two or 
more lines (essentially another term for a node in an SNA graph), while an “edge” is a line 




represent ties. Vertices can also describe points or nodes; edges (ties) are connected to two 
vertices.  
 
The mathematical representation of a graph might be:  
(U, V) = e (G). 
 
When two vertices (U, V) are linked by an edge e, they are said to be adjacent. Hence, the size 
of the graph G is the total number of e (edges, ties or vertices) which makes the size of the or 
represented in mathematically equation above (Diestel, 1990). Where two vertices (for example, 
SMoH and Gs5 in Figure 18) connect to the same edge they are said to be incident. Rather 
confusingly, if the vertex A is connected to an edge e, then A may also be said to be incident 
on- e (vertex-edge incidence).  In graph theory, the “degree” (of connectedness) of a vertex is 
the number of edges that are incident to the vertex. In plain English, a node that connects with 
three other nodes has a degree of 3. Graphs may represent ties between nodes as being directed 
or undirected. A directed graph is a network with arrows attached to the ends of the edges. A 
directed edge between two nodes (otherwise known as an arc) may be able to reverse direction, 
depending on the nature of the network activity under consideration. Figure 18, for example, 
shows a set of vertices (Hospital manager, WHO, SMoH, NHIS, Doctors and Gs5), and one 
edge between SMoH (the State Ministry of Health) and Gs5 (a State government official of 
health). Directionality in this arc might indicate, for example, that the SMoH allocates funds to 
a state government official Gs5, and not the other way around. However, if the visualisation 
was constructed to represent patterns of advice-giving rather than financial flows, the arrow on 
the arc might be reversed.  
Every so often, vertices may express attributes such as qualities, motivations, properties or 
relationships other than actors that tie with actors in the network graph. (Robins, Lewis and 
Wang, 2012). Figure 18 illustrates a simple unipartite network with one kind of node 
(policymakers) represented by six actors. These six policymakers are the same type of node 
with a relationship, an interaction or an edge between the SMoH and Gs5 node can assume 
different forms of relational data such as advice, coalition or members of a discussion group. 
In any case, Robins, Lewis and Wang (2012: 377) insinuate that in unipartite networks, “there 
may be ties between nodes of different types but not between nodes of the same type.”  Bipartite 
networks consist of a two nodal type network where ties/edges connect actor y to organization 







Figure 20: The Hamlet network (Moretti, 2011). 
 
To provide a further illustration of how SNA is conducted, Figure 20 reconstructs the network 
of actors within Shakespeare’s play, Hamlet.  It depicts a typical undirected graph containing 
edges without directional arrows. An undirected graph is used to describe links and ties where 
it is not necessary to know the direction or where there is reciprocation. An example might be 
a graph of the audience members at the premiere of a movie in which, within a network where 
there is no verbal interaction, individuals are asked whether or not they saw named others. 
 
The network should not be seen as a unitary entity because actors form relationships of different 
kinds for different purposes, and the same actors relate on multiple dimensions, which can each 
be said to constitute a different network. As mentioned in an earlier example, the ties in a 
network concerned with financial flows are likely to be different from ties in a network 
concerned with the flows of advice, even though many of the individual actors involves are 
present in both networks.  
 
According to Lazega (1997), social networks typically consist of subsets of actors, who are in 
regular interaction with each other. Such subsets can be identified, and the nature of their 




• The distance or density of ties between actors, so that a clique is formed from a subset 
of actors who have direct, strong ties with each other.  
• Structural similarity among actors. In this case, the subset into which similar actors are 
grouped may be called a cluster, a position, or a clique.  
 
In this way a visual map is created of different subsets or clusters where the subset is made up 
of actors who interact with each other according to specific criteria (Lazega, 1997). Figure 20, 
for example, is a representation of Franco Moretti’s (2011) analysis of the web of relationships 
between characters in the play Hamlet. The principal character, Hamlet, is the central node, 
and the diagram reconstructs the ties/edges between this actor and other actors (nodes) in the 
network circle (Moretti, 2011). It can be seen that apart from the cluster around the central 
node (degree 16), there are clusters around the important nodes of Claudius (degree 13) and 
Horatio (degree 12), as well as some smaller clusters centring on Ophelia and the Queen.  
 
The ties between each node tell us something about the roles of the main characters and the 
groups that form around them. That is, in the language of SNA, a character can be categorised, 
to list some possibilities, as a connector, a leader, a bridge, or an isolate. Various concepts are 
used to characterise relationships between proximate nodes. For instance, two nodes with no 
direct tie may appear not to be connected, but information may still be passed between them 
through ties to intermediary nodes. In the Hamlet network a path of this kind may exist between 
the Priest and Reynaldo via Laertes and Polonious.  
 
According to SNA terminology a path is any sequence of non-repeating nodes that connects 
the two nodes of interest. Therefore, the sequence involving the Ambassadors, Horacio, 
Fortinbras and the Norwegian captain is a path, while the sequence encompassing the Queen, 
Ophelia, Polonius, Queen, Gentleman is not a path because the Queen features twice. The part 
of the sequence between the Queen and the Gentlemen is referred to a trail, because in a trail a 
node is revisited, but no edge is traversed more than once. A sequence that moves through an 
edge more than once is neither a path nor a trail and is referred to as a walk.  For example, the 
sequence Claudius- Queen- Guildenstern- Claudius- Queen- Horatio revisits both a node 
(Queen) and a tie (between Claudius and the Queen) and is therefore a walk.  A walk traverses 
a sequence of nodes and ties, doubling back to re-visit at least one tie (Borgatti et al., 2013 and 




traversed. In the view of Borgatti et al. (2013) and Prell (2012) all paths eventually lead to a 
trail, which leads on to a walk.  
 
Components in graph theory are portions of a network that are not connected to each other. 
They are subgraphs within which any two nodes are connected to each other by paths, but there 
are no ties to any additional nodes in the wider identified network (the “supergraph”). In 
essence, a component is a group of nodes that are able to interact, via established ties and which 
will remain connected if an additional node is inserted. Many real-world networks have 
multiple components.  
 
Bridges are formed when the tie between two nodes forms the only link (“cut-point”) between 
two positions of a network. If this tie were removed the network would divide into two separate 
components or networks. In Figure 20, the link between (Claudius, Osric, and Queen) and 
(Horatio), if broken, will result in two separate subgraphs with Horatio at the centre of one and 
Claudius at the centre of the other. Isolates, as the term suggests, are nodes that are 
disconnected from other nodes. In Figure 18, the Hospital manager, WHO, Doctor, and NHIS 
nodes are not connected to other nodes and so are isolates. SMoH and Gs5 would be termed 
pendant vertices, meaning that they connect to only one other edge (degree 1). The edge 
between them is known as a pendant edge, because it links two pendant nodes. 
 
A number of critics have suggested that a gap exists in SNA theory because the emphasis is on 
description rather than theory (Granovetter, 1979; Burt, 1980; Salancik, 1995).  It may be 
argued that the play network which Moretti (2011) constructs to visualise relations between 
characters in Hamlet is a descriptive and not a theoretical analysis.  
SNA makes available a number of techniques for measuring such network characteristics as 
autonomy, centrality, cohesion and structural equivalence (Prell, 2012). For example, Boyer et 
al. (2010), illustrated the usefulness of SNA in investigating relationships between doctors in 
a French hospital by describing centrality, prestige and clique formation, with the aim of raising 
healthcare quality and improving staff welfare by achieving better relationships between 
medical professionals.  
 
SNA analyses commonly seek to attach values to the ties (edges) between actors (nodes) so as 





SNA has a number of ways of conceptualising, measuring and analysing actors’ positions in 
the network.  Seeing a visual representation of the network can provide a qualitative 
understanding that would be difficult to gain through numerical data alone. As we saw in the 
figures above, a network diagram comprises points that represent nodes and lines that represent 
ties. The points and lines have various characteristics that can be represented through shape, 
size and colour in order to communicate information about the nodes and their 
interrelationships. In the next section, the visualisation of social networks will be discussed, 
and the discussion will distinguish between the elements themselves and the way they are 
graphically represented. Further examples will be provided to show ways in which certain 
issues of visualisation can be addressed and (especially in large networks) network complexity 
can be reduced (McGrath, Blythe and Krackhardt, 1997). 
 
 
3.6 Social network analysis and policy process in health context 
Volumes of academic work combining policy network analysis and policymaking theories 
spanning over three decades and have extended vastly through topics varying from local, to 
state and to international levels of analysis (Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Schneider, 1992; 
Thomson et al., 2006; Witte et al., 2000). 
 
“Policy network analysis or policy network” was first termed by Katzenstein (1976) in a study 
comparing French and United States economic policies (Knoke, 2014). 
 
Other policy theorists add that applying SNA into policymaking can define the policy concerns 
or consequences using a structural network of actors competing and cooperating within a 
particular policy environment (Knoke, 2014), and this is because SNA analytic assessments 
have an array of models, ideologies, and propositions to explain different features of policy 
networks (Robins, Lewis and Wang, 2012). 
 
This section defining policy network and other corresponding policy concepts adopted by many 
analysts, examines crucial developments of studies applying policy networks in policy 








3.6.1 Understanding policy network 
A policy network like any social setting consists of a group of actors interacting in several ways 
in order to achieve a given objective, where actors within the network serve either as individual 
persons (such as Bill Gates, Greta Thunberg or the Clintons) or individuals representing 
organizations (NGOs, External Government Agencies, UN Bodies, political parties, labour 
unions or legislatures) at the state and global level of analysis (Knoke, 2014). For instance, 
Kenis and Schneider (1991) perceive the policy network as a set of public and private corporate 
actors developing relationships through the exchange of information, expertise, trust, and other 
political resources.  
 
Corresponding policy concepts such as the policy game; the policy regime; the policy sector 
(see Benson, 1982); the policy domain (see Laumann/Knoke, 1987); the policy system for 
actors (see Sabatier, 1987); the policy community (see Jordan/Richardson, 1983; Meny, 1989); 
and the policy arena develop theories in parallel with policy network when describing certain 
phenomena (Kenis and Schneider, 1991). For instance, a well-known concept, the ‘policy 
domain’ shares familiar boundaries with the policy network where actors’ predispositions are 
considered social construct of their environment and their behaviour surrounding decision 
making occurs as a result of interacting with other domain respondents (Laumann and Knoke, 
1987). 
 
Policy domains exist within several sectors such as defence, education, agriculture, social 
welfare, health, and transportation (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Burstein, 1991). According to 
Konke and Laumann (1982: 256), policy domain in any policy process “identified by 
specifying a substantively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation among 
a set of consequential actors concerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting courses of 
action (i.e., policy options) that intend to resolve the delimited substantive problems in 
question.” Both concepts (the policy network and the policy domain) recognize that a social 
environment system is bounded by actors’ interconnection with each other (Knoke, 2014), 
while other policy concepts accentuate special features (Kenis and Schneider, 1991). For 
instance, the policy arena concept examines policy making practices within institutional 
structures whether focusing on institutional conflict and institutional integration.  
 
The policy network approach combines well with many social science disciplines such as 




diverse understanding of how well network analysis works and what a policy network approach 
categorically infers in policy analysis (Börzel, 1998; Carlsson, 2000; Kickert et al., 1997). 
Combining social network analysis with policymaking contributes to the creation of a rich 
mixture of policy models and theories that can evaluate, detect and tackle policy issues, policy 
actors and policy solutions with feasible options. For instance, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s 
(1993) advocacy coalitions, Hjern and Porter’s (1993) implementation structures, Jordan & 
Schubert’s (1992) iron triangles, Heclo’s (1978) issue networks, Jordan’s (1990) policy 
communities, and Rhodes’ (1990) sub governments are all policy models or theories included 
in this category. 
 
Understanding social network analysis in policymaking is required to examine the thesis’s 
research questions and achieve the research objectives. Hence, empirical investigation of UHC 
Nigeria policy reflects a series of “actions taken by members of a group to further their common 
interests” (Bogdanor, 1987: 113) and the social interactions among policy actors involved in 
UHC Nigeria is perceived as “problem-specific entities, organizing a policy area by different 
forms of collective action” (Sandstrom and Carlsson, 2008: 508). Furthermore, the thesis 
adopts similar perspective to policy networks as Sandstrom and Carlsson (2008), where 
networks are structured social environment which involves diverse relationships of policy 
actors engaged in a process for the collective good of their interests and policy solution. 
 
Despite the significant development of policy networks in policymaking research, several 
critics suggest that the concept of policy network analysis is incapable of producing substantial 
metaphorical use and a coherent theory (Carlsson, 2000; Dowding, 1995). They express 
concern that the concept of policy networks is more or else a descriptive metaphor 
demonstrating the materialization of certain key political events occurring from a group of 
interactive actors mostly at a macro level and should not be treated as theoretical models 
capable of explaining policy change or outcome (Dowding, 1995).  
 
Proponents suggest that the challenging question of adopting network analysis is by asking are 
beneficial to the topic? A formalised SNA through quantifying social interactions, mapping 
network structures, and statistically examining social networks increases the potential for the 








3.6.2 Origins of Policy networks 
This section presents three key geographical origins of the policy network approach in 
policymaking, which come under a fair amount of dispute by many policy analysts (Peterson, 
2003). Richardson (2000: 1006) states “British origins of what is now termed the network 
approach.” Rhodes (1990: 32) agrees that “American political science was not the major 
formative influence’ on early work which sought to make sense of the British ‘post 
parliamentary’ state using network analysis in the late 1970s.”  
 
Firstly, Laumann and Pappi (1976) ushered German literature of community power into new 
directions. They revealed in a study that the public policies of a small German town were 
influenced by the collective effort of multiple networks of elites. Their approach began to 
spread within German public policy analysis seen in studies such as Laumann and Knoke’s 
‘The Organizational State’ (1987), which extended network analysis of power structures to 
national policy domains. The organizational state research puts forward the idea that national 
policy domains are complex social networks between formal organizations and not elite 
individuals. Laumann and Knoke’s (1987) reveal that the power structures within a formal 
organization are organize in complex patterns of networks such as communication, resources, 
reputations, and political support among organizations with partially overlapping and opposing 
policy interests. Henceforth, many in Europe have taken into the network approach on policy 
analysis. 
 
Secondly, in Britain, many political scientists in the 1980s moved closer to policy network 
analysis as policymaking began to shift away from entrenched sub governments (such as 
ministerial-level policy domains) responsible for consensual policy agendas. British political 
scientists’ pursuit of network analysis was to identify the dimensions of a policy network 
structure according to distinguishing features (such as pluralism and corporatism), as issues 
within national policy domains become complex (Rhodes, 1990; Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; 
Jordan and Schubert, 1992). According to Richardson (2000: 1009-11), in national domain 
structures, “more fluid and unpredictable networks emerged in such policy domains as 
agriculture, civil nuclear power, youth employment, smoking, heart disease, sea defences, and 
information technology.” Furthermore, the 1990s saw British political scientists shift towards 





Thirdly, the American perspective on policy network analysis on policymaking is entrenched 
in the German policy network approach. For instance, a study utilizes the network approach on 
two middle-sized Illinois cities to illustrate how formal organizations positioned centre in the 
network structure influence and shape policy affairs within the community, which is an exact 
replica of Laumann and Pappi’s (1976) community power structure reiterated in the German 
origins. In contrast to the French and British policy network analysis, the German and the 
American share a similar approach because their federal system resembles each other, where 
states have the decision-making power on policies concerning the national government. Pre-
reunification, Lehmbruch (1984) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) draws ideas from 
Scharpf’s et al. (1976) interlocking politics to investigate corporatist politics, which portrayed 
the web of inter-organizational networks as crucial in stabilizing collective policy actions. 
 
In earlier studies, analysts were unsure whether to place policy networks either as dependent 
or independent variables because these research studies unsuccessfully created thorough 
theories and concept on policy advancement and results (Knoke, 1990). These policy network 
studies relied more on metaphor and description while lacking heavily on terminological 
imprecision and proliferation of typologies, especially when the goal was examining policy 
networks development (Dowdling, 1995; Mikkelson, 2006). Furthermore, as time went by, the 
policy network generated an abundance of models, ideologies, theory, procedures, and 
techniques that facilitated the field and prepared the foundation for other forthcoming studies, 
especially within the health context. For instance, modern policy network studies in health 
policymaking context include Goldman (2007)  assessing in what way did the World Bank link 
several environmental NGOs alongside the business community in creating a transnational 
water-policy network; Kohlmorgen et al. (2007) analysis the networks of influence and 
relationship between southern actors global campaign against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria and Oliver’s (2012) exploration of power, influence and evidence-base in social 











3.7 Characterizing whole networks  
One immediate issue confronting the analyst is who is in a social network. To identify in 
advance every actor who participates in a social network is difficult (Wellman and Berkowitz, 
1988), as is delineating the boundary of a network. Network research designs can be divided 
between whole network and personal network forms. 
 
A personal network (often called an ego network) refers to the network immediately 
surrounding a single actor. A personal network contains a set of focal nodes (ego nodes) and 
illustrates their ties to others (alters). Each respondent is the centre of his or her network, and 
the study of personal networks is mainly concerned with the way egos relate to alters or are 
influenced by them. Belloti (2015), for example, studied the friendship networks of a non-
representative sample of 12 male and 11 female single heterosexuals between the ages of 25 
and 35 years who lived in Milan. Interviews were focused on the meanings of friendship ties, 
the resources they offer, the conflicts and constraints involved, and the way they evolve and 
develop over time. Such person-focused designs are valuable for investigating the social 
situation of given individuals, but not well suited to the analysis of policy networks.   
 
Whole network designs are more appropriate for policy-oriented research. Such studies 
examine relationship patterns of a particular kind – control, support, advice – between a defined 
set of actors. One of the most frequently studied settings for while network research has been 
the formal organisation, and especially organisational management structures. Common topics 
include the degree of integration of the organisation, the relationships between autonomy, 
power and centrality, how patterns of ties influence decisions, and what structures bring 
competitive advantages. Such studies have found that relationships of friendship, influence and 
advice can cut across functional, hierarchical and office boundaries so that informal practice 
may be different from the formal organisational plan, and that such network relationships affect 
how resources are exchanged and distributed between members (Miller and Dingwall, 1997). 
 
Mainstream SNA studies of this kind tend to involve primarily qualitatively analysis, but there 
is growing interest in mixed quantitative/qualitative designs. According to Lazega (1997), use 
of quantitative SNA techniques can add an important missing dimension to qualitative research, 
but the qualitative component remains equally valuable in preventing the analysis from 
becoming overly formalistic and divorced from the subjective perspectives of the participants. 




a network of European intellectual property judges, who discuss legal principles, read papers 
written by other network members and refer to each other’s decisions. His study illustrates how 
a research phase involving analysis of nodes and ties in the network, can be followed by a 
second phase when behaviour and actor perspectives are examined via qualitative interviews.  
Lazega’s various research studies show how a formal SNA component within this type of 
mixed-methods approach can contextualise behaviour via description of the network 
environment, and so provide an analysis that bridges the individual, relational and structural 
levels (Miller and Dingwall, 1997). 
 
We now turn to discuss three important facets of network analysis and then introduce to the 
metrics that the method section is planning to use in the analysis: morphology (network and 
subgroup structure), actor positioning or location within a network, and performance. 
 
 
3.7.1 Morphology  
Determining network structure or morphology is one of the primary steps in SNA. As 
mentioned earlier, determining a network member’s position in a relational structure is a way 
of setting behaviour in its immediate social context.  We have mentioned already that networks 
do not always consist of a single component. Groups of actors interacting with each other to 
such a degree that they could be regarded as a separate entity are often found embedded in a 
network (Wasserman and Faust, 2009). In a friendship network, for example, there may exist 
a group of close friends who socialise together, as well as other actors at the periphery who 
interact less frequently. At the group level, a network of interacting organisations may have 
embedded within it a group of organisations subject to common governance arrangements, 
such as a government department and its parastatals. Relational structures of this type of form 
building blocks for larger network structures and are known (among other terms) as cohesive 
groups. A cohesive group is a subgroup within a network where a high percentage of the 
subgroup’s actors share ties that are strong, direct, mutual, frequent and/or positive (Moody 
and White, 2003). Subgroups within a network may be various described as “components”, 
“cliques,” “blocks,” “core-periphery structures,” and “k-cores”.  These subgroups influence the 
behaviours and perspectives of individuals as well as of the collective and are part of the metrics 





Cohesion is an important SNA concept, and several techniques are used to measure the degree 
of cohesiveness of subgroups. Cohesion is by its nature multilevel.  It involves mutual ties in 
dyads (pairs of actors), as well as the embedding of dyads in larger structures, and the roles 
played by individuals in linking together the larger network.  Relational cohesion between 
dyads is measured in several ways, including the adjacency of nodes, reachability in terms of 
a path between nodes (fragmentation), and distance between nodes in terms of the number of 
edges traversed (transitivity). Similarly, cohesion in subgroups can be analysed using multiple 
techniques, such as summing the results calculated for dyadic cohesion, measuring subgroup 
graph “density” (in terms of the proportion of dyads that are tied), “transitivity” (in terms of 
the extent that dyads are connected by an edge), “fragmentation” (in terms of the proportion 
dyads not able to reach each other) and calculating the average subgroup degree (based on 
number of ties between a node and other nodes).  Prell (2011) cautions that this is a complicated 
task, so that it is important in subgroup analysis to be clear about the theoretical implications 




Several procedures exist to describe the position of actors within a social network. Actors’ 
locations can be described in various ways, for example, by their participation in a clique or 
cluster or degree of centrality, autonomy, or prestige. These procedures can be used flexibly so 
that an analysis can move between individual, structural, local and global levels (Miller and 
Dingwall, 1997). - cohesiveness, while others indicate differences as the shape of the network, 
such as a strong core-periphery structure or a network split into distinct components.  
 
Measures of centrality aim to determine the structural importance of a node within a network; 
for example, to identify the most influential actors in a policy network, or the super-spreaders 
in a disease epidemic. These procedures can be applied to total networks or to network 
components. A researcher who has collected network data for a whole organisation could elect 
to calculate centrality scores for nodes at that level, or to do this for particular subgroups, such 
as organisational departments. This enables the analyst to find well- connected actors, actors 
who are likely to greatest access to information, or actors best placed to connect with the wider 
network.  A node can be important to a structure in a variety of ways. A bridging node may be 




with a large number of ties may be a key source of influence within a cluster of network actors. 
Centrality may also be considered according to the advantages a node receives from where it 
sits in the network (access to information would be an obvious example). Nodes can have high 
centrality because they are positioned to catch what is passing between the nodes, or because 
of their ability to control information flows, either by filtering or modifying messages in a way 
that is beneficial to the node (Borgatti, 2005). 
 
Centrality is interpreted sociologically in many ways, with various degrees of abstraction. 
Network centralisation is likely to be associated with hierarchical organisation, in that 
centrality measures the extent to which activities are dependent upon one or more dominant 
individuals. A central node may be described as having great power, influence, prestige, 
prominence and/or autonomy. It may also be described as being a gatekeeper or a leader. 
Strictly speaking these properties are not inherent properties of centrality, but rather predictions 
of the consequences that centrality will have, whether for the node itself or for a group in which 
the node is embedded. Centrality is often used in empirical studies as an independent variable 
used to predict node outcomes such as health, status, wealth acquisition and satisfaction with 
life (Prell, 2012). A review of the various measures of centrality is beyond the scope of the 
present thesis, but five popular measures will now be described. 
 
Degree centrality measures how many adjacent nodes have ties to an actor in a particular 
network (see Figure 41). Bogatti et al. (2013) regards degree centrality as the most natural form 
of centrality.  As we saw above, the degree of a node is determined by the number of ties it has 
with other nodes, while taking no account of the value or direction of the ties. Degree centrality 
measures the involvement of an actor in a network regardless of the influence the actor may 
have. 
 
Eigenvector centrality expands the idea of degree centrality by calculating values for the ties 
an actor has with other network actors but taking the degree centrality of those other actors into 
account. It assigns scores to all the nodes in a network and makes the assumption that a 
connection to a high scoring node carries more weight than a connection to a low-scoring node 
(Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001).   The basic idea is that an actor connected to a given number of 
high-scoring actors has a higher centrality score than the same actor if connected to the same 
number of low-scoring nodes. If, for example, a pupil starts at a new school and wishes to 
become popular among his or her new peers, one way to achieve this would be to become a 




popular student to others (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001). Eigenvector centrality is therefore 
focused on the value of the scores within a node’s local network (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001). 
It is possible to take different views of Eigenvector centrality, but many consider it to be a 
refined version of degree centrality (Borgatti, 1995).  
 
Betweenness centrality quantifies the number of times a node functions as a bridge along the 
shortest path between two other nodes. It calculates values for all of the ties in a network when 
calculating a node’s score but is concerned with a different aspect of centrality from 
eigenvector centrality. For example, in a learning network betweenness centrality may be used 
to determine scores for students who have potential to gain knowledge. A student whose 
attendance rate is high and is placed between a number of other students with lower attendance 
rates can choose to withhold or share information obtained from tutorials and has a high 
centrality score on that basis.  
A node’s betweenness is zero when it is never along the shortest path between any two other 
nodes. This can occur when the node is an isolate, or when all other nodes are directly 
connected to each other. Betweenness reaches its maximum value when the node lies along 
every shortest path between every pair of other nodes. 
 
Closeness centrality indicates the independence of a node. It is calculated by measuring the 
average length of the shortest path between the node and all other nodes in the network.  The 
nodes with the shortest sequence of ties to other nodes are those with the most closeness 
centrality. Briefly, the rationale underpinning this measure is that nodes that are not central will 
usually have to rely on others to have a message relayed through the network (Borgatti et al., 
2013).  The degree of closeness centrality a node has indicates how much freedom it possesses 
to access information easily through any form of network, be it a power network, an influence 
network, or a communication network (Friedkin, 1981).  
 
Investigating the positional patterns (using centrality) enables the understanding of UHC 
Nigeria’s policy network. The opportunity to visually map the UHC Nigeria policy structure is 
an issue in research not encountered in other fields of social science. Network analysis provides 
answers to questions in search of, for instance, are nodes in central positions influential in 
making a decision, does a more cohesive network encourage affiliations to achieve results, and 
does a fragmented network spell conflict and contention among subgroups (Robins, Lewis and 





Another challenging question of network performance and effectiveness is identifying the 
relational correlation among two or more network structures. Using the SNA technique called 
“Quadratic assignment procedure” (QAP) recognises relational elements among pairs of 
matrices (Bochsler, 2008). 
QAP: The “quadratic assignment procedure” (QAP) was coined first by Hubert (1987) for 
general investigative approach on data but is applied in social network analysis as a statistical 
analysis to measure the correlation of two matrices (Robins, Lewis and Wang, 2012). The QAP 
techniques are not explicit to social network analysis and were originally used to explore if the 
spread of disease was environmentally clustered by the statistician Mantel (1967). The 
application of QAP in social network analysis evaluates the association between the same set 
of nodes in two networks. For example, a research question may pursue the association between 
an organization’s informal communication network with formal organizational hierarchy.  
 
According to Krackhardt (1987), QAP can address the above research question on network 
analysis. For instance, “take two adjacency matrices, y and w, we can produce a statistic of 
association (e.g., a Pearson correlation coefficient) just by treating the corresponding cells of 
the two matrices (excluding diagonals) as a data point involving two variables (i.e., yij and wij) 
(Robins, Lewis and Wang, 2012: 384).” QAP offers a non-distributional bootstrapping way of 
analysis to assess the relationship between y and w. The QAP’s application in social network 
analysis extends to both unipartite and bipartite networks structures. Correlation between the 
two matrices is then calculated the normal way with the researcher given the opportunity to 
choose an association statistic suitable to the measure of the relationship. within the network. 
According to Robins, Lewis and Wang (2012), the Pearson correlation suit for valued data than 
binary data. Furthermore, when the relationship of two matrices is independent of each other, 
the statistic is consistent with a regular correlation subjected to a standard null hypothesis test, 
which determines whether there is a connection between two networks or conclude if the value 
is significantly different from zero. However, self-organizing nature of policy networks mean 
that there is a form of dependency between network variables (Robins, Lewis and Wang, 2012).  
The challenge that these questions of network performance and effectiveness present is exciting 









Some SNA studies have investigated the association between network characteristics and 
organisational performance outcomes (Sandström, 2008; Chambers et al., 2012). For example, 
Cummings and Cross’s (2003) study of a large communications company found that work 
groups that had strong hierarchies and a clear core-periphery network structure performed less 
well than those with flat hierarches and a more cohesive shape. Several such studies have aimed 
to improve performance in the healthcare domain (Aydin et al, 1998; West et al., 1999; Scott 
et al., 2005).   
 
The idea of interconnectedness is similar to that concept of cohesion discussed above. As we 
have seen, it is typically investigated using the measures of centrality and density touched upon 
earlier. We will examine these concepts in more detail, and then go on to consider structural 
holes, defined as the absence of ties or as the presence of weaker ties within or between 
networks. 
 
Network centrality and density can be analysed in various ways. Position and patterns of 
relationships between network actors may be seen as independent variables that shape 
behaviour and can be measured (Miller and Dingwall, 1997). One approach here is to look at 
micro-level structures in networks and relate this to organisational outcomes. Some analysts 
have undertaken a so-called triad census, or census of different configurations of dyads into 
sets of three actors (triplets), to investigate whether these low-level structures have an impact 
on how the overall network operates. For example, measuring the proportion of triplets in a 
network neighbourhood that are closed (i.e., fully connected by three edges), as opposed to 
only being connected by two edges, is a way of identifying clusters.  This section will focus on 
structural measures that take account of the whole network and consider the degree to which a 
network remains coherent compared with the degree to which a network breaks apart. A 
network’s cohesion is the degree to which it does not break up into substructures. 
 
Density is assessed by measuring the number of ties in a network as a percentage of the 
maximum possible number.  It amounts to the probable likelihood that a tie will exist between 
any two nodes chosen at random. In general terms, density counts the number of actual ties a 
network contains and expresses this as a proportion of the ties that could potentially exist. 
Higher density scores indicate more dense networks, and therefore the level of inter-





Cohesion measures (such as fragmentation and transitivity) include factors like average 
distance between pairs of nodes and how many nodes would have to be removed from the 
network to disconnect a pair chosen at random and the significance of this would be to help 
measuring the inter-connectedness of small groups within social network settings. 
 
Burt (2000) defines structural holes as the absence of connections or only weak ties in an area 
of a network.  He explains that: “Holes are buffers, like an insulator in an electric circuit. People 
on either side of a structural hole circulate in different flows of information” (Burt 2000, 353). 
Those in a position to bridge what would otherwise be separate network components can act 
as “entrepreneurs” who manage the flow of information and are well-placed to control projects 
that involve communication between actors on different sides of the “hole” (thus creating 
entrepreneurial networks). For Burt these bridging actors are rich in social capital and are often 
able to use their position to influence flows of information and resources. Writers influenced 
by this social capital perspective, such as Sandström (2008; 69) see structural holes not just as 
a feature of whole networks, but as something affecting a network’s linkage to other networks 
and its cross-boundary character. The concept of global structural holes is intended to capture 
the way that policy networks, in particular, are connected to other network constellations and 
involved in various forms of cross-boundary exchange.  Exchange will often be facilitated by 
actors who are able to act as a bridge between, for example, a domestic policy network and 
international donor organisations. Sandström (2008: 70) suggests that cross-boundary 
connections are likely to be more successful when a network contains a diversity of actors from 
different professions, organisations and sections of society, because this heterogeneity is likely 
to bring more bridging opportunities. 
 
Sandström (2006) set out to test Burt’s predictions about the significance of closure and 
structural holes by undertaking mixed-method case studies of three Swedish policy networks, 
centring on a university reform program, the establishment of a research station in a local 
government region, and a fresh-water fisheries management project managed by an association 
of fishing rights owners.  She hypothesised that a “high performing policy network is a 
heterogeneous network with a high level of network closure”, and that such a network would 
be “dense and centralized”, but at the same time contain a “diversified set of actors involved in 
cross-boundary interactions” (Sandström, 2006: 70).  The study found that these characteristics 
could have positive effects, but in different ways.  A greater degree of network closure 




more heterogeneous networks were better able to mobilize resources from external sources, 
which improved effectiveness.  In Sandström’s research SNA was used to measure network 
characteristics, while an assessment of performance was based on reconstructing the policy 
stories of the three projects and making a judgement about their degree of success.  Indeed, a 
scoping exercise of studies on network structure and performance in healthcare organisations 
by Chambers and associates (2012) found only one study that systematically measured a 
change in practice (involving a quasi-experimental design).  Most of the 52 studies reviewed 
described how SNA was undertaken as a means of assessing performance but reported no 
follow-up action that might have conclusively shown that shifting towards a more optimal 
network structure had positive results. 
 
The hypothesis of a strong association between performance and network closure and/or 
structural holes deserves further investigation but does not at face value appear likely to hold 
for all network types is all contexts.  The two dimensions pull in different directions with the 
first suggesting the potential value of cohesion, and the second pointing to benefits of a more 
diffuse network structure with important outward-facing connections.  It seems likely that 
dense, highly centralised networks function well for some purposes, while the strong 
hierarchies and top-down control that this may involve will do less well when innovation and 
flexible responses by actors at the periphery of a network are important.  Granovetter’s (1973) 
classic paper on “the strength of weak ties” suggests that the latter have valuable bridging 
functions between a closely-knit group of actors and more distant parts of a social network; 
they are necessary to ensure that information flows and action can be coordinated for 
occasional joint projects. A diversity of actors appears to help a network form outward 
connection with other networks in its environment, but probably involves a network form that 
is less dense and more dispersed towards its periphery, which will lack the benefits gained by 
relatively closed networks.  
 
The present study employs SNA mainly for the purposes of describing a policy network and 
its dynamics, rather than offering any rigorous assessment of the impact of network structure 
on performance.  The intention is to build a picture of network relations that provides a 
foundation for qualitative investigation of how actors understand and work within the network 
environment. Given that implementing UHC in Nigeria is an unfinished story and was likely 
to remain so within the timespan of this research project, it would not have been feasible to 




in studies of network structure and success of clinical interventions.  Nevertheless, some 
structural features of the Nigerian UHC policy network appear to have negative or positive 
impacts on policy development, and this will be discussed in later chapters. 
 
 
3.8 Relational perspective of SNA and policy analysis  
Dye (1976: 1) says policy analysis “is finding out what governments do, why they do it, and 
what differences it makes” while policy network or social network analysis is a wide range of 
analytic techniques that investigates social interactions within network structures. Both the 
policy analysis and policy network analysis are two disciplinary fields within the social 
sciences with the potential for cross-fertilization. The systematic integration of both research 
methodologies, which are highly relevant to each other, creates the flexibility in addressing the 
research questions because each research domains covers their weaknesses with their strengths 
(Kenis and Schneider, 1991). For instance, policy network analysis by itself cannot produce an 
explicit theory (Collins, 1988) even with its strong affinity to certain policy theories but has 
the toolset to assess the structural and relational features of a network. In contrast, policy 
analysis evaluates policymaking process from defining the problems, identifying policy 
options, implementing policy solutions to evaluating the policy outcomes (Buse, Mays and 
Walt, 2012). 
Using the perspective of Kenis and Schneider (1991), this section looks at three network 
analysis applications in the study of policymaking:  
1. This strategy, i.e., describing and measuring network analysis capacities, can be used 
for cross-network comparisons to develop (or test) hypotheses which explain the effects 
of the policy network’s aggregate characteristics on specific interactions. This can be 
achieved by comparisons of cross-national policy networks, or comparisons between 
different national policy domains or policy processes. The strategy focuses on 
constructing empirical indicators for measuring network characteristics (for example, 
density, connectedness, centralisation, asymmetry, fragmentation, etc.) and on building 
models which relate to the performance of these structural characteristics, or the 
outcomes which result from specific policy networks. It may be that, in such a 
hypothesis, the more asymmetrical the exchanged or influenced networks, then the 





2. Network analysis can also be used to construct and test formal models on policy making 
processes. In this research strategy, network analysis is used in the operation of formal 
models. For example, the model developed by James S. Coleman on exchanged 
processes within systems of action (Coleman, 1990). Applying a model such as this 
necessitates a greater amount of information in regard to structural dependencies and 
resource flows within a set of policy actors. The information can be collected, and the 
required model indicators constructed, using network analytic tools. 
 
 
3. Network analysis can also be used to test the hypotheses of theories on policy making 
which includes structural propositions. For instance, corporatist theory operates on the 
assumption that specific relational configurations function between large and 
monopolistic associations, their members, and the state. This contracts with pluralist 
theory, which assumes different structural arrangements in the policy process. 
Moreover, governance theories which distinguish between hierarchies and market-like 
relations feature specific propositions on structural configurations, which can be more 
precisely identified and described using network analysis. For example, it could be used 
to determine if an empirical structure of cooperation and information exchange is 
representative of hierarchical control rather than market coordination. Or, crucially, it 
could reveal empirical forms of cooperation, including hybrid mixtures of different 


















3.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined a number of theoretical concepts and practical considerations 
associated with the policy process approach and SNA.  Although the two frameworks have 
different origins and put different degrees of emphasis on qualitative versus quantitative 
methods, they both point to the importance of actors and their interactions, and the influence 
of context on courses of action.   While the author had been aware of convergence between the 
two approaches as reflected in the work of Lazega (1997) in utilising SNA to add rigour to 
qualitative studies, it became apparent from reviewing relevant literature that others too saw 
value in a synthesis of approaches.  Policy process researchers connected with the London 
group have been incorporating elements of SNA into their recent studies (e.g., Quissell et al., 
2018; Shearer et al., 2018), and SNA researchers also see advantages in adding a larger 
qualitative component (see: Hollstrein, 2016).  Therefore, combining the two approaches in a 
policy study such as the present one seems eminently feasible.  
 
The move towards UHC in Nigeria has extended over many years, and involved different 
governing administrations, NGOs, and professional and civil society groups.  There is a 
complex interplay between federal, state and local actors, as well as those operating at national 
and global levels.  These actors form an extended and geographically distributed network, 
which has changed somewhat as UHC was pushed onto the government’s policy agenda, and 
actors have lined up to support or oppose the formulation and implementation of various public 
health insurance, service delivery and financing reforms introduced with the aim of expanding 
coverage.  Both the structural characteristics of that network, and the subjective perceptions 
and actions of the actors who populate it, are therefore highly relevant to the UHC policy story 

















This chapter discusses practical and philosophical issues considered in the design of the study, 
and goes on to outline the chosen study methods, and selection of location and samples. It 
outlines the rationale for combining the policy process approach (developed by Walt and 
Gilson) with elements of Social Network Analysis (SNA) in order to investigate the 
interactions of elite policy actors involved in developing and debating UHC policy in Nigeria. 
Ethical issues relevant to the study process are also discussed. In later sections, the sampling 
strategies and participant recruitment for the two phases of the study - the SNA and qualitative 
interviews exploring the policy process – are described. This is followed by sections on the 
data collection process for each phase, how data were analysed, and an explanation of the steps 
taken to maximise research quality.  
 
 
4.1 Outline of the study design 
A well-designed study needs to start with a clear research question and make logical 
connections between the methods chosen to address that question and the theoretical 
framework used to make sense of the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). It is also important to 
ensure that the methods selected, and the type of analysis attempted are compatible with the 
philosophical assumptions – the ontological and epistemological positions – that guided the 
study. In seeking to examine how elite actors sought to advance or oppose policies that would 
bring the Nigeria healthcare system closer to UHC, the author reasoned that subjective 
perceptions and ongoing constructions of the meaning and significance of particular policy 
initiatives would be crucially important, and that a predominantly qualitative approach would 
be needed to get “inside the black box” of the policy process and understand its dynamics.  
Moreover, the author felt that utilisation of such a qualitative approach would fit with the 
traditional theoretical framework of interpretive or interactionist sociology from which the 
approach had emerged (see: Miller and Dingwall, 1997), so that the evolution of policy could 
be seen as a constructed reality that emerges from social interactions between the key actors 




to explore the dynamics and meaning of policy from the perspectives of multiple actors might 
not tell us as much as we would like to know about the overall shape of the policy network, the 
nature and frequency of contacts between the various actors and organisations that make it up, 
or the way they divide on various issues.  For that reason, SNA appeared to the author to 
provide a valuable additional dimension that could combine with qualitative interviews to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the UHC policy process.  In the author’s view 
this combination of methods retains epistemological coherence because both approaches sit 
within a broadly “realist” position, and more specifically the position of “subtle realism” 
adopted by a number of qualitative researchers (Hammersley, 1989; Murphy et al., 1998; Pope 
and Mays, 2000).  The constructivism of this study may be seen as a “soft” constructivism that 
admits the existence of an external world of interests and political manoeuvring and is fully 
compatible with a SNA that maps patterns of relationships between the actors who are of 
interest. Thus, in line with the literature discussed in Chapter 2, the chosen study design 
involved a mixed method approach that sought to understand interactions between key policy 
actors through the twin lenses of SNA and in-depth qualitative interviews.  
 
 
4.2 Research objectives 
The main aim of this study is to examine and elucidate the policy drive to push the Nigerian 
healthcare system towards achieving UHC.  As explained in the previous chapter, the study 
relies on a combination of SNA and a policy process approach. Using the former it aims to 
describe the network of actors and organisations that shapes UHC policy, while the latter is 
utilised to follow the life of the policy through the stages of policy formulation and 
implementation, paying close attention to who the key actors are at different stages of the 
process and how they interact. This combined approach aims to elucidate the characteristic 
features of the UHC policy process, and to identify factors that advance or impede progress 










4.3 Mixed-methods research design  
Sekaran (2009: 4-5) defines research as, “a multi-step process and an organised, systemic, data-
based, critical, objective, scientific inquiry or investigation into a particular problem 
undertaken with the purpose of finding answers or solutions to it”. Here, the main objective is 
to solve past and present problems and to share the knowledge of their solutions (Bassey, 1999; 
Sekaran, 2009; Saunders, 2012). As was stated earlier, this study sets out to understand the 
challenges and obstacles that stand in the way of moving towards UHC in Nigeria. The main 
aim of this study is to explore how policy was developed, advanced, and sometimes slowed in 
debates between elite actors.  
 
To achieve this, a mixed-methods approach was chosen as the most appropriate approach by 
which to identify key policy actors, the social networks in which they operate, and their 
perspectives on, and interpretations of emerging policies of these experiences (Saks and Allsop, 
2013). This is because it provides researchers with the means to explore research participants’ 
subjective points of view, while locating those perspectives within wider social structures or 
patterns.  Although mixed method studies typically involve a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, it is worth noting that studies that combine different qualitative methods, 
such as observation and interviews are also common. The present study combines qualitative 
interviews with SNA (that takes a largely but not wholly quantitative form), but the inspiration 
for combining these two approaches comes from the work of Lazaga (1997), who sees this 
approach as a way of adapting a broadly qualitative approach to import greater formality and 
rigour into some aspects of the analysis. 
 
Mixed-methods research has its critics, who question the epistemological consistency of many 
such studies, often making the related point that quantitative and qualitative approaches 
represent two separate paradigms (Morse, 2003; Bryman, 2012).  The underlying philosophical 
assumptions of each method must be carefully addressed to avoid epistemological incoherence 
(Morse 2003). Additionally, researchers face the risk of making the mistake of using one 
approach which might overshadow the other throughout the study (Dunning, 2007; Rohlfing, 
2008). Finally, a researcher can be criticised for poor understanding and application of a 
particular method or using one method more effectively than others (Bennett, 2007; Lohmann, 
2007). Bryman (2006b) cautions that the use of a mixed-methods approach should not be 
considered necessarily superior to single method studies. Despite such criticism, mixed- 




benefits of triangulation or the broadening of the focus of single studies (Denzin, 1978; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Morse, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 21: Classification of mixed-methods research.  
Source: Bryman (2012: 632). 
 
Figure 21 shows nine possible classifications which originate from Morgan’s (1998) 
framework. In the diagram, the upper-case word indicates priority, and the lower case indicates 
the secondary method. For example, QUAL→quan indicates that the qualitative component 
was the main data-collection approach, and the quantitative approach played a more subsidiary 
role.  
Morgan’s classification provides a useful indication of the range of mixed-methods study, 
though as Bryman (2012) observes it may not be easy in practice to establish what the priority 
and sequence were in a particular study. 
 
Figure 22: Study with equally weighted, combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. 
 
Figure 22 shows where the present study fits into Morgan’s (1998) taxonomy, falling into the 
seventh QUAN→QUAL category.  The research uses quantitative SNA analysis to map the 




and generating information about the relevant policy network that would help to guide the 
content of the qualitative interviews.  
 
The QUAN→QUAL category is similar to the approach Lazega (1992) (to which the thesis 
adopts) where he uses SNA to map out the relationships and flows of advice between 
colleagues in a New England corporate law firm.  Lazega (1992) identified an influence 
network encompassing 71 lawyers in three offices - 36 partners and 35 associates. For the 
quantitative SNA phase of the study, he distributed questionnaires to partners and associates to 
map the network and generate quantitative data on relationships, which was later 
complemented with qualitative interviews that explored network members’ perspectives in 
greater depth. This is essentially the approach that is employed in the present study of the actor 
network involved in the development of UHC policy in Nigeria. 
 
Overall, the present study seeks to achieve a balance between approaches by combining 
quantitative data collected using SNA techniques and thematic analysis of qualitative face-face 
interview data with the same actors. This type of combined approach remains fairly unusual 
and involves a sequential research design where the application of the quantitative method 
comes first, before the use of the qualitative method. The two phases are separate, but the 
second step depends on the outcome of the first step and presents a logical extension of the 
findings of the first phase (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, Morse 2003: 199, Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 2003).  
 
Furthermore, the point of interface between quantitative and qualitative methods, and how each 
method serves to the operationalization of the research questions is understood in two 
directions. Firstly, the SNA analysis focuses on the section of the research questions, which 
involves revealing policy actors participating in UHC Nigeria discourse; identifying key policy 
actors within the UHC policy; understanding the relational and interactive pattern between 
policy actors inside the discourse; differentiating the role of contending actors from actors in 
support of existing issues and expanding on existing disagreement within the UHC discourse. 
Secondly, the answers from the first direction generates will enough meat for the policy process 
analysis to pursue the remaining research question, in which this analysis evaluates, the factors 
leading to UHC Nigeria initiation, the faces of power exercised in UHC policy making, and 
the challenges and obstacles facing UHC Nigeria’s implementation. Finally, these actions are 
set to provide significant empirical evidence capable of offering the obstacles and challenges 





4.4 Quantitative approach  
Wassermann and Faust (1994) state that the use of social network analysis (SNA) as a 
quantitative approach is an effective way to put the interactions between actors into context 
through a descriptive and inductive modelling of the relational and structural study of the social 
environment. Carrington (2014) also suggest that “SNA is fundamentally neither qualitative 
nor quantitative, nor a combination of the two. Rather, it is structural” (Carrington 2014: 35). 
The mathematics behind social network analysis – graph theory – does not represent “quantities” 
but “structures” (Carrington 2014: 35), as in patterns that emerge from interweaving ties 
(Bellotti, 2015). However, some authors applied the SNA as a quantitative approach to evaluate 
mathematical, statistical and graphical demonstration of their research outcomes (Noorale, Sale, 
Marin and Ross, 2018; Freeman, 2004). For example, Neergaard, Shaw and Carter (2005) 
research utilised quantitative network analysis to present key concerning gender bias in small 
firm network. Most notably, Gorard (2010: 238) criticized the current norm of defining 
quantitative research as involving numbers, and qualitative as involving everything else (e.g., 
text and discourse, images, observations, recordings, etc.).” 
 
 Contextualization for the purpose of this section is divided into substantive and 
methodological dimensions. Here the substantive aspect means recognising some of the 
limitations put on some individual’s behaviour and the specific roles proposed to them, while 
the methodological dimension compares and generalises findings. Therefore, SNA needs 
accurate data, such as an interaction between people in a social setting, and this data is analysed 
using established SNA techniques and usually visually represented in graphs.  
 
The thesis seeks to understand the development of UHC in the context of Nigerian policy 
making and the patterns of relations between the various stakeholder groups involved.  In their 
volume on “context” in qualitative research, Miller and Dingwall (1997) argue that SNA can 
provide a strong foundation for subsequent qualitative interviews. Social network analysis is 
defined as the investigation of the interrelationships between a set of individuals within a 
particular social boundary (Miller and Dingwall, 1997). Hence, analytically the relationships 
formed between actors has precedence over actor characteristics. Researchers start with 
relationships and structures, before they consider the characteristics of actors or actors’ 
behaviour, in order to make sense of the structures emerging for the analysis, to explain the 




position in the network. The main point is that researchers start with data on relations, adding 
information on attributes and additional behaviour only at a second stage. The main 
contribution of this method to theory-building is its capacity to contextualize behaviour by 
describing relational structures in a way that bridges the individual, relational and structural 
levels of analysis. The use of network analysis requires two additional but important 
preliminary tasks: identifying the boundaries of the field of action under examination and 
mapping out the relationships used to constitute the informal social structure of the setting 
(Miller and Dingwall, 1997).  
 
With regard to boundaries, rigid delimitations of a social setting are always arbitrary, but 
network analysis offers systematic ways of defining and redefining the field of action. Usually, 
social systems do not have clear boundaries, and there is flexibility in SNA to allow researchers 
to define temporary boundaries after exploration of the process of boundary definition by the 
members themselves. Two comments can be made regarding the definition of the network 
relationships involved. First, the description of the relational structure by identification of sub-
sets (cliques or positions) in networks is a way of identifying inductively actors present at a 
specific moment in a social setting, as well as the relationships or exchanges between them. 
Second, the description of these relations, or absences of relations, between blocks identifies a 
system of interdependences between these network actors. The analysis thus sheds light on 




4.5 Qualitative approach  
The second qualitative phase of the study is intended to explore the nature and meaning of 
interactions between actors in the UHC policy network in more depth.  Popay (1992: 100) 
states that the qualitative approach “explores the meaning people attach to their experiences 
and identifies and describes the social structures and processes that shape these meanings”. In-
depth interviews can produce “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) of events and relationships. 
Geertz (1973) explains that thick description allows the unravelling of social actions embedded 
within social norms and ideologies that bring meaning to social behaviour. Bryman (1988:61) 
suggests that the thick description is “seeing through the eye of the people you are studying”. 




from a policy actor’s perspective. This will elucidate the dynamics of the UHC policy process 
in Nigeria and may reveal patterns that also appear in similar policy networks in other 
developing countries. Because qualitative studies seek to answer “what”, “how” and “why” 
research questions, the approach is well suited to exploring the health policy making process 
which is the focus of this study (Silverman, 2001; 2004).  
 
The approach used in the qualitative interviews was tailored to answer what, how and why 
questions of Nigeria's UHC policy process. As is conventional in qualitative studies, the author 
planned to use thematic analysis to identify patterns in the interview data and make connections, 
because the study would need to link to a large existing health policy literature on the policy 




Table 5: Methods for identifying themes from semi-structured qualitive interviews. 
 
Bryman and Burgess (1994) point out that the criteria employed in the identification of new 
themes or assessing the relevance of themes identified in past research, are often unclear. The 
current study is influenced by the framework developed by Ryan and Bernard (2003). This aim 
is to identify, examine and report the themes and patterns which recur in the data. This 
technique is used for organising and describing the information source as well as for 
interpreting the various elements of the research findings. There is no single correct method by 
which to find themes, but under some conditions certain techniques have greater effectiveness. 
Ryan and Bernard (2003) evaluate eleven methods on the five dimensions of: (1) type of 
datasets, (2) proficiency required, (3) expected labour, (4) quantity of themes required for 
generation, and (5) validity and reliability concerns. These methods are based on use of two 
sets of techniques (scrutiny and processing techniques), which can be utilised in different 
combinations according to the characteristics of particular studies to generate themes. Figure 






Figure 23: Ways of classifying themes. 
Source: Ryan and Bernard (2003: 102). 
 
Table 5 incorporates part of this framework to illustrate the application of the study dimensions 
and techniques in a study like the present one that relies on semi-structured qualitative 
interviews. Looking at Table 5, similarities, differences, and repetitions, and as well as cutting 
and sorting techniques, are the techniques best suited to discovering themes in a study of this 
kind.  Section 4.13 described how these analytical phases were applied in greater detail. This 
approach can be employed in regard to several different techniques for analysing qualitative 
data, such as grounded theory, narrative analysis, critical discourse analysis, and qualitative 
content analysis. It has also been employed in relation to the systematic review of qualitative 












4.6 Justification for combining SNA and qualitative interviews 
As mentioned earlier, a common criticism of mixed methods designs is that they combine 
methods rooted in different epistemological traditions. Development of the ethnographic origin 
of SNA occurred in the 1920s primarily through collaboration between anthropologists and 
mathematicians; significant contributors included Jacob L. Moreno, Helen Jennings, and 
associates (in the 1920s and 30s), Kurt Lewin (in the 1940s), Max Gluckman (in the 1950s), 
Clyde Mitchell/Thomas Kuhn (in the 1960s), Harrison White (in the 1970s), with recent 
contributions from Barry Wellman and Patrick Doreian (Otte and Rousseau, 2002).       
 
Categorising SNA as a theory or a metaphor has become a divisive discourse over the years. 
Earlier theorists used SNA analysis to capture the relevant connections and structural features 
of social networks (Wellman, 1988). Modern scholars have disputed this stance and offered a 
well-developed SNA which consists of theoretical concepts such as structural holes (Burt, 
1992), centrality (Freeman, 1978), the strength of ties (Granovetter, 1973), and structural 
equivalence (Lorrain & White, 1971).         
 
Some have made the discourse surrounding the concept of SNA research ambiguous. Many 
scholars consider SNA a quantitative method (Crossley & Edwards, 2016; Hollstein, 2014) and 
other researchers have suggested that it is qualitative and to view it as quantitative is a complete 
divergence from the historic origins of SNA (Freeman, 2004).       
 
Although SNA has developed from an ethnographic approach and followed a path different 
from a qualitative approach influenced by Chicago sociology and anthropology, the 
quantification that it involves does not imply any assumptions about determinism or causality 
that contradict the idea of human agency and the emergence of meanings in social interaction.  
 
Hammersley (1999: 73) argues that decisions about what methods to utilise “should depend on 
the nature of what we are trying to describe, on the likely accuracy of our descriptions, on our 
purposes…not on our ideological commitment to one methodological paradigm or another”.  
Sarantakos (2005: 48) suggests that the differences between methods should be seen in context 
as differences rather than deficiencies. He concludes that arguing that the mixed method 
approach is deficient based on the differences in its epistemological and ontological 
deficiencies is like “arguing that ships are not an effective means of transport because they 




was shown in Chapter 3 a growing number of writers from SNA, the policy process approach, 
and interactionist sociology see the combination of network analysis and qualitative interviews 
as a feasible and legitimate way forward, and the author does not believe that this poses major 
epistemological difficulties.  
The study involved two phases of data collection. Phase one involved structured SNA 
interviews with policy actors. Because this exercise set out to identify the network participants 
before analysing the nature of the network, it consisted of two rounds of structured interviews. 
Phase two involved semi-structured qualitative interviews with the same group of individuals. 
The following section discuss ethical considerations, location of interviews, sampling, data 
collection, data analysis, and “relevance” in relation to the study.  
 
 
4.7 Ethical considerations 
Research governance provides a regulatory framework of principles, requirements and 
standards of excellence of research activity undertaken in the United Kingdom (DOH, 2005, 
2008). These standards offer public reassurance that all research activity is guided by rigorous 
ethical principles. It is incumbent on all those involved in research nationally and 
internationally to ensure that all studies receive ethical scrutiny (WMA, 1964). This includes 
assessing the risks and benefits for anyone participating in research studies, assurances of 
participant consent, and ongoing governance arrangements for monitoring of studies (DOH, 
2011). The author applied both for ethical approval from the Ethics Committee of the College 
of Human and Health Sciences (ECCHHS) in Swansea University, and relevant organisations 
in Nigeria for access and confirmation of ethical approval to conduct the study. Subsequently, 
the ECCHHS granted ethical approval and written and oral permission for research access was 
obtained from the relevant Nigerian health organizations (Appendix 2). The latter accepted the 
ethical approval granted by the ECCHHS as sufficient so that no additional ethical approval in 
Nigeria was needed.  
 
With regard to access consent the general procedure used was to gain consent at the 
organisational level, and then one by one from individuals who were identified as target 
participants.  Those approached all agreed to receive details of the study. All participants had 
the opportunity to ask questions and be given more information about the study throughout 




before signing a consent form (Appendix 5). The author emphasized to participants that they 
could opt in or out of the study at any time without giving a reason. Written consent was only 
sought from study participants once they had been given full information about what their 
involvement in the study would involve. Participants in this study held top professional and 
managerial positions within their respective organisations and directorates. Consequently, once 
they had the participant information sheet and the opportunity to discuss any aspect of the study, 
the author’s view was that they were fully capable of making an informed decision to 
participate. Before commencing interviews, the student again made a point of asking if consent 
was still forthcoming and emphasizing that involvement in the study was entirely voluntary. 
The author had previously emphasized to participants when making presentations about the 
study and when clarifying participant involvement that he would rather they did not take part 
in the study if they felt pressured to do so.  
 
Ethical issues must be considered in any research study (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). The 
social research process has the potential to create conflict between the aim of research and the 
rights of participants to maintain privacy and confidentiality (Orb et al., 2000). Ethics pertains 
to doing well and avoiding harm (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Harm can be prevented or 
reduced through the application of appropriate ethical principles. Therefore, the protection of 
participants in any social research study is imperative. The author paid careful attention to 
specific ethical issues posed by this study, in particular informed consent, the right to maintain 
privacy, and the right to retain confidentiality (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), which are 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
It was not envisaged that participants would be at risk of significant harm. The student did 
however consider that if there was a need for debriefing following any difficult interactions 
that occurred during interviews, then it would be right to halt and if necessary, end the interview. 
Another consideration was that participation in interviews was often outside individuals’ 
working hours, on some occasions before or following office hours. The student gave some 
thought to the possibility of rescheduling interviews should this clash with participants’ work 
duties. 
 
In Nigeria this field of study is mostly located at the head offices of the participants, which are 
mostly in urban areas in Abuja the state capital and other states in Nigeria, particularly Lagos 




place for the interviews to take place, and these were generally convenient and safe places as 
far as the researcher was concerned.  None of the participants were known to the researcher 
prior to the study.  
 
Assurances of participant anonymity and confidentiality were given for both phases of the 
study. The risk of breach of confidentiality was carefully considered. All participants were 
provided with clear information in English (written in English on the Participant Information 
Sheet) about the confidential nature of this study. In interviews this issue of trust centred on 
the relationship between the participant and the researcher. Many participants knew of others 
in the study because snowball sampling had been used to generate an initial list of names. The 
researcher therefore started each interview in the first phase by discussing ground-rules which 
included issues of anonymity and confidentiality, and this was repeated again with the second 
phase interviews. The researcher first clarified the purpose of the study, which was to gather 
information from elite policy actors with various experiences of the UHC debate in Nigeria 
and reviewed the overall aims of the study.  
 
The researcher told all participants that they would be given a pseudonym attached to their 
specific interview or transcript. It was explained that all study documents and transcripts would 
remain securely stored in a locked cabinet. For the duration of the study, all electronic data 
were kept on a personal computer located in a university post-graduate research room allocated 
to the student and password protected. Apart from storage on a PC hard drive, one backup was 




4.8 Sampling  
Elite policy actors are pivotal in shaping policy in health care sectors or policy in general. At 
the onset of the study the researchers were aware that policy actors from government 
institutions, interest groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were all involved in 
policy debates about UHC. However, the immediate question to answer was how to go about 
identifying the network of key policy actors shaping the UHC debate in Nigeria.  
 
According to Prell (2012), it is essential to identify your population in other to get an idea of 




complicated as they are connected to the concept of a network boundary. Network boundary is 
regarded as the line that encircles the social environment made up of the individuals involved 
in the network of interest. Ascertaining the network boundary is equal to identifying the 
individuals from a study population. Unfortunately, no ideal solution exists for determining a 
network boundary, and this is an issue that network analysts have yet to fully resolve 
(Granovetter, 1976; Knox et al., 2006).  Statisticians still debate how best to model social 
networks when the population or sample is not fully known (David and Snijders, 2002). 
 
The best current practice is to use various known techniques for approximating what the 
boundary might be. Borgatti et al. (2013) suggests three approaches that a researcher can 
employ to define the boundary of a network: the realist option, the nominalist option and the 
snowballing option. In the realist approach the analyst turns to the actors themselves to define 
their network, but this raises the problem of knowing which actors to approach in advance of 
knowing who is in the network. In the nominalist approach it is the analyst who defines the 
network, usually by using a list of employees, documents or media reports to identify key 
names. The third snowballing approach combines elements of the other two; the researcher 
identifies key actors who are known to be involved in the area of interest and then asks them 
to identify others in their network, whom the researcher then approaches. Since there is no 
perfect solution to network sampling, a pragmatic approach seemed to be to select 
organizations, departments and individuals on the basis of their apparent involvement in UHC 
policy making, and then seek to add to this by “snowballing”. This resembled the purposive 
sampling used in much mainstream qualitative research. 
 
Social network data is often incomplete, with some actors or links missing from the dataset. In 
a whole network social setting, most of this incompleteness emerges from the following 
sources: the so-called boundary specification problem (Laumann et al., 1983); respondent 
inaccuracy (Bernard et al., 1984; Brewer and Webster, 1999; Marsden, 1990; Butts, 2003); 
non-responses in network data collection (Stork and Richards, 1992; Rumsey, 1993; Robins et 
al., 2004); or via study design (Burt, 1987). Although missing data often occurs in empirical 
studies, there has been little research which has examined the possible effects of missing links 
or nodes on the measurable properties of networks. This section aims to highlight the problem 
of missing data in social network analysis.         
 
One way to approach this is to develop analytic techniques that capture global statistical 




complementary strategy is to develop remedial techniques that minimise the effect of missing 
data (Holland and Leinhard, 1973; Robins et al., 2004). Although a definitive statistical 
treatment is not offered in this paper, we conduct exploratory analyses which are clearly 
acknowledged and discussed in the methodological section (Costenbader and Valente, 2003). 
Non-responsive participants are an important limitation of the research.        
 
In a standard sampling situation, for example when drawing a representative sample from a 
population, special techniques are available to correct parameter estimates for imperfect 
response rates (Little and Rubin, 2002). The refusal of some participants to reply adds to the 
limits of the network representation. From the description it seems that the network represents 
only a partial section of the policy network – that which was reachable by the candidate. This 
section utilizes Kossinets (2006) ‘actor non-response’ principal of missing data mechanisms to 
discuss the effect of miss data in social network analysis  
 
Actor non-response principal: an examination of these mechanisms was performed in regard 
to their impact on random bipartite graphs. The results of the simulation reveal that actor non-
response is an important issue within the study, as it appears from the data collection that 
network representation is missing a partial section of the policy network.       
 
A crucial issue within network survey research is that of non-responses to the survey. In a 
standard sampling situation, such as drawing a representative sample from a population, special 
techniques are available to correct parameter estimates for imperfect response rates (Little and 
Rubin, 2002). However, there is no such definitive treatment for social network analysis, 
although the effects of non-responsive participants on some network properties have been 









While single-mode networks with non-respondents are amenable to statistical treatment 
(Robins et al., 2004), non-response in networks with multiple interaction contexts (modelled 
as bipartite graphs) have other particular implications. When collecting data of an affiliation 
network, the survey asks actors to name peers with whom they interact (that is, ignoring the 
multiplexity of ties); this allows the non-response effect to be balanced out by reciprocal 
nominations (Stork and Richards, 1992), for instance, if actor C failed to fill in the network 
questionnaire (Figure 24). Yet, C’s interactants who participated in the survey (A and B) must 
have reported their interactions with C. It is therefore expected that if the number of non-
respondents is small relative to the size of the network, and the researcher does not require all 
nominations to be reciprocated (as a crude validity check), then the quantity of missing data as 
a result of non-response should be negligible, or at least small (Kossinets, 2006).       
 
 
4.9 Participant selection 
Due to the practical and financial limitations that apply to a single-researcher doctoral project, 
it was not feasible to interview all the policy actors involved in policy discussions about UHC 
across the country.  However, it was envisaged that a full range of organisations could be 
included, with a sample of actors from these organisations then being interviewed. As 
explained above, the elite policy actors involved in this study were first identified using the 
nominalist approach, and the sample later expanded using the snowballing approach. It was 
felt that using the nominalist approach alone might potentially omit other important actors 
involved in UHC policy discussions in Nigeria (Wassermann and Faust, 1994). Thus, to get a 
better picture of the network as the actors themselves saw it, an element of snowballing was 
added. Additionally, a contact known to the researcher from Management Science of Health 
(MSH), who works on UHC implementation in Nigeria, also helped by pointing to possible 
omissions.  
As a first step the researcher prepared a candidate list of actors and organisations, which on a 
basis of a reading of media reports and documents about UHC in Nigeria appeared likely to be 
centrally involved in the policy process. It was not anticipated that all these candidates would 
be accessible for interviews or would necessarily have great influence, but this was seen as the 






1. Rockefeller Foundation representative  
2. World Bank Group country representative  
3. World Health Organization representative 
4. International Labour Organization representative 
5. Management Sciences for Health Nigeria representative  
6. USAID representative 
7. Health for All campaign  
8. Chief Executive NHIS 
9. Health in Africa initiative  
10. Minister of Health  
11. Minister of Finance  
12. Executive Governors 
13. Health state commissioners 
14. Traditional rulers 
15. Hospital managers 
16. NHIS board and management  
17. Head of Health Workers Association  
18. PharmAccess Foundation  
19. State Ministry of Health officials 
20. Federal Ministry of Health officials  
21. 12-member technical group for UHC  
22. Permanent Secretary MoH 
23. Nigerian Medical Association  
24. Senate Committee on Health 
25. Health Maintenance Organizations representative 
 
These actors and organisations listed above come from various sectors and strata of Nigerian 
society, and for the purposes of the study the researcher categorised them in terms of four 
groupings of: 
• Government, including both the federal and state levels and the parastatals 
• Labour, including professional organizations and trade unions 
• Health Sector, including the NHIS, the public and private hospitals and the HMOs 





The researcher reasoned that the final mix of network participants selected for SNA should 
include a reasonable balance of all these categories.  However, for various practical reasons, 
including lack of personal contacts and problems of circumventing gatekeepers, the researcher 
felt unable to proceed to approach all the above actors/organisations immediately, and instead 
opted to start the study by interviewing a relatively accessible subset of actors who could be 
asked for their views of who the key policy actors were. To address the research questions, it 
was necessary for the researcher to gather the views both of these who supported the UHC 
policy and those who opposed it. This would be a snowballing exercise which would generate 
a more precise list of names and a better idea of feasible channels of communication to request 
participation. 
In consultation with the key informant from Management Science of Health the researcher 
identified 25 persons with known involvement in UHC policy discussions, and who included 
both proponents and opponents of the policy, who would be approached to help generate a list 
of influential policy network members.  Because of the researcher’s lack of easy access to 
international bodies from within Nigeria, and limited contacts at the governmental level, the 
group for the snowballing exercise was skewed towards the Health Sector and Labour groups.  
However, it was intended that the final selection of participants included in SNA would be 
spread more evenly across the categories.  
 The 25 approached for the round one snowballing interview comprised: 
• Government: one senior official from the federal MoH and one from a state MoH (n = 
2) 
• Labour: senior representatives from the medical (1), dental (1) and nursing (3) 
professions and two from community health organizations (n = 7) 
• Health sector: four senior officers from NHIS, six senior managers from HMOs, five 
managers from private sector providers or provider associations (n = 16). 
 
One candidate (from an association of private sector organisations) declined to participate, but 
the remaining 24 were interviewed. They were given the list of candidate actors/organisations 
mentioned previously as possibilities and asked for names of particular influential actors 
involved in UHC from these or other backgrounds, which the researcher then wrote onto a 
prepared sheet.  The list was intended as an aide memoire of possibilities rather than an 





Interestingly this insider group indicated that several individuals or groups on the nominal list 
of candidates were not as centrally involved in UHC policy as the researcher had supposed. 
They suggested that other senior officials had greater hands-on involvement than the Minister 
or Permanent Secretary in the MoH, or the Minister of Finance. No member of the Senate 
committee on Health was named as a key actor, and no traditional rulers were named. 
Representatives from the Rockefeller Foundation, the International Labour Organisation, 
Management Sciences for Health, the Health for All Campaign, the Health in African initiative, 
or the PharmAccess Foundation featured on the expanded list of 67 names produced. 
Where snowballing is used, the process ideally continues until names start to repeat, and the 
researcher feels he or she has saturated the possible list of nominations within the network 
boundary (Bryman, 2008). Bearing in mind the limited resources of a doctoral study, the 
researcher’s initial view had been that it was impractical to include many more than about 40 
actors, with around 10 in each of the four chosen categories (Government, Health Sector, 
Labour and International Bodies).  However, the expanded list appeared to include highly 
relevant persons and so the researcher decided to go ahead with a larger sample than had been 
tentatively planned and approach all 67 candidate network members. 
 
According to critics of the snowballing approach, its main disadvantage is that the sample is 
biased by the referring actors (Scott, 2000). Hence, who the researcher approaches first for 
additional names may determine who is deemed to fall within the network. Individual actors 
may have their own inner circles, which may be different from the acquaintance circles of other 
key actors. Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) propose viewing the network as dividing into a number 
of zones where each sample collected through snowballing is formed out of the first set of 
nominees put forward until something approximating a full circle of network members emerges, 
but this was not possible with the resources available in the present study. What was done 
instead was to include key actors even where this involved more interviews than initially 
planned.  
 
The list from snowballing comprised 67 candidates from eighteen policy organisations who 
might take part in stage two SNA interviews. When these were approached 6 stated they were 
not in fact involved in UHC policy and so were not included, and a further 14 declined to take 
part.  Of these 14, three were from UN bodies, five from Health Maintenance Organisations, 
and six were from the Labour sector, including one who had held a senior position in the NMA. 




SNA interviews and were joined by an additional 23 consenting participants identified from 
snowballing. Therefore 47 respondents took part in second stage structured interviews 
concerned with SNA data.  
The list of the 47 participants and their roles is shown in Table 7 in the next chapter (see page 
153).  The breakdown of actors in terms of the four categories mentioned earlier was: 
Government 12, Health Sector 16, International Bodies 9, and Labour 10.  Thus, a reasonable 
balance was achieved between what appeared at the onset to be key stakeholder groups. 
 
 
4.10 The Interview Method 
The present study is primarily an interview study, and so it is worth discussing this method in 
some detail. Interviews are interactions between an interviewer and a respondent, completed 
with the purpose of gathering information on a specific set of topics (Harrell & Bradley, 2009). 
Interviews are a common method for collecting primary data in scientific studies. First, 
interviews are an ideal way to collect information from individuals about their own practices, 
beliefs, or opinions, and they also can be used to gather information on past or present 
behaviours or experiences (Warren & Karner, 2005). Second, the method of the interview is 
suitable for gathering deep, nuanced, and complex data because it allows the interviewees to 
describe their perspectives in their own words with minimal distortion arising from the 
researcher’s assumptions or the structure of the questions (Britten, 2000).  
 
According to how much control the interviewer will have over the interaction, interviews can 
be categorised as unstructured, semi-structured, and structured interviews. There are benefits 
to each of these approaches. 
 
The structured interview exerts considerable control over the content of answers. In structured 
interviews, the questions are fixed, and they are asked in a specific order (Harrell & Bradley, 
2009). These interviews are often used in quantitative research, and when the researcher has a 
very large sample and is looking for data that can be generalised to a large population (Harrell 
& Bradley, 2009). A face-to-face structured interview is a type of interview in which the 
interviewer asks a particular set of predetermined questions that have been planned and 
created in advance. This means that all respondents are asked the same questions in the same 
order. Structured interviews are also known as standardized interviews, patterned interviews, 




are asked the same questions, it is easy to quantify and compare their answers. Finally, this 
type of one-size-fits-all interview can seem a bit cold and impersonal, making it harder to 
generate rapport between researcher and respondent. 
 
In qualitative unstructured interviews, the researcher has a clear plan and set of topics, but 
minimal control over how the respondent answers (Harrell & Bradley, 2009). Collecting 
information in this manner might lead to very rich and nuanced data, but the process of 
interviewing, transcribing and analysis can be more time consuming than analysis of closed-
end structured questions (Harrell & Bradley, 2009). Usually an interview guide is used, which 
lists general questions and topics that must be covered.  However, this only provides a loose 
structure, so that most questions are open ended, and additional questions can be added to those 
on the outline guide.  This enables the researcher or the participant to diverge from a standard 
question in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail (Britten, 2000). Semi-structured 
interviews allow interviewees freedom to respond in their own way and describe events or 
concepts in their own words (Morse & Field, 1996).  Using an outline interviewing guide in a 
flexible way can help not only to cover the necessary questions but also to encourage 
participants to tell their stories in their interviews (Bryman, 2001).  
 
Hence, the method of semi-structured interviews can help the researcher to delve deeply into a 
topic and get respondents to develop their answers at greater length. The researcher can use 
follow-up questions to get respondents to clarify ambiguous statements (Kvale, 1996; Mason, 
2002), and a series of linked questions can draw out accounts of specific situations and action 
sequences (Kvale, 1996). Therefore, the method of face-to-face semi-structured interviews was 
considered suitable for data collection in this study because it seemed a well-tried way of 
exploring and understanding the interactions between elite policy makers. 
 
 
4.11 Data collection 
As explained earlier, the first phase of the research utilised a social network analysis to provide 
a “visualisation” of interactions with the UHC policy network, and the nature of the policy 
process was explored further in second phase qualitative interviews. Additional analysis of 
relevant documents concerned with UHC policy was undertaken to examine the origins and 




The first phase of data collection took place in Nigeria between March and June 2016. The 
second phase of data collection commenced immediately after the first and ended in February 
2017.   
 
 
4.11.1 Phase One 
As explained above, two rounds of SNA interviews were necessary because the researcher had 
first to identify who was in the network, before then asking that full set of participants about 
the nature of the network and the ties between them.  The first round was designed to generate 
a list of key UHC policy actors, but also collected some basic background information on the 
round one informant.  The second-round SNA interviews were administered to network 
members who had been identified in the first-round interviews and agreed to participate.  The 
questions were grouped into six sections concerned with different relationships of the 
interactions between network actors and were intended to allow the mapping out of the flow of 
information between them and the nature of the ties between them. These six sets of questions 




4.11.2 Phase Two 
Phase two of the data collection involved the use of the semi-structured qualitative interviews 
to flesh out the meaning that participants attached to their dealings with other network actors 
and their perspectives on UHC policy. All 47 first-stage SNA participants completed a second-
stage semi-structured interview lasting approximately 45 minutes to an hour.  This was mostly 
at a location acceptable to the participants. However, due to visa problems and the need to 
return to the UK, the researcher ended up conducting the last few interviews by telephone, 
again though moving through a similar set of loosely framed questions.  
 
The interview guide used was designed according to the research questions of this study and 
themes derived from the literature review.  It was further developed and refined in the light of 
experience of the early interviews. Over time some questions were changed or added based on 
emerging themes that arose during preliminary and ongoing analysis and reflection. For 
example, it became evident that some topics initially included in the topic guide were not 




identified as important and therefore subsequently included. In addition, using a semi-
structured topic guide allowed for flexibility in the style and order of the questions, allowing 
topics to be further explored and expanded upon based upon interviewees’ responses (Britten, 
2006; Denscombe, 2007). Topic guides were adapted to be slightly different for the interviews 
which depended on the position of the interviewee (e.g., Government, UN Bodies/External 
Government Agencies/NGO, Health sector and Labour) (see Appendix 3- Phase two). 
 
With the permission of the participants, each interview was audio recorded using a digital 
recorder. All interviews were recorded in the English language and the data were transcribed 
manually on paper and subsequently typed up into text files on your PC. This approach allows 
the researcher to use direct quotations from the interviewee when presenting the findings and 




 4.12 Document review 
Alongside the interviews, documentary analysis was used to provide background, especially 
on the evolution of UHC policy in Nigeria. This was useful in filling gaps in interview accounts 
and understanding some of the events or developments mentioned. 
Documentary sources can provide information about previous social events and reflect the 
social behaviours that emerge in a given political, economic or socio-cultural context (Prior 
2003). Data from documents can be applied either directly or indirectly, to answer research 
questions or for the purpose of authentication of what informants say in interviews (Mason 
1996; Patton 2002). Such documents usually take the form of written texts collated by an 
organization or individual for specific purposes (Mason 1996). Many documents are relevant 
to health policy research, for example papers, articles, official papers, statistical databases and 
the Internet (Buse, Mays, and Walt 2005). Researchers should not overlook how documents 
select and represent the information they present (Patton 2002). Hence, a document can be 
defined as a social artefact that can take many different forms.  
In this study documentary analysis was used as a complementary source of data collection to 
examine relevant documents relating to UHC policy. Official documents relating to UHC 
policy in Nigeria and the policy process practice in particular were investigated, including 




document. Several documents were gathered from various government/UN agencies mainly 
the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), Ministry of Health (both Federal/State), UN 
Bodies and Health and the Planning Secretariats. Both qualitative and quantitative data have 
been gathered through these sources. The qualitative data have been used to describe Nigeria’s 
path towards achieving UHC through the interaction between actors during the policy process 
stages. However, studies on the subject of the health policy process in general and in Nigeria 
are very limited, and published data associated with the topic are also rarely available or easily 
accessible. Thus, it is worth mentioning that most of the secondary data used in this study were 
obtained through direct contact with different sources during the two fieldwork periods in 
Nigeria. Furthermore, every health research must follow ethical procedures and must also 
appear ethical otherwise views such as political correctness or moral qualities may prevent its 
approval from peers or society at large (Johnsson et al., 2014). Researchers soliciting 
documents need to be conscious of their obligation to protect the respondent involved in their 
research. When the researcher uses documents contained in public archives, then much of the 
bureaucracy of governance and ethics is redundant. As the documents are in the public domain, 
they are freely available and the problem of protecting sources does not arise.  
 
 
4.13 Analysing the SNA data 
Overall, the data collection included three rounds of interviews gathered in two phases, where 
the first phase involved two rounds of face-to-face structured SNA interviews, and the second 
phase involved a third round of semi-structured qualitative interviews.  
 
Only limited analysis was needed for the data gathered from the 24 participants involved in the 
first round of face-to-face structured SNA interviews, because these were completed primarily 
to identify further network members (via snowball sampling).  There was an identity check and 
a confirmation of their consent to participate in the study, and some questions on socio-
demographic information and personal views about UHC. Data analysis for this first round of 
SNA interviews took the form of simple descriptive statistics on characteristics, but as this 
group did not comprise the final network this was used only as a check on the likely 
demography and balance of the final sample. The main purpose of this round was to expand 
the pool of candidate network members for the next stage.  47 selected network members 




were intended to allow an analysis of the network structure. Again, the researcher interviewed 




Read Relationship - involves those that have read any published work to get ideas from the 
following network member.  
Discussion Relationship - involves those that have taken part and have face-to-face meetings 
in a UHC discussion forum with any of the following network member. 
Coalition Relationship - involves those that have formed a coalition with any of the following 
persons within the policy network. 
Affiliation Relationship - involves those that have followed network members, outside what 
we might call your coalition of close associates share the same views within the network 
boundary. 
Conflict Relationship - involves those that have followed network members, outside what we 
might call your coalition of close associates have a conflict of interests within the network 
boundary. 
Advice Relationship - involves those that have taken advice from any of the following network 
member. 
Box 1: Six Relationships of the policy network  
 
The analysis examined the policy network and the nature of ties between network members.  
Ties were investigated according to six relationships, comprising the read relationship (read a 
named actor’s work), the discussion relationship (discussed issues with named actor), the 
coalition relationship (aligned with named actor), the affiliation relationship (attachment to 
named actor), the conflict relationship (past conflict with named actor) and the advice 
relationship (took advice from named actor). 
 
A social setting may have key actors positioned in different sections of the network boundary; 
some actors are located at the centre, others are at the periphery and a few are isolated (Borgatti, 
2004). The analysis sought to identify the shape of networks for each of the six relationships 
using appropriate social network measures that reveal the network structure. Identifying key 
sub-networks is a step needed to assess the impact of degree of network cohesion and relational 




identifying the behavioural patterns of cohesive subgroups within their social environment, but 
there is no single comprehensive model that provides understanding of social and 
organisational processes (Borgatti, 2013). The chosen SNA analysis examined the six 
relationships of the policy network taking account of the network structural characteristics. 
 
Structural characteristics: This aspect of SNA evaluates the structural component of the policy 
network in four stages using SNA techniques to create a taxonomic tree (see Figure 50). The 
four stages are as follows. 
 
Connectedness stage: This stage evaluates the network size of each policy network and the 
ratio of connected to unconnected ties within each network. It uses structural measures such as 
network sampling and it measures the total number of nodes involved in the network boundary 
(active and inactive nodes), in addition to network density (Moody and White, 2003).  
 
According to Faust (2006), network size, density, transitivity and fragmentation are 
fundamental network measures used for identifying the distribution of dyadic properties. 
Network density is the number of ties in each policy network divided by the potential number 
of ties. For instance, when each respondent’s average number of ties is precisely quantifiable, 
then the total number of ties increases with the network size. If the network size is raised by 
the power of two, then the potential number of ties increases. The assumption is that the density 
of each policy network may show the possibility of heavily constrained dyadic distributions. 
Some dyadic properties have low probabilities, simply because of the density of the policy 
network (Faust, 2006). Transitivity states that the extent to which two interacting policy actors 
in the policy network are connected by an edge. Transitivity of an interaction means when there 
is a link between actor A to actor B, and actor B to actor C, there is a link between actor A to 
actor C- a friend of my friend is a friend. Fragmentation is the proportion of pairs of nodes that 
cannot reach each other. For instance, Fragmentation is how shattered the policy network looks 
when a couple of policy actors are removed from the network.  
 
The problem with using network size, density, transitivity and fragmentation to examine the 
policy networks is their limited value for identifying cohesive subgroups. The next section 






Figure 25: Component analysis of the “advice” relationship of the policy network. 
 
Component of policy network stage: The previous stage evaluates the properties of potential 
connections and the structural boundary in each policy network. This stage focuses on 
deconstructing each policy network by progressively removing parts to find the relevant 
subgroups and examining not just the respondents and their interactions, but the entirety of the 
network subgraphs. Measures of the cohesiveness of network components are applied at this 
stage to tackle the issue of cohesion mentioned at the end of the connectedness stage. For 
instance, Figure 25 gives an example where portions of the policy network are disconnected 
from each other, where x represents nodes red and, y represents nodes in blue.  Cohesion is a 
multilevel idea that evaluates all six relationships of the policy network in search of 
components that are disconnected from one another (Moody and White, 2003). 
 
Subgroups within the network stage: Unlike the previous stage which explores the number of 
existing components within the subgraphs of all six policy networks, this stage focuses on areas 
within the suggested components where the actors are structurally related to each other more 
than they are to the others in the rest of the network (Alvarez-Hamelin et al., 2005). Identifying 
the policy actors of the cohesive subgroups within a network is a significant issue in social 
network analysis. Cohesive subgroups are a small group of actors connected with similar tie 




core, cliques, and core-periphery in order to find the cohesive subgroups of actors within all 
six relationships of the policy network.  
 
Key institutions and organisations in policy process stage: Not all individuals are equally 
important in social networks. Key nodes exist to link a focal unit to other areas within the 
organisation (power actors), as well as to areas outside of the organisation (gatekeepers and 
policy actors connected to the power actors). Individuals can also be uncoupled from the rest 
of the network (isolates). Centrality describes an actor’s relative position within the context of 
his/her social network. Centrality measures have been applied in a diverse range of research 
studies (Ortiz-Arroyo, 2010). For instance, centrality measures have been applied to investigate 
influence within inter-organisational networks, the power or competence in organisations, to 
analyse the structure of terrorist and criminal networks, to analyse employment opportunities 
and many other areas (Berlusconi et al., 2016). The ability that centrality measures have to 
determine the relative position of a node within a network has been used in previous research 
to discover the key players in social networks. 
 
Degree centrality (including indegree and outdegree centrality), betweenness, closeness and 
eigenvector centrality are among the most popular social network measures used in this stage. 
These measures focus on discovering a set of key players in the policy network involved in the 
UHC dialogue in Nigeria. A simple example in Figure 41 illustrates the possible taxonomy 
outcome of the research analysis on the data collected from the second round of interviews.  
 
This section has presented a brief summary of methods that can be used to identify key actors 
in the UHC policy network. The development of the taxonomy tree involved an iterative 
process, where the structural patterns presented in the policy network informed the questions 
about their content and meaning. The results of this more qualitative aspect of SNA were used 
to interpret the data, and also to enhance and amend the visualisations. The act of visualising 
and narrating the networks usually prompts a justification of their changing nature over time. 
Thus, we are not simply counting the number of ties in each relationship of the policy network 
but rather, we are trying to understand the dynamic meaning and intensity of the relationships 
among the policy actors in Nigeria’s UHC discourse (Ryan, 2016). This was then taken a step 






4.14 Analysing the qualitative interviews 
All of the 47 first-stage SNA participants participated in a second-stage semi-structured 
interview which lasted for between 45 minutes and one hour.  Thematic analysis was used to 
organise data by identifying patterns, and for analysing and reporting themes. This is an 
inductive approach allowing accessibility and, in theory, flexibility, and can be especially 
relevant to researchers early in the qualitative research process (Braun & Clarke, 2006).     
 
Because of this method’s flexibility, researchers are able to use their own subjective 
assumptions (Bristowe et al., 2015) as long as what they are doing, and how and why, is 
transparent (Attride-Stirling, 2001). Finally, Vaismoradi et al. (2013) have stated that this 
approach is reliable enough to be used to conduct an introductory study on a novel phenomenon, 
where the data depends on the quantities of energy and time the researcher must expend on the 
data collection and analytic process. The raw data consisted of the interview transcripts. As 
DeSantis and Ugarriza (2000) indicate, the thematic analysis involves searching for, and 
identifying, commonalities across a set of interviews.      
 
Analysing text consists of several aspects: (1) discovering themes and subthemes, (2) whittling 
these themes down to a manageable number (i.e., deciding on which themes are important), (3) 
constructing hierarchies of themes or code books, and (4) linking the themes to theoretical 
models (Ryan and Bernard, 2003).     
 
This process was iterative, rather than linear with constant moves back and forth between the 
entire dataset, the coded transcript extracts, the emerging themes/categories and the relevant 
notes, in line with the usual qualitative analysis processes (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). Although 
this is not a grounded theory study as such this aspect of the analysis is similar to Glaser and 
Strauss’s (1967) constant comparative method in that the themes identified in transcribed 
interviews are compared and elaborated as analysis proceeds. Themes emerging from earlier 
interviews sometimes led to more emphasis being given to those topics in subsequent 
interviews (Boeije, 2002).  
 
Three scrutiny techniques (things to look for in texts) are described, as is one processing 
technique, concerned with how to process texts into rich narratives for the qualitative analysis 






Table 6: Example of coding techniques used in the analysis. 
 
 
4.14.1 Identifying themes in interview transcripts 
 This usually involves scrolling through a number of texts and marking relevant passages.  This 
may be done manually by, for example use of different colour fonts or appended code numbers, 
or electronically by attaching codes to text segments. Bogdan and Biklen (1982) suggest 
reading the text over at least twice, while Sandelowski (1995) suggests analysing the texts by 
proofreading the material and underlining key phrases “because they make some as yet 
undeveloped sense”.  The three scrutiny techniques alert the analyst to features to look for. 
 
Repetition: is an easy way to identify themes. For example, in semi-structured interviews with 
respondents from the labour sector, it was found that the participants repeatedly referred to 
ideas linked to the mismanagement of health funds, insufficient healthcare spending, self-
indulgence and misappropriation. The conclusion was that these ideas were important themes 
and were displayed alongside other ideas linked to the obstacles and challenges which affect 
the process of the implementation of UHC in Nigeria.  The more the same concept occurs 
within a text, the more likely it is to be a theme. However, the number of repetitions required 
to constitute an important theme is an open question which only the investigator can decide 





Transitions: refer to naturally occurring content shifts in interview talk may be theme markers. 
In these semi structured interviews, the conversation moves from one topic to another, which 
creates transitions. Analysing the features of conversation and discourse, such as the structure 
of turns at talk in the interview (including, for instance, speaker interruptions, repairs or 
formulations of gist) can identify these transitions (Silverman, 1993).     
 
Similarities and differences: comparison involves looking at similarities and differences in the 
presentation of a topic by different respondents or different topics by the same respondent. 
Careful attention to how a given respondent presents particular issues can help the researcher 
build themes empirically from the data rather than basing them on prior theoretical assumptions 
(Charmaz, 2000).     
 
Processing technique: alongside the three scrutiny techniques analysis involves use of a 
processing technique. This technique is informal and involves organising the textual data from 
interviews into manageable categories.  Traditionally it meant spreading out transcripts on the 
floor and making a start on marking themes and relevant sections, while in the computer age it 
may involve entering text files into a qualitative data package or sorting passages from 
transcripts into different MS Word file folders.     
 
Cutting and sorting: After the initial sifting and marking of transcripts, cutting and sorting 
involves the identification of relevant quotations and then arranging them into piles of items 
which go together. However, this technique has many variations.  For example, traditionalists 
who prefer manual analysis might cut out relevant quotes (ensuring that some of the context in 
which it occurred remains) and paste the passage onto a small index card. On the reverse of 
each of the cards a note might be made of who said it and where it appeared in the text. Next, 
the cards are laid out on a table and sorted into piles of similar quotes. Each pile is then named. 
These are the themes. As the first exploratory data analysis stage, investigators are more 
concerned with identifying the largest range of themes possible. In later steps, they identify 
which themes are the most important and require further analysis (Ryan and Bernard, 2003).  
In recent times many will prefer to automate this process by using a computer application, such 
as NVivo, to undertake a series of similar steps electronically. 
 
Additionally, this processing phase may also assist in provisionally identifying findings (see 




manner. Suitable data extracts can be selected and presented to illustrate the points which the 
research is demonstrating, without unnecessary complexity.     
 
 
Figure 26: Using thematic analysis to map out findings. 
 
 
4.15 Data management 
All the interviews were audio taped and transcribed. Being personally involved in the 
interviewing process aided in transcription because of the benefit of knowing who is speaking 
at any particular time. Field notes were taken during the interviews and after each interview a 
post-interview synopsis was written. This helped during the transcriptions to recreate the 
research environment and the picture of the events. A journal of all the documents that were 






Reflexivity is concerned with the researcher’s awareness of his/her own influence on each stage 
of the study as it develops (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Reflexivity is more than mere reflection. 
It involves consideration of every aspect of researcher’s interpretive activity beginning with 
the study rationale and research questions, and continuing with choices about methodology, 
sampling, data collection methods, approach towards data analysis, and the way the research 
is documented and disseminated (Denzin, 2008). Reflexivity is concerned with 
“epistemological accountability” in terms of explaining how researchers have come to their 
research decisions (Hand, 2003). This involves consideration of the mindfulness by which 
researchers are able look back more immediately on their personal thoughts and feelings and 
how these may have affected the research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Walker Read and Priest 
(2013) advocate that researchers take account of the concept of reflexivity because it is 
impossible to remove the researcher from the research process or the findings of the study. The 
concept of reflexivity acknowledges that the orientations of researchers are shaped by their 
socio-historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations confer on them 
(Kvale, 2002). Mruck and Mey (2007) explain reflexivity as active acknowledgement by the 
researcher that her/his own actions and decisions will inevitably impact upon the meaning and 
context of the action under investigation. Reflexivity requires researchers to improve their 
awareness of personal prejudices, to reflect on actions taken, their roles and emerging 
understandings, whilst engaged in the research process (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). 
Reflexivity is therefore not an activity that occurs at one point in time, but it is a process that 
is carried out throughout the entire research process (Ortlipp, 2008).  
To improve his reflexive awareness throughout this study, the student maintained a reflexive 
diary, which recorded his reflexive insights, and the ways in which the study findings will have 
been influenced by his personal sociocultural background, world view, subjective experiences, 
and pre-understandings (Nadin and Cassell, 2006). The diary also recorded some analytical 
memos, and unexpected incidents which happened during the study. The reflexive diary helped 
the student because it provided an outline of his thinking and reminded him of what had 
achieved so far and what was still required. The student drew on notes from the diary to look 
back on some key decision made, and these provided a kind of audit trail for readers. One 
example of reflexive diary written after participants’ interviews are provided in Appendix 12. 
Moreover, the use of reflexivity also aided the researcher in clarifying his views regarding 




In terms of a study of UHC the status of the researcher as a person living in Nigeria and familiar 
with the domestic healthcare system and way of life or a person coming from overseas and 
seeing Nigeria as yet another “foreign” healthcare system worthy of study through a 
comparative lens, makes a considerable difference to the kind of research produced.  Dwyer 
and Buckle (2009: 60) observe that some researchers occupy “the space between”, in that they 
do not fit easily into either the insider versus outsider, or domestic versus foreign researcher 
categories. Moreover, these authors suggest that the researcher role itself tends to accentuate 
ambiguity about which status applies: “We may be closer to the insider position or closer to 
the outsider position, but because our perspective is shaped by our position as a researcher 
(which includes having read much literature on the research topic), we cannot fully occupy one 
or the other of those positions” (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009: 61).  
 
That was the case for the author, who has a Nigerian background, but had lived away from the 
country for more than eight years in the UK.  He could be seen as having a “outsider” 
perspective because he had become unfamiliar with the way the Nigerian health system works, 
and yet still had many connections to Nigerian culture and social norms. Thus, in his case the 
boundaries between insider and outsider status were blurred and are not as clear cut as the wider 
literature suggests. This sense of being, at least in part, a stranger to the system had a 
considerable impact of the experience of fieldwork, and the interpretation of the findings. 
 
 
4.17 Ensuring rigor  
The study sought to address the issue of rigour mainly through the use of triangulation. 
Triangulation is the utilisation of “two or more sources to achieve a comprehensive picture of 
a fixed point of reference” (Padgett, 2008: 186). Drisko (1997) also points out that qualitative 
researchers are capable of achieving “completeness” or an exhaustive response to the research 
question through collecting data from multiple sources (data triangulation) or using multiple 
analysts to review the data (observer triangulation). To ensure that the outcome of this research 
was an appropriate and adequate representation of the evidence available, the selected data 
collection methods were applied in a rigorous manner, as has been illustrated. Critics of mixed-
methods research argue that data from exploratory studies are often messy, non-methodical and 
that the researcher can most often end up seeing what he wants to see through some form of 




to the data both in collection and analysis to maximise robustness. The triangulation strategies 
used were:  
• Method triangulation. Findings of the study were checked for consistency with the 
different data collection methods of SNA, qualitative interviews, and documentary 
evidence.  
• Source triangulation. Data sources were collected from policy actors within four 
different institutions comprising Government, international actors, the health sector and 
Labour. This helped to clarify meaning and to corroborate observations and 
interpretations.  
• Perspective triangulation. Different theoretical perspectives are used to analyze and 
interpret the data. This included in particular Walt’s policy process approach and SNA 
techniques.  
 
One of the main criticisms of mixed method research is that sample size is usually small. This 
study attempted to identify a policy network made up of key actors involved in the UHC policy, 
by first using a purposive selection of policy actors and then using a snowballing technique to 
mark out the network boundary so as to include the most important actors. These key policy 
actors represented the study respondents who were later interviewed face-to-face.  As all 47 
who completed phase 1 also participated in phase 2, this seemed to the researcher to meet the 
requirements of ensuring representativeness. The strategy used in arriving at the sample for 
this study has been rigorous and logical. Persons from each institution were given the 
opportunity to be included in the study. The result has a good spread of demographic 
characteristics, including different levels of experience, exposure and clout in the UHC debate. 
It is also worth mentioning that the data obtained from qualitative interviews are used to 
increase our insight into social phenomena rather than demonstrate statistical 
representativeness in any strict sense. The logic is similar to that of the case study where the 
objective is to produce theoretical generalisations that can be tested in further case studies, 
rather than to demonstrate statistical generalisation from the study sample to a wider population, 
or in this case to UHC policy making outside Nigeria (Mitchell, 1983; Yin, 2017). 
 
In the view of Marshall (1990), if a researcher desires to give value and trust to mixed method 
research, then the following should be done: the research design and methods must be explicitly 
detailed; the research questions and relevance of data must be rigorously argued and explicit; 




demonstrated a robust qualitative strategy that fulfilled the Marshall's criteria and enabled the 
collection of adequate and appropriate data to achieve the research objective. This 
notwithstanding the researcher concedes that there are limitations of the study and these are 




Hammersley (1992: 73) identifies two core aspects of relevance, namely “importance of topic” 
and “contribution to the literature”. An evaluation can be made in terms of the importance of 
the studied topic to a substantive field and its relevance to wider societal values and contexts. 
Moreover, the relevance of a research is judged by its contribution to the literature. 
Hammersley (1992: 73) stresses that “research that confirms what is already known well is of 
little value.” A study must constitute a significant addition to what is established knowledge, 
either through empirical findings or building theory (Lofland, 1974, Athens, 1984). If the 
findings and analytical insights are found to be meaningful and have potential to fit situations 
outside of the study, then a contribution to theoretical development can be made.  
 
Therefore, the research can be judged to be relevant or irrelevant “not only in terms of its 
relation to some topic of interest but also on the basis of its exemplification of some 
methodological or theoretical paradigm” (Hammersley, 1992: 73). The student agrees that the 
relevance of this study will be established if the findings fit with other situations outside of the 
study, or if readers judge the findings to be meaningful and credible (Sandelowski, 1986). 
Therefore, the author has attempted to provide sufficient information in regard to the locations 
and settings of the study whilst maintaining participant confidentiality so that readers can judge 




This chapter has discussed issues involved in combining the methods of SNA and qualitative 
interviews, and the approaches taken to study design, data collection and data analysis.  The 






CHAPTER 5  
ANALYZING THE UHC POLICY NETWORK 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main findings of the SNA component of the study. It describes key 
features of the network in which UHC policy is debated, formed and contested, and presents 
visualisations of aspects relevant to the analysis. It presents the taxonomy for classifying 
stakeholder groups implicated in the policy discourse on UHC and maps out relationships and 
cross-cutting patterns of influence. 
 
The characteristics of the UHC policy network were examined by applying various standard 
SNA measures such as size, density, transitivity, fragmentation, component analysis, k-core, 
core-periphery measure, cut-points/blocks and centrality, together with a qualitative narrative 
for each relationship. A four-stage social network analysis (comprising a connectedness stage, 
component of policy network stage, subgroups within network stage, and key institutions and 
organisations in policy process stage) was used to examine the degree of interaction between 
actors and their position as core or peripheral participants in networks or isolates with little 
network involvement. Actors were classified according to their institutional affiliations as 
governmental, health sector, international body or labour organisation participants, so that the 
network relations between these sectors could be examined. The analysis investigated the 
nature of network relationships by measuring respondents’ structured interview responses 
regarding six relationships of interpersonal contact and influence: reading another network 
actor’s written products, discussing UHC policy with that actor, entering a coalition with them, 
being formally affiliated with them, taking advice from them, or being in conflict with them. 
These will be referred to in the chapter as the network relationships or the modalities of 
engagement. The relationships may overlap and should not be interpreted in an overly rigid 
way in determining whether an individual is a core or peripheral member of a network; it is the 
overall combination of relational relationships that determines position in the network (see 
Bellotti, 2015).  This part of the SNA ends with a taxonomy of the four stages of the analysis, 
summarising how it has examined network connectedness, network components, network 
subgroups and key network institutions and organisations network connectedness. 
The chapter concludes with a qualitative narrative that builds on the quantitative SNA to 




It looks in particular at the relative influence of the different institutional sectors and 
organisations.  There is a discussion of key power actors and gatekeepers, and the pattern of 
relationships between different stakeholder groups in the policy network.  
 
 
5.1 The network actors and stakeholder groups 
Table 7 shows the respondents classified according to their institutional affiliations and 
indicates their network status (in terms of core actors, peripheral actors and isolates) across the 
six relationships of contact and influence. Table 8 shows groups of actors by sector and 
institutional affiliation and shows their network status in respect of the six relationships of 
contact and influence at this institutional level. The analysis involves 47 individual policy 
actors who each provided data on their relations with other network actors relating to the six 
relationships mentioned above (Table 7). Additionally, for some aspects of the analysis, the 
individual actors were aggregated into 18 participating organisations (Table 8), so that in total 
there are 65 actor nodes. The actors were classified according to their institutional affiliations 
and internal (Nigerian state sector actors) versus external (Nigerian non-state or foreign actors) 





Table 7: Taxonomy of respondents involved in the second round of structured SNA interviews.
Read Discussion Coalition Affiliation Conflict Advice
25 Internal M (ACHPO) Strategic Planning Government Core Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Periphery
26 Internal M (ACHPO) Strategic Planning Government Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Core Core
27 Internal M (ACHPO) Strategic Planning-CAO Government Core Periphery Periphery Core Core Periphery
28 Internal M (ACHPO) Strategic Planning-Assistant Chief Government Core Periphery Core Periphery Core Periphery
29 External M FMoH-Scient fic Officer Government Core Periphery Periphery Core Core Periphery
30 External M FMoH- DoHPRS- HSSD- HFEI- Senior Health Economist Government Core Core Periphery Isolate Core Core
43 Internal M Yobe State- Permanent Secretary State-Government Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Per phery Periphery
44 Internal M Gombe State-  Permanent Secretary State-Government Periphery Periphery Core Core Per phery Core
45 Internal M Adamawa State-  Permanent Secretary State-Government Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Per phery Periphery
46 Internal M Borno State-  Permanent Secretary State-Government Core Periphery Core Core Per phery Core
5 Internal M Deputy director of health Lagos State State-Government Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Periphery
47 Internal M State- Civil Servant State-Government Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Per phery Periphery
23 Internal M General Manager NHIS Public Health Sector Core Core Core Periphery Core Core
21 Internal F Deputy General Manager NHIS Public Health Sector Core Core Core Periphery Core Core
22 Internal M Assistant General Manager NHIS Public Health Sector Periphery Periphery Core Periphery Core Core
24 Internal M Principal Manager NHIS Public Health Sector Periphery Periphery Core Periphery Core Core
2 Internal M HMO Manager (Medical Doctor) Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Per phery Periphery
7 Internal M Regional Head Hea th Care Security Ltd Private Health Sector Core Periphery Periphery Core Core Periphery
8 Internal M Head of Business Development, Marine Med cal services HMO Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Isolate Periphery
9 External M General Manager Clear Line HMO Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Isolate Periphery
10 External F Manager Mu ti Shield LTD (Nurse) Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Per phery Periphery
11 Internal M Chief Operating Officer (HMO) Private Health Sector Core Periphery Periphery Periphery Per phery Periphery
16 Internal M Quality Assurance Officer (Clearline HMO) Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Per phery Periphery
18 External M HMO Manager (Medical Doctor) Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Isolate Periphery
20 External M CEO (HMO) Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Isolate Periphery
4 Internal M Chief Operating Officer (Medical Doctor) Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Isolate Periphery
6 Internal M Chairman AGPMPN Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Per phery Periphery
19 Internal M Head Adminstrator KAL Private Health Sector Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Per phery Periphery
WHO 34 Internal M WHO Rep International-UN Core Periphery Periphery Isolate Isolate Periphery
World Bank 35 Internal M World Bank Rep International-UN Core Core Periphery Isolate Isolate Periphery
UNICEF 32 Internal M UNICEF- MNCH- Health Specialist International-UN Core Core Periphery Isolate Isolate Core
USAID 33 External M USAID Rep External Govt Agencies Core Periphery Periphery Isolate Isolate Periphery
DFID UK 38 External M DFID UK Rep International-NGO Periphery Core Periphery Periphery Isolate Periphery
Global Affairs Canada 39 Internal M Global Affairs Canada Rep International-NGO Periphery Core Periphery Core Isolate Periphery
ABT Associates 37 Internal M Abt Associates Rep International-NGO Periphery Periphery Isolate Isolate Isolate Core
HERFON 31 External M HERFON- Executive Secretary International-NGO Core Periphery Periphery Isolate Periphery Core
Health Partners-(PHCUOR) 36 Internal M HPI- Public Health Specialist and PHCUOR Expert International-NGO Periphery Core Isolate Isolate Isolate Core
40 External M NMA Pres dent Labour Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Isolate Core
41 External M NMA Secretary General Labour Core Core Periphery Periphery Isolate Core
42 External M NMA Select Committee (Consultant Ophthalmologist) Labour Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Per phery Core
Doctors 3 External M Public Health (Physician) Labour Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Isolate Periphery
1 Internal M Community hea th extension worker (CHEW) Nurse Labour Periphery Periphery Periphery Periphery Isolate Periphery
12 External F Community hea th officer Labour Periphery Periphery Isolate Periphery Isolate Periphery
13 Internal F Ch ef nursing officer (midwife) Labour Periphery Periphery Periphery Core Isolate Periphery
14 Internal F Ch ef nursing officer (nurse) Labour Periphery Periphery Isolate Periphery Isolate Periphery
15 Internal F Community hea th extension worker (CHEW) Nurse Labour Periphery Periphery Isolate Periphery Isolate Periphery
Allied Professional 17 Internal M Dental Officer Labour Periphery Core Periphery Core Core Periphery
Category 
Policy Networks



























Table 8: Taxonomy of policy organisation involved in the second round of interviews. 
 
The organisational level data, formed by aggregating data on individual actors, was used to 
examine the degree of influence the various organisations have in the network.  There is a risk 
here that designating an organisation (comprising multiple respondents) as an actor alongside 
individual actors in a network diagram automatically means the organisation have more ties 
and more influence than the individual actor nodes.  However, it must be remembered that the 
selection of network participants is based on respondents’ own perceptions of who the key 
network actors are, so that grouping key actors according to organisations is a legitimate step 




5.2 Network size, density, fragmentation and transitivity  
Figure 27 presents a visualisation of the directed and non-valued network in which the red 
nodes (circle-shaped) represent sixty-three active actors and the blue nodes (square-shaped) 
represent two inactive actors (isolates). This presents an image of the network size (65 nodes) 
and the links between actors. 
 
 
Figure 27: Size of the directed and non-valued policy network. 
 
Figure 27 shows a large number of social interactions within the discussion relationships 
between policy-actors involved in the UHC policy process. There is also a sizeable amount of 
social activity between respondents that is concerned with the coalition and affiliation 
relationships, while the conflict relationship has the lowest social activity out of the six 










Table 9: Measures of cohesion for six relationships of the policy network. 
 
In SNA the intensity of interactions between actors is termed network density, and network 
density on these six relationships is shown in Table 9. Density is based on the number of active 
connections reported by respondents. It portrays the level of activity that occurs within the 
policy network by quantifying the frequency with which activities such as reading the work of 
others, holding discussions and taking advice (plus the other three of the six relationships) are 
mentioned.  The network analysis in itself does not tell us the precise functions and meanings 
of these various forms of interaction. However, the “read” and “discussion” relationships have 
the same density score, while these are denser than the “advice” relationship, which is denser 
than the “coalition” and “affiliation” relationships (both of these last relationships have the 
same density score). The “conflict” relationship is the least dense relationship. In comparison 
to the network density, fragmentation and transitivity are more sensitive in measuring large 
number of networks along the same cohesion measure lines. 
 
 Fragmentation is one minus connectedness, where connectedness is the proportion of pairs of 
actors interacting with each other through a path in the same component. Fragmentation is 
interpreted as the proportion of paired actors (within the policy network) that cannot relate with 
one another in any way possible (Borgatti et al., 2018). The Fragmentation measure is used to 
evaluate any transformations occurring inside a network either in reality or as part of computing 
model. Table 9 shows how fragmentation captures cohesion for the network of all six 
relationships. The “read” and “discussion” relationships have the same fragmentation score, 
while these are more connected than the “advice” relationship, which is less fragmented than 
the “coalition” and “affiliation” relationships (both have the same fragmentation score). The 
“conflict” relationship has the most fragmented score in all six relationships. 
 
This may suggest a kind of hierarchy in the reported (density and fragmentation measures) 
frequency of the various relationship forms so that more informants talk about reading others’ 




as more common than joint activities concerned with affiliation or coalition formation, and that 
conflictual relationships are even less common.   
   
Furthermore, when networks have lots of transitivity, they tend to have a clumpy structure. 
That is, they contain knots of nodes that are all interrelated. Transitivity refers to the ratio where 
the number of triads (A-C) is the numerator, and the denominator is the number of triads (A-
B) and (B-C). Applying the transitivity to all six relationships of the policy network yields a 
high score of 0.765 in the “conflict” relationship, which is the highest of all six relationships 
and the “affiliation” relationship having the lowest transitivity score (0.509). The policy 
network is characterized as transitive through the presence of quite high transitive scores 
among all six relationships automatically implying other structural features exist within the 
policy network.  
 
The network density, fragmentation and transitivity of the policy network shows its 
cohesiveness, but Friedkin (1981) objects to the use of density, fragmentation and transitivity 
as a measure of cohesion because it fails to highlight significant cohesive sub-groups within 
each relationship of the policy network. for instance, most experts suggest that density score in 
larger networks is only a partial measure of cohesiveness. A possible solution is to investigate 
the existence of ‘components’ within each relationship (Tsvetovat and Kouznetsov, 2011).  
 
 
5.3 Network components 
Borgatti et al. (2013) defines a component as the maximum group of actors in which all actors 
are connected to each other by some path. The term ‘maximum’ means that the introduction of 
a new actor into the group would not disrupt the structural integrity of the path. However, this 
approach is only meaningful if the given network is broken down into several different 
components or into a component and isolates (see Figure 28). An isolate is regarded as a 
disconnected component (Tsvetovat and Kouznetsov, 2011). In this context, an isolated node 
refers to the respondent not named relevant in a relationship but who participated in the 
interview. Figure 28 shows the component analysis of the read relationship of the policy 
network where the two nodes in blue squares are isolates (two components) and the nodes 
represented by red squares are actors that form a single network component. Concerning the 
concept of cohesion, a network consisting of just one component is a strongly connected graph 




Findings suggest that every relationship of the policy network have strongly connected graphs 
and are likely to give more robust subgroups (see Appendix for the other relationships of the 
policy network). 
In this diagram individuals with clear organisational affiliations have been aggregated under 
their organisational labels to form nodes. This was seen as an aid to identifying possible 
subgroups within the network that might solidify into components. 
 
 
Figure 28: Component analysis of the “read” relationship of the policy network. 
 
Figure 28 presents a visualisation of the component analysis of the 2-mode (bipartite graph) 
“read” relationship network, using this first relationship as an example. The graph shows that 
in terms of the “read” relationship the policy network has two components: the two blue 
squared nodes are isolates disconnected from the strong and well-connected component of 
cohesive subgroups in the red nodes.  
Findings from the component measure showed that for each of the six relationships only one 
major component of connected actors (nodes) was evident (see Appendix for the other 
relationships of the policy network).  
 
Borgatti et al. (2013) suggests that the component approach comes with limitations because 
component analysis is only significant when the networks are broken down into several 
components (Boland and El-Neweihi, 1995). This approach does not measure the social 




analysis is needed to evaluate the quantitative and qualitative properties of the components of 
the networks as well as their dyadic relationships (Boland and El-Neweihi, 1995). 
 
This provisional finding that the policy network did not appear to divide into obvious sub-
networks but rather took the form of a single network component together with isolates, will 
be explored in more depth in the next section.  
 
 
5.4 Network Components and the ‘closeness’ of links between actors 
SNA provides various techniques for investigating network components (sub-networks) in 
more depth. In the absence of obvious cliques, k-core and core-periphery analysis is an 
alternative approach to further conceptualise and measure the cohesiveness of a network 
component (see: Prell, 2012). A core-periphery analysis breaks down a network structure into 
a core group of actors and a periphery group of actors. Therefore, a core-periphery structure 
indicates a subgroup of actors where those interacting within the core have more 
control/influence than actors on the periphery (Borgatti et al., 2013). Models of core-periphery 
structures are described in more detail in Figure 35 - 40. Many experts argue that the k-core 
measure offers advantages over core-periphery structure analysis for measuring cohesion. 
Unlike the latter, k-core analysis investigates the extent to which peripheral nodes may 
nevertheless be linked to the core nodes within the network structure (Zhang et al., 2014).  
 
K-core is a measure of cohesiveness that re-arranges the heterogeneous nodes within a network 
into clusters of homogeneous sub-groups determined by their k-core score. A k-core is a group 
of actors, who are all connected to a specified score (k) of other members of the group. The k 
value can be varied to require an actor to have a link to more or fewer group members before 
being deemed a member of the k-core. In the analysis otherwise heterogeneous actors (nodes) 
with the same k-core score are taken to constitute a subgroup for analytical purposes (Borgatti 
et al., 2013). Subgroups in this sense are theoretical constructs emerging from the analysis that 
have no relationship to the classification of actors presented in Figure 29– thus they are not 
formed on the basis of institutional affiliation, though there may be some overlap.  Prell (2012: 
159) explains that in deciding what constitutes a k-core subgroup ‘as the value of k becomes 
lower subgroup sizes will increase, that is, it becomes easier to draw a boundary around the 




relationship was set at seven (for read), seven (discussion), five (for coalition), five (for 
affiliation), two (conflict) and five (advice).  
 
Figure 29 shows a k-core graph based on the “read” relationship where the core actors (nodes) 
who read each other’s work fall within the red boundary, the peripheral actors (nodes) are 




Figure 29: Visualisation of the k-core measure of the (bipartite graph) “read” 
relationship of the policy network showing the presence of eight subgroups.  
Nodes within the red circle are at the core of the relationship, nodes inside the black circle 
are termed peripheral nodes and the isolates (Subgroup 0) are circled yellow. 
Key: Core nodes- Subgroup7, Periphery nodes- Subgroup6- Subgroup5- Subgroup4- 
Subgroup3- Subgroup2- Subgroup1, Isolated nodes- Subgroup0. 
 
Although the k-core finding in this case suggests that the network divides into three groups 
(core, periphery and isolates) with respect to the “read” relationship, for purposes of analysis 
it was necessary to categorise the nodes into eight subgroups based on k-core scores. Thus, 
nodes in subgroup7 link to 6 other nodes, nodes in subgroups6 to five other nodes and so on, 
with nodes in subgroup 0 having no connections to other nodes and constituting the isolates. 
The k-core analysis confirms the finding from earlier measures that the primary network 
component divides into two major groups without the isolates (because isolates are nodes that 
have minimal involvement in a network), core and periphery. Figure 29 illustrates three 




score of seven and belong to the core group, while the black boundary line contains peripheral 
nodes with k-core scores ranging from six to one (each node is represented with their colour 
codes). Figure 35 illustrates how the core subgroup of the ‘read relationship's core-periphery 
structure contains the same nodes inside the red boundary of Figure 29.  
 
In comparison, the core-periphery analysis and the k-core subgroup7 of the 'read relationship' 
share similar core subgroup actors- USAID, WHO, SMoh, FMoH, NMA, NHIS, HERFON, 
World Bank, Health Partners, Doctors, Hospital Managers, HMO rep, Iu31, Iu32, Iu34, Iu35, 
Gf30, Gf25, Gf29, Gf28, Gf27, Gs46, Hp21, He11, Hp24, He7, Hp23, Lp42 and Lp41 (see 
Figure 35). Although both measures (core-periphery analysis and k-core analysis) share similar 
nodes within their periphery subgroup, the k-core measure does better by explicitly defining 
the connection between periphery nodes to core nodes from those periphery nodes furthest and 
closest to the core subgroups in the ‘read relationship.’ The findings relating to the core-
periphery analysis and k-core measure of the other five relationships of the policy network 
showed a similar resemblance to the ‘read relationship’ outcome.  
 
Core-periphery analysis and the k-core measure of the ‘discussion relationship’ show that each 
has a similar set of core actors in the core subgroup of the core-periphery structure and the k-
core score of subgroup7- Doctors, Hospital Managers, NMA, HMO Rep, NHIS, SMoH, Health 
Partners, USAID, World Bank, WHO, HERFON, FMoH, La17, Iu36, In36, Iu32, Lp41, Hp23, 
In38, Gf30, In39 and Hp21 (see Figures 30 and 36).  
 
The core subgroup measures for the ‘coalition relationship’ suggest that key interactions 
revolve around the Hospital Managers, HMO Rep, SMoH, WHO, Doctors, World Bank, 
USAID, Hp23, Hp24, Hp22, Hp21, Gf28, Gs46, Gs44 and NMA nodes, seen within the core 
subgroup of the core-periphery structure and core subgroup5 of the k-core measure (see Figure 
31 and 37).  
 
However, for the ‘affiliation’ relationship, most core activity surrounds the NHIS, FMoH, 
SMoH, Hospital Managers, Health Partners, HERFON, USAID, WHO, World Bank, HMO 
Rep, He16, He7, La17 In39 He18, Gs46, Gs44, He20, Gf26, Gf27, Gf29, Ln13, Lp40, He4, 
He2, Lp42, He9 and NMA exhibited in the core subgroup of its core-periphery structure and 





The findings in the ‘conflict’ relationship suggest that the USAID, World Bank, HMO Rep, 
Health Partners, NHIS, WHO, Gs5, Gf27, Gf30, He7, Hp22, Gf28, Gf29, Gf25, Gf26, Hp23, 
Hp24, Hp21, La17 and Hospital Managers’ nodes have the most core-to-core interaction 
surrounding them in the core subgroup of its core-periphery structure and subgroup2 of the k-
core score (see Figure 33 and 39). The ‘advice relationship’ also shows a core-to-core 
interaction of nodes such as the FMoH, NMA, HMO Rep, USAID, World Bank, WHO, NHIS, 
Hospital Managers, Health Partners, HERFON, Gf26, Lp40, Iu31, Lp41, Lp42, Hp23, Gs44, 
Gs46, Hp24, Gf30, Hp21, In37, Iu32, In36 and Hp22 which are represented in both the core 
subgroup of the ‘advice relationship’ core-periphery structure and the subgroup of k-core score 
five (see Figure 34 and 40).  
 
 
Figure 30: Visualisation of the k-core measure of the (bipartite graph) “discussion” 
relationship of the policy network showing the presence of eight subgroups.  
Nodes within the red circle are at the core of the relationship, nodes inside the black circle 
are termed peripheral nodes and the isolates (Subgroup 0) are circled yellow. 
Key: Core nodes- Subgroup7, Periphery nodes- Subgroup6- Subgroup5- Subgroup4- 












Figure 31: Visualisation of the k-core measure of the (bipartite graph) “coalition” 
relationship of the policy network showing the presence of eight subgroups.  
Nodes within the red circle are at the core of the relationship, nodes inside the black circle 
are termed peripheral nodes and the isolates (Subgroup 0) are circled yellow. 
Key: Core nodes- Subgroup5, Periphery nodes- Subgroup4- Subgroup3- Subgroup2- 














Figure 32: Visualisation of the k-core measure of the (bipartite graph) “affiliation” 
relationship of the policy network showing the presence of eight subgroups.  
Nodes within the red circle are at the core of the relationship, nodes inside the black circle 
are termed peripheral nodes and the isolates (Subgroup 0) are circled yellow. 
Key: Core nodes- Subgroup5, Periphery nodes- Subgroup3- Subgroup2- Subgroup1, 














Figure 33: Visualisation of the k-core measure of the (bipartite graph) “conflict” 
relationship of the policy network showing the presence of eight subgroups.  
Nodes within the red circle are at the core of the relationship, nodes inside the black circle 
are termed peripheral nodes and the isolates (Subgroup 0) are circled yellow. 















Figure 34: Visualisation of the k-core measure of the bipartite graph “advice” 
relationship of the policy network showing the presence of eight subgroups.  
Nodes within the red circle are at the core of the relationship, nodes inside the black circle 
are termed peripheral nodes and the isolates (Subgroup 0) are circled yellow. 
Key: Core nodes- Subgroup5, Periphery nodes- Subgroup4- Subgroup3- Subgroup2- 











Figure 35: A core-periphery network of the bipartite graph “Read” relationship of the 






Figure 36: A core-periphery network of the bipartite graph “discussion” relationship of 







Figure 37: A core-periphery network of the bipartite graph “coalition” relationship of 








Figure 38: A core-periphery network of the bipartite graph “affiliation” relationship of 








Figure 39: A core-periphery network of the bipartite graph “conflict” relationship of the 









Figure 40: A core-periphery network of the bipartite graph “advice” relationship of the 
policy network showing the presence of core and periphery subgroups. 
 
The visualisations for the ‘read relationship’ and the other modalities of engagement show a 
core group of highly active and central policymakers (albeit a mixture of types of policy actors) 
surrounded by a group of peripheral nodes - policy actors who engage in a less intensive way. 
Findings from the k-core measure suggest the core group itself (based on nodes with similar 
scores) is quite large, heterogeneous and fragmented. These participants were capable of 
shifting the direction of the policy debate towards their interests by maximizing their influence 
in comparison to the peripheral actors. 
 
The k-core analysis helps identify a core of highly active participants who differ in the intensity 
of their links from a group of more peripheral actors, but it does not adequately describe the 
relative positions of the core actors vis-à-vis their ability to exert influence, and the interactions 
between them   Given that the study research questions include: ‘What are the most important 
actors and networks within the UHC policy process?’ these issues need to be addressed. 
Centrality measures provide a tool to address this issue. Centralisation is characterised by an 




influence within the network (Prell, 2012). The next stage of the SNA focuses on the precise 
identification of key actor networks for the six relationships of the policy network.  
 
 
5.5 Investigating core group interactions via measures of centrality 
5.5.1 What is centrality analysis? 
In the present study centrality analysis focuses on interaction between actors with the highest 
k-core scores, what we might term core-core interaction within the core group in the UHC 
policy network. It measures relations between network actors using various centrality methods 
such as degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, eigenvector centrality 
and other variances (Halgin and Borgatti, 2012). Unlike cohesion measures (such as density) 
and sub-group cohesion measures (such as k-cores), centrality provides a more precise 
description of an actor’s positioning in a network graph. Labels such as prominent, leader, 
prestigious, and influential are used to characterise the position of an actor within the social 
circle (Valente et al., 2008). 
 
According to Borgatti et al. (2013), degree centrality is the most intuitive out of the centrality 
techniques. It measures each relationship by adding the number of ties that an actor receives 
from other actors. Degree centrality identifies the most influential actor by its degree size. For 
instance, policy actors or policy organisations with a high degree of centrality in each 
relationship might theoretically exercise substantial influence within the policy process. 
 
 However, degree centrality is the least powerful measure of centrality. The other three 
centrality measures (betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and eigenvector centrality), 
unlike degree centrality, take into consideration the rest of the network when calculating the 
score for a given participant. A small network of highly central policymakers in the UHC policy 
process can be identified and separated from their colleagues using these centrality measures. 
 
We will now review findings generated by the different centrality measures listed above. The 
following sub-sections deploy the tools of degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness 
centrality and eigenvector centrality to identifying key actors for each of the six modalities of 
engagement (the relationships) used in this network analysis. The findings show that each 
centrality measure identified two key classifications within the core-periphery structure of the 




5.5.2 Degree centrality and power actors 
According to Prell (2012), degree centrality is mostly interpreted as a measure of influence and 
power in a social setting. One might predict that nodes (i.e., actors) with higher degree 
centrality have better access to UHC information and resources or have the influence to steer 
the policy process towards their own objectives. The findings show that the degree centrality 
of all six network relationships breaks the core sub-group into two key sub-networks (foreign 
and domestic). We have given the designation ‘power actors’ to the nodes with the highest 
degree centrality values in both the foreign and domestic sub-networks. Figures 29 and 41 
provide visualisations of the k-core and degree centrality measures for the “read” relationship 
(which is again selected as our example). Readers will recall that in Figure 29, the k-core 
measure identified three cohesive sub-groups (core, periphery and isolates) in the read network 
where the core sub-group is encircled in red, the periphery in yellow and the isolates in black. 
If the red section of Figure 29 is over-laid on Figure 41, there are seven prominent core nodes 
with a higher degree of centrality and these are actors from the WHO, USAID, the World Bank, 
FMoH, NMA, NHIS and SMoH. These seven nodes form the key network actors within the 
core sub-group based on degree centrality. The first three are foreign organisations, while the 
last four are domestic. These organisations are respectively the most influential foreign and 
domestic actors within the UHC policy network on the “read” relationship. 
 
Figure 41: Visualisation of the degree centrality measure of the 2-mode (bipartite graph) 





The policy network holds directional and non-valued data possible for the indegree and 
outdegree centrality measure on all six relationships. The indegree centrality evaluates the 
number of interactions a node receives from other nodes, and outdegree centrality measures 
the opposite. Indegree centrality often interprets prestige or popularity, and outdegree centrality 
interprets expansiveness (Borgatti et al., 2018). Findings show that the indegree and outdegree 
centrality score of every node in all six relationships have the same degree centrality score, and 
this has no significant impact on the degree centrality's interpretation. It is important to note 
that the drawbacks of using degree, in-degree and outdegree centrality to calculate meaningful 
links among actors in the same policy network do not account for missing actors. It increases 
the likelihood of bias which is sensitive to the representation of the network. For instance, the 
degree, in-degree and outdegree centrality calculate based on the given network data and where 
the more representative the network is, the decrease in a bias of the network interpretation 
(Borgatti et al., 2018). 
 
 
5.5.3 Betweenness centrality and the gatekeepers 
Betweenness centrality measures the number of times that an actor acts as a bridge along the 
shortest path between two other actors. This aspect of centrality emphasises the ability to 
control access to information so as to influence decisions affecting UHC policy. In general, it 
measures the potential control that key actors have over the flow of information. Therefore, 
actors with high betweenness scores are capable of connecting two actors at different sub-graph 
levels of a network. ‘Gatekeepers’ are in a position to threaten the network with the disruption 
of operations. For example, inside the red core circle of the “read” relationship, Figure 42 
shows seven prominent nodes with a higher betweenness centrality measure.  The NHIS and 





Figure 42: Visualisation of the betweenness centrality measure of the 2-mode (bipartite 
graph) “read” relationship of the policy network. 
 
SNA explores weak points in networks by examining what would happen if certain nodes were 
removed. A situation in which removal of an actor would cause a network structure to divide 
into unconnected parts is termed a “cut point”, while the divided parts thus created are terms 
“blocks”. Figure 43 shows the cut-point and block measure of the “read” relationship where 
there is a core-to-periphery connection between the core subgroups-NHIS-In36-DFIDUK and 
the core subgroups-NMA-HE10-Nurse. Both the NHIS and the NMA therefore appear to 
exercise substantial power as a bridge or gatekeeper controlling core-to-periphery connections 





Figure 43: Visualization of the blocks and cut-points of the 2-mode (bipartite graph) 
“read” relationship of the policy network. 
Note:  This is computed with three blocks, each containing one member and two cut-points 
(Iu36 and He10) isolating nodes nurse and DFID UK all circled yellow. 
 
The findings of the betweenness centrality measure are similar to that of degree centrality; there 
are two key networks with nodes either belonging to a foreign or domestic organisation. WHO, 
USAID and the World Bank nodes have the highest betweenness centrality within the foreign 
network and FMoH, NMA and NHIS have the highest betweenness centrality within the 
domestic network? 
 
It is important to note that the policy network variables are vulnerable to omission errors such 
as missing edges and nodes, which affect the betweenness centrality identification of key actors 
and determine node-level scores. Missing data can make policy actors in the policy network 
seem less significant or more important than they appear (Borgatti et al., 2018). Therefore, the 
study attempts to resolve this limitation by collecting data above the minimum size required 
for a network boundary. 
 
5.5.4 Closeness centrality and influence through proximity 
Closeness centrality calculates the shortest paths between all nodes, then assigns each node a 
score based on the sum of its shortest paths. Closeness centrality scores are used to rank each 




identify the key actors who are best placed to influence other actors in the network. Closeness 
centrality is best measured within a well-connected network (Prell, 2012). This is an “inverse” 
measure of centrality, meaning that a node with a higher score is highly peripheral (vice versa 
for nodes with a lower score).  The underlying assumption is that if a policymaker is not central, 
he/she generally tends to depend on individuals linked to policymakers at the centre of network 
to stay informed about the UHC policy discourse (Freeman, 1979). Thus, if we examine the 
DFID UK, Allied Professional, and Nurse nodes we can see that on average across all six 
relationships of the policy network these have the highest closeness centrality scores.  This 
suggests that these are highly peripheral actors in the UHC policy dialogue and tend to rely on 
the information coming from peripheral policy actors received from the central actors (see 
Figure 44). 
 
Figure 44: Visualization of closeness centrality of the 2-mode (bipartite graph) “read” 
relationship of the policy network. 
 
Measuring disconnected networks with closeness centrality is very problematic. Fortunately, 
all six relationships of the policy network are well-justified without variance on the closeness 
centrality scores, an issue the centrality suffers with, which leads to poor correlations with any 







5.5.5 Eigenvector centrality and how policy actors link to power actors 
Eigenvector centrality is a variant of degree centrality.  It examines nodes that are immediately 
adjacent to actors with high degree centrality or who are identified as powerful actors on other 
measures (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001). This measure can be seen of as a more refined version 
of degree centrality (Borgatti, 1995). It identifies nodes directly connected to influential nodes 
or nodes with high degree centrality. The underlying idea is that policy actors who have a close 
connection with power actors are more influential than policy actors who have no such 
connection.  Policy actors with higher eigenvector centrality are connected to the power actors 
in all of the six relationships of the policy network. Unlike the earlier classifications of the core 
sub-group via other centrality measures, the group of actors with maximum eigenvector 
centrality includes a high proportion of participants who do not work in the larger policy 
organisations. Thus Hp21, Hp22, Hp23, Hp24 have the maximum value of this centrality (see 
Figure 45). The nodes that link to the nurse, allied professionals, DFID UK, ABT associates 





Figure 45: Visualisation of the eigenvector centrality measure of the 2-mode (bipartite 





An important issue with eigenvector centrality is that in disconnected networks it will assign 
zeros to all members of the smaller components. Furthermore, to have an ideal eigenvector 
measure, the actor with the largest eigenvalue should be at least two or three times larger than 
the actor with the second largest eigenvalue. Otherwise, the measure will need more than one 
eigenvector to appropriately interpret the position of actors within the network, and it is not the 
case for all six relationships in the policy network. 
 
 
5.6 Identifying Multi-relational Policy Actors within the Policy Network 
This section applies a QAP correlation run on a UCINET analysis where all six relationships 
of the policy network are manually overlapped and compared using their topological and 
functional properties. It is important to note that not all policy actors have equal impact in a 
policy network. Some actors might be unique due to their multi-relationship connectedness. 
 
A QAP correlation of the all the networks representing each relationship will give robust results 
on the validity of these name generators and will present a clearer analysis of the relationship 
overlap. The idea of the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) is to identify the value of the 
measure of association when there really isn't any systematic connection between the two 
relations (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).  The QAP technique correlates the two matrices by 
effectively reshaping them into two long columns as described above and calculating an 
ordinary measure of statistical association such as Pearson’s r. Borgatti and associates (2018) 
call this the ‘observed’ correlation. According to Borgatti, Everett and Johnson (2018: 147), 
“to calculate the significance of the observed correlation, the method compares the observed 
correlation to a reference set of thousands of correlations between thousands of pairs of 
matrices that are just like the data matrices but are known to be independent of each other.” To 
construct a p- value, it simple counts the proportion of these correlations among independent 
matrices that were as large as the observed correlation. As elsewhere, we typically consider a 
p-value of less than 5 per cent to be significant (i.e., supporting the hypothesis that the two 
matrices are related) (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2018). It was decided to hold back the 
“conflict” relationship for separate analysis, because of its controversial nature, and it will be 





Figure 46: Association between all the networks representing each relationship by a QAP 
correlation.  
Key: Read relationship- ynetw1/ynetworkone; Discussion relationship- znetw2/znetworktwo; 
Coalition relationship- znetw3/znetworkthree; Affiliation relationship- znetw4/znetworkfour; 
Conflict relationship- znewt5/znetworkfive; Advice relationship- znetw6/znetworksix. 
 
 
To illustrate the policy network’s QAP correlation, the student ran all relationship in the policy 
network described in Box 1. SNA measures such as density, centrality, and size activity were 
employed to characterize and investigate their similarities and differences. The findings 
relating to centrality showed the importance of a highly active and well-connected set of policy 
actors in all six relationship core groups. Reconstitution and the overlapping of all five analysed 
relationships show that the correlation between the network of ‘Read’ relationship and the 
network of ‘Discussion’ ties is 0.581, and it is highly significant (see Figure 46). We note, for 
example, that there is an observed simple matching of 0.581 (i.e., if there is a 1 in a cell in 
network one, there is a 58.1% chance that there will be a 1 in the corresponding cell of network 
two). This would seem to indicate association. The results support the hypothesis that the two 
kinds of ties are related. The moderate and significant QAP correlation (0.493) shows there is 




they have read and the extent to which they interact with one another. This is not surprising but 
does reflect the tendency to interact more with actors with whom you have read any published 
work. 
 
One thing to note in the output is that 5000 permutations were used in this run. It is important 
to run a large number like this in order to stabilize the p-value. Since the permutations are 
random, if we only used a handful of them, each time we ran the program we would get a 
slightly different p-value (but the correction would always be the same). The larger the sample 
of permutations, the less the variability in p-values (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2018).  
 
 
5.7 Conflict in the Policy Network 
The conflict relationship was excluded from the overlapping analysis of the other five 
relationships of the policy network because of its uniqueness as a measure of tension and 
controversy within the policy network. Its function is to explore disputes among the 
policymakers within the ongoing policy discourse concerning UHC. Conflict during the 
process of making and legislating health policy occurs regularly among stakeholders. Conflict 
is not new to the health care system, which is a fragmented landscape with many players who 
from time to time will have divergent interests and objectives (Marcus, Dorn, & McNulty, 
2013).  
 
Figure 47: Visualisation of the core group of the 2-mode (dichotomised graph) “conflict” 




The findings in this section focus on policy actors, outside of their coalition of close associates 
that are involved in conflict concerning UHC policy. K-core, isolates, cut-point/block, and 
centrality are the primary SNA measures used to gather key findings on the “conflict” 
relationship (see Figures 47- 49). The findings show that the conflict relationship has the 
highest number of isolated nodes in the policy network. Isolates are considered to be 
components that are disconnected from a network. Figure 48 shows 30 isolated nodes 
disconnected from the “conflict” relationship, which would suggest that much of the criticism 
or opposition to UHC policy comes from individuals not connected to the core group of policy 
actors.  
 
Figure 48: Visualisation of degree centrality measure of the 2-mode (bipartite graph) 
“conflict” relationship between respondents. 
 
Analysis of the cut-points/block and degree centrality measures identifies three prominent 
nodes within the conflict relationship: the FMoH, hospital managers, and the HMO 
representatives (see Figure 48 and 49). This indicates that these actors (nodes) were more likely 
to be reported by other nodes as being in conflict with them. K-core analysis suggests that 
several respondents (nodes) reported that they were in conflict with the hospital managers and 
the HMO representatives.  Thus, in the core group of the “conflict” relationship only two 
(hospital managers and the HMO representatives) of the three prominent nodes (i.e., not 




HMO representatives are the two most prominent nodes in the core group of the conflict 
relationship (see Figure 47). It is unclear whether this means both were the most likely actors 
to be involved in disputes about UHC policy or merely the most likely to report or be reported 
as being in conflict with other nodes.  
 
Figure 49: Visualization of cut-points/block measure of the 2-mode (bipartite graph) 
“conflict” relationship of the policy network. 
 
 
5.7.1 Peripheral Policy Actors  
Earlier in the chapter we saw how, employing the k-core measure to examine network 
“components”, the policy network can be divided into ‘the core sub-group’ and the ‘peripheral’ 
actors. The peripheral actors are confined to an orbit around the augmented core sub-group (see 
Figure 29). However, these nodes are connected to nodes within the core sub-group, which 
suggests some form of core-to-periphery relationship. These nodes do not cluster.  There are 
several linear core-to-periphery interactions. However, to identify strategic peripheral nodes 
within each policy network, the cut-point between blocks and the closeness centrality measures 
were applied to every pair of peripheral ties that is adjacent to a core node.  
A cut-point/block point is a point whose removal would increase the number of components 




(Scott, 2017). The findings show that every policy network has a different cut-point/block 
outcome that is peculiar to their interactions.  
 
 
Table 10: Relevant periphery nodes of six relationships of the policy network using the 
closeness centrality and cut-point/block measures. 
 
The significant peripheral nodes for each given relationship were identified by comparing their 
closeness centrality score together with their cut-point positioning. Closeness centrality is a 
measure that inter alia indicates the least central peripheral nodes within a graph. For example, 
the node with the highest closeness score is the most peripheral node, while the node that has 
the lowest closeness score is the most central. Table 10 shows a summary of the relevant 
peripheral nodes identified using the closeness centrality and cut-point/block measures in all 
six relationships of the policy networks (see Appendix 7 for an example of all diagrams 
regarding the cut-points of the discussion relationship). 
 
 
5.7.2 Isolated Policy Actors 
One significant finding from the analysis so far is that the UHC network contains a number of 
isolated policy actors, actors who differ in their relationship to the core and peripheral network 
components according to various criteria. Crucially their vertices (the nodes in the 
visualisations) have no connection in the network in at least some relationships. These are 





Isolates may be a single node or multiple nodes that are not connected to the network of interest 
in at least some relationships that are of interest. Identifying isolated policy actors on the 
periphery of a policy network is essential, as the present network analysis requires knowledge 
of actors that did not participate in the UHC discourse in particular relationships. The findings 
suggest that the “conflict” relationship has the highest number of isolates followed by the 
“coalition” and “affiliation” networks. The “read” and “discussion” networks have the fewest 
isolates.  
 
5.7.3 The taxonomy used in the analysis 
Figure 50 shows the framework developed to construct a taxonomy of the policy network. This 
framework helped to inform the qualitative analysis in the next chapter, based mainly on 
interview transcripts, needed to answer the research questions. The qualitative analysis can 
explore and describe the network in conjunction with the (mainly quantitative) social network 
analysis. 
 



















5.8 Qualitative narrative  
This final chapter section aims to draw out implications of the SNA analysis for the UHC policy 
process by focusing on the parts played by power actors, peripheral actors, gatekeepers or 
brokers, isolated actors, and policy actors connected to the power actors. 
To investigate and identify relevant sub-networks, the second round of the SNA interviews 
proper examined the way information was exchanged. Tables 7 and 8 (above) displayed the 
full structural network taxonomy, showing first the respondents and their organisations, and 
then grouping these according to institutions - sector, subsector and organisation.  Table 11 
build on this institutional taxonomy by identifying key policy organisations with the highest 
average centrality scores (using three measures) in the policy network. 
 
 
Table 11: Centrality of key institutions for all relationships of the policy network. 
 
In Table 11, the nodes exhibiting higher centrality scores were grouped into the two key 
networks of domestic and foreign networks based on degree, betweenness and eigenvector 
centrality measure scores (with the exclusion to the closeness centrality measure because it 
focuses on the most peripheral policy actor). This can be considered alongside six tables 
illustrating the centrality scores of the key networks in each relationship of the policy network 
(see Tables 12-17), which include other actors that displayed similar features within their 
cohesive sub-groups. The key organisation on all six relationships of the policy network are 
the large nodes inside the red circle red in Figure 41: the FMoH, NMA, NHIS, and SMoH and 
the WHO, USAID, World Bank.  Using the categories of the taxonomy, and based on centrality 
scores, the FMoH is the dominant power actor, while the NMA, WHO and are influential 
gatekeepers or brokers controlling the flow of ideas and information, and the World Bank, 
SMoHs and USAID bring influence to bear through their close connections with the power 
actor.    
Degree Betweenness Eigenvector
WHO International UN Bodies 18(28%) 155.23 0.1778
USAID International External Govt Agencies 13.2(20%) 64.42 0.1324
World Bank International UN Bodies 13.2(20%) 76.92 0.123
FMoH Government Federal 19.2(30%) 229.34 0.1564
SMoH Government State 14.3(25%) 159.54 0.1498
NMA Labour Professional Association 19(29%) 215.36 0.1696










Table 12: Centrality of key institutions for the “read” relationship of the policy network. 
 
 


















Table 17: Centrality of key institutions for the “advice” relationship of the policy 
network. 
 
Table 11 shows the FMoH occupying the most prominent position in all of the policy networks, 
with an average of 30 per cent degree centrality score, leading to its classification by the author 
as the main power actor. Approximately 30 per cent of UHC policy discourse goes through the 
FMoH node in all six relationships of the policy network, and its average degree centrality 
measure is roughly one per cent more than the next largest node, which is the NMA, two per 
cent more than the WHO node, and seven per cent more than the NHIS node. 
 
On average, these four policy organisations (FMoH, NMA, WHO and NHIS) have the highest 
degree centrality measure in every cohesive sub-group. These may be seen as the key policy 
organisations with the ability to influence a wide range of policymakers engaged in the UHC 
policy discourse. 
 
The FMoH facilitates UHC policy development through national, state or local advisory bodies, 
through affiliation with other policymakers and stakeholders, and by indirectly providing 
reading materials as well as discussion forums that contribute to the policy discourse. As 
explained by Onoka et al. (2015), the NHIS is a decentralised public health authority set up by 




health insurance scheme and various other prepayment systems. The NHIS supports achieving 
universal coverage to improve health outcomes for Nigerian people. It is mandated to provide 
social health insurance for enrolees and oversees a system where health care services from 
contracted providers are funded mainly from contributions made by scheme participants, but 
with some additional subsidy from federal tax revenues. However, the NHIS is a public body 
influenced by the FMoH in many ways, such as the appointment of its secretary general, the 
funding subsidy provided to the NHIS and the provision of a progressive legislative 
environment for the NHIS to deliver on its mission. This makes the FMoH the most powerful 
actor in the policy network. 
 
According to the National Strategic Health Development Plan Framework (NCH, 2009), the 
FMoH has a mandate as the national coordinating authority on health issues in Nigeria. It is 
the highest decision maker in Nigeria’s health sector through the National Council on Health, 
which brings together various groups of stakeholders and policy actors for participation in 
policy formation and implementation. 
 
Among the international agencies/UN Bodies seeking to promote universal coverage in Nigeria, 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) is the most influential foreign actor providing technical 
support towards achieving UHC in Nigeria. The WHO has formed partnerships with various 
stakeholders in a number of projects that aim to improve UHC in Nigeria (WHO, 2017). It is 
the third most powerful actor in all six relationships of the UHC policy network and the most 
powerful actor among the foreign organisations. However, its absence from the nexus of 
conflictual relationships, shows that, whether through design or because of a lack of lack of 
influence on local actors, it has little involvement in domestic debates about the role of HMOs 
and the private sector. 
 
The application of SNA to the six relationships of the UHC highlights the role that the FMoH, 
NMA, WHO and NHIS play as key actors exerting influence and creating alliances within the 
UHC policy debate. It provides ways of quantifying the power these key policy organisations 
exercise, and how relationships to these central actors’ help determine the degree of influence 
that other policy organisations and actors can bring to bear.  
 
Table 11 shows the actors with the highest average betweenness centrality scores for all six 
relationships of the policy network. FMoH, again, has the highest betweenness score in the 




meaning that the FMoH, more than any other organisation, facilitates the exchange of 
information between state and non-state groups, international and national partners and local 
and state groups.  
 
The newly elected President of Nigeria recently highlighted the importance of the FMoH in 
rejuvenating primary health care (PHC) as a pathway towards a stronger health care system 
and a prerequisite for achieving UHC in Nigeria. To improve the societal benefits for Nigerians, 
the FMoH facilitates its global relations by collaborating with different groups of healthcare 
partners to support its policy strategies. The FMoH organises various forums or platforms in 
conjunction with health bodies such as the Public Health Foundation of Nigeria and the UK’s 
Faculty of Public Health (a public health association with charity status), which provides the 
opportunity for various stakeholders to network and discuss UHC-related issues. 
 
A second key organisation, because of its connecting role, is the NMA. It is responsible for 
forming ties between the FMoH and the labour workforce. NMA, as an association, is the most 
powerful professional representative body for healthcare professionals in Nigeria and it 
mediates the exchange of information between medicine and other health professions.  
 
NMA, as a gatekeeper or broker, has the potential to control the flow of information on UHC-
related policy guidelines and frameworks coming from the FMoH, SMoH NGOs and UN 
bodies to doctors and related professional networks. For example, the NMA node reaches its 
maximum score when it lies along the shortest paths connecting actors from the labour sector 
and international bodies, government and health providers. The findings show that the FMoH 
and the NMA control much of the flow of information between policy organisations and actors, 
and thus influence any learning which might occur in the process of UHC policymaking.  
 
Turning to foreign network actors, the World Health Organisation acts as a key gatekeeper in 
all six policy relationships of the network. It is a UN body extensively involved in the 
implementation of UHC in many LMICs.  One source of influence is that it provides technical 
liaison support to central departments such as the FMoH and actors in the state Ministries of 
Health. It also functions as an international consultant to other non-governmental organisations, 
as a gatekeeper of global resources available to support healthcare system development, and as 
a channel for disseminating knowledge generated by global health policy discourses. Together 




the FMoH, act as brokers to control the exchange of ideas and information within the policy 
network. 
 
The implementation of UHC in Nigeria is a dynamic process that brings together multiple 
policymakers and key stakeholders with different vested interests, and differing visions of how 
Nigerian citizens can achieve access to affordable healthcare (Onoka Hanson and Hanefeld, 
2015). Conflict arises in any decision-making process, especially where there are continuous 
social interactions. Conflict is a dynamic process that can be positive or negative, healthy or 
dysfunctional, within the domain of policy making (Birkland, 2016). Figure 47 shows the 
visualisation of the lines of conflict in the policy process. Figures 47 to 49 demonstrate how 
conflict is centred on three policy actors (in red circles) – the FMoH, hospital managers, and 
the HMO representatives - these are the three policy organisations that have the highest degree 
centrality in the graph. This appears to reflect a domestic tension between the FMoH and 
private health care providers regarding how health care coverage can best be extended.  
 
The underlying tensions between government plans and the ambition of private sector 
organisations to increase the volume of paid-for services they provide as Nigeria moves 
towards UHC have become clearer since fieldwork ended.  In July 2017, the FMoH indicated 
that it wished to see a curtailment of the role of Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) in 
Nigeria. The Minister of Health, Professor Isaac Adewole, cited the results of a two-day 
investigation hearing organised by the House of Representatives Committee on the healthcare 
service compliance rate of HMOs. The investigation found that many HMOs had mismanaged 
funding from the NHIS, mistreated enrolled patients, and neglected their responsibilities to 
offer affordable care to vulnerable patient groups (Ovuakporie and Nwabughiogu, 2017). The 
lines of disagreement were illustrated when the Chairman of the Health and Managed Care 
Association of Nigeria (HMCAN), Dr Babatunde Ladapo, responded by saying that HMOs 
could play an important role in achieving the global benchmark of UHC for Nigeria. He argued 
that the problems found had arisen because of the federal government’s failure to make HMOs 
follow the rules and stated that it was not the HMOs’ responsibility to manage the social health 
insurance scheme (Ifijech, 2017).  
 
The SNA yielded several important findings concerning the key policy actors, the patterns of 
influence, and knowledge-sharing relationships found in the network. Senior government 
officials were at the centre of UHC policy and decision-making and were also influential in 




has been classified as the main power actor. Six other organisations or organisational groups 
were close to the centre of the network.  The NMA, WHO and the NHIS acted as brokers of 
ideas and information, while the SMoHs, World Bank and USAID exerting influence through 
their close connections of the Ministry.  The FMoH, NMA and the WHO in particular, are in 
positions to influence the UHC policy process, but may need support from other policy actors 
with whom they are connected if particular initiatives are to succeed.  These alignments will 
differ according to the sectors and issues involved. Thus, the HMOs, unions, doctors and other 
health professions may all exercise power from time to time in their spheres of influence.  Much 
of this is to be expected, but certain organisations were less prominent than might have been 
predicted. The World Bank, which has been a major player in UHC reform because it controls 
substantial development funding is not currently providing any substantial funding to support 
Nigerian UHC and was less central to UHC policy development in the period studied than was 
the WHO.  Considering the decentralised organisation of the Nigerian healthcare system with 
34 SMoHs having considerable devolved authority over the organisation of state health 
services, these state bodies occupied a less important position within the central cluster of 
policy organisations than might have been expected. The fact that the SMoHs were not a major 
source of advice, suggests that engagement with the FMoH was not as close as might have been 
anticipated, and this may connect with qualitative findings presented in the next chapter.  The 
position of the HMOs and professions towards the periphery of the networks on many of the 
six influence relationships suggests that, despite fears about the malign power of the private 
healthcare sector in the Nigerian public insurance system, its influence was on the wane in the 
period studied. Interesting the low scores of the international bodies on the “conflict” 
relationship suggest that they have avoided entanglement in the controversy about the role of 
the private sector; whether because of a desire to maintain a neutral status or other reasons they 
have not taken sides. 
 
From the quantitative analysis, we can see that the results of the SNA can usefully complement 
the findings from the qualitative analysis. The SNA method can illuminate the general patterns 
of interaction between the policy actors and provide a series of ‘snapshots’ of the various 
relationships of the UHC policy network. Identifying the policy actors and the policy network 
framework provides a map of the network and its subgroups that is a foundation for more 
detailed examination of the perspectives of those concerned. The study now seeks to shed 
further light on the associated relationships, views and interactions by discussing findings from 




CHAPTER 6  
UNDERSTANDING THE UHC NETWORK VIA POLICY PROCESS THOERY 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the findings from the semi-structured interviews which were carried out 
face-to-face, and which comprise the second primary data collection method used in this 
research. It describes the perspectives of the respondents regarding the main aspects of how 
UHC policy is financed, formed and contested. The theoretical framework used to examine the 
formation and implementation of UHC policy combines elements of Walt (1994) and Gilson’s 
(2012) policy process approach with Kingdon’s (2010) Multiple Streams Framework (MSF).  
The chapter identifies certain stages in the change and implementation processes of Nigerian 
UHC policy.  
 
The chapter considers aspects of the policy triangle approach (Walt, 1994), including the key 
actors and - most importantly - the power relationship. The chapter considers various 
relationships of power and how ability to marshal certain forms of power affected the way 
actors engaged in the policy discourse.  It considers whether implementation depends mainly 
on rational-technical planning or is more realistically viewed as the outcome of struggles 
between contending groups of actors exercising their power as policy develops (Gilson et al., 
2018). Such an analysis requires an examination of the role of key policy actors, and how they 
interact with each other in the UHC network in Nigeria 
 
The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) is useful because it allows us to identify policy 
entrepreneurs, their engagement in networks, and their ability to use opportunities for agenda 
setting to move items onto the formal Government policy agenda for UHC-related reforms.  
The framework describes how the characteristics of policy issues together with current political 
circumstances, can lead to the opening and closing of ‘windows of opportunity’ for moving 
issues onto the agenda to begin the policy process. The MSF describes the interaction of three 
‘streams’ implicated in this process: the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics 
stream. Policies only rise on to the policy agenda of the government when the three streams 
run in the same direction.   
Kingdon (2010) states that these three streams flow along different channels and are 




problems, and both are joined to favourable political forces, leading the streams to converge. 
An issue rises towards the top of an official (or institutional) agenda actor in the relevant 
departments and agencies begin to address it. This framework offers a useful way of 
understanding the shape and nature of the policy process within UHC Nigeria. 
 
The sections that follow will examine the actors, the groups into which they align, their relative 
power, and the evolving content of policy – the chronology of the policy story.  Each will be 
examined taking account of specific features of the Nigerian context.  The chapter will 
conclude with consideration of actors’ views on the future of UHC in Nigeria and 
developments since fieldwork ended. 
 
 
6.1 Policy actors and the UHC policy network 
The development of UHC policy in Nigeria occurred within a policy network characterised by 
the heterogeneity of prominent actors, including those of government (Federal, State, and local), 
NGOs, UN Bodies, labour groups, multilateral agencies, think tanks, the private health sector, 
and medical professionals. Participants involved in the semi-structured interviews come from 
many different policy institutions represented within the UHC discourse in Nigeria. 
 
There is the assumption among many participants that the involvement of a diverse range of 
policy actors is beneficial for the development of UHC policy and will magnify the efforts 
towards achieving UHC in Nigeria. This may occur through various public and private-sector 
organizations, resources, and influences motivated by various inter-related interests, ranging, 
for example from the provision of affordable health services, and increases in health system 
budgets, to the creation of new opportunities for private healthcare providers.    
Some participants shared views such as: 
“In order for the beneficiaries of our health system to access quality health 
services they need to appreciate the Federal Government’s and different 
health parastatals’ effort which encourages foreign health organizations 
involvement into achieving UHC policy in the country.” (RC.28) 
 
“If I am to mention key organizations, I would mention HERFON, Nigerian 
Health Watch, WHO, World Bank, UNICEF, FMoH, Federal Government 
even different bilateral agencies most notable USAID, DFID. These actors 





“Different policy makers were involved in the process… but to my knowledge 
common health experts like NMA, HMOs, WHO, FMoH, SMoH, NHIS and the 
National Assembly were 70 per cent involved in setting the policy agenda 
towards UHC implementation in the country.” (RC.13) 
 
This section focuses on the reflections of participants about the range of policy actors involved 
and how they helped shape the discourse on UHC policy. Of course, within Walt and Gilson’s 
(1994) policy process framework, policy actors are a key component in the policy triangle and 
the power dynamics of policy formation and implementation.  
 
 
6.1.1 Organisations rather than individuals as key policy actors   
Given that policy actors are so critical, one significant early finding was that named individuals 
were seen by most respondents as being less important than organisational representatives. In 
line with Weber’s (1978) classic theory of the bureaucratisation of charisma, respondents 
suggested that it was institutions rather than individuals that develop consistent policies over 
time, so that it was the collective organisational position rather than a particular individual 
office holder that was important. This would suggest that charismatic individuals and 
‘leadership’ are less important in UHC policy making than convergent organisational positions 
that have a fair degree of consistency over time.  Usually these are positions that align with a 
policy agenda that is being heavily pushed by international bodies like WHO and the World 
Bank.  This general feeling is illustrated in comments from the following participants: 
“So, I can list for you from the government side the names of prominent 
individuals involved the UHC policy process. Yet, I feel that naming prominent 
individuals is irrelevant because they work for the government and they 
represent that part of the institutions and when they retire or move elsewhere 
their title and representation changes. But the government’s (as an 
organization invested in UHC) agenda stays the same, and I don’t know how 
useful it will be for you if I name each government representative.” (RC.30)  
 
“I know a number of them if you want their names in specific…. but having 
names of notable health professionals in my opinion does not make sense but 
rather you will achieve more if you focus on the agenda and interests of vital 
government parastatals, NGOs, labour groups and research institutes 
involved in the UHC discussions and policy process in Nigeria.” (R41) 
 
Many participants believe that it is the organizations that are best seen as the key actors because 
it is collective organisational perspectives rather than individual perspectives that has greatest 




remains the case. However, it is important to acknowledge that this does simplify the issue to 
some extent. Individuals are unable to be disentangled from the organisations where they work; 
an organisational group is formed of various people, not all of whom speak with a singular 
voice, so that individual beliefs and values may vary (Buse et al., 2012: 9).  
 
When respondents mentioned which policy-actors were influential they named a range of 
organisations, and their relative importance was not immediately clear.  
“The Government, Ministry of Health and NHIS are very important in 
Nigeria’s UHC development.” (RC.32) 
 
 “With poor domestic funding from the government, we continue to discuss 
financing health services to move towards UHC in Nigeria while mobilising 
financial support from the World Bank as a catalyst towards UHC 
development.” (RC.35) 
 
“UHC is a health policy heavily backed by all tiers of government with the 
promise that Nigerians must have access to universal health care. The 
government promises to implement this policy in order to improve access to 
basic health services and basic health outcomes like malaria, HIV/AIDS and 
Life expectancy.” (RC.40) 
 
“Then in terms of the private sector we have a thousand and one HMOs that 
are doing one thing or the other in different areas in order to push the health 
system towards universal coverage.” (RC.3) 
 
“The FMoH ensure the government sectors get involved in UHC at the 
grassroots level through the primary health care sector.” (RC.23) 
 
When the interviews are considered as a whole, and also bearing in mind the SNA findings, it 
was perhaps predictable that respondents identified The Federal Government, the FMoH and 
other Ministry of Health parastatals, HMOs and NHIS, the WHO, ILO and World Bank as 
highly influential actors shaping the development of the UHC policy. The range of 
organisations mentioned suggests that international as well as domestic bodies have an 
influence in policy networks responsible for achieving UHC in Nigeria.   Thus, the challenge 
is in part to examine how the various organizations interact and whether their influence is 
confined to various stages or aspects of policy. This is a complex task because of the large 
number of actors, or individuals, involved in implementing the UHC process in Nigeria. This 
section now moves on to consider further interview extracts to suggest how the various players 
fit into the policy process. It explores the roles of the various bodies in the UHC policy 





To help our understanding of why certain organizations are seen as the main players, it is 
helpful to consider the two relationships of longevity of participation and organisational 
decision status.  Both can be seen as a basis for claims to authority and legitimacy. The first 
relationship assumes that influence can be gauged by the duration, continuity and intensity of 
participation in the policy discourse about UHC.  The second relationship of decision-making 
status is concerned with whether an organisational has a specific constitutional, legal or 
political mandate to be involved in policy formation in some designated area or if its structural 
position in the field of institutions means that it is inevitably involved. The two may overlap to 
some extent in that organisations able to exert strong influence over decisions are likely to 
maintain continuing involvement in the UHC policy discourse over time.  However, there are 
also organisations that lack power over decisions but still maintain a place in the policy network 
over time, and organisations that have decision power at a particular juncture but then move 
into the background as policy discussions continue. 
 
 
6.1.1.1 Longevity of policy organizations 
Longevity refers to the fact that some policy organisations remain as significant actors in the 
policy network, while others are prominent at certain times but then fade into the background. 
This is important because longevity may be an issue missed in a snapshot image of the policy 
network produced by an SNA. 
One participant described the way some organisations drifted in and out of the ‘policy 
discussion’ at different stages of policy development, while others maintained steady 
involvement: 
“So, there are a lot of policy organizations that I have never heard about and 
some others that I have heard about whose contributions to the UHC agenda 
enabled several policies such as the signing of the Act. Many of these 
organizations have left the policy discussion while the rest that are still around 
are very much contributing to UHC. These organizations have been around 
before and after the 2014 UHC inception, they start from the government, 
legislators, Ministry of Health, international donors and UN organizations 
like WHO. These actors have been around from the beginning as others have 
fizzled out mainly from the private health sector.” (RC.31) 
 
International organisations might be more or less involved at different times but did remain as 





“International organizations that have been there for us and I hope we will 
continue to have them for a long time are the WHO and the World Bank. They 
have done a lot in sponsoring the country financially and technically 
supporting the health system move towards UHC agenda.” (RC.29) 
 
This relationship recognizes key policy organizations on the basis of the duration of their 
participation in policy development. The longevity of policy organizations involved in the 
Nigerian UHC discourse is relevant because it demonstrates a commitment to supporting, or in 
some cases stalling, the process over a long period of time. Informants suggested that the UHC 
policy process underwent changes in the degree of involvement of several stakeholders, as 
institutions (involved in healthcare) and health organizations either left or joined discussion 
about the policy initiative. These respondents stated that policy organizations that remain at the 
centre of things as policy developed included the Federal Government, MoH, WHO, World 
Bank, and Legislative Committee on Health.  However, these differed in the degree of power 




6.1.1.2 Decision-making power 
This brings us to the second relationship of status and power in the decision-making process. 
There are a range of organisations whose statutory powers and duties, professional mandates 
or role under international treaties or agreements would seem to put them at the heart of UHC 
policy making.  In many cases they are indeed at the centre of the policy dialogue, but in others 
their involvement is less central than might have been expected. This suggests that an 
organisational actor’s location in the wider network, its alignment with other actors, and its 
contingent ability to exercise influence at a particular time need to be considered alongside its 
formal organisational mandate.  
 
This discussion revisits the insider/outsider typology which is frequently used to differentiate 
the status of interest groups in the development of policy. Marsh et al., (2009) suggest that the 
term ‘insider group’ is associated with a specific style of policymaking and that it is important 
to avoid conflating group strategy and group status.  Grant’s (1978) typology of policy 
organizations distinguished between insider and outsider groups according to the type of 




Nigerian context, participants commented on the close relationships between the ‘parastatals’ 
(the linked state departments) involved in UHC policy discussions: 
“The NHIS is not different from the government… you should also understand 
that NHIS, NTHC, CDA and NAFDAC have been contributing policies related 
to the UHC and they are all Ministry of Health parastatals under the federal 
government. That said, I think one of the unsung heroes also is - not as a 
person but an organization - is NAFDAC that has also been dealing with 
issues around quality drugs because if you are pushing for access to care and 
Nigeria does not have quality drugs and quality care. NAFDAC has also 
contributed a lot… These organizations are involved immensely both at the 
federal and state level of the MoH.” (RC.22) 
 
“The policymakers in Nigeria that are key in making sure that the UHC policy 
is implemented start from the government itself; the federal government and 
then the legislators since they have the power to decide what the enacted 
policies are, after which the FHoM and SMoH will deliver the policies to local 
communities through the primary health care, since it’s an avenue closer to 
the people.” (RC.9)  
 
Such responses suggest that the core network for policy development does indeed involve a 
small number of central departments and agencies, and that it is these actors, who retain close 
links with government, that have greatest influence.  Insider groups in the UHC discourse are 
policy actors who are an official part of the government machinery and are recognised by 
Ministers as legitimate players in the policy-making circle.  These organisations are regularly 
consulted and are expected to form part of the decision-making process for reform in the health 
system. Such insider groups either singly or working together become involved in testing 
policy ideas, overseeing pilot schemes, and otherwise developing UHC policy. Thus, certain 
key organisations - the Federal Government, the FMoH and its parastatals, the Legislative 
Committee on Health, SMoH, NHIS, and NAFDAC had high legitimacy to enact policies 
connected to UHC.   
 
In contrast to this inner circle, participants described how certain peripheral organisations had 
more of the character of outsider groups.  Some of these are peripheral because they ‘chip in’ 
input at certain stages of policy development, and so lack longevity of participation. 
 
“First of all, the advocacy for UHC in Nigeria started with Good-luck 
Jonathan’s signed declaration on UHC in 2014 which also saw the 
implementation of the 2014 National Health Act. Yet, the pursuit of UHC 
existed more than ten years prior to this event. This particular advocacy was 
led by Health Reform Foundation of Nigeria (HERFON) in collaboration with 




of Health (FMoH) and of course there were different partners that chip in 
efforts - both local and international organizations.” (RC.31) 
 
“Part of our role as the NMA within the UHC campaign is to challenge the 
government to organise favourable conditions for medical practitioners 
across the country. We advocate for policies that increase the benefits for both 
medical personnel and various local communities. We do this by forming 
difficult alliances with other labour groups with the other health labour unions 
banding themselves under the Joint Health Sector Unions (JOHESU) banner 
and other organizations invested in the health system.” (RC.40) 
 
Other organisations remain prominent actors in the policy network over time, but only have 
real influence at certain stages, as when international bodies provide direct technical support 
on particular policy developments or operate as brokers that bring in external consultants or 
specialist partners for short periods when the need arises. 
 
“I see the World Health Organization as a foreign stakeholder that brings 
together bilateral agencies and international organizations with their 
technical strategies, exchanges and several initiatives to support the 
government in a successful UHC implementation.” (RC.26) 
 
The outsider groups include both domestic and international policy organizations with 
specialist expertise that progressively contributed to the UHC discourse over time, but which 
are external to the government policy-making process. Perhaps the highest profile policy 
organizations regarded as outsider groups within the UHC discourse are the WHO, USAID, 
World Bank, NMA and HERFON. For instance, the development of a national communications 
strategy for UHC required WHO, USAID, World Bank, Results for Development (R4D) and 
HERFON to work with the FMoH to produce the necessary plan and guidance. The FMoH 
commissioned three states (Abia, Osun, and Niger States), financed by the basic health care 
provision fund, to undertake a pilot scheme designed to help Nigerians better understand the 
value of UHC in their community (Onyedinefu, 2019). 
 
Participants recognise that different actors have different roles or mandates that affect their 
mode of participation in the UHC discourse. This is not just a straightforward question of 
relative power, but of the legitimate limits of influence for particular bodies, and an agreed 
division of labour in the policy-making process.  Thus, the international bodies - UN bodies 
such as WHO, World Bank and ILO, and national bodies such as USAID - must tread carefully 




generally frame their activities as technical support that draws on the expertise of the 
international health policy community. This is a different role from that of domestic 
governmental bodies, which have a democratic mandate to make policy, and non-governmental 
organisations such as the NMA and HERFON, which have a place in policy discussions 
because of their influence over the profession and wider public.  While all have some influence, 
the international bodies and domestic NGOs are, relatively speaking, regarded as outsider 
groups whose level of influence over UHC policy relies on getting the ear of policy insiders, 
such as the central government departments and their health parastatals.  
 
 
Table 18: The nature of the UHC network. 
 
Overall then the interviews paint a picture in which policy is largely steered by a cluster of 
insider organisations comprising the Federal Government, the Legislative Committee on 
Health, FMoH, SMoH, and NHIS, and outsider organisations – such as NAFDAC, USAID, 
World Bank, NMA and HERFON - that remain highly visible in the policy network but exert 
real influence only from time to time. Classified into insider and outsider groups, the key policy 
organizations mentioned in the interviews fall into a similar pattern to the core/periphery and 
domestic/international network patterns emerging from the SNA (see Table 18). The policy 
organisations seen by respondents as the insider groups (Federal Government and its parastatals 
such as the Legislative Committee on Health, FMoH, SMoH, NHIS, and NAFDAC) are present 
in the core and domestic category of the SNA framework. The policy organizations, such as 
the WHO, USAID, World Bank, NMA, and HERFON, listed as outsider groups by respondents 
were split between domestic and international and between core and periphery in the SNA. 
 
However, alongside this broad similarity there were some differences between the findings 
from the qualitative interviews and the SNA. Interview respondents tended to categorize policy 




discourse, while the SNA identified the most influential policy organizations according to their 
position, location, interactions, and metrics in a social network. This meant, there was less 
consensus among respondents in the interviews than in the SNA, and that a more complex 
picture of the extent of tensions and conflict within the policy network emerged. 
 
 
6.2 Contending groups  
Nigeria’s push towards UHC is attracting interest from international health policy experts and 
increasing optimism about the prospects of successful reform.  Yet the interesting finding here 
is that different stakeholders’ favour different visions of what a UHC system means. Within 
the UHC discourse, conflict between policy organizations occurs due to contrasting interests 
and opinions about the approach that best fits the Nigeria context. Respondents’ answers on 
this theme reveal several areas of tension between policy organizations arising from opposing 
ideas about how UHC should be developed, handled and especially the balance between public 
and private sector involvement in the policy. 
 
 
6.2.1 Policy consensus or opposing factions? 
In the interviews, some of the participants described how policy actors shared common goals 
and values when it came to UHC. Several participants maintained that there is an atmosphere 
of togetherness in the Nigerian UHC discourse that is encouraged by the federal government 
in the hope of preventing fragmentation of the policy network and promoting a rational process 
by considering options and selecting the best policies to hasten UHC policy development. This 
resonates with the SNA findings which suggest a relative lack of conflict within the policy 
network, except in respect of the role of the private sector. In this view there is a division of 
labour whereby the FMoH exercises substantial control over key stakeholders such as the 
USAID, Health, Finance and Governance (HFG), Results for Development (R4D) and Nigeria 









The comments below illustrate this view: 
“Our goal within the government is to limit fragmentation among key 
stakeholders during the policy process and make sure that we all align our 
efforts together so that we can move forward.” (RC.28) 
 
“At the point of implementing the National Health Act to the one percent of 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) if we the legislative arm of the health 
sector had not worked with other health groups both domestic and 
international… I don’t think we would have been able to get to this point where 
we see the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF) considered for 
implementation.” (RC.32) 
 
“So, we have those that have contributed immensely from the two arms of the 
senate - the upper and lower house.  They have contributed a lot to making 
sure our UHC agenda is properly structured and there is an easy pathway to 
implementing UHC in Nigeria.” (RC.25) 
 
However, other participants refute this claim of a unified cooperative approach, especially 
where peripheral organisations are involved: 
 
“Many of these policy organizations have provided massive efforts to 
accelerate the country’s UHC agenda. We have a thousand and one NGOs in 
different areas of the health sector that prefer the freedom to individually do 
their thing to push the Nigerian health system towards universal coverage. 
These organizations like to work separately from other organizations because 
it gives them the space to achieve more progress rather than been dragged 
along by others.” (RC36) 
 
Respondents like the one just quoted argued that many organizations prefer the freedom to 
individually work on their ideas or concepts to support UHC.  There was a suggestion that they 
prefer to avoid accountability for other policy organizations’ incompetent and unproductive 
efforts to advance the UHC agenda, while focusing on their own favoured approach or area of 
work.  Another respondent explained that the complexity of UHC policy necessarily involves 
many different organisations working on different facets that are difficult to bring together until 
policy development work has reached a certain stage and agreement on a way forward is 
possible: 
 
  “Some participants are giving the wrong impression that UHC in Nigeria is 
just one policy with several actors coming together to achieve a policy 
outcome… That is not true. From my understanding the movement towards 
UHC in Nigeria has various sections with several developing policies in 
formulation and interests involved end up in engaging one another to achieve 




13 years since its inception. Even though everybody agrees and believes that 
the scheme provides an avenue for access to health care to all Nigeria, this 
was not achievable during the 13 years because all 36 states in Nigeria refused 
to join NHIS because the government was advocating for a central risk-
pooling fund. Since the health system is decentralised with the SMoHs having 
the ability to independently make decisions and plan healthcare on behalf of 
their state, they did not think it was legally right for the government to 
establish the NHIS as a central risk pool. After several agitations from the 
SMoHs over the years, it was not until 2015 that both the state and federal 
government came up with a policy to decentralise the NHIS.  That now gave 
rise to the State Health Insurance Scheme and within several years we have 
got up to 75 per cent of states have established a Health Insurance Scheme at 
the moment. It took over thirteen years of back and forth between the 
government and SMoH to reach this conclusion.” (RC.5) 
 
Another respondent echoed this view of a broad policy process with many strands and a 
multiplicity of actors with different interests and different roles in the policy process: 
 
“UHC policy in Nigeria is very broad and it is difficult to tell you every 
contending group which exists within the policy process because there are 
many components of the UHC policy that has different aspects with plenty of 
policy actors having different interests and functions. Hence, I would disagree 
with other participants suggesting a form of unity among policy actors within 
the policy process. So, does it mean that all the actors including the 
government and non-government are always in unison about the various 
policy interventions and their implementation towards UHC in Nigeria? The 
answer is no! For instance, the organized labour headed by the NMA refused 
to pay part of workers’ salaries into the risk pool of the NHIS because they 
felt that their money would go into the hands of the HMOs. According to them, 
the scheme is designed to charge higher premiums for a higher standard in 
the delivery of care because of immense private sector participation in the 
scheme. All the HMOs and providers are privately owned. And that is why 
they forced the implementation of the National Health Act which increases 
public financing into healthcare.” (RC.42) 
 
These respondents argue that policy development is shaped by contending groups, which 
contest ideas and seek to influence the UHC discourse to suit their own interests.  In particular 
there is scepticism about the motives of HMOs and private providers. The large number of 
interest groups involved in the policy discourse creates problems for the central government 
departments because it is difficult to create an environment where developments in different 
parts of the policy network are synchronous. The case mentioned in the last extract was recalled 





This case concerns how Nigerian labour groups, such as the NMA, opposed the government’s 
expansion of the NHIS program from federal workers to workers in the informal sector. Such 
an expansion needed non-federal workers to enrol in the NHIS scheme by paying contributions 
from their salaries, which according to the NMA might end up in the pocket of HMOs (the 
private health sector). This led to several disputes between the NMA and HMOs, which saw 
the NMA call on doctors to boycott HMOs, and direct a series of strikes against the scheme, 
and threaten to create an alternative health service provider focused on universal coverage.  
There is a widespread perception in Nigerian society that HMOs focus more on profits than 
affordable treatments. This encouraged the NMA to campaign for a National Health Act, which 
would provide a framework for the regulation, development and management of a national 
health system and set standards for providing health services.  
 
The Act established the Basic Health Care Provision Fund, the target of which is to 
substantially increase revenue and improve Primary Health Care (PHC) services. The Nigerian 
government and the Nigerian Medical Association had argued over the content of a future 
National Health Act for over ten years before it was enacted in 2014. When the law came into 
effect, its improved access to health care by combining a Community Based Health Insurance 
Scheme (CBHIS) with the broader State Health Insurance Framework in order to provide 
coverage for the informal sector population, including poor and underserved communities. 
Under an agreement between the government and SMoH, the new scheme (CBHIS) was added 
to the existing state health insurance framework in every local government area to stimulate 
demand for health insurance across the State. The CBHIS predominantly targets informal 
sector workers and offers a package of prepaid healthcare services for enrolled community 
members. The intended outcome is to convert the current prevalent out-of-pocket payments for 
healthcare into prepayments which are more progressive and equitable. Over 75 per cent of 
states in Nigeria have adopted this scheme in order to extend coverage (Fadlallah et al., 2018). 
Based on the interviews, participants can be categorized into three different groups. Group A 
consists of participants whose perception of the UHC discourse in Nigeria presents policy 
organizations as working together cooperative to develop a largely consensual approach to 
UHC policy. According to these participants, the Federal Government of Nigeria provides an 
environment within the health system that limits fragmentation between policy organizations 
and encourages close inter-organizational relationships within the policy network. Participants 
in Group B said the opposite; they denied that a unified approach existed. They argued that the 




policy organizations due to their differing interests, ideologies, and approaches to achieving 
UHC in Nigeria. In Group C, participants are somewhat on the fence between Group A and 
Group B arguments. They acknowledge that there have been government efforts to create a 
cooperative environment that brings together stakeholder efforts towards achieving 
universal coverage but say that in reality contention between policy organizations is reflected 
in differences in approach that are hard to reconcile.  
 
 
6.2.2 Two main opposed groups 
Just how UHC should be provided has long been a matter of controversy for many Nigerians, 
and perhaps the most important line of division concerns the role of the public and private 
sectors.  Consider two interview extracts, which at face value may seem to only contain a subtle 
difference of emphasis, but illustrate the way the argument is often framed:     
 
“The NHIS is very important to making UHC a reality in Nigeria. We provide 
the working tools, prepaid from government.” (RC.23) 
 
“NHIS gives a quality health care service by pushing tight regulations on 
Nigerian health providers to make the basic health insurance available for 
many Nigerians.” (RC.20) 
 
The first extract casts the state as a system manager and direct provider, while the second 
presents the state as a regulator of public and private providers. While a large number of 
participants maintained that the National Health Insurance Scheme is the key mechanism by 
which to achieve UHC in Nigeria, the two camps disagree when it came to the balance between 
public and private provision. The insurance mechanism itself is relatively uncontroversial, 
since as well as being supported by reports from the World Bank and WHO (PWC, 2019) it is 
familiar to Nigerians because the NHIS has already run for more than fifteen years and covers 
3% of the population.  The major point of difference that divides participants concerns the 
preferred type of healthcare provider to delivery UHC to the population through the NHIS.   
The two viewpoints are reflected in the following data extracts, the first from a respondent 
from the private sector and the second from a government official:    
 
“We are leading the advocacy for UHC post-2015 SDGs and developing 
several frameworks to increase the health coverage to about 30 percent with 




government to improve regulations that encourage the expansion of health 
insurance coverage through an increase of health providers from the private 
sector… Because, to achieve this 30 percent, the government needs all the help 
it can get especially from health providers to resolve health financing and the 
universal coverage gap.” (RC.9) 
 
“The health insurance scheme is slow and losing its effectiveness. For me… 
that’s why I consider that the Federal Government and people in power need 
to take charge of providing health services outside the civil servant bubble, 
using the extra funds enabled from the Act… To also improve on the laws and 
operational guidelines to prevent inadequate ownership by stakeholders and 
a poor enrolment strategy by many HMOs destroying the progress of health 
coverage in Nigeria.” (RC.41)  
 
The interviews show that the framework to deliver a health insurance scheme and extend 
coverage to underserved populations is a divisive issue amongst policy organizations, mainly 
revolving around the respective roles of the state and the private sector. Those who see the road 
to UHC involving an expanded public sector are opposed by a private lobby calling for a mixed 
system. We now turn to consider how a state-level insurance scheme, the State Health 
Insurance Scheme (SHIS), was implemented in various Nigerian states, paying attention to 
how conflict between the two opposing groups played out.  The SHIS aims to fund basic care 
and inject new energy into the primary health care system through the construction of a network 
of functional health centres providing basic services across every Nigerian state.  
 
6.2.2.1 The private lobby and the desire for a mixed system 
One issue as policy on the SHIS was developed was how far the SHIS and the HMOs should 
cooperate, and whether services were best delivered in publicly provided health centres or a 
mixed system. Advocates of a mixed system argued that private healthcare providers should 
be free to register and manage new enrolees and participate in the management of the insurance 
scheme (Global Health Sciences, 2016). Proponents tended to argue that private sector 
involvement was necessary to ensure adequate finance for the scheme:      
 
“It will be difficult for states to adopt universal coverage for their people 
because of the cost attached to it, the financial budget for health in some states 
can’t provide the basic health package of the health scheme. But with the 
inclusion of more private health providers, their invested participation would 
ease the burden for some states and encourage the development of health 





Some also suggested that closer links between the NHIS and private health providers of a kind 
that might develop after cooperation regarding state level insurance, would encourage the 
private sector to take on greater responsibility for the construction, financing and maintenance 
of operational risks, and therefore improve and increase the provision of healthcare services 
for others besides insured civil servants.  
 
"From 2015, 2016 to 2017… Throughout these years, the government focused 
on achieving universal health coverage for ordinary Nigerians. There were 
funding and financial arrangement difficulties due to the economic instability 
of the country. However, in the last two years, we are advocating for an 
increase in the Ministry of Health's engagement with the private sector to 
encourage private investment into various states that have adopted the state 
insurance scheme. In my opinion, private investment in health is needed to 
stabilize the funding and financial volatility within each state. This is precisely 
what the Dangote group is doing through their Bank of Industry, which injects 
billions of Naira into the private health sector, making capital, equity, and 
loans available for healthcare start-ups. I firmly believe that encouraging 
more private participation like Dangote into the system will ease the burden 
on government and speedily increase our chances of achieving universal 
coverage for many." (RC.7) 
 
The private sector argues that a mixed model under a well-regulated SHIS would advance 
progress towards UHC in Nigeria, partly by increasing the number of beneficiaries and the size 
of the risk pool, vital if national health insurance scheme is to be the mechanism for widening 
coverage. Advocates argue that, to achieve this, states must adopt strategies encouraging 
resident participation in the schemes. This may involve measures like tying service eligibility 
by the state to scheme participation. (Global Health Sciences, 2016).     
 
6.2.2.2 The coalition supporting UHC led by the public sector 
On the other side of the argument, the NMA has expressed its concerns about the involvement 
of HMOs in any SHIS scheme. The Association suggests that HMO participation would be 
likely to result in rising premiums, defeating the purpose of the SHIS which aims to reduce 
healthcare costs.  There were some concerns among respondents about the drawbacks of a 
mixed system:    
 
“Funding misappropriation, no accountability, inappropriate capacities and 
regulatory incompetency at the top while lack of adequate professional 




characteristics of HMOs… This is what is adding to the burden of out-of-
pocket payments and premiums on enrolees for healthcare services.” (RC.41) 
 
“Poor sub-nationals and private sector buy-ins; inadequate regulations and 
frameworks prevent many of the enrolees from getting access to medical 
treatments.” (RC.3) 
 
The above participants and others pointed out that NHIS had barely increasing coverage above 
5% of the population. They claimed that problems have arisen from factors such as low 
individual enrolment, a number of corruption scandals, some HMO failures, mismanagement 
of NHIS funds, and poor enrolee contributions collected were too low to keep the scheme viable.  
 
The NMA instead supports an SHIS healthcare initiative led by the public sector and using the 
Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF) via the National Health Act to provide sustainable 
healthcare to individuals in different states. Part of the requirement is that states should enrol 
and provide healthcare to registered individuals paid for by federal government funds under 
provision of the Health Act. The NMA pressured the government for meaningful engagement 
to prevent HMO involvement by advising doctors not to participate in the SHIS (Onyeji, 2018).   
 
 
6.3 Power and politics in the UHC policy network 
Exercising power is a critical element of Walt and Gilson’s policy analysis triangle framework. 
The understanding of power is vital in the analysis of UHC discourse in Nigeria (Sriram et al., 
2018). Power is implicitly and explicitly manifested in many ways via the interactions of health 
system actors at local, national and global levels, particularly when negotiating priorities and 
the allocation of resources (Sheikh et al., 2014).   This section considers these relationships 
using social or political theories to consider power and politics within the UHC discourse.  
 
Power is a complex and controversial concept.  While some scholars argue that it is tightly 
concentrated among particular actors, as for example, within a power elite (Mills, 1956), others 
like Dahl (1957) maintain that it is dispersed more broadly among individuals and groups, who 
are competing for influence (Buse et al., 2012).   
 
One definition of power is “the ability to influence people, and in particular to control resources” 




ability to control individuals or groups, regardless of their intentions (Buse et al., 2012). 
Particular groups in a health system can determine the direction of health policy, as they seek 
to use argument and persuasion to get their preferred outcome (Khan, 2010), or conversely to 
block policies that are not seen to be advantageous to the relevant group. 
 
For example, Nigeria’s Oral Health Policy (OHP) went through three decades between 1984 
and 2009 when attempts to get improved oral health onto the government policy agenda failed 
to command support. According to Etiaba et al. (2015), the external influence of international 
bodies such as the WHO played a substantial role in getting domestic policy actors to 
acknowledge the importance of the OHP and successfully implementing the policy. This 
illustrates the amount of power the World Bank and WHO wielded in certain sectors and certain 
time periods, including the adoption of OHP in Nigeria. The policy led to a reduction in oral 
health diseases, an expansion of the medical workforce, and improvements in coordination of 
oral health service delivery (Etiaba et al., 2015).  
 
This section aims to explore various aspects of power based on the qualitative interviews. The 
interview extracts suggest that the power sources in the UHC policy process divide into 
multiple relationships, namely political power, financial power, professional power, power 
through technical expertise and power in numbers (via formation of coalitions). This can be 
linked to Steven Lukes’ (2005) concept of the three faces of power.  It can be argued that in 
the UHC policy discourse power can be analysed according to (a) how it emerges (b) how it is 
channelled, and (c) how it is overtly or covertly expressed.   
 
 
6.3.1 Financial power 
Power in the Nigerian health sector comes primarily from political office or state power 
deriving from access to financial resources such as taxation, oil revenues, and using that power 
to influence decision-making about UHC policy.  
The importance of control of budgets can be seen in interview extracts such as the following: 
 
“You will agree with me that nobody has power more than that person who is 
holding the money, so if you are a budget holder you have the power. So, it’s 
only when you have the power and money you will start talking about the 




that they don’t think that anything like political will exists.  If they have plenty 
of funds, then they can forget political will.” (RC.30) 
 
Power as decision making focuses on individual and group acts which influence policy 
decisions. Robert Dahl’s (1961) classic study investigates the distribution of power by 
examining the preferences of interest groups and making a comparison with policy outcomes. 
He discovered that the resources conferring power on citizens and interest groups varied and 
that these resources were unequally distributed: while some actors had plenty of certain 
political resources, they were poor in others. Thus, different individuals and groups were able 
to exert influence on different policy issues. These findings led Dahl to conclude that different 
societal groups, including weak groups, could ‘penetrate’ the political system and exercise a 
degree of power over decision makers depending on the resources they could bring to bear in 
that policy area. The range of resources which can be used in health policy give different groups 
more or less power in influencing policy and will be a function of policy content and context 
(Buse et al., 2012). Several respondents argued that money is a driving factor in the progress 
of UHC in Nigeria, and access to financial resources constitutes the decisive power shaping 
policy within the UHC discourse. The interviews suggested that the core institutions wield 
more influence than outsider groups in the UHC policy process because they can access the 
financial resources needed to move UHC forward.   
 
In recent times financial support for the implementation of UHC in different national contexts 
has come from both international and domestic sources.  As another respondent points out 
recent changes that have placed a greater emphasis on funding from national budgets have 
changed the balance of power between domestic and international organisations in the policy 
network. 
“Now for me, you know the difference between MDGs and SDGs, is that 
MDGs was funded from external funding. The other one will require huge 
domestic resources and less international funding. Now characterizing these 
policies. Some of the policies that we directed to the MDGs were not like one 
years or two years or three-year policy. They were like a 10-year plan that did 
not end even post 2015-MDGs.  Some of them spilled over into the era of SDGs 
and then of course their implementation continues until that date. Apart from 
the fact that these policies were overlaps, the failures of the MDGs made us 
face reality and make the government own up to its responsibility, which is to 
commit more resources to the health system. Which is why the 1% CRF came 
on board.  It didn’t just come from government actually started putting down 
strategies to achieve the 1% CRF. It was the policy overlap started making the 





Unlike the MDGs initiative, which depended on funding from international health donors, UN 
agencies and other external sources, current UHC developments in Nigeria depend on domestic 
government expenditure and achieving UHC has been estimated to require 15 per cent of total 
government expenditure to be committed to health system.  This is so despite exhortations for 
international donor stakeholders to fulfil agreed targets for Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to Nigeria (The World Bank, 2017). For example, the Federal Ministry of Health’s 
implementation of the MDGs in Nigeria began when they pledged to apply the savings accrued 
from the Paris Club Debt Relief Deal in 2005 to pro- poor programmes and projects. Several 
policies, programmes and projects aimed at MDG achievement have been implemented by 
diverting savings from external debt relief to implement MDGs programmes and projects 
(OSSAP-MDGs, 2015).  
The above respondent, like several others interviewed, takes the view that, given the failure of 
the MDG initiative, an increase in domestic expenditure provides a stronger foundation for 
UHC than does dependence to foreign funding. Several respondents mentioned the importance 
of core government funding:   
 
“Health financing affects all the health systems building blocks towards UHC 
and this is my view I believe that health financing… appropriate health 
financing is a gateway towards UHC. And just checking there is no country 
that has achieved universal coverage without putting appropriate health 
financing in place.” (RC.29) 
 
“My view here is that for Nigeria to be able to achieve UHC, which I think is 
very possible, Nigeria must get health financing right. So that all the effort 
around decentralizing health insurance ensures that each State establishes a 
functional health insurance scheme, and the direction all our efforts are 
headed in right now is towards the Basic Health Care Fund which will serve 
as a subsidy to the State Health Insurance Scheme (SHIS). It will also provide 
additional funding for the primary health care and input in terms of the 
operational cost of primary healthcare facilities. Hence, without appropriate 
domestic funding it is impossible to have these systems in place to work the 
way you want.” (RC.5) 
 
The above quotations make the point that such funding must be channelled through an effective 
health financing system, something that has been continually emphasized by international 
advocates for UHC, such as the Joint Learning Network. Thus, several participants mentioned 
the importance of matters such as the design of health insurance schemes (about which there 
are differing views), the rational allocation of resources to support services that bring the most 




strategic purchasing, and strengthening managerial capacities at federal and state level- all 
affecting implementation, and ultimately UHC progress.  
 
The diminishing flow of international funding and greater reliance on domestic budgets meant, 
for many respondents, that it was the Ministry that had become the main driver of UHC, even 
if the international bodies continued to push in that direction. 
 
“To answer your question, I think those that are providing persuasive support 
are partners in the UN agencies, the CSOs and development partners. These 
are powers trying to drive and force the government to implement the policy 
into the health system. But when it comes to the main driver of this initiative 
in this country you talk about the federal government of course. They, the 
Ministry of Health and other federal agencies have the power to drive this 
initiative to fruition.” (RC.31) 
 
This suggests that the widespread perception (mentioned earlier in the chapter) that power 
centers upon the Federal Government and its parastatals, such as the FMoH, SMoH, the 
National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) and NHIS is linked to the 
view that only they have political and financial authority to allocate resources to support new 
policy developments.  As one respondent said it is the Ministry that occupies the central 
position in policy development:  
 
  “The FMoH plays a vital role by making the health services accessible to the 
whole country.” (RC.9) 
 
This is not to say that there is always a common view within the inner network of government 
ministers, departments and agencies.  Some respondents suggested that where there were 
differences with Federal Government Cabinet policy, the FMoH is sometimes sufficiently 
powerful to bring about a change in direction. The FMoH has primary responsibility for the 
downstream allocation of health sector departmental budgets which is received from the annual 
budget. While it must operate within the envelope of the national health budget, it can influence 
how it is spent. The FMoH also has responsibility for liaising on UHC policy with domestic 
bodies, such as SMoH and NHIS, and international bodies, such as the World Bank Group. 
Just as the FMoH can sometimes influence Ministers, an informant suggested that the NHIS 
can sometimes push back to maintain a consistent approach when government policy 





“The main stakeholders are not always consulted when decisions are to be 
made i.e., the main people concerned are being boycotted (overlooked) during 
decision making. To me, I think the NHIS plays a major role in making UHC 
a reality by being consistent at every step of the debate.” (RC.6) 
 
This was further explained by another participant: 
 
“Leave the federal government for now. I think the National Primary Health 
Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) and NHIS have found themselves in 
key positions within the UHC policy process, mandated to them by the 
Ministry of Health to do things that will make UHC achievable in the country.” 
(RC.41) 
 
Other participants also maintained that the NHIS and NPHCDA wield influence alongside the 
FMoH. They suggest that this comes mainly via their formal responsibilities in a number of 
specific areas relevant to UHC. For example, the NHIS’s powers span regulating private health 
insurance companies to create health coverage for vulnerable groups and the formal sector, 
mainly via social health insurance schemes. It gains influence partly through its close 
association with the private health sector, which has considerable muscle due to its size, as 
reflected in the number of treatment facilities, health maintenance organisations, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, and other entities (Adewole et al., 2017).  
 
 
6.3.2 Political power  
Political forces play a dominant role in shaping the delivery of health services for many 
Nigerians. The transition into democracy illustrated how a change in the political environment 
opened the way for major improvements in the healthcare system. Health services have often 
been something of a ‘political football’ by which opposing political parties could seek to attract 
votes and form governments, and sometimes this has meant that politicians have promoted 
certain interest groups within the health system to gain their support (Sriram et al., 2018). This 
political relationship featured in the accounts of respondents, such as the following: 
 
“So, I am going to take that it from a different perspective. Firstly, UHC is the 
right thing to do, as it is the responsibility of the Nigeria government to take 
care of the health sector…the introduction of UHC is mainly a political issue 
used as a political tool by our political leaders that want to show results to 
their constituents, and some of those results can be achieved through health 




results of health surveys because they do not want health surveys to come out 
as bad as they use to be. So, the question is ‘what have you achieved during 
your political tenure?’ So, they use significant health policies, such as the 
UHC policy to increase their political currency - if there is a promise of 
improvement in health care. Lastly… the international health bodies such as 
the World Bank, WHO and UNICEF persuaded the federal government to 
start on a current health development programme and this enabled the 
Goodluck Jonathan administration to use its commitment to UHC as a 
political tool to influence voters for their re-election campaign.” (RC.23) 
 
Many participants identified political authority as the dominant source of power that exists 
within the UHC discourse. According to participants, the federal government is the sole 
political actor that has the ability to establish a legislative framework that can shape the 
direction of UHC implementation and also set aside financial resources for the policy.  Thus, 
some participants maintained that recent progress towards UHC can be attributed mainly to the 
Goodluck Jonathan administration’s commitment to the policy at the presidential summit in 
Abuja Nigeria on 10th March 2014.  The push towards UHC in Nigeria was given fresh impetus 
at this summit because the federal government decided to commit to the policy in a high-profile 
international forum (WHO, 2016). 
 
 
 6.3.3 Power through technical expertise 
One way that policy organizations outside government can play a bigger role is through 
providing specialist technical expertise. Their participation may be attractive to governments 
because of the legitimacy their perceived expertise brings when they give a policy their support.  
UN and international aid bodies feature prominently in this category and respondents 
mentioned them frequently in the context of advice, knowledge sharing, technical strategies to 
achieve UHC, and policy ‘push’: 
 
“The major drivers trying to advise the government towards achieving UHC 
are the World Bank, WHO, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, UNICEF, 
DFID, USAID. These are the major the drivers that push the UHC agenda 
because they advocate strongly to the government for the increase in health 
financing, reducing the chances of corruption and strengthening of primary 
health care, which all address the issues of equity in the health system.” 
(RC.35) 
 
“I see the World Health Organization as a foreign stakeholder that brings 




their desire to exchange and share several initiatives from other countries’ 
successful UHC implementation.” (RC.26) 
 
 
“… the WHO and other international organizations want to produce the same 
health services as in other developing countries by introducing UHC in the 
health system.” (RC.38) 
 
 
“So maybe what I can do is share the list of the attendance of the people that 
participate in the national advisory committee for the Basic Health Care 
Provision Fund (BHCPF). I attended that meeting this afternoon and I can tell 
you from the participants in attendance they have a lot of authority and power 
in health so that you could see it and feel it. The Minister of Health was present, 
so were UN agencies such as the World Bank, WHO and UNICEF, several 
international donor agencies such as DFID, USAID.  But I didn’t see the 
Canadians (but they are part of the committee). Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation were also there, and several private sector groups such as the 
Dangote group. There were a lot of powerful people involved whose bottom 
line is to focus on achieving UHC in Nigeria.” (RC.32) 
 
 
“The WHO continues to work closely with the FMoH on various technical 
aspects which improve UHC progress.” (RC.32) 
 
According to the respondents an array of technical experts is involved in supporting the UHC 
policy process, with most being affiliated with the various UN bodies, NGOs, international 
health organizations, private health sector groups, civil society organizations, and academic 
institutions.  It is important to note though that such actors exercise influence as specialists in 
the overall division of labor, rather than direct decision makers, and that this influence 
generally takes the form of technical support and consultation for the Ministry of Health. Their 
strength comes from the range of specialist expertise they can offer, so that their involvement 
will often take the form of episodic contact in relation to particular problem issues.  Generally, 
their recommendations are consistent with current international initiatives and shared 
knowledge disseminated through various global or regional UHC networks and reflects the 
way that UHC has now risen near the top of the policy agendas of leading organizations such 
as the World Bank and WHO.  
 
Relating this back to our earlier mention of Lukes’ (2005) three faces of power, it might be 
argued that the de facto consensus among the leading international organizations represents the 
most insidious relationship – what he terms ‘thought control’ - even if the motivations of the 




perceptions, cognitions and preferences so that actors accept the value of a movement that has 
currency far beyond Nigeria. Joseph Nye (2004) spoke of soft power as achieving influence in 
world politics, where an actor’s values, culture and institutional prestige are the political 
currencies promoted to get what they want.  It can be argued that these policy organizations, 
both domestic and foreign, while separate from the national institutions of government, 
nevertheless use soft power to exert indirect influence on the UHC policy process. Of course, 
they do not convince everybody, and as already mentioned there is a powerful domestic lobby 
associated with the private medical sector that remains resistant to the international push 
towards UHC. We have seen already that participants see the WHO, the World Bank, the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, DFID and USAID, as being among the key external agencies 
influencing Nigerian UHC policy.  
 
Achieving universal health coverage in Nigeria depends on willingness to learn from the well-
documented experiences of other countries in achieving UHC. Much of this information is 
transmitted via collaborative action from multiple foreign stakeholders, organizations and 
institutions working together to find more sustainable solutions. Although policy organizations 
such as the UN bodies, external government agencies, and NGOs are outside the government’s 
sphere of influence in Nigeria’s health care, they still deliver the power through technical 
expertise to determine the shape of Nigeria’s UHC implementation.  
 
 
6.3.4 Power in numbers: coalitions 
The notion of power in numbers concerns the ability policy actors have to assemble coalitions 
of multiple actors or groups to advance or block a policy.  This can be positive or negative.  
According to one participant: 
 
“Needless to say, universal coverage for Nigerians and financing of the health 
system have been victims of the federal government’s lack of commitment to 
improvements in health policies related to UHC development… That said it is 
our responsibility as the Nigerian Medical Association to hold the government 
in check by reaching out to several allies such as other union health groups 
with the aim to fight for the realisation of UHC and proper working conditions 
for medical professionals in Nigeria.” (RC.40) 
 
Some respondents viewed labour groups, such as the NMA, as occupying a strong position in 




from other labour groups to oppose policy developments they disliked. The NMA favors 
implementing UHC, and makes constant efforts to increase policy awareness, in the general 
population. Its views are represented in the public political discourse, political party manifestos, 
campaigns and media debates.  For example, the NMA has influenced government by pointing 
out these shortcomings (such as the concerns about poor coverage, alleged corruption, alleged 
mismanagement of funds contributed by subscribers and inhumane treatment of enrolees), and 





A participant from the labour sector vented his frustrations about the NHIS’s operations in 
Nigeria: 
“The NHIS has yet to reach its full potential, with just less than five than per 
cent of the population with health coverage, those people in that organization 
need to get their act together and do their jobs properly if we are to achieve 
UHC in this country.” (RC.41) 
 
Complaints have been made by the NMA about attempts by the previous and present NHIS 
leadership to undermine NHA authority.  They have suggested that these leaders are too close 
to HMO representatives who are on the same Health & Managed Care Association of Nigeria 
(HMCAN) agency board. The NMA insisted that this situation leads to conflicts of interest that 
hinder NHIS progress and urged the government to order cessation of fund disbursement to the 
HMOs. The NMA states that the NHIS was established to provide care to Nigerians regardless 
of their ability to pay, employment status or other life situations. However, the number of 
Nigerians covered by the NHIS after 12 years is 1.5 per cent of the population, which compares 
unfavourably with countries like Kenya and Rwanda which have achieved better outcomes. 
NMA pressure on the federal government led to the suspension of top officials in NHIS and 
the committee for health investigated several HMOs for possible infractions (Nigeria Health 
Watch, 2017).   
 
The NMA’s influence comes from its central position in medical and other professional 
networks and its ability to coordinate action of other labour groups.  As the following extract 





“Part of our role as the NMA is to organize favourable conditions for medical 
practitioners and access to basic health services Nigerians across the country.  
We advocate for policies to the government that increase the chances of 
improving health insurance coverage around lower-income communities in 
many parts of the country. Although difficult, we use any means necessary by 
creating awareness compelling the government comes on board improving 
health as we do all this in alliance with other groups whose interest is aligned.” 
(RC.42) 
 
Constituent professional specialties (including physicians like this respondent) affiliated with 
the NMA may also feel their power is enhanced by the Association’s collective ‘clout’ and 
wider influence. 
 
“As part of the NMA, we drew government’s attention to selected health issues 
that will impact positively on the health indices of the nation and the state.” 
(RC.40) 
 
The NMA uses ‘power in numbers’ by marshalling support from other professional 
associations in the health sector as well as donor agencies, community leaders and traditional 
leaders to persuade the government to act, or not act, so as to ensure that UHC develops in its 
preferred direction.  
The NMA frequently criticizes Nigeria’s slow progress towards UHC and blames the 
government for poor political leadership, lack of commitment, and inadequate budgetary 
allocations, which results in a poor access to healthcare and heavy reliance on out-of-pocket 
payments. The kinds of pressures described above have long-term impact, but only work slowly 
to challenge the inaction of the government in advancing UHC policy. The NMA was 
particularly influential in securing the enactment of the 2014 Health Act, which advanced the 
Association’s objective of creating earmarked funding that would support an extension of 
coverage. Thus, it lobbied successfully for the inclusion of an additional one per cent of the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) into the 2014 National Health Act budget: 
 
“… the Act made specific provisions for the establishment of Basic Health 
Care Fund which is a first-line charge on the consolidated revenue of the 
Federal Government. This fund is to be primarily deployed into our primary 
healthcare which has been so neglected in the past.” (RC.30) 
 
The extra one per cent will support a range of new developments, including expanded social 
health insurance, primary healthcare revitalization, accident and emergency services, and 




only through the NMA’s influence on the public sector unions, and the threat of damaging 
strikes, that the Nigerian government was persuaded to put forward legislation (Onyeji, 2018). 
This raises the question of whether the power dynamic between the NMA and the federal 
government creates an unhealthy situation whereby the federal government complies with the 
NMA’s demands because it fears protests, strikes and walkouts. The Association has been 
criticised for its willingness to use a strike weapon that may short-term damage on the 
healthcare system by stopping patients getting care, but it does appear to have given the HNA 
power beyond it formally mandated role. 
 
 
6.3.5 Professional power 
According to Buse et al. (2012), one structural characteristic of many health systems around 
the globe is the dominant position of the medical profession (see also: Freidson, 1970; Alubo 
and Hunduh, 2017). Almost all participants said that medical doctors were powerful actors in 
the Nigerian health system.  They occupy leading positions in many areas of the health sector, 
such as the senior management echelons of the FMoH, SMoHs, NMA, UN Bodies, Federal 
Government and the HMOs, and they are at the centre of the UHC discourse. 
 
Participants say that the level of access the medical profession possesses in UHC policy 
discussions gives them the professional power to shape, control, and regulate the pace at which 
UHC is implemented.  While many doctor respondents expressed strong support for a version 
of UHC driven by state investment, many in senior positions wanted a policy that opened the 
door for significant private-sector involvement and was not leading to any rapid extension of 
coverage. This stance was important because allied health professionals and nurses habitually 
rely on the lead set by doctors when framing their own policy positions on UHC. Respondents 
see doctors as the dominant professional group, mainly because of the authority conferred by 
their perceived expertise in a spectrum of matters relating to health, ranging from the drugs 
required in a basic benefits package to the design of effective health promotion and disease 
prevention measures.  This cultural authority is illustrated in the following interview extracts: 
“Well, doctors, of course, are the major custodians of health for the Nigerian 
population and the Nigerian Medical Association - among its reason for 
existence - is to safeguard the integrity of other health professionals and the 
wealth of the nation through events, talks, health awareness programmes, 
conferences and advocacy for better health coverage, which is conveyed to the 





“The reality is that the Nigeria Medical Association in conjunction with the 
Joint Health Sector Unions (JOHESU) are just bunches of medical doctors 
who believe that as a healthcare workers group, their one obligation is to 
serve the common will of those who are in need of health services in Nigeria.” 
(RC.40) 
 
Many respondents agreed that professional power within the UHC dialogue is primarily 
understood by participants to involve doctors’ power to influence other health professionals by 
shaping their policy stance on health care. Doctors themselves believe that their collective 
power can influence policy makers: 
 
“As a medical doctor who has been well active in the UHC policy process 
over the years, the 2014 National Health Act policy, with a lot of contributions 
from the NMA I must say, has a lot of promise if implemented properly in 
making UHC possible in our health system.” (RC.41) 
 
“We, the doctors, are today calling for the immediate government response by 
saying that the time to implement the Health Act is now; we can no longer wait 
any further.” (RC.3) 
 
According to Friedson’s (1970) four factor definition of medical dominance, the privileged 
position of the medical profession within the UHC discourse is manifested through the 
professional autonomy of doctors, through their pivotal role in the economics of health services, 
through dominance over allied health occupational groups, through administrative influence, 
and through the collective influence of medical associations (Kenny and Adamson, 1992). The 
interviews suggest that though many practicing doctors express strong ideological support for 
UHC, medically qualified officials and senior managers, as well as those in the private-for-
profit sector, are slowing progress towards UHC by taking policy down the complicated path 














6.4 The evolving content of UHC policy 
We now turn to consider the trajectory and evolution of UHC policy as presented in the 
interviews, and how this fit with the theories of the policy process mentioned previously. 
 
The first stage of the policy process cycle (Walt, 1994; Buse et al., 2012) is agenda-setting.  
Getting UHC onto the Nigerian Government’s health policy agenda was a critical milestone 
because there had been a long period when providing healthcare to the wider population had 
been regarded as economically infeasible. Although Nigeria was experiencing high morbidity 
and mortality from both communicable diseases (malaria, typhoid, and HIV/AIDS) and 
emerging diseases of affluence, the initiatives that emerged in the late 20th century focused on 
particular diseases or sectors rather than attempting comprehensive health system reform. Lack 
of progress in improving health outcomes mobilized numerous policy actors to address these 
problems.  One issue to consider is what happened in the debates and dialogue that then 
occurred to open a “window of opportunity” for future health system transformation. Here 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) suggests a framework for analysing what 
occurred as UHC came on to the Nigerian health policy agenda. The evolving content of UHC 
policy is discussed in many interviews, which touch upon the goals of the UHC policy, policy 
development, and possible problems surrounding the policy process. We will consider these 















6.4.1 Three stages in the chronology of reform 
The interviews describe a timeline of how the pathway towards achieving targets and 
developing UHC policy occurred. Figure 51 has been constructed to reflect the view emerging 
from the interviews that there were three stages of UHC policy development, namely: pre UHC, 
when the NHIS, NHP and NHSDP were formed; the inception of the UHC policy and the 
window of opportunity; and post-2015 policy development.  
 
 
6.4.2 Pre-Universal Health Coverage 
The pre-UHC period can be viewed as the time when widening healthcare coverage emerged 
as a something that might climb towards the top of the policy agenda. According to respondents, 
health experts in the pre-UHC period were preoccupied with a range of public health issues, 
such as the health impacts of poverty, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR), infant mortality rate 
(IMR), high rates of child mortality, and health-related disease indictors. According to official 
estimates the poverty rate stood at 69.2% in 1997, while the MMR was one of the poorest in 
the world at 630 maternal deaths per 100,000 births and child mortality under five years was 
191 deaths per 1000 lives in 2000 (Nwanolue, et al., 2014; USAID, 2012 and Igbuzor, 2013).  
 Quotations like the following give a good idea of respondents’ views of this period. 
 
“If the previous government was fully committed to our health system there is 
an 80 per cent possibility that it would have significantly addressed the 
primary healthcare needs of Nigerians.  This would also have eased the 
burden of focus on other NCDs. Remember more than 80 per cent of health 
needs are related to PHC issues and so if people can access quality health 
services at an affordable rate in any state in Nigeria the effort of the 
government will be lauded by the people of Nigeria.” (RC.27) 
 
“As it is the responsibility of the government to take care of our failing health 
system, there was the urgent need for capable health policies and programmes 
needed to tackle the burden of disease happening in Nigeria… and of course 
the performance of the health sector in Nigeria using key service delivery 
indictors such as the skilled birth attendance, immunisation rates and the 
other indictors shows how the burden of disease directly affects the health 
outcomes of the infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate and the life 
expectancy in the country, which have been very low. Even after the efforts of 
several health policies implemented by the health sector the health outcomes 





“The fact is that the previous health situation in Nigeria was awful and many 
health experts felt it wasn’t acceptable for a country of this status. The 
government also was not satisfied with health outcomes in the country. 
Therefore, they were looking into a change agenda in the health sector that 
would ensure that every Nigerian will be provided with proper health services 
despite their background.” (RC.1) 
 
Many participants suggest that international health bodies drew the government and 
policymakers’ attention to these deteriorating health outcomes and called for policy actions to 
improve equitable access to health services. This gave rise to several health policy measures 
(seen in Figure 51) that were designed to enhance equity, efficacy and efficiency. 
 
Figure 51 shows a decade of subsequent policy initiatives in this period which began with the 
establishment of the ward health system (WHS) in 2001, followed by the national health policy 
(NHP) in 2004, the national health insurance scheme (NHIS) in 2005, the national strategic 
health development plan framework 2009- 2015 (NSHDP 1) in 2010 and lastly the Nigeria 
State Health Investment Project (NSHIP) in 2012. 
Some participants reflected that these developments provided a useful baseline for later policies 
linked to UHC but needed to be integrated within a more comprehensive reform plan. 
“At that time, the FMoH set up commendable health programs and policies 
which focused on integrating the ward system into localized primary care 
components to strengthen health promotion, while other policies invested in 
several health projects which boost state health delivery.  In my opinion, such 
policies, programs, and projects undertaken by the previous governments 
would be relevant to our current policy direction.” (RC.29) 
 
“Without a doubt UHC is one of the most significant health policies 
introduced into our health system. Before its introduction into the health 
system, healthcare in Nigeria was tackled in bits and pieces, you had the 
National Strategic Health Development Plan, you had the National Health 
Policy, these campaigns were embarked to address the existing public health 
issues.” (RC.47) 
Other participants all echoed the view that these early developments were important milestones 
on the path to comprehensive reform: 
 
“NHIS is one of the significant health policies implemented in increasing 
healthcare coverage, by increasing health coverage which provides a basic 
health package; some Nigerians can get access to these health services.” 
(RC.21) 
 
“I am certain off the top of my head I can give you individual policies that 




implementation of the national health policy has made a lot of positive 
contributions to the health indices because we have seen many other health 
initiatives come and go and none with the prowess of the NHP.” (RC.5) 
 
“The previous National Strategic Health Development Plan was designed to 
aid the MDGs through the improvement of several primary health care 
facilities across many communities but came up short in its objectives which 
later affected the country’s targets towards the MDGs.” (RC.27)  
 
Public opinion was also a significant factor in this period when support for comprehensive 
healthcare system reform grew.  As the following respondent suggests, politicians were not 
blind to the potential electoral popularity of widening healthcare coverage, and this may well 
have played a part in the success of Goodluck Jonathan’s Democratic People’s Party.   
 
“I am glad that after so much domestic and international calls for better 
affordable health for many Nigerians, the Jonathan administration held to its 
own commitment which is to adopt the Universal Health Coverage policy into 
the health system, and I hope this commitment extends into the new 
administration health agenda for healthcare improvement.” (RC.32) 
 
This participant hints that the Jonathan administration adopted a policy that was seen to have 
widespread international and domestic support because it was likely to gain votes in the 
upcoming election. Health reforms have often been described as part of ‘populist’ political 
programmes, although this can also be seen as language that conservative critics use to suggest 
that UHC reforms are financially infeasible (Wangkiat, 2019). 
Kingdon’s framework would predict that during the pre-UHC period, the streams flowed along 
different channels until conditions changed to bring them into at least partial alignment and 
open a window of opportunity (see Figure 17). The following sections explores how specific 
issues brought the UHC policy initiative to near the top of the health reform agenda. 
 
In terms of the problem stream, health issues in Nigeria caught the attention of policymakers 
in various ways, such as monitoring the health status, evaluating existing policies, and public 
opinion, which initiated a reaction from the government. There was also global pressure from 
various international health bodies such as the WHO, the World Bank and UNICEF. For 
instance, to alleviate Nigeria’s overstrained health system, the World Bank suggested a path 
towards UHC via an improved strategic planning framework and development of health 
insurance (The World Bank Group, 2016). However, many participants say that the three key 




Framework (NSHDP 1), the National Health Policy (NHP) and the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS)) - did little to improve the country’s health outcomes. Participants say that 
these policies never achieved their targets and brought no significant improvement in the health 
status of the population.  
 
For instance, if we consider some of the key health outcomes data at the end of the MDG period 
in 2015, Nigeria’s infant mortality rate was 72.7 deaths per 1,000 live births, the contraceptive 
prevalence rate was 15.1% (2013), health expenditure was 3.9% of GDP (2013); the prevalence 
of HIV was 3.17% (2014), and life expectancy at birth was 52.55 years (2014), all of which 
are significantly lower compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (WHO, 2015).   
 
Respondents suggested that the implementation of the three aforementioned policies feel 
considerable short of their projected targets, and this in itself was seen as generating a series of 
policy problems:  
“The previous National Strategic Health Development Plan was designed to 
aid the MDGs through the improvement of several primary health care 
facilities across many communities but came up short in its objectives which 
later affected the country’s targets towards the MDGs.” (RC.27) 
 
 
“While UHC remains a promising policy for our health system, the execution 
of several previous health policy frameworks has been lacking over the years. 
There was a lack of sincerity on the part of the government to own up to the 
failures of the NHIS scheme and all the other bottleneck health policies which 
resulted in a low-level of enrolees, health maintenance organization problems 
and many unsolved health concerns in the country.” (RC.40) 
 
Respondents suggested that the inadequacy of these programmes in addressing the multiple 
health problems of Nigeria has resulted in a failure to achieve policy objectives. For example, 
after NHIS launched in 2005, the scheme appears to have failed in realising its core objective 
of making healthcare affordable to Nigerians. Although good strategies were introduced to 
improve scheme coverage, the scheme was not implemented well which led to less than 5 per 
cent of the Nigerian population, primarily federal government workers and their dependents, 
being covered (Onwujekwe et al., 2019).  
 
The policy stream involves discussion and debate about policy options for addressing the issues 
emerging within the problem stream. At this time, driven by a global momentum, many health 




UHC. Several international organisations portray UHC as a global movement in which 
countries that have successfully implemented UHC reforms provide a model for other LMICs 
to emulate, especially when it comes to baseline pre-requisites and financing mechanisms 
(WHO, 2016; Meessen et al., 2019). In the push to respond to Nigerian health issues within the 
problem stream, no policy reform united as wide a range of stakeholders as the call to 
implement UHC. Against the background of a strong push in this direction from World Bank, 
WHO, ILO and others, many domestic policymakers saw a UHC policy initiative as a means 
to address the shortcomings Nigeria’s healthcare system.  
Thus, according to this participant:  
“Well with substantial evidence, it was necessary to implement universal 
health coverage because the health indices of Nigeria were less than 
impressive. So now, we are experiencing a higher rate of infant mortality, 
maternal mortality and the prevalence of diseases has obvious impact or 
burden on the economic indices of the country. There is no questioning the 
fact that a poor health sector exhibiting poor health indices is anathema to 
meaningful development for the country - even to the viability of the 
government of the day. It was an inescapable necessity to develop policies 
which reacted to the failing health indices in order to improve development.” 
(RC.33) 
In this policy stream, multiple possibilities were explored and were narrowed down to one 
policy initiative, UHC delivered via an expansion of health insurance. This stood out as an 
attractive policy option at this time, not just because of UHC’s rising global prominence, but 
because the policy offered the prospect of addressing Nigeria poor health outcome indices, 
putting right the failures to achieve MDG targets and making a start in charting a path towards 
achieving the SDG health targets. 
 
This convergence of external international pressure with the need to find a policy that would 
assist domestic policy actors in finding solutions to their own problems comes across in several 
interview extracts.  Some put more emphasis on how the policy offered solutions to problems 
faced by domestic policy actors. 
 
“Well as I said the need for universal health coverage was self-evident 
because of Nigeria’s abysmal indices and… I supposed by UHC you are 
talking about it in its current form because there has always been this idea 
that UHC in this country came in the form of free healthcare that was not 
sustainable. I suppose you’re asking about UHC in its current form with the 
health insurance model - that Third Republic event which occurred under 
Former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s 1999 to 2000 tenure. Like I said 
earlier the indices were abysmal, there were the MDGs which created a new 




required to the present course of our health system. There had to be a policy 
change and the old ways were not just working, there was a great deal of 
advocacy with demands from the international health community such as the 
UN Bodies and other multi-lateral agencies encouraging local support to 
renew the push for UHC through NHIS.” (RC.28) 
 
Others put more weight on the influence of the international bodies in suggesting a policy 
direction. 
“Let me just tell you from my point of view, the government didn’t really 
understand the real intricacies of universal health coverage. What persuaded 
the government to go down the UHC route was global pressure whose 
objective is to increase basic healthcare coverage for many within LMICs. So, 
the policy is just being driven down into the Nigerian health system, it’s not 
that the national, sub-national or local level is driving us towards UHC. Not 
at all. It’s the pressure that was put down by the international community on 
the government to adopted UHC policy in order to tackle its health issues.” 
(RC.41) 
 
The majority view is that the external organisations – the World Bank, and WHO – were highly 
influential at this time in suggesting the outline of a policy that offered the prospect of solving 
certain problems facing domestic policy actors. Some domestic organisations such as 
HEFRON and various CSOs played an important role in cooperating with the international 
bodies to tailor a UHC policy to Nigerian situation, by combining finance through health 
insurance with a plan to develop primary healthcare infrastructure. According to this account 
the international bodies therefore had maximum influence at this early stage, mainly through 
suggesting the feasibility of an outline policy that had been successfully implemented in several 
other LMICs. These bodies remained as active plyers in the wider policy network, but as time 
passed and the MoH and the parastatals took the lead in driving UHC policy, the international 
bodies throttled back their policy push to take on a more passive technical support role. 
 
The politics stream involves specific political events that developed independently of the first 
two streams. These events make convergence of all three streams possible so as to create the 
right climate for a policy to rise to the top of the government’s policy agenda (Buse et al., 2012). 
The interviews suggest that political calculations ahead of the 2015 presidential election in 
Nigeria were the final important factor in advancing the UHC policy. 
 
 In the run-up to the 2015 election politicians in all the main parties would have been 




President Goodluck Jonathan had been in place for around four years, and it was only in that 
year that it made an explicit policy commitment at a presidential summit to fund the move to 
UHC. At the 2014 Summit on UHC in Abuja, Jonathan stated that for UHC to be introduced 
to Nigeria, health insurance needed to be compulsory. He signalled the government’s political 
commitment to providing equitable, good quality and affordable healthcare for all Nigerians, 
though acknowledging that there are challenges which meant that this would take time (WHO, 
2014). 
The policy featured prominently in the election campaign as the contending political parties 
scrambled for political points to sway voters to their side. The main parties all saw benefits in 
supporting a policy that addressed voters’ concerns about the poor quality and accessibility of 
Nigerian healthcare, and the pressure on policy makers to move on from failure to make 
expected progress on the MDGs to do better in the SDG era (Vos et al., 2014). 
6.4.3 Inception of UHC (and Window of Opportunity)  
Two elements from Figure 17 not so far considered are policy entrepreneurs and agenda 
knowledge. The theoretical concepts of policy windows and policy entrepreneurs were 
recognised in interviews with stakeholders. Participants identified four key factors that 
contributed to the rise of UHC to the top of the policy agenda: the influence of policy 
entrepreneurs; increasing knowledge about and visibility of feasible policy strategies; the 
recognition of the importance of increased public finance as a prerequisite for UHC; and the 
salience of health as a policy issue in the political environment.  
 
Factor one- the influence of policy entrepreneurs promoting UHC: 
Several respondents said that the rise of the UHC policy depended on the evidence of a coalition 
of policy advocates, spanning both the international organisations and domestic bodies (such 
as the HEFRON and CSOs).  These informants maintain that their efforts to persuade were 
instrumental in placing UHC on the policy agenda: 
 
“To answer your question, I think that those that are providing support 
include development partners, HEFRON and the CSOs.  They are trying to 
drive and force the government to do what it’s supposed to do in terms of 
implementing UHC in Nigeria. To me these are the various [influences].” 
(RC.44) 
 
These organisations are seemed like policy entrepreneurs because, acting in accord with their 




role of HERFON, a non-governmental organization, was to collaborate with various 
international health agencies to help develop and advocate for health reform strategies and a 
UHC policy design that fits into the health system model of Nigeria. The CSOs sought to 
influence the policy design by campaigning for more focus on equity and public involvement, 
consonant with their citizen-led philosophy. They sought to get policy makers to pay greater 
attention to the health needs of the most marginalized and vulnerable people in Nigeria. These 
domestic policy entrepreneurs were critical in helping localise policy templates coming from 
the international bodies for the Nigerian context. 
 
Factor two - growing knowledge about and visibility of feasible policy strategies: 
While general support for UHC policies by the international bodies was backed up by evidence 
from a number of national case studies of successful UHC reforms, there was a need to develop 
detailed plans for an insurance-based approach for Nigeria.  A considerable amount of 
preparatory work was necessary to build a “road map” for Nigeria: 
 
“Yes, the agenda was to send the UHC policy proposal to the federal 
government through the Ministry of Health… And, before its approval into the 
health sector, the government had to understand the intricacies of the UHC 
policy…, Hence, government set up a technical working group involved in 
building a road map for UHC Nigeria…” (RC.31)    
 
To formulate feasible policy strategies to achieving UHC, the government launched a health 
committee in collaboration with development partners and other stakeholders such as the NMA, 
HEFRON and the CSOs to focus on the technicalities of assimilating UHC into the Nigerian 
health sector.  
 
Factor three - recognition of the importance of increased public finance to resolve public 
health problems: 
Over time there was a growing recognition that earmarked public budgets to support the 
extension of coverage was essential if progress towards UHC was to be made. According to 
participants: 
“Through strong advocacy, we teamed up with non-government organisations 
such as the HEFRON, who are based in Abuja. We pressed the government on 
the need to improve the accessibility of quality health services to average 
Nigerians. The National Health Act policy advocated making primary health 
care functional for at least 24 hours a day. It advocated that our funds should 




4 per cent while making available the one percent Consolidated Revenue Fund 
(CRF) for health. So, we have been advocating this Act to least raise the health 
budget beyond the 4 per cent that we are currently having within the health 
system.” (RC.42) 
 
Of course, we (the HEFRON organization) led the coalition that resulted in 
the enactment of the 2014 National Health Act. We led.  In fact, the reason for 
this was because of Nigeria’s bad performance in the World Health Report in 
2000 that made us set up specific agencies that will metamorphize to help 
improve the Nigerian health system. So, we believed that there must be a 
legislative overarching mechanism to support UHC.  That’s why we set up the 
Health Act and we continued to advocate for funding, ownership, 
transparency and then good governance in health.” (RC.31)  
 
“Among other policies, I would say that the 2014 National Health Act, if 
implemented, would provide, or let’s say create, further financial allocation 
towards the health sector, which can be beneficial to the progress of UHC in 
the country. The Act contains the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF) 
which is at a pilot stage conducted in selected states in the country whereby 
the result of its performance is bound to radically shift health financing 
towards UHC. The Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF). Remember, 
I previously said that proper health financing would be good for the progress 
of UHC in our health system.” (RC.45) 
 
Several participants stated that the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), various civil society 
organisations, and the Health Reform Foundation of Nigeria (HERFON) were instrumental in 
the enactment of the 2014 National Health Act. The Act authorizes an additional injection of 
public expenditure into the health system via the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF), 
and the one per cent consolidated revenue fund (CRF), which will help finance UHC in Nigeria. 
Among other things, these additional expenditures will go into expanding the basic minimum 
package of health services available to Nigerians under the National Health Insurance Scheme 
(NHIS), combined with a drive to improve and maintain the network of primary healthcare 
facilities across the country (FMoH et al., 2017).   
 
Factor four - the salience of health as a policy issue in the political environment:  
The 2015 presidential election campaign brought healthcare coverage to the centre of the 
political debate in a way that had not happened before.  It led politicians to make connections 
between extending coverage and the poor healthcare outcomes of the past that raised public 
expectations.  According to a senior administrator: 
 
“It will be fascinating if at the end of the day if we can implement UHC in this 




proper health care… I think the commitment to UHC around this period is a 
massive gift that makes Nigerians optimistic about health improvements in the 
future.” (RC.43) 
 
The political debate raised awareness among both political stakeholders and the general public 
of policy options for UHC. Kingdon’s concept of “agenda knowledge” (or knowledge 
acquisition) is related to awareness of the emergence of feasible solutions at a specific time. In 
the run-up to the election the growing focus on health led the Goodluck Jonathan government 
to sign into law health legislation that had been debated since 2014.  This brought health to the 
centre of the election campaign, and in the view of several informants put in place important 
building blocks such as finance necessary to make progress towards UHC.  A survey of 130 
health professionals carried out in 2015 found that 86.2 per cent claimed good awareness of 
the 2014 National Health Act, with almost as many have a positive opinion of it, although their 
detailed knowledge of its provisions was much less good (Enabulele and Enabulele, 2016). 
Translating technical proposals into proposals in a political campaign – “political facts” - is a 
crucial step in building support for a reform policy.  
 
Several respondents explained that the financial provisions of the Act, together with measures 
to extend primary care provision to vulnerable population groups such as women, children and 
older people, were its most important sections.  
 
“To me… the signed 2014 Health Act created an avenue for health experts 
and the Ministry of Health to further nudge the federal government into 
making a stance on UHC commitment… Because, with additional financing 
from the Act and global pieces of evidence that the UHC policy can improve 
our failing health outcomes, committing to the UHC policy on the healthcare 
agenda is the right timing for the Good-luck Jonathan administration.” 
(RC.24) 
 
“But it was not until 2014 when President Jonathan signs the 2014 National 
Health Act which allowed the opportunity to define the health system of the 
country… and in that Health Act, it defines the Basic Health Care Provision 
Fund which is supposed to inject extra financial funds into the health sector 
in order to increase health coverage to some of the poorest and most 
vulnerable Nigerians.” (RC.40)  
 
“To be honest UHC in Nigeria is still very new… apart from declaring UHC 
in 2014, it’s around 2015 that is when the discussion of UHC started and was 
taken seriously by decision-makers in the health sector. One of the pointers or 
indictors that led to this serious discussion is when Nigeria developed a new 




achieve UHC. So, through that Act, all of the discourse is about revitalizing 
the primary health care linking it up to the secondary and tertiary level, so 
that the quality of health delivery is strong. surrounding UHC in Nigeria.” 
(RC.30) 
 
The passage of the Act marked a breakthrough for the groups campaigning for UHC, but the 
window of opportunity opened was seen to be time-limited because of the possibility that the 
outcome of the election would halt progress.  There was therefore a push to secure as many 
government commitments as possible on the use of the new budgets and the planned expansion 
of coverage before the election.  There was a perception that the Act itself locked in some 
progress, but that more needed to be done: 
“Because of the change of government administration in Nigeria, health 
policies such as UHC held by the previous administration might be affected 
by the objectives of the newly elected administration. When there is a new 
administration in power, they have the ability to change or scrap previous 
policies of the last government. For example, Nigeria’s constitution runs a 
four-year presidential term… a new government can discard a four-year 
policy by readdressing these issues, which not only wastes a lot of time but 
hinders the progress of the health system. This is why the Jonathan 
government signed the Health Act in order to safeguard our commitment to 
UHC from any change in administration because Nigeria does not have a 
stable government or system. Stability is a big issue in Nigeria and again with 
the lowest healthcare allocation in Africa, our funding issues might be 
resolved with this Act thereby having a positive effect on UHC 
implementation.” (RC.3) 
 
“The third factor is the inconsistency on government policies because of 
changes from one government to another which are the main challenges.” 
(RC.19) 
 
This accounted for the sense of urgency felt by domestic policy actors, such as the HEFRON 
and the CSOs, to enact and then make the most of the Health Act before the window of 
opportunity closed.  
 
6.4.4 Post-2015 policy developments and implementation issues  
In the March 2015 general election Goodluck Jonathan’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 
was defeated by the All-Progressives Congress (APC), an alliance of four opposition parties 
headed by the retired Major General, Muhammadu Buhari.  Apart from the health issue the 
election debates had been dominated by concerns about Boko Haram activity in the north, the 




in fighting corruption and improving infrastructure, all of which had counted against the PDP. 
The new president pledged to continue to prioritize the health sector for funding, carry on with 
coverage extensions through the NHIS, such as free surgery for 10,000 vulnerable NIHS 
beneficiaries, and maintain the focus on improved basic care for all through improvements in 
primary care infrastructure (WHO, 2016).  However, increasing economic problems and a 
series of corruption scandals involving APC politicians, meant that health dropped down the 
policy agenda.  The government was heavily preoccupied with the continued squeeze on global 
oil prices, which affected Nigeria’s main export commodity and depressed the revenues 
available for public expenditure, including the health budget. 
Respondents’ views on progress towards UHC after 2015 were mixed but often gloomy, with 
many feelings that momentum had slowed: 
“It depends on which category of Nigerians you are talking about on how the 
process of UHC is moving in the country. I think you can classify them into 
those that are policymakers, healthcare industries and those that are receiving 
healthcare. I think the healthcare industries are pushing and technically 
assisting the policymakers on how to go about UHC and some Nigerians are 
open to the idea of UHC in their community. But the policy process needs to 
gather more momentum in providing more coverage to individuals because 
many are still without health coverage.” (RC.25) 
 
“We have not progressed as much as we should and sadly this is because of 
the lack of capacity in terms of understanding the design… also people are 
very sceptical about doing things differently and trying to experiment on what 
they are not very sure of.” (RC.5) 
 
Some participants say that the post-2015 period is mainly about moving from policy design to 
implementation and grappling with the changes needed to widen coverage. Many were worried 
about the pace of change and the commitment of the government.  Improvements in primary 
care remained quite limited, while the NHIS is still lagging behind the projected increase in 
health coverage for the uninsured. According to a Guardian (2019) article, written around the 
time of Buhari’s election for a second term, the government’s promise to move towards UHC 
had been slow to materialise.  It will be difficult to achieve coverage for all in Nigeria before 
2030 if the PHC system fails to improve and enrolment in the NHIS remains voluntary.  Despite 
the provisions of the 2014 Act, many respondents mentioned finance as a continuing barrier to 
progress. 
 
“I think for me… implementing UHC with the funding framework of our health 
system limits its process. We don’t have an appropriate funding allocation that 




countries. Just two months ago the finance minister came to tell us that the 
government does not have the resources to allocate to the health sector to help 
implement UHC on a large scale. So, one of the ways the government chose 
to implement UHC is to start in the first two years focusing on rebuilding 
functional primary health care facilities throughout the country as a way of 
making coverage easier for the NHIS to provide. According to the minister, 
this would cost the government 5-6 billion dollars per annum for a large-scale 
implementation which is a lot of money the government is not willing to 
spend…” (RC.26) 
 
Other participants insisted that the slowdown in the momentum of UHC Nigeria is not just 
about finance, but about phasing implementation to give priority to primary care and expanding 
health insurance. These respondents argued that the planning process was itself defective and 
that politicians and civil servants had an over mechanistic view of developing policy in stages, 
which meant that the reform vision was being lost as participants squabbled about incremental 
change at the margin.  
Like policymakers in many countries those in Nigeria operate with model for policy 
development that assumes a logical linear flow between discrete phases, so that they first define 
objectives, before identifying policy options and assessing the costs and benefits of the various 
paths. There are valid reasons for thinking in this way since it represents a basic Nigerian 
democratic model: politicians have goals, which are translated (via consultation and lobbying) 
into governmental action plans, which are executed by healthcare officials. This is a basic 
input/output model, and it possesses strong intuitive appeal.  
 
Unfortunately, policy development in Nigeria has been affected by lack of capacity to manage 
a complex policy that extends over different levels of the national and state healthcare systems 
and a multiplicity of actors, as well as political pressures arising from reduced export earnings, 
Islamist insurrection in the north, and squabbles in the governing circles.  Working out how 
polices to extend coverage at different levels of the system has proved more challenging that 
reform advocates anticipated. 
 
“I think I would say that we are in the rudimental stages… put it in terms of 
conceptualisation, understanding the policy concept and adopting policies at 
different levels and putting in resources to begin to implement and then 
monitoring the level implementation of policies that are supposed to enable 





A gap has emerged between the idealised planning process and the reality of a fragmented 
healthcare system negatively affected by lack of resources and opposing visions of the meaning 
of UHC (Hongoro et al., 2018). Some participants said that achieving UHC will hang in the 
balance if policymakers do not resolve these challenges.  Five significant challenges came up 
recurrently in the interviews: the changing political climate, concerns about finance and system 
capacity, poor coordination between federal and state levels, problems with the private sector 
(especially HMOs), and corruption.  Of course, from the government’s perspective such 
challenges in the health policy domain do not exist in a vacuum, and issues from other policy 
domains will from time-to-time command greater attention.  
 
 
6.4.4.1 Changing political climate 
Following the 2015 election the new government launched a series of policies affecting the 
healthcare system, including the National, Strategic Health Development Plan II (NSHDP) 
2018-2022, a Primary Health Revitalization initiative, and the operationalisation of the Basic 
Healthcare Provision Fund (BHCPF), which included the one per cent Consolidation Revenue 
Fund (1% CRF). Via such policies, the Buhari administration seemed to signal its commitment 
to re-energising the drive towards UHC (NBS, 2017). However, the interview extracts below 
show that key stakeholders in senior positions in the health sector were highly sceptical about 
the government’s “political will” to advance the UHC policy at a time of economic constraint: 
 
“Lack of political will within the present (Buhari) administration is a major 
obstacle coupled with the financial crisis the country is facing, since we are 
yet to recover from the previous global recession.” (RC.28) 
 
“The lack of political will keeps repeating itself as an inescapable obstacle to 
the progress of UHC in Nigeria.  The reason being that the new administration 
is filled with many officials, politicians, legislators, and policymakers who do 
not take healthcare as the top priority when it comes to dealing with issues 
affecting the country. We, as the custodians of health in Nigeria, have to make 
them see the value of providing better healthcare to Nigerians.” (RC.42) 
 
“The lack of political will on the government part is a major obstacle to us 
policy makers in our efforts to carry out the implementation process for this 
policy.” (RC.35) 
 
Comments like those above suggest that many participants were doubtful that the Buhari 




that their pledges to continue progress towards UHC (which continued in the run-up to the 
2019 general election) were mere lip service. 
One participant raised the issue of whether finance came first and political will was only 
meaningful if resources were available:  
 
“Finally, when we are talking about political will concerning the health 
system governance and stewardship, if the budgetary allocations for health 
were adequate, we would not consider the political will as a major obstacle to 
UHC progress in Nigeria.” (RC.30) 
 
Whether or not one factor is dependent on the other, it seems evident that without both political 




6.4.4.2 Concerns about system capacity and finance 
The concern about the influence of an over-mechanistic conception of policy development 
mentioned earlier was partly based on the observation that Nigeria’s attempts to move towards 
UHC did not progress in a linear process following the conventional stages or cycle models, 
but that instead policymakers oscillated back and forth between agenda-setting, policy 
formulation and implementation. For instance, in the words of a senior manager within the 
NHIS: 
 
“There have been mechanisms in place that formulate policies that are passed 
to legislators… but the implementation is yet to be processed. So, the 
formulation mechanism that guides the conduct of achieving UHC in the 
country is mostly on hold.” (RC.24) 
 
According to this participant, policy makers have not harnessed Nigeria’s full health system 
capacity in the post-2015 period. His concern is that continual failures to implement changes 
that improve health services delivery leads to a perception of crisis and a back-and-forth 
regression in several rounds of policy discourse (oscillating between tweaking plan and trying 
to implement the revised policy design) that lead to a form of policy stasis. Two economist 
respondents were concerned that delays and stop-start policies meant that headline changes 
were often not supported by necessary changes in downstream parts of the healthcare system 
they would affect: 
“The federal government did not release funding from the last budget. But in 




the [Finance] Bill to get the one per cent consolidation revenue fund going 
after so many years of stagnation after the signing of the [2014] Act. As we 
speak, we are just trying to put the processes in place so that that structure is 
there from the federal government down to all the states - so that people 
understand it.” (RC.31)  
 
“There is a lack of capacity in the health system to handle the demands of the 
UHC policy. Many of the states in Nigeria do not have the required capacity 
or structure to be able to implement or roll out the Basic Healthcare Provision 
Fund. For instance, states are required to have the State Health Insurance 
Scheme (SHIS) which does not exist in many of the states… yet these states do 
not have the capacity to run or implement the SHIS, and the public health 
sector of many states does not have the financial ability to achieve the scheme. 
The majority of the people within these states are under the informal sector 
which financially finds it hard to provide health coverage.” (RC.30)  
 
These two respondents appear to see these deficiencies as stemming from systemic weaknesses 
that will be hard to overcome in the immediate future. Other participants agree that there are 
problems but think these can be overcome step by step given time. 
 
“UHC needs a step-by-step approach since our technical capacity is not up to 
par, but with assistance from the UN bodies most of our policy makers can 
little by little learn how to formulate the right policies which can assist UHC 
implementation in our health system rather than rush into its 
implementation… and I also heard it is not an easy policy to go into.” (RC.32) 
 
The forgoing extracts represent two schools of thought among respondents: those who say that 
UHC in Nigeria is still in its early stages so that patience is needed, and implementation should 
not be rushed, and more sceptical participants who argue that Nigeria’s health system is 
incapable of achieving universal coverage until several pressing issues are addressed. These 
latter issues include agreeing on a funding mechanism that would support the policy, increasing 
health system capacity to allow the rollout of new programs, and achieving better coordination 
of Federal and State Ministry of Health programs. 
 
 
6.4.4.3 Poor coordination between federal and state levels 
Interviewees state that the level of public health expenditure for health is insufficient to support 
the necessary infrastructure, service improvements and operational expenses required for 
achieving UHC.  This means that central government allocations to the states have often been 




“Several states are yet to adopt mandatory health insurance schemes; other 
states have either passed this into their state law or begun to enrol individuals 
in their state. However, the one concern for many states, especially for those 
yet to adopt the programme, is the issue surrounding the level of available 
funding allocated to health from the federal and state government. I think the 
government is not releasing enough funding for us to put in place an effective 
structure in order for us to enrol more individuals.” (RC.5) 
 
Once the FMoH has distributed the central health budget to key parastatals the rest is allocated 
to the SMoHs, which is not enough to fund the SHIS adequately. A participant explained that:   
 
“And the constraint is that… well that depends on the national budget, we see 
a lot of diversions of money towards other sectors rather than health where 
the distribution of the national budget filters through to other sectors leaving 
no money left for health.” (RC.3)  
 
Some respondents complained that the Federal Government consistently gives lower priority 
to health in its budget allocations than to other departments of state, for instance the Ministries 
of Works, Power, Housing and Transportation.  These may or may not be taking money from 
healthcare in a competitive way, since some policy initiatives in these areas may themselves 
impact on health. Another respondent argued that improved coordination between federal and 
state governments in planning service development was crucial if extra funding was to bring 
the maximum benefit: 
 
“From all the list of challenges I have given you, I can gladly say that the 
government is aware of most of them, and they are trying to solve them little 
by little. For instance, the Federal Government is coming up with several 
funding programmes for PHC and infrastructure development in the health 
sector. But, without a strong relationship between the FMoH and SMoH, 
improving funding into the sector will discourage better engagement with 
health experts.” (RC.31) 
 
Several participants argued for better coordination of the budget planning process to facilitate 




There are various impediments to achieving UHC in Nigeria, but several participants 
maintained that the root cause is mismanagement of limited financial resources by the MoH, 





“The first on my top list of challenges is corruption, which is massively 
affecting the implementation of UHC policy in Nigeria, and I’m referring to 
that at the government level where the leaders at the top care less about 
making Nigeria move forward, not to talk about the effect of which trickles 
down into the health sector.” (RC.6) 
 
“Corruption is an inevitable impediment to this policy.” (RC.7) 
 
“And again, corruption too, our leaders prefer to use money for something 
else rather than to use it for health and the ‘I don’t care’ attitude is a common 
thing in Nigeria’s system, which is a major constraint we have… corruption. 
If we can deal with this thing will be better.” (RC.14) 
 
“Corruption is a disease that has genetically been inherited for generations, 
to the extent that is has become the reflection of the society in which it 
functions.” (RC.17)  
 
“The goal of achieving UHC in Nigeria is very clear and it is understood by 
many policy-makers. But there are people who are very sceptical, they are not 
sure of how it will form, and they are afraid that corruption will take all the 
money for health. They feel that there is corruption from down the road at the 
primary health level up to the world development committee, and that may 
affect the prospects of UHC in Nigeria.” (RC.32) 
 
These participants consider corruption to be the main reason why the financial expenditure for 
health remains insufficient, and mismanagement of government funds for health will continue 
to affect the budget allocations necessary for progress towards UHC. Participants suggested 
that corruption undermined the planning and allocation of resources in the MoH system, and 
thus harmed preparations for UHC. They claimed that the effect of corruption further 
downstream in the system affects many health service programs and pushes patients towards 
private health care.  Respondents suggested that this partly accounts for Nigeria’s high levels 
of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, which drive the lower-class and sick towards 
impoverishment. Eradicating corruption in the healthcare sector will increase the chances of 
achieving UHC, reducing out-of-pocket spending and catastrophic health expenditure linked 









6.4.4.5 Problems with the private sector – HMOs  
The recent accreditation of private health insurance companies saw the governing council of 
NHIS delist at least 23 out of 57 HMOs because they failed to achieve the standard 
requirements necessary for operational services, training activities, and maintenance services. 
The decision was made after 57 HMOs underwent an accreditation process required by the 
NHIS. The health system possesses about 60 HMOs with 600 functioning branches.  The 
budget allocated for public health insurance is estimated to be about N28 billion in the 2019 
budget, and yet this sector only covers that section of the population, estimated at just over 5%, 
that has health insurance. This led some respondents to question the significance of HMOs’ 
role in expanding coverage, and some maintained that they were actually an impediment to 
progress in implementing UHC. A recent NGO report (Onyeji, 2019; Akinbode et al., 2019) 
suggests that HMOs have failed to live up to their potential. Several of the same shortcomings 
listed in this report were mentioned by respondents: 
 
“We are hopeful that we would soon get it right as a nation. But the NHIS as 
it is presently constituted needs to be unbundled and replaced with a more 
efficient framework that removes the middlemen - HMOs - who are presently 
one of the banes of the scheme’s workability. Sustained funding by government 
usually does not get to the heart for those that need health care due to way 
funds are mishandled.” (RC.40) 
 
There were suggestions that the corruption mentioned earlier extended to the HMOs, so that 
government monies were being creamed off without translating into extended coverage for 
NHIS beneficiaries. Some participants blamed the government for creating an environment that 
facilitates corruption, where HMOs allegedly have the opportunity to embezzle government 
funds as cover for providing private health insurance coverage. They think this environment 
leads to complacency within the private health sector, where many HMOs lose sight of their 
responsibility as health providers, leading to poor service delivery, financial irregularities and 
unaffordable care.   
 
At the time of research fieldwork there were tensions within the Federal Ministry of Health 
after senior officers had been accused of disregarding public service rules and possible 
malfeasance. The Guardian (2017) reported that high ranking officers from the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS), certain Health Maintenance Organizations, and the National 




allegations. Many higher-level policymakers called for the suspension of these officials after 
their alleged corrupt practices were reported in the media. 
 
 
6.5 What will it take to achieve UHC? 
Many interviewees remained optimistic about the prospects of progress on UHC, even while 
acknowledging that current health outcomes require improvement. However, views differed 
about what it will take to achieve UHC, how it should be implemented, and the impediments 
to progress. Such differences were generally related to professional background and interests.  
 
The vision of the future for many participants looks forward to a time when all Nigerians have 
access to affordable healthcare. Participants state that every Nigerian deserves the right to basic 
health services with adequate social protection backed by good governance.  
The following comments represent the views of several interviewees who are optimistic about 
the future:  
“To me I think the future is bright and I say this because of the SHIS program. 
At the rate we are going before the end of this year, every state will have 
mandatory health insurance and once that happens there will be a domino 
effect of many states beginning to implement the SHIS. However, what this 
means is that… if for example, a state like Kano refuses to adopt the 
implementation of the SHIS, the government should make it illegal to do so 
and make them aware that they are breaking the law. So, I think the SHIS is a 
game changer once many states begin to adopt mandatory health insurance. I 
also think that social media could play a big part for the future of UHC in 
Nigeria because I know a lot of doctors in Nigeria who use this medium to get 
information across to people in order for them to prioritize their health. Once 
Nigerians start making health a priority then you can rest assured that when 
you tell them to pay a small fee of 15,000 naira per annum for health insurance 
this can provide some basic minimum of care for them and their families… 
Because if you walk into a health facility for a caesarean section, it will cost 
an individual a fee of 200,000 naira an operation. This is the trade-off. So, I 
am certain of a better future where the Nigerian health sector will achieve 
UHC soon.” (RC.45) 
 
“My view is that if properly implemented with well-structured monetary and 
evaluation systems in place - and with a judicial process for managing funds, 
risks and to prevent corruption in the chain across the agencies - the Basic 
Health Care Provision Fund for the first time can provide the opportunity for 
Nigerians to provide primary health care on their doorsteps free of charge, 





“I am assured about the future of UHC in Nigeria but it’s not going to be easy 
or straightforward to achieve this task. It will need putting systems in place to 
revitalize the health system. For instance, imagine going to your village to 
witness a 24-hour functioning primary health centre with constant electricity, 
running water and the basic commodities needed for a woman to deliver a 
child, immunize the child, take care of the child’s injures if needed and all of 
that. I think that would be a significant leap if a system was put in place.  Also, 
this system must reduce out-of-pocket expenditure, catastrophic expenditure 
of many families in the villages. We have estimated that it will save a family 
in Nigeria over 10,000 naira every month if a proper system is implemented, 
which will be a huge boost to the economy. I know that this will work, but it 
will take time to implement it because it’s not a one-year, two-year program… 
I am hoping that before we get midway into the SDGs the system will start 
working. I am not 100 per cent sure even with the Basic Health Care Provision 
Fund that Nigeria will achieve the SDGs.  We need more significant 
investments and getting the primary health care and tertiary care to work. 
Making sure our people are educated, employed, fight poverty/illiteracy and 
all of this are complementary issues that affects our health outcomes. Then 
when these systems are functioning, the health sector can easily achieve UHC.” 
(RC.35) 
 
This group of participants offers a progressive opinion focused on building a sustainable system 
which will secure the prospects of UHC Nigeria. These participants propose the 
implementation of mandatory laws requiring or forcing states in the country to adopt an SHIS 
program. They reason that making the SHIS scheme mandatory for states increases the 
probability of expanding health coverage because, when fully implemented, the scheme can 
reach many individuals in various local communities, opening up access to essential health 
services.   
 
Some participants in this group think the best prospect for UHC Nigeria is through the 
implementation of a well-structured performance management and evaluation framework with 
safeguards for managing risks and achieving key health policy objectives. For example, the 
Basic Health Care Provision Fund, initiated by the National Health Act to substantially increase 
financial revenue into the health system, needs a well-structured financial management strategy 
to ensure accountability at national, state, local levels. 
 
Other participants highlight the need to address issues outside of the health sector which might 
impede UHC’s development. Factors such as poor education, climate change, transportation, 







Health policy emerges from the places where politics and policy development intersect. The 
study of policy formation on its own focuses on the content, context and process of the 
discourse (Hill, 2014). Policies can be described and evaluated, and alternatives explored. To 
analyse policy success or failure, consideration must also be given to politics; the factors that 
affect interactions between decision-makers as policy is adopted, elaborated and implemented. 
This chapter reflects on the policy process concerned with UHC in Nigeria and the nature of 
power and politics that surround the UHC discourse.  
 
Informants acknowledge that Nigeria has not yet achieved UHC but suggest that the 
government is developing policies that open the way for a major extension of coverage.  Many 
respondents believe that Nigeria can achieve UHC in the coming years, providing that the 
health system can overcome certain challenges and obstacles. Although participants have 
different opinions of what UHC entails and how it can best be implemented, they all share a 
similar objective, which is to provide social and financial risk protection schemes for poor and 
vulnerable populations as a basic human right.  Universal health coverage is the ultimate 
expression of fairness and one of the most powerful social equalisers among all policy options 
(Sakolsatayadorn and Chan, 2017). The next chapter discusses what the findings reveal about 


















CHAPTER 7  
DISCUSSION 
 
7.0 Introduction  
The first section of this discussion chapter provides a summary of the main findings from the 
study. Next the chapter turns to provide answers to the seven research questions listed in 
Chapter 1. Later sections consider what the research adds to the existing literature on UHC 
policy development, and the methodological limitations of the study.  
 
 
7.1 Overview of the study 
The research objectives are: 
1. To investigate the roles and interactions of policy actors in the UHC policy process and 
how they impede or advance progress in extending coverage.  
2. To investigate the extent of consensus or disagreement between influential actors and 
interest groups on the direction of UHC policy, and how that has affected progress. 
3. To identify the barriers and obstacles which affect Nigeria’s process of health policy 
towards achieving UHC.  
 
These objectives were pursued by examining the actions and interactions of key actors who 
make up the network concerned with the development of UHC policy in Nigeria, and especially 
the obstacles and challenges that may help explain the slow pace of progress towards UHC in 
that country. This was undertaken through a study divided into two phases, which respectively 
examined formal aspects of the network using SNA techniques, and the nature of the policy 
process as revealed through qualitative interviews. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5 (analysing the UHC policy network), the respective positions of, 
and relations between, actors who had been identified as part of the policy network were 
examined using a range of SNA measures. This enabled the researcher to map out the key 
organisations implicated in the development of UHC policy, the nature of their relationships 





These actors and organisations enjoyed different degrees of access to information, to 
professional support and material resources, in part at least according to their location and 
connections to other network actors around them.  Relationships within the network were 
investigated using six relationships that were assumed to indicate different forms of influence 
or power, named reading another’s written products, taking advice, discussion, coalition, 
affiliation, and conflict).  These patterns of relationships created opportunities for influence but 
might also restrict a policy actor’s scope for action because of obligations to, or conflict with 
others in, the network (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994).        
 
The SNA analysis suggests that, while the six UHC policy network relationships point to a 
complex mix of relationship forms, a fairly stable subset of seven organisations have high 
centrality and influence across most relationships. Other organisations and actors have high 
centrality only on some relationships. In essence the UHC discourse is substantially shaped by 
three important categories of actors: which the author has termed power actors, 
gatekeepers/brokers, and actors who have close connections to the power actors. There may be 
variations in the roles of less central actors because of their relationship to the core and 
peripheral network components according to several criteria. It is important to identify isolated 
policy actors on a policy network’s periphery, and to map whether there are some relationships 
of the UHC discourse in which they become more involved. For instance, conflict with the 
UHC discourse had the fewest number of involvements amongst policy actors, leaving the 
FMoH, hospital managers and HMO representatives prominent as those most likely to be 
involved in policy disputes. By contrast, those policy actors whose influence comes from their 
close connection to the Ministry (the power actor) have a more limited role in policy network 
information exchange.       
 
In general terms, senior government officials have most influence over UHC policy 
development and decision-making, and also a degree of control over the transfer of information 
within the policy network. Their influence highlights that government officials both drive and 
obstruct the policy process involved in achieving UHC in Nigeria. However, coalitions and 
connections to other actors are also important. The FMoH, NMA and to a lesser extent the 
WHO and NHIS have influence over UHC policy processes but might require support from 
other connected policy actors if particular initiatives are to succeed.  One rather surprising 
finding is that the SMoHs, while in the inner circle of influential organisations, are neither a 





The second findings chapter - Understanding the UHC network via policy process theory 
(Chapter 6) – investigated the policy process relating to UHC policy in more depth, using 
qualitative interview data.  It drew on both mainstream policy process theory and Kingdon’s 
(1984) multiple streams framework to examine how policy evolved and the degree to which a 
window of opportunity opened – and remained open - for UHC reform. From the perspectives 
of various actors, the aim of the framework is to increase the awareness of what occurred when 
UHC emerged onto the Nigerian health policy agenda. More recent expositions of the MSF 
(Ridde, 2009; Boswell and Rodrigues, 2016; Zahariadis and Exadaktylos, 2015) suggest that 
full convergence of the politics, problem and policy streams predicted in Kingdon’s seminal 
book may not always be present when a policy moves forward, and that conditions may change 
between the time of initial policy formation and further development of implementation, and 
the Nigerian story fits this picture of generally favourable conditions at certain times giving 
way to times when barriers to further progress emerged. The period leading up to the 2014 
Health Act was a time when a number of positive factors supporting UHC came together and 
represented a breakthrough for groups campaigning for reform.  But the window of opportunity 
was widely perceived to be time-limited because of the possibility that the election outcome 
would halt progress. Despite a push to secure firmer government commitments on securing 
new budgets and the planned expansion of coverage, progress since the change of government 
once again appears to have slowed.       
 
Chapter 6 utilised qualitative interview accounts to examine how UHC policy was formed and 
contested, and also to understand the engagement of various relationships of power that could 
be harnessed by policy actors within the UHC policy discourse. Policy development occurred 
within a policy network characterised by the heterogeneity of prominent actors (see Table 13), 
with collective organisational perspectives proving more important and enduring than the 
perspectives of individual actors, even when forceful personalities were involved. While 
international as well as domestic organisations influenced the policy process, the international 
bodies generally had decisive influence only at certain key stages and in relation to particular 
issues, rather than have the continuous and wide-ranging control that the Federal Government, 
the FMoH and its parastatals and to a lesser extent the NHIS, exerted. Two relationships that 
differentiate the organisations at the centre of policy from those with more peripheral, issue 
specific, or episodic involvement are longevity of participation and organisational decision 




typically have both longstanding involvement and a formal mandate to take part in policy 
making.        
 
Power manifests in a number of ways through the interactions of actors in the health system at 
local, national and global levels, particularly during the negotiation of priorities and allocating 
resources (Sriram et al., 2018). The power sources in the UHC policy process can be divided 
into political power, financial power, professional power, power through technical expertise 
and power in numbers (via formation of coalitions), which were all discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 At the time of the study UHC was a key issue in the election campaign and ongoing political 
debates. A large group of pro-reform informants acknowledged that Nigeria has not yet 
achieved UHC but argued that policies being developed by the then government would 
significantly extend coverage. They believed that Nigeria would soon be able to achieve UHC 
because changes underway since the 2014 Act would help overcome the challenges and 
obstacles that had blocked progress. However, others were more sceptical and saw the obstacles 
to reform as more intractable, expressing divergent views about the role of the private sector 
in achieving UHC, and worried about the degree of political commitment to push reform 
through.  While almost all participants express support in principle for UHC it was clear that 
different groups had different understandings of what UHC entails and how it should be 
implemented.  
The chapter now turns to a review of the research questions, and how far the study has provided 
answers to them.  Readers will recall that the research questions were as follows:      
1. Which influential actors and organizations are shaping Nigerian UHC policy? 
2. What are the patterns of power relationships and influence in the policy network? 
3. What are the roles of international and domestic actors in shaping policy? 
4. Is there any disagreement in the policy network over how to pursue UHC, or the 
feasibility or desirability of UHC policies? 
5. What gains and setbacks have so far been encountered, as seen by policy actors? 
6. How far along the UHC path do policy actors think Nigeria has travelled, and how do 
they assess the prospects of achieving adequate coverage? 
7. What general lessons can be provided by Nigeria regarding the policy process 






7.2 RQ 1: Who are the influential actors and organizations shaping UHC policy in 
Nigeria? 
Policymaking is a complex process that involves actors and organisations negotiating in pursuit 
of their interests and marshalling different types of evidence to support their policy positions 
(Russ et al., 2014). We have seen that the policy network in Nigeria is characterised by the 
heterogeneity of prominent actors, including those from government (federal, state, and local), 
NGOs, UN bodies, labour groups, multilateral agencies, think tanks, the private health sector, 
and the medical and nursing professions. This mix of organisations appears typical of the type 
of policy network that shapes health system reform in low- and middle-income countries (Khan 
et al., 2017).  Interestingly however, the study respondents reported that the main areas of 
policy under debate depended more on the positions developed by the various organisations 
than on particular named individuals. The SNA data suggest that collective organisational 
perspectives and patterns of relationships take a broadly consistent form and that individual 
actors tend to operate within the envelope of an organisational position. 
 
Patterns of relationships within the network revolve around three key entities: a major power 
actor, gatekeepers (or brokers), and policy actors connected to the power actor. On the 
periphery of the network other actors in more isolated positions may become involved more 
intermittently under certain conditions via their contacts with well-connected actors. These 
isolated actors on the periphery of the network tended to participate in some modalities of 
engagement more than others. For instance, when the “conflict” relationship was examined, it 
appeared that many preferred to take a more neutral position in respect of the major policy 
disputes about the role of the private sector, disputes in which the main actors were the FMoH, 
hospital managers and HMO representatives.         
 
The three categories of power actor, brokers, and policy actors connected to the major power 
actor were identified on the basis of SNA centrality scores.  The principal power actor, defined 
as the organisation that had the highest degree centrality in every cohesive sub-group, was the 
FMoH.  In reality, as the qualitative analysis indicates, the FMoH may be seen as a kind of 
shorthand for the Ministry itself and the other departments of the Federal Government, which 
may sometimes exert influence via this channel. The policy brokers – the main agencies in the 
network that control the flow of ideas and information - are the NMA, WHO and NHIS. These 




broker to connect actors such as professional bodies with information providers such as the 
WHO. Other actors closely connected to the central actors and exercising some influence 
because of this are USAID and the World Bank. All these organisations have the potential to 
influence or shift decisions on given issues affecting UHC policy, but not with equal force over 
time.  The Federal Ministry has decisive control over the overall policy process, while the 
brokers are key actors with continuing influence on the content of policy, but not the same 
decisive authority.  The World Bank and USAID had more episodic issue-specific influence 
based on their close connections to the other listed organisations.  
 
The seven key organisations listed above were the key actors exercising the greatest influence 
within the policy network, but this did not apply uniformly across all six relationships of 
influence (the modalities of engagement).  As mentioned above, the “conflict” relationship was 
the most obvious exception, and this was excluded from an exercise undertaken to assess the 
degree of overlap/correspondence of centrality on each of the other five relationships (read, 
advice, discussion, coalitions, affiliation).  Mantel’s (1967) Quadratic Assignment Procedure 
(QAP) method was used to assess the extent of overlap of relationships across the five 
relationships. This showed that on both the “advice” and “read” relationships six of the seven 
key organisations had high centrality scores, with the only other organisations emerging as 
prominent in these relationships being HMOs for “advice”. Interestingly, the SMoHs scored 
low on the “advice” relationship, and less well on other relationship that most other key 
organisations, suggesting that there are not as closely involved in key decisions as might have 
been expected (see Table 11). The seven central bodies read each other’s documents and share 
advice, but interestingly influential actors might also read the work of non-influential actors 
without taking their advice. For example, Table 11 shows that two government officials (Gs46 
and Gf30) read the works of non-influential actors such as hospital managers and doctors, 
presumably without giving so much weight to their advice that they are allowed a central role 
on other influence relationships. The seven key organisations feature as prominent nodes in the 
centrality diagrams for all five relationships and are prominent in both the “advice” and “read” 
relationships. The pattern with the other three relationships shows a more diffuse set of 
influence relationships.  Perhaps most interestingly, on the “discussion” relationship SMoHs, 
hospital managers, doctors, health partners and the NMA were prominent nodes alongside the 
seven key organisations, suggesting more intense interaction on this relationship than say on 
the “advice” relationship. The “coalition” and “affiliation” relationships are more indicative of 




stakeholders.  Regarding the “coalition” relationship (Figure 31), hospital managers are shown 
to be important supporting actors, while in terms of affiliation (Figure 32) HERFON and health 
partners are important allies.   
 
SNA can also help to identify influence channels.  In particular, it shows the roles played by 
the FMoH, NMA, WHO and NHIS in creating alliances in the UHC policy debate. These are 
the main policy brokers or gatekeepers in the policy network, with the highest betweenness 
centrality scores in all six policy relationships. Most of their brokering occurs through 
facilitating contact or information flows between actors, meaning that the FMoH assists with 
exchanging information between state and non-state groups, international and national partners 
and local and state groups. The NMA, as a gatekeeper, has control over the information flow 
on UHC-related policy guidelines and frameworks received from the FMoH, SMoH, NGOs 
and UN bodies to doctors and other relevant professional networks. The World Health 
Organisation is a key gatekeeper of global resources supporting development of the healthcare 
system and acts as a channel for disseminating knowledge generated by global health policy 
discourse to domestic organisations.  Perhaps surprisingly the World Bank and USAID – the 
policy actors connected to the power actor - have lesser roles in facilitating information 
exchange.         
 
Unsurprisingly the study confirms that senior government officials are able to substantially 
shape the direction of policy, and along with WHO facilitate the transfer of information within 
the policy network. This means they are in a position both to drive policy forward and at times 
to obstruct progress towards achieving UHC. The NMA, WHO and NHIS are brokers whose 
influence permeates the UHC policy debate and supply a flow of information to network actors. 
In general, the analysis shows that the FMoH, NMA, WHO and the NHIS all act as brokers to 
feed ideas and information influencing UHC policy development but may need support from 
connected policy actors for particular initiatives to be successful.      
 
 
7.3 RQ 2: What are the patterns of influence and power relationships within the policy 
network? 
Power is relative and relational and has an impact at levels that range from macro policy making 
to locally implemented interventions. Several studies have drawn attention to power influences 




(Kentikelenis et al, 2016), to control over consultancy expertise (Lee et al., 2002), and rare 
instances such as in the Thailand case where domestic policy makers were able to push ahead 
with UHC reform despite World Bank advice that this was infeasible (See: Evans et al., 2012). 
Power is often a neglected factor in recent work that emphasises evidence-based strategies to 
guide decision-making, which focus more on issues of knowledge transfer rather than politics 
(Sriram et al., 2018).      
 
This study shows that while some organisations have enduring and continuous influence, the 
exercise of power is quite widely dispensed.  The international bodies, which are usually seen 
as powerful actors in global terms, only seem to exert real influence at certain critical times 
and usually in relation to specific issues. For example, the World Bank Group, which the 
research anticipated would be a powerful actor in the Nigerian context, was less central to the 
policy network than the WHO. The qualitative interviews suggested that the circle of policy 
“insiders” centred on governmental bodies at the national and state levels as well as the NHIS 
and NMA. Healthcare unions and frontline health workers had more episodic influence, often 
in local contexts and in relation to workforce and service delivery policies, something that has 
been reported elsewhere (Gore and Parker, 2019). 
 
To summarise the content of section 6.3, power in the UHC policy process has multiple 
relationships, and depends on actors’ ability to make authority claims based on their political 
connections, control over finances, professional authority, technical expertise or critical mass 
(“power in numbers”, usually via the formation of coalitions).  
 
The study categorised policy actors according to their location in four sectors or sets of 
institutions: government, the health sector, international bodies and labour organisations (see: 
Table 7).  The qualitative interviews added depth to an examination of how these interact and 
their relative ability to shape policy.  Those interviews support the general picture emerging 
from the SNA that government – in the shape of the FMoH and the Federal Government more 
generally – is the dominant actor determining the direction of policy, and that key organisations 
from the other sectors (WHO, HMA, NHIS, SMoHs, the World Bank and USAID) also have 
significant roles, with the HMOs, labour unions, doctors and other health professions getting 
involved from time to time.  Much of this is fairly predictable, but certain actors mobilised less 
power to steer events than might have been anticipated. The limited role of the World Bank 
has already been mentioned, and the fact that the SMoHs had relatively low centrality scores 




on many issues suggests that the private healthcare sector has not managed to steer the UHC 
reform process as much as some respondents feared. 
 
Probably few readers will be surprised that government largely controls the reform process.  
The literature tells us that health system reform requires competent governance based upon 
technical knowledge, ethical probity, political skills, and strategic vision (Frenk, 2011). 
However, the picture of reform in developing countries in past decades did not always take this 
form, and there are several case studies where structural adjustment policies and conditionality 
imposed by the IMF and World Bank overshadowed the domestic policy programmes of 
national governments. That has not been the case in Nigeria, where both successes and 
problems in the reform process are largely the responsibility of the governing politicians and 
administrators. The major step forward - the 2014 National Health Act – is among the 
Goodluck Jonathan government’s major achievements, although its enactment may have been 
more to do with an attempt to court electoral popularity than with any longstanding 
commitment to the ideal of UHC. Although the Act has not broken the logjam that stops UHC 
becoming an immediate reality, the guarantee of earmarked funding through the BHCPF and 
1% CRF are likely to make a big difference in future years. 
 
Part of the FMoH’s power comes from the coordinating role it performs in mediating 
communication between other actors and information flows. The Ministry is responsible for 
technical support to the health system, and inter-organisational relations regarding health 
policy and provision of services.  It is normally the channel via which the Federal Government 
communicates with external policy organisations, and it mediates the flow of technical 
expertise from the UN bodies and international health organisations to the SMoHs, domestic 
NGOs, private health sector groups, civil society organisations, and academic institutions.  
Against these sources of power, its main area of weakness is that it is financially dependent on 
the Federal Government’s allocation of healthcare funds, so that it is in competition with other 
government departments when it comes to gaining the resources needed to take forward 
initiatives linked to UHC.       
 
Another important finding about the role of government is that the FMoH has considerably 
more prominence in UHC deliberations than do the 34 State Ministries of Health, even though 
Nigeria has a decentralised healthcare system, in which the States have considerable discretion 




SMoHs are one of the seven key organisations, they had lower centrality scores than most 
others, and scored particularly low when it came to the “advice” relationship.  This SNA 
finding about network structure chimes with the qualitative interview data finding that the 
SMoHs were not as closely involved as they might have been in deliberations regarding health 
insurance system development.  In many cases they appeared to have been slow to implement 
feasible State health insurance schemes under the umbrella of the NHIS, and there was little 
commonality of approach at the State level.  This is one factor that may help explain the slow 
progress in increasing the number of citizens covered by public health insurance and progress 
towards achieving UHC. 
 
The three most influential institutions from the health sector as measured by their centrality 
scores in the SNA were the NHIS, HMO representatives and hospital managers. The NHIS has 
a brokerage role in mediating communications between government and health sector 
organisations, which reflects its position as a decentralised public health authority responsible 
for the oversight of the various public health insurance systems.  Its tasks of fund management 
and organising HMO and provider registration, accreditation and monitoring have become 
more complicated as new and decentralised schemes have been established and private sector 
involvement has increased. Acting on behalf of the FMoH the NHIS can provide conditional 
funding to support the development of State insurance schemes or reduce financial deficits, but 
as we have seen this is an area of weakness which may have impeded UHC development and 
may be reflected in the patterns of relations shown in the SNA.  Onoka, Hanson and Hanefeld 
(2015) argue that decentralised State public health insurance made most progress when the 
FMoH liaised directly with the States to get new programmes off the ground but ran into 
problems when the NHIS took over the leadership role.  The qualitative interview from the 
present study confirms Onoka and colleagues’ suggestion that the growing role of the HMOs 
caused discomfort at State level and reduced State support for public health insurance. This fits 
with the finding from the SNA analysis that it was HMOs and private sector hospital managers 
who scored highest on the “conflict” relationship. Admittedly SNA analysis in itself does not 
reveal the nature of that conflict, but the qualitative analysis shows frequent tension between 
the HMOs, the NMA and other actors.  
 
The effective implementation of UHC in Nigeria undoubtedly involves close cooperation 
between domestic policy actors and international institutions. External non-state policy 




expertise, and (to a lesser extent in the Nigeria case) donor finance.  Governments are willing 
to accept inward knowledge transfer because of the added legitimacy this gives to policy.   
Promoting UHC in LMICs has moved near to the top of the agendas of all the major 
international health sector bodies in recent years, and there a fair degree of consensus about the 
broad shape of national policies that should be encouraged, though also a recognition that one 
size does not fit all.  There is a well-established corpus of evidence from pathfinder countries 
like Thailand, Mexico and Ghana that has been collated by organisations such as the Joint 
Learning Network for UHC and fed to WHO, World Bank, USAID and ILO, and can be passed 
on by collaborating with countries such as Nigeria (Campos and Reich, 2019).  
Yet there are challenges as well as opportunities. These challenges include the overshadowing 
of the existing programmes in these countries, ignoring the capacity of their national health 
systems, providing poor advice based on ideology or the non-transferability of lessons from 
other countries (Bowser et al., 2014). For example, there have been mixed results from the 
research into whether externally funded vertical programmes (for example HIV treatment 
programmes) strengthen or weaken current health systems (Yu et al., 2008). Probably the 
mistakes of the past have led the major international bodies to be more cautious, and in the 
period covered by the study the WHO and World Bank in particular appear to have taken a 
restrained stance centring mainly on technical expertise necessary to develop the building 
blocks required to develop sustainable financing mechanisms, a viable health insurance system 
and the necessary health delivery infrastructure and professional workforce.   From respondents 
accounts the WHO did push very hard in an earlier period to encourage the Nigerian 
government to bring UHC onto the policy agenda, but in recent years is involved more 
episodically in relation to particular technical challenges.  ILO, which is a major player in 
supporting UHC policy development in Southeast Asia, featured less in the Nigerian health 
policy network than had been expected.  
 
The institutions making up the labour sector generally lacked sufficient power to change the 
direction of policy in isolation but could sometimes bring more influence to bear by forming 
alliances.  Medical professionals have attempted to influence UHC policy at different stages of 
the policy cycle to minimise their losses and maximise the gain from the proposed changes. 
The NMA has often taken the lead in assembling coalitions with other professional associations, 
unions or private sector bodies to push policy in its desired direction, harnessing what in 
Chapter 6 the author termed “power in numbers”.  Among other moves, the NMA has tried to 




system regulation and maintain professional autonomy. It can resist policy implementation by 
using the cultural authority of the medical profession (Campos and Reich, 2019) and also the 
threat of wider industrial action. Some critics have raised the question of whether the power 
dynamic between the federal government and the NMA has led to an unhealthy situation where 
the federal government is complicit with the NMA’s demands because it fears walkouts, strikes, 
and protests. The Association has come in for criticism for being so enthusiastic in its use of 
industrial action as a weapon to cause short-term damage to the healthcare system by halting 
patient care, but this appears to have been an effective tactic in preserving its position near the 
centre of the policy network.       
 
 
7.4 RQ3. What are the respective roles of domestic and international actors in shaping 
policy? 
Part of the answer to this question has already been provided by the brief review of the relative 
influence of the international bodies and three categories of domestic actors above and will not 
be repeated here.  As has been explained, the Federal Government has been the key actor in 
taking decisive steps forward, such as the statement at the Presidential Summit on Universal 
Health Coverage (UHC) in 2014, and the subsequent enactment of the Health Act. These 
created a window of opportunity for concrete steps to widen coverage, but, as has also been 
argued, such “windows” are time-limited and at the present time it looks as though momentum 
has again been lost.  However, if we focus in on this limited step in the path towards UHC it is 
clear that international and domestic organisations also played a part in building pressure 
through multi-sectoral advocacy, which pushed the government to make commitments to the 
benefits and feasibility.  Much lobbying was done to gain attention for the issue. Moreover, the 
government’s support for the UHC appears to have had a pragmatic, more than an ideological 
basis.  Commitments were made in the run-up to the 2014 presidential election, and the 
electoral appeal of the policy was a definite factor.  
 
Because of the complexities and intricacies of health coverage expansion on a larger scale, it 
is difficult for government going forward to implement concrete reforms without the domestic 
and international partnerships of which the policy networks are comprised. Apart from the 




public health insurance and controversy about the role of the private sector, along with difficult 
economic conditions help explain why progress towards UHC has again slowed. 
 
The typology in Table 20 shows where the various organisations sit in terms of their status and 
power to influence UHC policy development.  It distinguishes those who can be considered 
members of an insider group from an outsider group, and which domestic and international 
bodies fall into each category.     
 
The table again shows how UHC policy is primarily steered by a number of insider 
organisations comprised of the Federal Government, the Legislative Committee on Health, 
FMoH, SMoH, and NHIS.  Outsider organisations – for example the WHO, USAID, World 
Bank, NMA and HERFON – remain highly visible in the policy network, but only occasionally 
exert real influence as non-state actors, and then typically on particular issues or aspects of 
reform.     
 
The authority and legitimacy of the government to make final decisions on public policies is 
its most influential resource.  As outsiders, non-state actors (domestic and international) have 
different organisational priorities and aims as well as technical resources and have the greatest 
voice when the issues of concern lie within their domain. This means that, in terms of 
continuous involvement and steering of reform, the state actors were generally able to dominate 
the policy process. The influence of health officials over civil society members can be seen at 
all policy stages. For example, the determination to embark on a path towards UHC through a 
particular form of public health insurance came from state actors rather than bodies like WHO 
and World Bank, which were setting out a wider range of policy options. 
 
 
7.5 RQ4. Are there disagreements within the policy network over the approach to UHC 
to be pursued, or the feasibility or desirability of UHC policies? 
Some degree of disagreement is unavoidable in any health policy process and the 
implementation process of UHC in Nigeria is no exception. Disagreement and tension form 
part of the decision-making process of healthcare policies, and inevitably result in some degree 
of discomfort for those in the policy network. Often disagreement between actors will translate 




lead to a slowing of the policy process because of relationship breakdown amongst actors in 
the network (Klofstad, Sokhey and McClurg, 2019).       
We saw from Chapter 6 that almost all actors express in-principal support for UHC, even if 
they do not share the same vision of what it will entail. Nigeria’s poor performance on a number 
of indicators of morbidity and preventable early deaths lead many to think that UHC reform 
offered the best route to health improvement (Onwujekwe el al., 2019).  The inclusion of UHC 
among the targets spelled out in Sustainable Development Goals was a further factor 
encouraging many stakeholders to get behind the policy.  The SDG target of achieving UHC 
in Nigeria by 2030 is very challenging (WHO, 2019), and politicians of all the main parties 
recognise that failure to meet the target will have a political cost.       
Cost has long been seen as one of the biggest obstacles to implementing UHC, and as discussed 
above, the passing of the 2014 National Health Act that enshrined increase health expenditure 
in law through the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF) and the 1% Consolidated 
Revenue Fund received broad support from a range of stakeholders.  Yet the translation of this 
new legal structure into improved health infrastructure, medicines availability and workforce 
improvement, alongside better public health insurance that covers more people is complicated 
and generates many disputes about means to the desired end of UHC.  The financing 
arrangement was one of the big issues that gave rise to disagreements among participants.   
Against those respondents who believed that the injection of additional finance would enable 
politicians to translate policy rhetoric into policy reality (Aregbashola, 2018), others contended 
that affordability and financial sustainability remained huge issues. The present level of public 
expenditure on health, which is much less than the 15% of government expenditures allocated 
to health deemed necessary in the Abuja Declaration.  Exercises conducted by WHO (2011) 
and USAID (2013) before the present study began suggested that Nigeria was one of a number 
of Sub-Saharan countries that would meet the target only with great difficulty.     
 
Doubts about affordability led to differences of view about just what UHC would entail in 
terms of who would be covered and for what range of services. As we saw in Chapter 2, UHC 
is often represented using a cube with three relationships of coverage (population covered, 
services provided and extent of financial coverage), with of which might be varied in different 
reform designs (Cotlear and Rosemberg, 2018) (see Figure 2). For some respondents this 
suggested the necessity of trade-offs, on the basis that a LMIC could not provide everything 
for everyone, free of charge (compare: Ochalek et al., 2020). Many concluded that even if the 




implementation was more feasible than a single “big-bang” reform. A step-by-step approach is 
dependent upon efforts to gain political support from (and sometimes confront) specific interest 
groups, and also relies on developing institutional and technical capacities in the move towards 
implementing UHC.   This meant that much of the conflict within the policy network involved 
disagreement about specific incremental reforms that in themselves were just small steps 
towards the end goal.    
 
As shown by the SNA and confirmed by the qualitative interviews the main conflicts in the 
study period involved the respective roles of the public and private sectors in healthcare 
delivery and the development of public health insurance schemes. Those who saw the path to 
UHC coming through an expanded public sector generally opposed lobbying for a mixed 
system. On the other side of the argument were those who argued that private sector 
involvement in well-regulated health insurance would hasten the progress of UHC by 
increasing the number of beneficiaries and the size of the risk pool, which is crucial for the 
financial viability of a national health insurance scheme.  Often the positions taken reflected 
organisational positions and interests, with HMOs, other private providers and a section of the 
medical profession lining up in favour of a mixed system, and many officials, NGOs and public 
sector doctors favouring a predominantly publicly funded and managed system.     
 
Although actors who aligned directly with the private sector were a minority in the UHC policy 
network, and in many cases appeared disconnected from the core power actors, support for a 
large role for the private sector clearly extended into the upper reaches of government.  
President Buhari has expressed the view that public-private partnerships are critical in 
generating the necessary finance to extend coverage (Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 
Commission, 2020).  Moreover, the large size of the Nigerian private sector in relation to the 
public sector meant that it would not be ignored.  It can be argued that the ongoing conflict and 
tension between supporters of a mainly public route to UHC and those who favoured private 
sector involvement did not reach any early resolution because these were very powerful and 
well-matched groups.  There was effectively a situation of “countervailing power” (Galbraith, 
1952) where neither group was able to establish dominance and direct the UHC reforms 
decisively in their preferred direction. But in contrast to the positive policy dynamic that 
Galbraith had believed emerged in the USA from the twin centres of power of business versus 
trade unions and consumer organisations, the conflict in Nigeria appears to have led to policy 




American health care, where the medical profession's domination of the medical market was 
significantly reduced through federal legislation, and cost controls imposed by insurance 
companies and the federal government programmes. In the US case, this ongoing conflict 
without a clear winner has led to continuing system tensions and the frustration of reform 
initiatives (of which the curtailment of Obama’s Affordable Care Act reforms is the latest 
example). It seems that in Nigeria as well an intractable conflict between powerful interest 
blocs poses a major obstacle to early movement towards UHC. 
 
 
7.6 RQ5. What are the main gains and setbacks to date, as seen by policy actors? 
Before turning to discuss what the respondents themselves considered to be the main positives 
and negatives to date, it is worth summarising the findings from a systematic assessment of 
progress towards UHC in eleven countries undertaken by the Government of Japan and the 
World Bank (Maeda et al., 2014; Reich et al., 2016). This exercise assembled data on countries 
that had committed to UHC as a key national aspiration and categorised them into four groups 
based on stage of progress. Countries in group 1 have set achieving UHC as a national policy 
agenda but so far made little progress; countries in group 2 have made significant progress 
towards UHC yet still face substantial coverage gaps; countries in group 3 have recently 
achieved many UHC policy goals but now need to deepen and sustain coverage; and countries 
in group 4 have mature UHC health systems but must still adjust their national policies to meet 
changing circumstances (Reich et al., 2016).  It seems clear from the criteria used in this study 
that Nigeria falls into group 1, as a country in the early stages of UHC with very low population 
coverage. The country’s status with regard to UHC policies and programmes is that it still 
focuses on setting agendas for developing new systems and piloting new programmes. 
Implementing UHC in Nigeria has been a lengthy, and sometimes low-priority and conflict-
ridden process that has been affected by unexpected contingencies.           
 
In the eyes of most respondents that major steps so far have been: (1) the establishment of 
NHIS and decision to make health insurance the primary mechanism for achieving UHC; (2) 
the 2014 National Health Act; and (3) the earmarked budgets created by the Act.  
 
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the scope the NHIS has widened with the Formal Sector 
Social Health Insurance Programme, now operating alongside other programmes such as one 




et al., 2018).   Respondents who support the NHIS in its present form see it as offering a staged 
progression towards increased coverage over time. However, opponents criticize it for not 
achieving expected milestones. Coverage in Nigeria remains low, with less than 5% of the 
population having health insurance) and over 65% of healthcare funded from households’ out-
of-pocket payments (Aregbeshola, 2018).  In spite of this criticism, many in the policy network 
still think that the NHIS is the most promising route to UHC, providing that it is appropriately 
managed. As noted earlier the role of the private sector and the relations between the NHIS and 
state insurance schemes remain areas of contention. 
UHC policy optimists remain positive about the National Health Act, seeing it as a viable 
framework for fast-tracking progress towards UHC, and praising the financial provisions in 
particular. The Act strengthens the NHIS’s position as 50% of the Basic Health Care Provision 
Fund (BHCPF) is to be managed by the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) to provide 
basic health insurance for vulnerable populations.          
The above developments show that there has been substantial government support for UHC, 
even if this has ebbed and flowed over time, but the more critical respondents believe that 
further implementation delays are likely. Among the factors highlighted by participants that 
block or set back further progress are the uncertain political climate, system capacity, problems 
in coordinating action at federal and state levels, poor financial management, and problems 
associated with HMO participation in health insurance. 
 
Among the more critical respondents there was a large strand of the scepticism regarding the 
“political will” of the government to push forward UHC policy at a time of economic constraint. 
While it was noted that the Buhari administration appeared as keen on UHC in its election 
campaign as the previous government, some respondents maintained that their pledges were 
just lip service. Given the centrality of government in the policy network, the absence of 
political will, would mean that real progress towards UHC in the short term is unlikely.    
 
The critics also expressed concerns about system capacity, claiming that, even since the 
financing changes introduced in the wake of the 2014 Health Act, policymakers have failed to 
use the full capacity of the healthcare system. They are concerned with what they see as the 
constant failure to introduce new measures to improve services, leading to policy stasis.  They 
claim that policy development is bedevilled with circular arguments and constant attempts to 
amend plans. Generally, respondents divide into the two groups of those who suggest that UHC 




who argue that unresolved problems are blocking further progress. The main problems, as seen 
by these informants, are disagreement about the specifics of funding mechanisms, failure to 
increase healthcare system capacity sufficiently to permit new program rollouts, and poor 
coordination of Federal and State Ministry of Health insurance programmes.     
 
This latter issue of poor coordination between federal and state levels appears to be one of the 
main factors impeding progress on UHC.  Even with the new budgets created by the 2014 Act, 
the Nigerian healthcare system remain under-funded, and central government allocations to the 
states are frequently late, causing delays in changes at the state level. In most years the FMoH 
distributes the bulk of the central health budget to key parastatals, leaving insufficient funding 
for the SHISs in particular. Respondents suggested that more funds are needed and that even 
the improved coordination of service development planning between state and federal 
government levels is needed if extra funding is going to have the maximum effect.  As 
mentioned previously, the SNA findings on relationship patterns within the policy network 
suggest that contacts of this kind are relatively infrequent and weak.     
 
According to respondents, mismanagement of limited financial resources at federal and state 
levels frequently involves corruption. This undermines resource planning and allocation by the 
FMoH and is harmful to UHC preparations. Informants stated that systemic corruption affects 
several health services programmes and drives patients away from public facilities towards 
using private healthcare. A study within the same research group as the present study at 
Swansea University found that “dual practice” doctors in Nigerian public hospitals frequently 
push patients towards their private facilities (Eze, 2019).  Our findings indicate a widespread 
perception that corruption acts as a barrier to healthcare access, which negatively affects 
progress towards UHC. Measuring and tracking corruption in the healthcare sector is important 
to guarantee that there is progress towards achieving UHC (Hsiao et al., 2019).      
 
For some respondents the important role that HMOs have in the health insurance schemes is 
another major impediment to progress.  This is partly about probity, but perhaps more centrally 
about the perverse incentives that prevent these private organisations from expanding coverage 
to the whole population.  Respondents claimed that there is a corruption aspect whereby 
government funds channelled to HMOs fail to be translated into services for the intended. But 
more crucially many respondents point to the HMOs failure to boost the number of Nigerian 




status quo, leading to complacency and a lack of incentive to extend services or coverage 
further.  This means that the overall management and operation of Nigerian public health 
insurance is flawed, and that major problems are building (Falade, 2020).      
 
 
7.7 RQ6. How far along the path towards UHC do policy actors believe Nigeria has 
travelled, and what is their assessment of the prospects of achieving adequate coverage? 
Respondents divided into optimists and pessimists. There is optimism amongst many network 
members about the timescale for achieving UHC in Nigeria, yet others are doubtful that the 
2030 SDG target can be achieved. The former state that the progression of UHC 
implementation may have slowed because of problems like limited finance, capacity, and lack 
of political commitment, whilst the latter believe that little real progress has being made in 
addressing these issues. In the 2010-15 health financing plan for Asia Pacific region, WHO 
(2009: VI) identified four indicators of progress towards UHC: total health expenditure of 4% 
to 5% of GDP; reducing out-of-pocket spending levels below 30%-40% of total health 
expenditure; ensuring that over 90% of the population is covered through risk-pooling 
prepayment schemes; and achieving close to 100% coverage of poor and vulnerable persons 
with safety net schemes. As the time of the study, Nigeria was close to the GDP requirement 
(spending 3.9% of GDP on health), but well short on the other indicators of progress.  Out-of-
pocket spending was 72% of total health expenditure; prepayment and risk pooling schemes 
covered less than 10% of the population, and less than 39% of poor and vulnerable persons had 
coverage (WHO, 2019).  The known disparities between benchmarks for UHC progress and 
Nigeria’s actual performance gave the more pessimistic stakeholders plenty of ammunition to 
support their assessment that Nigeria was unlikely to achieve UHC in the foreseeable future.    
 
Although many interviewees remained optimistic about continuing progress, these respondents 
differed in their views about what was required to achieve UHC, and how barriers could be 
overcome. Many see access to healthcare as a human right which must be pursued 
notwithstanding current obstacles. A sizeable group believe the best route to expanding the 
coverage of public health insurance is for government to make it mandatory for all and put 
more pressure on the states to roll this out in a reasonable time scale.  Others talked of the need 
to achieve the SDG targets on UHC and argued that stronger management was needed to take 




several respondents say that financial management in particular must be strengthened.  None 
of the respondents interviewed believed that an immediate “big bang” reform that would 
introduce UHC in a single step was feasible: those who believe that UHC will come envisage 
that this will be through incremental change in a series of progressive steps. 
 
 
7.8 RQ7. What general lessons can Nigeria provide regarding the policy process 
associated with UHC reform? 
Nigeria is a country that in terms of national wealth and income appears to have high potential 
to achieve UHC, but for various reasons has made only limited incremental gains. It has 
adopted the general strategies recommended by major international bodies such as WHO, while 
also trying to fashion a path suited to Nigerian conditions.  The lessons that it may provide 
come in several areas. 
 
The first area of interest concerns social health insurance as a route to UHC. Although the 
healthcare systems of some UHC countries include a large component of public tax-financed 
and directly provided services, and others give a bigger space to the private sector both 
regarding providers and voluntary private medical insurance, most also make some use of 
social health insurance.  However, the evidence base remains thin concerning how public health 
insurance can best be developed, the choice between tax and contributions funding, whether a 
single national scheme or multiple and possibly decentralised schemes are preferably, and 
whether the private sector can have a major role in a publicly managed scheme. 
 
It is difficult to reach any conclusion other than that Nigerian public health insurance has 
performed poorly.  Coverage remains disappointingly low, and the way forward for the 
insurance system remains one of the main areas of controversy among policy actors.  Where a 
country such as Turkey consolidated multiple pre-existing social health insurance schemes into 
a single public insurance scheme (Atun, 2015) and Thailand left in place existing schemes for 
civil servants and workers in formal employment alongside its universal coverage scheme 
(Evans et al., 2012), Nigeria has built on its original scheme for public-sector employees (the 
original NHIS) in a more piecemeal way.  The introduction of supplementary schemes for 
particular population groups under the NHIS umbrella introduced additional complexity, and 
complexity has been accentuated by decentralisation and the attempt to develop SHIS.  When 




becomes very complicated, and system fragmentation, problematic relations between federal 
centre and state periphery, and fierce disagreements about the role of HMOs, all appear to have 
slowed progress towards UHC.  Therefore, one lesson from the Nigerian experience is that a 
simpler, more integrated public health insurance system design is likely to bring better results.  
A second area where lessons can be learned concerns the importance of adequate and 
sustainable finance for UHC reform, and how different approaches to finance meet with 
success or failure.  Generally speaking, public funding is needed in LMICs to subsidise health 
costs for poor and chronically sick populations and improve equity of access. Critically, the 
expansion of health coverage from the formal sector into the informal sector, where much of 
the population does not have regular, salaried employment, makes it difficult to collect 
revenues from direct taxes or health insurance contributions. Funding must instead come from 
government revenues mainly sourced from indirect taxes (e.g., value added taxes), which then 
need to be levied selectively to reduce their regressive impact on the poor.  In a period of falling 
government income from oil and gas exports, the inability of government to get poorer service 
users to share costs puts a huge burden on public finances, which again is a major factor in 
Nigeria’s slow progress towards UHC. 
 
Progress so far has centred mainly on giving greater priority to health financing in national 
budget allocations, mainly by ring-fencing funding through the Basic Health Care Provision 
Fund (BHCPF) and the earmarking of 1% of the Consolidated Revenue of the Federation for 
health. These funds represent only a small incremental increase in the overall health budget.  
Arguably the main intention is to try to get Nigeria over a crucial early threshold for widening 
coverage by developing primary care infrastructure in geographically remote areas and 
extending coverage to rural populations who presently get little or no access to modern 
healthcare.  The limited progress made so far again suggests that steps taken to date may have 
been insufficient. 
 
Perhaps because Nigerian policy makers are still trying to put basic building blocks of UHC in 
place, less attention has been paid to the issue of gaining maximum health improvement from 
the budget that is available, and how financing mechanisms can be designed to properly 
incentivize providers and patients to use the system wisely. Much of the debate in countries 
whose UHC schemes cover the bulk of their populations, is concerned with matters such as 
primary care gatekeeping, and closed-end funding mechanisms such as weighted diagnosis-




intended to ensure that the system can deliver UHC as reasonable cost.  Probably these topics 
will feature more in debates about financing as a greater proportion of the Nigerian population 
is brought under the umbrella of public health insurance.  The relatively intensive involvement 
of the private sector in Nigeria compared with most UHC pathfinder countries may mean that 
financing mechanisms designed to control costs are resisted, and that is likely to be part of the 
future UHC story.  The present study suggest that attention should be paid to efficient use of 
budgets as well as re-allocation of budgets between sectors. Ensuring probity in a state sector 
notorious for its levels of corruption is part of this, but the overhaul of healthcare financing 
arrangements that several high-level respondents advocated would also make a difference. 
 
The trajectory of UHC reform in Nigeria suggests additional lessons concerning the appropriate 
roles of the public and private sectors in UHC reform.  The government has determined that 
the best way to expand coverage quickly is through public-private partnership between the 
NHIS and the HMOs.  The rationale for this is that while the NHIS has an official mandate to 
oversee the health insurance system, it makes sense to harness the expertise of the HMOs in 
enrolling members and arranging healthcare provision.  As has been documented earlier in the 
thesis, critics of this arrangement point to a number of issues such as corruption, tension 
between HMOs and unions or professional associations, the non-remittance of private 
payments to health providers, poor customer service, and inaccessibility to enrolees at critical 
moments of need, all of which indicate that PPPs are not working as well as intended.      
 
The author’s view, as expressed above, is that PPPs add complexity to an already fragmented 
health insurance system, and that a comprehensive review and reappraisal of the framework 
for delivering public health insurance in Nigeria is needed.  If it is determined that HMOs 
should continue to have a prominent place in a reformed system, then the role of government 
as regulator needs to be strengthened.  There is a strong case for a public agency that sets 
standards concerning probity, fair competition, affordability, service quality, and is responsible 
for monitoring performance against these standards.  That is to say that PPPs do not imply “less 
government”, but rather a different and more active governmental role (Jamali, 2004; Scharle, 
2002).  It is not clear that the NHIS, as the existing system manager, is in a position to also act 
as regulator.  Instead, government should consider creating a semi-autonomous, arm’s-length 
agency to undertake this role.  This could be based on the model found in the English NHS 
with the arm’s-length bodies Monitor and Care Quality Commission, though in the Nigerian 




7.9 What the research adds to the wider literature 
Although there are an increasing number of published studies of LMICs that aspire to achieve 
UHC, the majority of these focus on pathfinder countries that have made substantial progress 
(the Stage 2 or 3 countries in Reich and colleagues’ (2016) paper), rather than countries that 
aim for UHC but have progressed less quickly (Stage 1 countries).  Yet arguably, it is this latter 
group that can provide the most valuable lessons on barriers, obstacles and possible solutions 
as more LMICs and LICs seek to take the UHC path.  Nigeria falls clearly in the Stage 1 country 
category. The author is unaware of any past research examining the Nigerian UHC policy 
process in the detail presented here, or using the combination of methods utilised, and so this 
study makes a unique contribution in that regard.  The study uses primary data to dig deeper 
into the policy process than is common in studies that use secondary sources, discussing the 
key policy organisations, the nature of the Nigerian UHC policy network, patterns of 
interaction between players, and the exercise of power among policy actors. 
 
While questions about the role of the private sector in Nigeria’s national health financing 
system have been touched upon in the existing literature, no previous research has examined 
this topic using a combination of policy process theory and both qualitative interview and SNA 
data. Onoka, Hanson, and Hanefeld’s (2015) research covers some of the same ground but 
relies on a more restricted data set of 35 in-depth interviews, admittedly with a similar range 
of institutions. The present study interviewed a larger set of policy stakeholders, who describe 
controversies over the involvement of HMOs and private providers in which many of them 
have been involved first-hand.  Both the present study and the one by Onoka and colleagues 
are closer to the key actors than are papers based on media accounts and secondary data. 
 
Although the present study is not unique in seeking to combine the policy process approach 
with more formal SNA, applying this approach in the health policy field remains unusual, and 
means that the author often needed to work out how to combine these methods with little in the 
way of guidance from previous studies.  In outline the SNA provided a snapshot of patterns of 
relations with the policy network at a particular time, and allowed formal measurement of 
relative influence, alignments and conflict in the network using standard SNA concept such as 
centrality and clustering. The qualitative interviews provided a window on the subjective 
perspectives, policy aims and strategies of these same actors, and allowed the researcher to 
reconstruct a picture of the development of policy over time so as to tell the story of how UHC 




connections between this research and other research findings that cumulatively begin to flesh 
out the story of the development of Nigerian UHC policy and its link to the 2030 SDGs agenda.  
 
Chapter 5 on the policy network and its structure provides original quantitative data on network 
characteristics that would have been very difficult to infer from a conventional observational 
or interview study. The chapter presents a four-stage policy network taxonomy that identifies 
the roles played by three categories of key actors - power actors, brokers, and policy actors 
connected to the power actors – as well as peripheral or isolated actors. The visualisations of 
network structure constitute unique data that are a valuable part of a mixed methods study.  
SNA has been deployed in other health policy and healthcare delivery studies (Blanchet and 
James, 2012; Chambers et al., 2012; Hindhede and Aagaard-Hansen, 2017), but rarely in 
combination with a more conventional policy approach. The present study provides another 
case to add to the small group of policy process studies also incorporating an SNA component 
that have emerged from the LSHTM group in recent years (e.g., Shearer, et al., 2014; 2016; 
Quissell et al., 2018). 
 
Chapter 6 follows a fairly conventional policy process approach, and the main intention is to 
add an additional and useful country case study to the stock of policy process studies, rather 
than offering any great theoretical advance.  The present study borrows elements of Kingdon’s 
MSF, as well as ideas from Sabatier and Weible’s “advocacy coalition” framework but prefers 
not to incorporate the “3-Is” framework of interests, ideas and institutions (based on John, 1998) 
that has influenced some recent LSHTM policy process studies. This is because the Nigerian 
case involves an incomplete implementation process, thus raising the question of why a 
window of opportunity has not been taken and suggesting that MSF can aid understanding.  
The present study draws on the main elements of the MSF, such as the three streams, windows 
of opportunity and policy entrepreneurs, to try to make sense of the policy process in a 
developing country but does not seek to contribute to the sophisticated theoretical debates about 
the development of MSF that can be found in recent literature (e.g., Vos et al., 2014; Jones et 
al. 2016).  The story here is one of a window of opportunity that was opened due to a perceived 
problem of poor health indicators and the efforts of determined policy entrepreneurs, but led 
only to incremental progress and now appears to be closing.  In so far as the Nigerian case 
study provides theoretical insights, these are that windows of opportunity are important at the 




about how long windows stay open and why they close, and that pushing through a major UHC 
reform may require a series of windows over time before it can be achieved.  
 
Windows of opportunity close for various reasons ranging from subversion by interest groups 
that oppose reform, poor cooperation or coordination between those charged with 
implementing change, and general loss of momentum due to factors such as economic 
constraint.  Studies of just why a planned policy reform is not carried through to full 
implementation are still thin on the ground, especially in cases where there is no clear policy 
U-turn but developments that progress the reform have diminished to a trickle.  The present 
study gives an outline of the many factors that have close down the window of opportunity 
provided by that 2014 Health Act in Nigeria.  The main components of the policy story seem 
much less than ideal:  UHC comes to the top of the Government’s policy agenda because of a 
global drive towards UHC, the SDG targets and a perception that poor health indicators 
revealed fundamental problems in the Nigerian healthcare system; an existing public sector 
insurance scheme is chosen as the primary vehicle for achieving UHC; instead of developing 
a comprehensive strategy to revamp public health insurance, the government opts for piecemeal 
extensions and later for decentralisation to state level; the major role handed to the HMOs only 
accentuates fragmentation and conflict in the system, and all this takes place in a period of 
domestic political instability (with  an armed Islamist movement creating disturbance in the 
north) and worsening economic conditions. Additional uncertainty was introduced because of 
a change of government at just the time when the 2014 Act were expected to begin to bring 
about changes that would widen coverage. Policy optimists continue to believe that UHC will 
come in Nigeria, but momentum has gone. 
 
And yet it would be too simple to portray the Nigerian experience as a straightforward case of 
policy failure, because it is not yet clear that the UHC policy is dead.  In the second decade of 
the 21st century the inability of a national government to deliver on UHC policy is not enough 
in itself to consign the policy to failure, because the external push for UHC is so strong.  The 
SDGs remain in place, and there are a powerful coalition of international organisations led by 
the WHO and World Bank that continue to support the policy.  Significantly the drive for UHC 
cannot be presented as an attempt by the rich countries of the Global North to push the poorer 
countries of the Global south into adopting an unaffordable policy that they are unlikely ever 
to achieve, because some of the strongest UHC advocates are themselves from the South.  




such as the Joint Learning Network for UHC now takes the form of South-South knowledge 
transfer.  Nigerian stakeholders who remain optimistic about achieving UHC may thus have 
good grounds for thinking that new windows of opportunity will appear before too long, and 
that achieving UHC through a series of incremental steps remains a realistic goal.  Therefore, 
it can be argued that, while the present case study finished before the Nigerian UHC policy 
story has come to an end, it provides an account of an ongoing policy trajectory that, in 
combination with future research, will aid understanding of the long-term unfolding of a major 
health reform process. 
 
The argument has been made that the main contribution of the thesis to the literature is to add 
another useful case UHC study, in this case not one that reports a reform success story but 
rather a struggle to maintain momentum for a policy that risks being derailed.  The other 
atypical and perhaps valuable feature of the study is that, even when compared with other 
policy process studies, it has a strong empirical basis in a large corpus of qualitative interviews 
conducted in the field.  While several recent volumes or initiatives on UHC include collections 
of country case studies, these generally take the form of compilations of national statistics that 
demonstrate the gains in coverage, reduction in out-of-pocket payments and catastrophic health 
expenditure, and health indices (e.g., World Bank, 2018; Balabanova, McKee and Mills, 2011). 
In the view of the author the literature will be strengthened if, in addition to these “overview” 
country profiles, researchers undertake more field-based case studies that engage directly with 
front-line actors and shine a light inside the policy process by collecting first-hand accounts. 
The present study sets out to make a modest contribution in that area, with the additional 
novelty of combining qualitative inquiry with a more formal SNA study component. 
 
 
7.10 Limitations of the study 
Some of the study’s limitations were touched on previously, particularly in the methods chapter 
when the data collected from the face-to-face semi-structured interviews and structured SNA 
interviews were discussed.  The combination of SNA and qualitative interviews represents a 
relatively new approach and one where there is no consensus about a robust method for 
combining the two kinds of data. At present each researcher undertaking a mixed-method study 
of this kind must seek their own way forward, and as a neophyte researcher the author concedes 




Possibly, with the benefit of hindsight more sustained consideration could be given to exactly 
which SNA measurements can be best aligned with the qualitative data, and whether qualitative 
questions could be more precisely framed to mesh with emerging SNA findings.  In the present 
study analysis of SNA data was done towards the end of the study period at almost the same 
time as analysis of qualitative data, so SNA findings were not available when the quantitative 
interviews were conducted.  This was mainly because of the logistics of a Ph.D. study in which 
only a short period could be spent on fieldwork in Nigeria before return to the UK for analysis 
and writing up. 
 
Other possible limitations of the study relate to the study sample and issues of 
representativeness, the robustness of the policy network boundary, and the political and societal 
context in which the study was conducted.    Sampling and the selection of participants who 
are deemed to be part of the network (identifying the network boundary) are related issues.  As 
all the participants included in the phase 1 SNA study also completed phase 2 qualitative 
interviews, the network became the sample for those interviews. 
 
One limitation of the study may be that the sample size is small. Given that Nigeria is a country 
of about 196 million people, with an extensive bureaucracy under the Federal Ministry of 
Health at the state and facility levels, as well as a large private sector, it would certainly have 
been possible to map out a larger network including inter alia more state and HMO actors.  
Against this, the number of participants interviewed was at the upper end of what was feasible 
for a lone researcher in a Ph.D. study.   
 
The use of snowball sampling brought the sample size higher, and also generated a good spread 
of nominations, leading to a diverse set of respondents.   Gaps may still exist.  For example, 
only one “allied professional” was identified as having involvement in the network. This could 
be because allied professionals are not (or at least are not recognised as being) engaged in UHC 
policy development, or because the study sampling strategy missed them. Another possible 
area of imbalance in sample selection is gender.  There were roughly four times as many male 
as female participants (81% versus 19%). The researcher had anticipated that there might be a 
preponderance of males in elite policy roles in Nigeria and tried to guard against ignoring 
influential female actors by inviting the inclusion in the study of nurses and other professions 
in which women are well represented. However, nominations put forward at the snowballing 
stage did not include many females, and the author suspects that the sample gender mix merely 





Lack of agreement on a clear methodology for identifying the boundary of the network (and 
which actors to include) is seen by many critics as a general problem in SNA studies.  It must 
be conceded that the present study opted for a pragmatic rather than definitive solution to this 
problem by using the snowballing technique to get known policy actors to name other 
participants in their policy network (see Lewis 2009). The possibility remains that snowball 
sampling might miss some targets and introduce selection bias. To reduce the chances of this 
happening interaction between the putative network members was examined carefully at the 
analysis stage, utilising, using six separate relationships to map influence relationships between 
actors and to confirm where the network boundary lay (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). As 
readers will recall, the six relationships of interpersonal contact and influence measured in the 
structured interviews were: reading another network actor’s written products, discussing UHC 
policy with that actor, entering a coalition with them, being formally affiliated with them, 
taking their advice, or being in conflict with them. These are referred to in Chapter 5 as the 
network relationships or the modalities of engagement. There may be some overlap in the 
relationships, and it is necessary to look across the overall pattern of linkages to determine 
whether an individual is a core or peripheral member of a network.  In other words, it is the 
overall combination of relational relationships which determines the network position (Bellotti, 
2015).   
 
Some readers may object that the patterns of influence that emerge from the SNA component 
of the study are based on actors’ perceptions rather than some more concrete measurement of 
impact on policy outcomes, and the author accepts that reliance on subjective assessments of 
participants’ roles within the network is a limitation. Such assessments in the structured 
interviews may indeed have over- or under-estimated the influence of certain actors and 
affected the measurements of such things as network density, centrality and the strength of 
connections between nodes.  However, there is strong corroboration from multiple informants 
of the central role of certain key actors, including the Federal Ministry for Health, NMA and 
WHO, which consistently scored highly for influence on multiple relationships.  Interestingly, 
several of the nominees from snowballing who declined to participate came from these key 
organisations, so that adding responses these missing respondents would probably have 
increased rather than decreased the high centrality scores recorded for the organisations.   The 
respondents selected undoubtedly included actors from relevant national and international 




way many participants were clearly key policy makers, actors whose participation is likely to 
increase the real-world impact of studies of this kind (see: Onoka, Hanson, and Hanefeld, 2015).  
 
The issue of representativeness can be considered at both the in-country and between-country 
levels.  While the author believes he has engaged with a reasonably wide and representative 
set of actors from national organisations, it must be conceded that most respondents come from 
Nigeria’s Capital Territory and largest cities, rather than being distributed across the 36 states, 
which all have their own health ministries and differ in their local policies on matters such as 
the specifics of public health insurance schemes. Yet as UHC policy is driven largely from the 
centre it can be argued that this national – rather than regional focus – provides an accurate 
picture of the policy process at the level that counts.  The research may be regarded as a case 
study that sheds light on the operation of a particular policy network at a particular time, so 
that findings may or may not be generalisable to other potential social networks that emerge as 
the UHC policy story continues, but these would need to be investigated via additional case 
studies. Analysis of sub-networks at state level or within the medical profession or private 
sector might expand and extend the insights that the present research provides, and again could 
be subjects for others to research in future. 
 
Turning to international representativeness, we may observe that Nigeria is an interesting case 
example, whose experience is relevant to some but not all of the many other countries now 
embarking on UHC reform.  Nigeria was not among the pathfinder nations in the wave of UHC 
reform in LMICs after the millennium – it lags behind say Thailand, Mexico, Turkey, or Brazil, 
which are all near to consolidating UHC.  However, pitfalls and obstacles encountered along 
the slow and uneven path towards UHC in Nigeria may provide lessons for several other 
countries that are only inching slowly towards that goal.   In terms of its representativeness of 
this group of countries, only some characteristics are shared but there will be certain common 
obstacles and barriers, and insofar as Nigeria has made progress in overcoming these, the 
solutions offered will be helpful to others.   
 
One factor that may determine whether there are lessons for other countries is the extent to 
which the political, economic and organisational context of reform in Nigeria was so atypical 
that it followed its own distinctive path.  Several writers have argued that context – the differing 
combinations of situational, structural, cultural and environmental factors that apply in a 
particular case – may limit generalisability (Leichter, 1979; Collins, et al., 1999; Buse et al., 




since independence, the oscillation between military and civilian governments, the 
programmes adopted by its political leaders and parties, the economic impact of falling world 
oil prices, and the chosen route of achieving UHC by public insurance with significant private 
sector involvement. Reforms are affected by societal values and governance arrangements and 
at times the Nigerian policy story may have affected by issues of probity and maladministration.  
With the above issues in mind, the lessons that emerge need to be considered critically, and 
may not apply to all contexts, but they should provide a valuable point of comparison for case 











This chapter summarises the study’s primary concerns and main conclusions. This research has 
examined the UHC policy process in Nigeria and collected empirical data to add to the subject 
knowledge, which is currently gaining awareness, but which is not yet well-documented in 
Nigeria. To achieve the objectives of the research two frameworks were developed to analyse 
the move towards UHC: Walt and Gilson’s (1994) policy process model and social network 
analysis (SNA), especially as developed by Lazega (1997). This final chapter summarises the 
conclusions emerging from the study, makes recommendations for further policy development, 
points to areas for future research, and provides a postscript to update readers on events since 
fieldwork was completed.     
 
 
8.1 What the study found 
This study examined the challenges and obstacles which have affected progress towards UHC 
in Nigeria. It used a combination of qualitative interviews and SNA to investigate how 
Nigeria’s UHC policy was initiated, developed, and implemented in the health system, and to 
identify the key policy actors, their roles and their social interactions within the policy network.  
The policy story encompasses the reasons for the appearance of UHC on the government’s 
health agenda, the decision to use national health insurance as the primary mechanism for 
achieving UHC, the intertwining of the UHC and SDG policies, and progress under the 
Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari administrations. The main conclusions of the 
study fall under a number of headings.  
 
Firstly, the study used SNA and qualitative interviews to investigate the roles and interactions 
of policy actors, and how they impeded or advanced progress in extending healthcare coverage.    
The policy actors were found to be a diverse group where varying interests that translated into 
certain recurrent lines of division, particularly with regard to the respective roles of the public 




The power that the contending groups are able to mobilise, together with the mediating role of 
the Federal Government, have a crucial bearing on outcomes.  Arguably the failure of either 
the supporters of public provision or their private sector counterparts to exert dominant 
influence is one of the factors that account for the slow progress towards UHC to date.  In a 
situation of countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952), where two sets of political actors must 
accept the influence of the other side, an uneasy compromise has emerged where UHC is 
pursued through the mechanism of a social insurance system in which the HMOs have a central 
role. 
 
Five different forms of power were discussed in order to understand how key policy actors 
mobilise influence: professional, political, financial, power through technical expertise, and 
power in numbers. Each provides a basis for bring power to bear within the policy process, and 
this sheds light on how different actor attributes and ways of applying influence within the 
policy network can impede or facilitate progress towards UHC.  
 
The SNA analysis suggested that the interactions in which power was deployed were crucially 
affected by position in the network, and especially by actors’ status as power actors (defined 
in terms of multiple connections to others), gatekeepers/brokers, and actors who have close 
connections to the power actors. These relationship patterns created opportunities for influence, 
yet they may also have restricted the actionable scope of policy actors because of obligations 
to, or conflict with others in, the network (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994).          
 
Another conclusion reached from the interviews is that there are markedly different 
assessments about the prospects for the ultimate success of the UHC policy, so that respondents 
broadly divided into the two categories of optimists and pessimists. 
 
Optimists were encouraged by the commitment of the government, the MoH and other 
stakeholders to the expansion of health coverage and suggested that implementing UHC can 
be better achieved through continuing incremental progress or a ‘phased approach’. They 
believed that this approach fitted into the Nigerian health system model of gradual 
improvement through targeting.  This is because the policy aims to improve health and prevent 
financial impoverishment for the most impoverished and vulnerable using the limited resources 
allocated to the health sector. Their preferred strategy is to make steady progress towards UHC 
through a series of incremental steps designed to expand health coverage for the majority of 




    
Pessimists in the policy network have loftier ambitions and think progress is too slow to have 
a transformative effect on the healthcare system. Irrespective of how committed the 
government is to achieve UHC in Nigeria, they think momentum is slowing to the point where 
on-the-ground changes do little to improve services for poorer people. They point out that many 
Nigerians have difficulty in accessing essential health services, and they little faith that health-
related SDGs will be achieved by 2030. Pessimists argue that progress towards UHC depends 
on the ability of policymakers to overcome five significant challenges which emerged from the 
interviews: the changing political climate, concerns about finance and system capacity, poor 
coordination between federal and state levels, problems with the private sector (especially 
HMOs), and corruption.  In their view these issues taken together act as a bottleneck to the 
UHC implementation process, leading to a degree of policy stagnation.  
 
The study indicates that, although pressure from international bodies was a significant factor 
in the early deliberations about putting UHC on the government policy agenda, and although 
the SDGs remain a major preoccupation for policy makers, it is domestic actors and particularly 
the Nigerian government that is determining the direction of current policy. International data 
and information about the experiences of universal coverage in other countries do continue to 
feed into policy debates in Nigeria but are used selectively in support of positions that reflect 
domestic concerns.  
 
Finally, the study has set out to inform the policy discourse concerning the challenges involved 
in implementing UHC in Nigeria. It provides a snapshot of relationship patterns within the 
policy network at a specific time, and sets out to measure relative influence, alignments and 
conflict in the network using standard SNA concepts such as centrality and clustering. The 
qualitative interviews give insights into the subjective perceptions of individuals, and the policy 
aims and strategies that lie behind their actions.  The interview accounts have allowed the 
researcher to construct an overview of policy development over time to tell the story of how 










8.2 Policy recommendations 
The Federal Government (FG) and the MoH need to make a sustained effort to overcome the 
existing challenges and obstacles to out from the qualitative data which have impeded the 
implementation of UHC in Nigeria. This section presents recommendations based on the 
findings from this study, which might help to take the UHC process forward. 
1. ‘Power as decision making’ in health policy is conceptualized by Steven Lukes (1974) 
to mean the ability of a policy actor or a group of policy actors to influence policy 
decisions according to a desired result. Respondents’ reactions from the qualitative data 
would suggest that the Federal Government (FG) assumes two dimensions of power 
sources in UHC Nigeria’s policy process namely political power and financial power. 
The SNA analysis also puts the FMoH as a power actor central to the UHC Nigeria 
policy network. These findings insinuate FG’s political power and the FMoH’s (as a 
power actor) can be linked with Lukes’ (2005) concept of ‘power as decision making’ 
because both the Nigerian FG and MoH plays a central role in shaping all aspects of 
the health system such as pursuing consistent policies and practices across all levels of 
government health functions and increasing the standard of quality health programmes 
beneficial to the health sector (Corrigan, Eden and Smith, 2003). The first 
recommendation at the national level is to undertake a government review of existing 
public health insurance schemes with a view to rationalizing and consolidating the 
overall framework of social health insurance.  Social insurance is the primary 
mechanism chosen in Nigeria to implement UHC, and so it is important to ensure that 
the arrangements in place rest on firm foundations. The existing system has evolved 
from the original core NIHS scheme for public employees in an incremental and 
piecemeal way, and the multiplicity of smaller schemes and variable engagement of the 
States in developing state-level programs means that it has become complex and 
unwieldy.  A more integrated and comprehensive scheme will need to attend to some 
specific issues mentioned in the remaining recommendations.  
 
2. Like any decision-making process, conflict is common to the health system, and it often 
occurs among actors involved in the policy process (Marcus, Dorn, & McNulty, 2013). 
The SNA finding reveals a conflicted relationship within the UHC policy network 
regarding the discourse surrounding the function of the health insurance framework. 




prominent policy actors (the FMoH, hospital managers, and the HMO representatives) 
involved in the conflicted relationship, and these actors are responsible for steering the 
health insurance scheme towards achieving UHC. Hence, the thesis recommends that 
the insurance framework needs to balance the existing benefits offered to middle and 
upper-income beneficiaries with greater gains for the poor.  As the existing programs 
mainly cover civil servants and those in formal employment they mostly cater for the 
better-off segments of Nigerian society.  However, if UHC is to achieve maximum 
health gain for the wider population it can have most impact by improving the situation 
of lower-income groups. Particularly in country situations such as that of Nigeria, 
where finance and other obstacles mean that UHC has to proceed step by step rather 
than in a single “big bang” reform, it is important to ensure that the poor are not left 
behind. Commentators increasingly write of achieving “progressive universalism”, 
meaning that every step along the path to UHC should bring as much benefit to the poor 
as to the rich (Gwatkin and Ergo, 2011; Jamison et al., 2013). 
 
The qualitative analysis uses Grant’s (1978) typology of policy organizations to define 
policy actors within UHC Nigeria’s network into insider and outsider groups. Findings 
demonstrate that cooperation between insiders and outsiders can influence and shift 
UHC discourse towards achieving progressive universalism. Both policy actors in both 
groups can actively participate in Nigeria’s political policymaking in the health system, 
e.g., by calling for legislative shift progressive universalism.  
 
Ensuring improved coverage for the poor is a crucial step in a country like Nigeria, but 
it is also important that targeted pro-poor programs do not halt progress towards full 
UHC.  There is a strong argument that universal programmes have greater sustainability 
than targeted programmes, since a broader population segment will support provision 
that covers everybody. There is a danger that countries see a settlement that delivers 
something short of full coverage but containing a strong pro-poor policy strand as an 
acceptable endpoint, and it would be a mistake for Nigerian policy makers to take this 
position. 
 
3. In reiteration, the financial power links to Steven Lukes’ (1978) concept of ‘power as 
decision making’ shows that the Federal Government has the ability to mobilize the 




financing is one of the building blocks of health system, its level of functionality has 
direct effect on the overall functioning of the health system. In terms of finance, it will 
be important to safeguard and indeed increase the budget of the MoH, as strengthening 
its core functions are critical for further reform progress and it is the main channel for 
allocating resources to the public healthcare system. The federal government’s current 
health budget allocation is insufficient to meet the 2014 Abuja target of 15% of general 
government spending. The health sector capital allocations at the federal level have 
been in decline for several years (relative to budget size), falling from a high of 5.97% 
in 2012 to 3.33% in 2019 (Budgit, 2019). Fitch Solutions reports that by 2021 
healthcare expenditure in Nigeria is predicted to reach an estimated 2.94% of the 
country’s GDP (Medic West Africa, 2019), and the position has been eroded since then 
by sharp cuts in the 2020 budget allocation (see Postscript). International observers 
have pointed out that the chronic insufficiency of domestic health budgets results in a 
large deficit in the critical inputs needed to implement UHC (World Bank, 2016).      
 
Many of the parastatals operating under the MoH umbrella need significant budget 
uplifts, and the federal government therefore needs to substantially increase the funds 
allocated to the Basic Healthcare Provision Fund (BHSPF), which is perhaps the single 
most important source of monies for UHC implementation. In the present financial 
climate, budget increases are, of course, politically very difficult, and the MoH should 
as far as possibly strengthen its existing efficiency savings and cost improvement 
programs so as to demonstrate that additional funding will translate into real coverage 
improvements rather than merely adding fat to the system.      
 
4. Reference from the qualitative data has already been made to the problems of 
fragmentation and coordination that exist with the present piecemeal organization of 
public insurance schemes. Mathauer, Saksena and Kutzin (2019, p. 1) argue that 
insurance pooling, “the accumulation and management of prepaid financial resources 
on behalf of some or all of the population”, is a relatively neglected aspect of UHC 
finance in the literature but actually a key policy instrument.  In terms of the 
classification of approaches put forward by these authors, Nigeria is at best a 
fragmented system with population segmentation through different pools for different 
socio-economic groups, complicated by different schemes for different geographical 




are particularly acute in the insurance schemes targeted specifically at the poorest 
population groups, the community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes aimed at 
the informal sector in local areas.  If greater insurance system integration is to be 
achieved then the sustainability and sufficiency of these schemes needs to be improved 
through a more coordinated and standardized approach, and one key element here is 
better risk pooling, organized at state level. 
 
The CBHI schemes operating under the NIHS umbrella aim to extend coverage to low-
income groups but are very diverse and uptake to date has been disappointing 
(Odeyemi, 2014). One problem is that due to the variety of groups covered, benefits 
offered and funding sources the insurance pool to be covered is fragmented. Risk pool 
fragmentation occurring through devolution of scheme oversight to state and local level 
poses particular dangers, with some schemes tottering on the brink of collapse because 
of small member numbers and inadequate finance.  While it appears infeasible to bring 
informal sector workers and dependents into the main FSSHIP section of the NHIS, 
these are the groups for whom UHC would make the greatest difference.  It is desirable 
to undertake a systematic assessment of the characteristics of this group, its health status 
and risk profile, and the budget needed to deliver a basic package of services (Etiaba et 
al., 2018).  Given that recruitment to CBHI schemes is voluntary, there is a danger of 
adverse selection in that the chronically sick are more likely to sign up than the healthy, 
and it is necessary to have a sufficiently large pool of members to spread risk and plan 
an appropriate level of public subsidy to supplement pre-paid finance from 
contributions. Scale is needed if sufficient health infrastructure and resources are to be 
put in place, and many of the existing schemes are too small to support this.  State 
governments should consider integrating the various CBHI programs into an 
overarching framework in which members of all schemes have access to common 
services in the local healthcare system, and member contributions from multiple 
schemes are pooled in a common fund, which is then topped up to the necessary level 
by donor and charitable finance as well as a state government subsidy.  
This is broadly in line with WHO (2000) recommendations that UHC countries work 
towards larger rather than smaller public insurance pools, a more diverse mix of risk 
within pools, and compulsory rather than voluntary pools. Ideally the CBHI schemes 
should shift to mandatory membership for all with contributions adjusted to community 




immediately achievable in Nigeria.  Equalization of benefits between CBHI schemes 
and consolidation of existing insurance pools and funds would be important first steps. 
Given the huge care deficit in the informal sector, some targeting, and prioritization 
will be necessary.  This can be done mainly through use of the state subsidy to fund 
scheme membership for poorer beneficiaries, but also via some redistribution of pre-
paid funds (Mathauer, Saksena and Kutzin, 2019).     
 
 
8.3 Future research recommendations 
The obvious and first priority for future research in this area is to follow the policy story 
through to the point where UHC is implemented, at least in nominal terms. Such a study would 
carry on with the main research questions addressed here concerning facilitators and obstacles 
in keeping UHC at the top of policy agendas until guaranteeing legislation is enacted and would 
further investigate the (changing?) nature of the policy network and the interest blocs, the 
interaction of problem, politics and policy streams, and the contextual and other factors that 
determine the outcome.  Of course, this might well turn out to be a story of policy failure rather 
than policy success. 
 
One interesting theoretical aspect that could be pursued in a further study concerns the question 
of how long a “window of opportunity” for a major health system reform, such as the move to 
UHC, remains open.  As touched upon in the literature review there has been recent interest in 
extending Kingdon’s (1984) three streams model (originally developed in relation to agenda 
setting) to also apply to the policy implementation stage (for example: Ridde 2009; Boswell 
and Rodrigues, 2016; Sager and Thomann, 2017), and additional empirical case studies would 
be invaluable as these are thin on the ground in the health sector. Sabatier (1999. P. 149) has 
written of the “desirability of longitudinal studies of a decade or more”, and others have 
suggested that major health reform efforts may last for ten to twenty years (Intaranongpai et 
al., 2012; Al-Abri, 2019).  Where there is an extended reform push as with UHC in Nigeria, 
we do not know whether it is more appropriate to theorize that a succession of policy windows 
open and close until an opportunity to complete implementation is taken, or if the problem for 
policy makers is to stretch a single window over a long time period.  Evidence is also scarce 




UHC, or its various constituent strands.  The Nigerian case provides a fascinating setting for 
future MSA studies of this kind. 
 
Apart from the task of telling the story of UHC reform at macro level there are, of course, many 
aspects of downstream healthcare system development relevant to UHC that warrant ongoing 
investigation.  For example, these could include perceptions of corruption in health insurance 
schemes, and the experiences and attitudes of government officials and private health providers 
to the various forms of misappropriation of public healthcare funds. More research is needed 
to determine how far corrupt activity is damaging the ability of the healthcare system to deliver 
high quality care to those who will benefit most. This is an area where a mixed methods study 
combining SNA analysis and qualitative analysis could shed light on the social networks that 
allow malfeasance to persist, whether that is in governmental, private or quasi-private 
healthcare systems.  
 
As the building blocks for a UHC system fall into place there will be scope for studies that 
assess the sustainability and benefits of the various system components, both on the financing 
and service delivery sides.   While there is an extensive literature on financing models for UHC, 
and theorising about their relative strengths and weaknesses, much less has been written about 
how resource allocation operates in practice, with detailed country case studies using data from 
frontline actors.  A study of resource allocation in Nigeria, starting with an examination of how 
the federal health allocation is distributed within the Ministry of Health and then examining 
the channelling of funds to the parastatals, the states and specific UHC-related projects, would 
fill an important gap.   
 
In the longer term, research will be needed to examine how Nigeria fits into the spectrum of 
developing countries that are attempting healthcare coverage reforms.  Studies of Nigeria’s 
experience of implementing UHC, including challenges overcome and any areas of particular 
success, will be invaluable to other aspiring UHC countries when knowledge is exchanged 
through forums such as the Joint Learning Network for UHC.  The idea of “good health at low 
cost” is an attractive one that has encouraged important comparative studies of countries that 
have achieved better health and social outcomes than others at similar income levels (Halstead, 
Walsh, & Warren, 1985). Twenty-five years on, the Good Health at Low-Cost project revisited 
these places, but also examined progress in a new wave of reforming countries that included 




to expect that a case study of progress in Nigeria might be added to the UHC country studies 
in future comparative publications of this kind.  
 
8.4 Postscript  
Following his 2015 election victory, President Muhammadu Buhari confirmed his commitment 
to the policy push towards UHC and achieving the targets associated with the SDGs.  However, 
despite regular statements reiterating support for UHC, progress was slow in Buhari’s first term 
in government.  The centrepiece of the National Health Act 2014, the Basic Health Care 
Provision Fund (BHCPF), which had been seen as the fundamental funding measure to support 
UHC, did not come on stream immediately.  Funds for the BHCPF were appropriated by the 
National Assembly for the first time in the 2018 budget.  At that time the federal government 
earmarked N55.1 billion from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to the BHCPF, while additional 
funding of around $30 million over several years was pledged by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the Global Financing Facility (a body launched by the World Bank and UN to 
support the SDGs), and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).  In 2018 a 
Second National Strategic Health Development Plan (2018-2022) was published and a scheme 
to give extra funding to high-performing states - the Save One Million Lives Programme for 
Results – was unveiled. Even after the announcement of the budget allocation, the rollout and 
implementation of the BHCPF was somewhat delayed (Premium Times, 2019).  This came 
during a period where state health budgets were highly constrained and many primary 
healthcare centres were struggling to stay open.  It was not until May 17, 2019 that the first 
tranche of BHCPF money was credited to the NHIS, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control 
(NCDC), and the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA). 
 
Health policy had been somewhat overshadowed by wider economic problems and the Boko 
Haram insurgency in the North, and Buhari’s All Progressives Congress Party, which claimed 
to have done well in these areas, won a comfortable victory in the general election of 26 
February 2019.  In an open letter welcoming Buhari’s second term, Nigeria Health Watch 
(2019) gave credit for the progress made with the BHCPF but noted that on-the-ground 
improvements to support UHC remained sparse, that the leadership of the NIHS would be 
critical for progress, but that “four years have been wasted on quarrels”. 
 
A furore erupted in October 2019 when the Buhari government submitted 2020 budget 




(Vanguard, 2019, October 15).  The proposed capital expenditure of N46 billion for the 
Ministry of Health was N4 billion less than the 2019 allocation and N10 billion down from 
2018.  More damagingly for UHC, the proposed allocation for the BHCPF fell to N44.5 billion, 
compared to N55.1 billion in 2019.  Overall, the budget left Health with the eleventh largest 
budget in the Ministerial pecking order. Within an aggregate 2020 government budget of 
N10.33 trillion, the proposed allocation to health was 0.4 percent, far short of the Abuja 
Declaration target of 15 per cent.  
 
Tensions escalated further in June 2020, when in the light of falling oil prices, curtailed 
government revenues and the economic downturn associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the government announced a downward revision of the 2020 budget. The allocation for the 
BHCPF was further cut from N44.4 billion to N25.5 billion, said by critics to be likely to highly 
consequential as the fund is the main source of primary care funding.  The opposition People’s 
Democratic Party and the Nigeria Labour Congress both condemned this move, pointing out 
that health and education were suffering more than most other areas of public expenditure, and 
suggesting that this reflected the low priority the Buhari administration gave to social policy 
(Abu et al., 2020, June 4; Vanguard, 2020, June 3).  The budget cuts appear to directly affect 
the achievement of UHC and the SDGs and are likely to have a disproportional effect on poor 
persons who might otherwise have been brought under the coverage umbrella (Abu et al., 2020, 
June 4).      
 
The COVID-19 pandemic is having a catastrophic impact on the most vulnerable communities 
around the world, and threatens the progress of other health initiatives, such as HIV, TB and 
malaria programmes. By the end of May 2020 Nigeria became the third African country to 
record over 10,000 cases of COVID-19.  The national response is being led by the Presidential 
Task Force (PTF) and the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), and they have 
announced a stimulus package to support businesses hit by the coronavirus pandemic. Some of 
the budget cuts has been returned to the health sector in the form of a share of this stimulus 
funding for the private healthcare sector, together with an initial allocation of $6bn to support 
the response to COVID-19 (NCDC, 2020), but is clear that the overall reduction in finance will 
have a severe impact. The larger picture is that the attention of the Nigerian government, the 
FMoH and the states has massively shifted from expanding health coverage to responding to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and that any immediate progress towards implementing UHC has 





In the period since the study some technical changes have occurred in the measurement of 
progress towards SDG targets, which affect how Nigeria’s status is assessed. Two updated 
indicators have been adopted by the UN Statistical Commission. The first concerns SDG 
indicator 3.8.1, coverage of essential health services, and the second the proportion of 
households with high health expenditure as a share of total household income (SDG indicator 
3.8.2) (Hogan et al., 2018).      
 
SDG indicator 3.8.1 is the preferred choice for tracking the progress of UHC coverage in 
Nigeria. Coverage of essential health services is measured using a series of tracer interventions. 
These include reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health, infectious diseases, non-
communicable diseases, and service capacity and access among the general and the most 
disadvantaged populations (WHO, 2019).      
 
Following the definition of SDG 3.8.1, four indicator categories were established: reproductive, 
maternal, new-born, and child health (RMNCH), infectious diseases, non-communicable 
diseases, and service capacity and access. 16 tracer indicators were selected for the index, this 
includes four from each of the categories of reproductive, maternal, new-born, and child health 
(RMNCH); infectious diseases; non-communicable diseases; and service capacity and access 






Figure 52: Indicators for universal health coverage service index. Source: (Hogan et al., 
2018). Key- the red dot indicates reproductive, maternal, new-born, and child health 
(RMNCH). 
In a study by Hogan et al. (2018), indicator data for 183 countries in the period 2010-2015 were 
analysed. In this exercise Nigeria ranks 166th out of the 183 countries measured with a UHC 
service coverage index of 39, while the highest country’s UHC service coverage index is above 
80. The current World Health Statistics report (WHO, 2020) shows that there has been little 
improvement. Nigeria’s UHC service coverage index increased slightly from 39 in 2015 to 42 
in 2020, but it remained towards the bottom of the league table of listed countries.     
 
From this it can be seen that Nigeria still has a long way to go to achieve UHC. Looking forward 
to 2030, much work is required to achieve UHC and the associated SDG targets in Nigeria, and 
more effort is needed from policymakers in tackling the obstacles and challenges identified by 
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Appendix 3: Interview guides used in the study 
PHASE ONE: Structured interview for the assessment of the obstacles and challenges 
affecting the move towards universal health coverage in Nigeria.   
Dear respondent,  
I am a PhD research student at Swansea University, United Kingdom and am in Nigeria to 
carry out a research study on the obstacles and challenges affecting the move towards universal 
health coverage in Nigeria. The overall aim of this research study is to examine Nigeria’s path 
towards UHC through the interactions of the policy actors involved in the policy process. The 
outcome of this research could assist policymakers involved make the right decision on 
Universal Health Coverage in Nigeria. 
You have been selected to complete this questionnaire because you have been identified as 
someone with knowledge about the policy. 
Your participation is voluntary, and you can decline to answer any question you do not feel 
comfortable with. A gentle reminder before we begin, I assure you that the entire information 
gathered in this questionnaire will be treated with absolute confidentiality. Your anonymity 
will be safeguarded, both by with-holding your name and being careful not to publish other 
information that might identify you. I will be careful not to pass on such information in 
interviews with other respondents, or in my project reports. After the study is completed, the 
content of any recorded interviews will be destroyed. If you have any questions, you may please 
ask at any time. 
 
 
SNA interview: Round One 
Section A: Background information and consent   
Information to be completed by the investigator 
Consent: Please before beginning the interview explain the consent to the respondent 
Questions Code 
A1. Has the respondent given consent to complete the 
interview? 
1= YES     
2= NO 





A2. Is the respondent involved in the Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) policy process in Nigeria? 
1= YES     
2= NO 











A4. Respondent ID  











In this section, we would like to ask you some questions about your personal profile. 
Your name:     ID:   
Questions Code 
B1. Sex of respondent? 





B2. What is your professional background? 
1a= Government Official (federal level) 
1b= Government Official (state level) 
2= HMO Manager 
3= NHIS worker 
4= Doctor 
5= Nurse/Allied Professional 
6= Other 









B3. What is your current position?  
B4. Length of time in current position?  
B5. Which category best describe yourself? 
1= External involvement in UHC policy 




Section C: Personal views of respondent (Insert code number only). 




C1. Are you familiar with the Ministry of Health’s policy on 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC)? 
1= Yes 
2= No 






C2. Do you understand the term- UHC? (general 






C3. Do you think the topic of UHC is prominent in health 














C5. Have you followed/been engaged in the development of 






C6. Which category do you fall under? 
1= Government 
2= Health providers 
3= Labour sector 
4a= NGOs           










C7. How long have you been involved in discussion about 
UHC policy in Nigeria? 
1= Less than one year 
2= 2- 5 years 
3= 6- 10 years 






C8. Which stages of the UHC policy process have you been 
involved in? (you may select more than one) 
1= Agenda setting 
2= Policy formulation 
3= Implementation 





C9. Which institutions or policy actors have the strongest 
influence on the UHC policy debates? (You may select more 
than one) 
1= Government 
2= Health providers 
3= Labour sector 
4a= NGOs 







C10. Overall would you say you are broadly in favor or 
against the development of UHC policy in Nigeria? 
1= Favor 




C11. How much coverage? Which statement most closely 
matches your view: 
1= Nigerian public health insurance should concentrate on 
those in state and formal sector employment. 
2= Nigerian public health insurance should include the 
above, plus targeted healthcare for the poor. 
3= Nigerian public health insurance should be extended to 
cover the whole population. 
4= Other 









C12. If Nigeria is to expand health coverage, which 
statement would you favor the most: 
1= A ‘Phased approach’ to implement UHC over a number 
of years. 
2= A ‘Big Bang approach’ going straight to implementing 
full UHC. 
3=Other 













SNA interview: Round Two 




The following set of questions is concerned with different relationships of interactions among 
policy actors involved within UHC discourse in Nigeria. The results will help me to map out 
the flow of information among them and better understand how policy actors influence each 
other. 
Please take a look at the following lists of policy actors (below) and tick those who are involved 
in each policy process 
Questions: 
F1. Did you read any of the published work of the following persons in making your own 
contribution to UHC policy?  
F2. Did you take part in a workshop or other discussion forum with any of the following 
persons in making your own contribution to UHC policy?  
F3. Did you form a coalition with any of the following persons in making your contribution to 
UHC policy?  
F4. Do any of the following persons, outside what we might call your coalition of close 
associates share the same views with regards to UHC policy?  
F5. Do any of the following persons: outside what we might call your coalition of close 
associates have a conflict of interests with regards to UHC policy?  
F6. Did you seek advice from any of the following persons in making your own contribution 
to UHC policy? 
 
PHASE TWO: Semi-structured qualitative interview for the assessment of the obstacles and 
challenges affecting the move towards universal health coverage in Nigeria.   
Interview Guideline Questions 
This section features four different categories of interview guideline questions tailored to the 
four categories of policy actors involved in the policy process of UHC in Nigeria. 
Category one- Government  
Introduction  
Section A. Interviewee Socio-demographic Background 
1. What is your occupation? 
2. What is your present position? 




4. Have you been continually involved? 
 
Section B. Major Questions 
5. What is the meaning of Universal Health Coverage? 
6. What persuaded the government to go down the UHC route and who or what were the 
principal influences? 
7. How would you describe the importance of implementing UHC in Nigeria? 
8. Is implementing UHC the most significant health policy the government has introduced 
in the last 15 years in Nigeria? 
9. How would you characterize the view of the Nigerian people towards UHC? 
10. What organizations have provided support for the government in implementing UHC? 
11. What would be your own main criticisms of the UHC policy? 
12. In your opinion what are the main obstacles and challenges affecting Nigeria’s progress 
towards achieving universal health care? 
 
Agenda setting regarding UHC policy: 
13. How did UHC get onto the policy agenda in Nigeria? 
14. What role did the government play at this stage? 
15. How much resource was allocated by your governmental organization to pursue the 
UHC policy? 
16. Who were the key actors in the agenda setting? How were they involved? 
17. Which stakeholders had the most influence at this stage? 
18. How much were external forces involved at this stage? 
19. How were policies selected and forwarded to the government for approval?  
20. What policies were selected for government approval? 
21. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
 
Formulation of UHC policy: 




23. How were particular policies selected, developed, and put into effect, and how were 
financial arrangements planned? 
24. Who were the key actors in policy formulation? How were they involved? 
25. What was the mechanism through which the policy was formulated? 
26. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
 
Implementation of the UHC policy: 
27. What role did the government play at this stage of the policy? 
28. How have those changes in policy affected your governmental organisation? 
29. What aspects of the UHC policy have been most difficult to implement? 
30. How are the implemented policies going to be evaluated, and what methods and criteria 
will be used for their evaluation? 
31. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
32. How is the budget planned for implementing the UHC policy? 
33. How far would you say we are towards implementing the UHC policy in Nigeria? 
 
Category two- Health Providers 
Introduction  
Section A. Interviewee Socio-demographic Background 
1. What is your occupation? 
2. What is your present position? 
3. When did you first get involved in the UHC policy? 
4. Have you been continually involved? 
 
Section B. Major Questions 
1. What is the meaning of Universal Health Coverage? 





3. How would you describe the importance of implementing UHC in Nigeria? 
4. Is implementing UHC the most significant health policy the government has introduced 
in the last 15 years in Nigeria? 
5. How would you characterize the view of the Nigerian people towards UHC? 
6. What organizations have provided support for the government in implementing UHC? 
7. What would be your own main criticisms of the UHC policy? 
8. In your opinion what are the main obstacles and challenges affecting Nigeria’s progress 
towards achieving universal health care? 
 
Agenda setting regarding UHC policy: 
9. How did UHC get onto the policy agenda in Nigeria? 
10. What role did your organization play at this stage? 
11. How much resource was allocated by your organization to pursue the UHC policy? 
12. Who were the key actors in the agenda setting? How were they involved? 
13. Which stakeholders had the most influence at this stage? 
14. How much were external forces involved at this stage? 
15. What policies did your organization put forward during the agenda setting regarding 
UHC policy?  
16. What policies did your organization disagree with at this stage of the policy process? 
17. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
 
Formulation of UHC policy: 
18. What role did your organization play at this stage of the policy process? 
19. How were particular policies selected, developed, and put into effect, and how were 
financial arrangements planned? 
20. Who were the key actors in policy formulation? How were they involved? 
21. What was the mechanism through which the policy was formulated? 
22. Did you think that the policies formulated at this stage were sufficient to address the 
health needs of the people?  





24. How far would you say we are towards implementing the UHC policy in Nigeria? 
 
Implementation of the UHC policy: 
25. What role did your organization play at this stage of the policy? 
26. How have those changes in policy affected your organisation?  
27. What aspects of the UHC policy have been most difficult to implement? 
28. To what extent do you think the Government’s policy address the needs of the Nigerian 
people? 
29. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy? 
30. How far would you say we are towards implementing the UHC policy in Nigeria? 
Category three- Labour sector 
Introduction  
Section A. Interviewee Socio-demographic Background 
1. What is your occupation? 
2. What is your present position? 
3. When did you first get involved in the UHC policy? 
4. Have you been continually involved? 
 
Section B. Major Questions 
5. What is the meaning of Universal Health Coverage? 
6. What persuaded the government to go down the UHC route and who or what were the 
principal influences? 
7. How would you describe the importance of implementing UHC in Nigeria? 
8. Is implementing UHC the most significant health policy the government has introduced 
in the last 15 years in Nigeria? 
9. How would you characterize the view of the Nigerian people towards UHC? 
10. What organizations have provided support for the government in implementing UHC? 
11. What would be your own main criticisms of the UHC policy? 





13. In your opinion what are the main obstacles and challenges affecting Nigeria’s progress 
towards achieving universal health care? 
 
Agenda setting regarding UHC policy: 
14. How did UHC get onto the policy agenda in Nigeria? 
15. What role did your organization play at this stage? 
16. How much resource was allocated by your organization to pursue the UHC policy? 
17. Who were the key actors in the agenda setting? How were they involved? 
18. Which stakeholders had the most influence at this stage? 
19. How much were external forces involved at this stage? 
20. What policies did your organization put forward during the agenda setting regarding 
UHC policy?  
21. What policies did your organization disagree with at this stage of the policy process? 
22. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
 
Formulation of UHC policy: 
23. What role did your organization play at this stage of the policy process? 
24. How were particular policies selected, developed, and put into effect, and how were 
financial arrangements planned? 
25. Who were the key actors in policy formulation? How were they involved? 
26. What was the mechanism through which the policy was formulated? 
27. Did you think that the policies formulated at this stage were sufficient to address the 
health needs of the people?  
28. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
 
Implementation of the UHC policy: 
29. What role did your organization play at this stage of the policy? 
30. How have those changes in policy affected your organisation?  




32. To what extent do you think the Government’s policy address the needs of the Nigerian 
people? 
33. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
34. How far would you say we are towards implementing the UHC policy in Nigeria? 
 
Category Four- NGOs and UN Bodies 
Introduction  
Section A. Interviewee Socio-demographic Background 
1. What is your occupation? 
2. What is your present position? 
3. When did you first get involved in the UHC policy? 
4. Have you been continually involved? 
 
Section B. Major Questions 
5. What is the meaning of Universal Health Coverage? 
6. What persuaded the government to go down the UHC route and who or what were the 
principal influences? 
7. How would you describe the importance of implementing UHC in Nigeria? 
8. Is implementing UHC the most significant health policy the government has introduced 
in the last 15 years in Nigeria? 
9. How would you characterize the view of the Nigerian people towards UHC? 
10. What organizations have provided support for the government in implementing UHC? 
11. What would be your own main criticisms of the UHC policy in Nigeria? 
12. In your opinion what are the main obstacles and challenges affecting Nigeria’s progress 
towards achieving universal health care? 
 
 




13. How did UHC get onto the policy agenda in Nigeria? 
14. What role did your organization play at this stage? 
15. How much resource was allocated by your organization to pursue the UHC policy? 
16. Who were the key actors in the agenda setting? How were they involved? 
17. Which stakeholders had the most influence at this stage? 
18. What technical support did your organization provide at this stage? 
19. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
Formulation of UHC policy: 
20. What role did your organization play at this stage of the policy process? 
21. How were particular policies selected, developed, and put into effect, and how were 
financial arrangements planned? 
22. Who were the key actors in policy formulation? How were they involved? 
23. What was the mechanism through which the policy was formulated? 
24. Did you think that the policies formulated at this stage were sufficient to address the 
health needs of the people?  
25. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 
 
Implementation of the UHC policy: 
26. What role did your organization play at this stage of the policy? 
27. What aspects of the UHC policy have been most difficult to implement? 
28. To what extent do you think the Government’s policy address the needs of the Nigerian 
people? 
29. What major obstacles and challenges did the government face at this stage of the policy 
process? 










College of Human and Health Sciences 
Swansea University, United Kingdom. 
 
Project Title: The obstacles and challenges affecting the move towards universal health 
coverage in Nigeria.   
 
Introduction 
My name is Jenson Gawain Fofah, a PhD research student at Swansea University, United 
Kingdom. I am in Nigeria to carry out a research on Nigeria’s path towards Universal Health 
Coverage. I formally invite you to partake in this research. Please, carefully read the participant 
information below. Please feel free to ask questions if anything is unclear or if you would like 
further information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
Thank you for taking time to read it.   
 
Purpose of the project 
This research examines Nigeria’s path towards Universal Health Coverage through the 
interactions of the policy actors involved the policy process. Furthermore, the research will use 
a social network analysis to illustrate a visual interaction between policy actors at every stage 
of the policy process in Nigeria. The research will also gather information of the impact of the 
Universal Health Coverage since its introduction in Nigeria.  
 
Why have I been selected/do I have to take part? 
You have been selected based on your suitability for this study. It is up to you to decide whether 
or not to take part; you will not suffer any disadvantage if you decide not to participate. If you 
do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to 
sign a consent form. It is important to note that if you decide to take part, you are still free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be asked to take part in a face-to-face interview and complete two questionnaires.  
The interview and the completion of two questionnaires will take less than 50 minutes. The 
first questionnaire involves the use of a snowballing technique with the intent of selecting 
significant policy actors involved in Universal Health Policy in Nigeria. The second 
questionnaire involves collecting data from policy actors for mapping out the social 
interactions among actors at every stage of the political process. The face-to-face interview 




so on. It is important for the research if the interviews are recorder because it ensures reliability 
and validity.  
 
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
Confidentially is considered as one of the top priorities of this research. In fact, any information 
collected, which includes the content of the interview recording, shall be held with extreme 
confidentiality. We will provide anonymity either to your name or any form data that might 
identify you during the data collection. After transcription, the content of recording shall be 
destroyed.  
 
What are the potential risks to you in taking part? 
There are no potential risks concerned in this research. However, you will be obligated to take 
time off your schedule to participate in this research.     
 
What happens next? 
If you are in agreement in participating in this research, you required signing a consent form to 
confirm co-operation.  
 
Researchers contact details 
Jenson Gawain Fofah,  
College of Human and Health Sciences,  
Swansea University,  
Singleton Park, Swansea,  

















Appendix 6: Examples of SNA measures from the read relationship of the policy network. 
 






















Appendix 7: Examples of SNA measures from the discussion relationship of the policy network. 
 



























Figure 62: Visualization of the blocks and cut-points of the (bipartite graph) “discussion” relationship of the policy network.  
Note:  This is computed with four blocks, each containing two isolating members (Ld3 and DFID UK) and two cut-points nodes (NMA and In39) 







Figure 63: Visualisation of the cut-points of the (bipartite graph) “discussion” relationship of the policy network.  






Figure 64: Visualization of the cut-point of the (bipartite graph) “discussion” relationship of the policy network (a).  





Figure 65: Visualisation of the isolate and cut-point of the (bipartite graph) “discussion” relationship of the policy network (b). Note:  This 






Figure 66: Visualization of the isolates and isolates cut-points of the (bipartite) “discussion” relationship of the policy network.   
Note:  This is computed with three blocks, each containing two isolating nodes (Global Affairs Canada and Abt Associates) and two isolating 





Appendix 8: Examples of SNA measures from the coalition relationship of the policy network. 
 




























Appendix 9: Examples of SNA measures from the affiliation relationship of the policy network. 
 




























Appendix 10: Examples of SNA measures from the conflict relationship of the policy network. 
 



























Appendix 11: Examples of SNA measures from the advice relationship of the policy network. 
  

























Appendix 12: Example of a reflexive diary 
 
